The Passionate God

I. Extended Preliminary Remarks: The Methodological Vagueness of a(n) (Anti-)Sys­tematical Contribution to Trinitarian Theology

The Reformed theologian Jürgen Moltmann presents with his 1980 published monograph, “Trinität und Reich Gottes: Zur Gotteslehre,” the first of six volumes in his series “Systematische Beiträge zur Theologie” (systematic contributions to theology). Even after publishing “God in Creation” (1985), “The Way of Jesus Christ” (1989), “The Spirit of Life” (1992), and “The Coming of God” (1995) during the last twenty years, Moltmann’s contribution to fundamental theology is still expected. Even more than the development of “pro -legomena” as “post -legomena,” the programmatic title “systematic contributions to theology” might surprise and irritate us, because Moltmann begins his new series (following the legendary trilogy “Theology of Hope” (1964), “The Crucified God” (1972), and “The Church in the Power of the Spirit” (1975)) with – as Dietrich Ritschl rightly called it – “heavy blows against ‘every’ system:”^[1]

“Every consistent theological summing up, every theological system lays claim to totality, perfect organization, and entire competence for the whole area under survey. In principle one has to be able to say everything, and not to leave any point unconsidered. All the statements must fit in with one another without contradiction, and the whole architecture must be harmonious, an integrated whole. Every theoretical system, even a theological one, has therefore an aesthetic charm, at least to some degree. But this allurement can also be a dangerous seduction. Systems save some readers (and their admirers most of all) from thinking critically for themselves and from arriving at independent and responsible decisions. For systems do not present themselves for discussion. For that reason I have resisted the temptation to develop a theological system, even an ‘open’ one.” (xi)

Yes indeed, Moltmann’s oeuvre has to be estimated as a “fragment” of an irregular dogmatician,^[2] for he does not develop a complete set of coordinated doctrines and beliefs, organized and arranged by the “dictatorship” of the loci-method. While the establishment of an overall or total theological system (so to speak the ultimate theological fulfillment of G.F.W. Hegel’s metaphysical principle “Das Wahre ist das Ganze“ – “The True is the whole”)^[3] is none of Moltmann’s business, he has nolens volens elaborated and unfolded his theology as system in the literal sense of the word systema – as an assemblage or a composition of elements which stand (histēmi) together (syn). The first lexical entry/record reads as follows: Systema est compendium, in quod multa congregantur.^[4] Yet, they do not stand and fit perfectly together like single pieces of a puzzle building the sum-total of all puzzle-pieces (this would be the classical loci method), rather they come together like overlapping, interconnected and therefore interdependent patches sewed into an unfinished, incomplete rag rug. Moltmann’s work does not represent a consistent whole without breaks and wholes, modifications and even self-corrections. This becomes quickly evident when we consider for instance the fact that Moltmann announced one year before publishing his book, “The Trinity and the Kingdom of God,” “eine Neuordnung des theologischen Systems zu einer messianischen Dogmatik, in der unter dem leitenden Gesichtspunkt der Trinität und des Reiches Gottes der Weg von der Geschichte zur Freiheit eingeschlagen wird.”^[5] It also may surprise us that the same theologian who states that “the Lord’s prayer is in fact directed towards the first Person of the Trinity, not the whole Trinity, as Augustine thought,” (164) can finish his most recent book, “The Source of Life. The Holy Spirit and the Theology of Life” (1997), with a prayer addressed to all three persons of the Trinity, that is “God, creator of heaven and earth”, “Lord Jesus, our brother on our way,” and the “Spirit of Life.”^[6] In addition, we might rub our eyes with surprise when Moltmann who finished his lecture, “The Trinitarian History of God,” delivered at the Universities of Oslo and Oxford in 1975 explicitly with “two brief methodological comments,” dispenses five years later with any reflection of methods.

Nevertheless, in spite of his methodological dispense his theological explications are full of methodological implications. His desideration, for instance, “that no summing up, generic terms must^[7] be used at all in the doctrine of the Trinity” (190), clearly indicates this fact. According to Moltmann’s argumentation, the headings of “processio” as well as “cause or origin (archē, aitia)” as descriptions of the begetting of the Son through the Father and the “procession” of the Spirit from the Father, neglects the special and particular character of the Son in relation to the Father, and the special character of the Spirit in relation to him or her (cf. 188). Moltmann argues also against the use of the headings “hypostasis,” “person,” and “modes of being,” which suggest the homogeneity and equality of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit (cf. 189). In awareness of the luring modalistic dangers intrinsic to the univocity of these terms, he makes the all too radical decision to abandon every summing-up and generic terms in general, to “remain concrete” and to narrate the eternal history of the Triune God as a story. This solution is based on a simplification, namely the general assumption that theologians do not know what “analogical” (analogy means a medium between equivocity and univocity) speech about the Triune God really means – as if they would use the terms hypostasis, person, and modes of being in regard to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in a univocal sense; and as if the application of the term person, hypostasis etc. to the Father, the Son, and the Spirit would connotate the identity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit and thus neglect their differentiation. We would even deny that in regard to “human persons.” To get that straight, it’s philosophically naïve to assume that the identity of terms (e.g. person, hypostasis etc.) corresponds to the identity of their denotations, that is the set of things (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) to which these terms refer. When we use the same expression like “person” or “hypostasis” as description for “objects” (like Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), it does not necessarily have the same denotation, in other words it does not denote the same thing.^[8]

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^[1] Dietrich Ritschl, Die vier Reiche der ‘drei göttlichen Subjekte’: Bemerkungen zu Jürgen Moltmanns Trinitätslehre” in Evangelische Theologie 41 (1981), p. 463. My translation.

^[2] We borrow the term “irregular dogmatics” from Karl Barth. Cf. idem., Church Dogmatics I/1, pp. 318-321.

^[3] Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes ed. by Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag 1952), p. 21.

^[4] Johann Micraelius , Lexicon philosophicum terminorum philosophis usitatorum (Jena 1653), p. 1053.

^[5] Jürgen Moltmann, Antwort auf die Kritik an “Der gekreuzigte Gott” in Michael Welker (ed.), Diskussion über Jürgen Moltmanns Buch “der gekreuzigte Gott” (Munich: Christian Kaiser Verlag 1979), p. 168. My emphasis.

^[6] Idem., The Source of Life: The Holy Spirit and the Theology of Life translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press 1997), p. 145.

^[7] Bad translation – the German word “dürfen nicht” has the much stronger meaning of a prohibition and has to be translated with “should”.

^[8] Cf. the article “denotation” in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge: University Press 1995), pp. 189f.