What is Contemplation

§1 Introduction

Plotinus’ metaphysical ideas are usually described as a descent from the highest principle, the One, to its lower forms, Nous and Soul.¹ In contrast to this, I want to examine the different ontological manifestations of his thought, beginning with the lowest individual forms.² The reason for this reversal is simply to illuminate the complex systematic account Plotinus provides us with. From this point of departure, we will be in a position to discuss and clarify problematic questions with regard to Plotinean research, which itself can only become meaningful when we address such problems in relation to our own realm, i.e. the realm of sensible concrete being.³

When Plotinus speaks of more advanced domains such as soul, nous and the one it is important to understand where he developed these categories from. If we claim that Plotinus’s systematic framework is coherent, his inductive method must match his deduction from the One, in order to be logical and consistent. It would otherwise become evident that Plotinus operates with presuppositions, which we can or cannot agree with. As a result of this analysis of Plotinean induction, his systematic and philosophical coherency is to be illuminated more lucidly. It is vital, in connection with this essay that the specifically Plotinean philosophical idea is outlined, which does not appear to only be a reaction to, let us say, Stoicism and an affirmation of Plato’s doctrine, but also expresses itself as a creative attempt to link particularities with universal forms.⁴

Indeed, if we look at Plotinean metaphysics from a procedural perspective, beginning with the lowest domain, two aspects of his philosophy must be borne in mind. Firstly, Plotinus himself must provide us with the means of deriving advanced categories from the onset.Secondly, there must be some kind of paradigm by which we can measure whether Plotinus’s thoughts are in contradiction with one another. As regards the first point, we might best elucidate the problem by taking Plotinus’s understanding of contemplation in Ennead III 8. Here, Plotinus demonstrates that contemplation is an inductive derivation of more advanced categories, beginning with the lowest domain. The second aspect must only imply that derived categories explicate what was previously implicit. We shall focus on contemplation and its transition from one domain to another and make explicit what arguments and presuppositions Plotinus uses in order to validate his transition. The analysis of Ennead III 8 is to provide an accurate account of whether contemplation is logically consistent in its transition and to what extent we must assume a terminologically weighted conceptual framework at the backbone of his arguments. However, this essay does not claim to decode the entire complexity of Plotinean metaphysics, but rather to point out core problems of his thought exemplified in Ennead III 8.

§ 2 Plotinus’s definition of contemplation in III 8,1

The most important word in III 8 (30 in chronological order), which Plotinus uses 24 times, is contemplation (i.e. qewr…a). In a prior Ennead, i.e. IV 4, 44, 1 (28 in chronological order), he uses this term as contrary to action, which also has an irrational principle and whose premise is passion.⁵ In Ennead III 8, however, Plotinus uses this term in a slightly different context.⁶ The first six chapters of III 8 outline contemplation as the lowest part of the soul, chapter 7 gives a brief summary thereof, chapter 8 introduces contemplation as the highest level of the soul, i.e. the Nous; whereas the last three chapters indicate the limits of Nous in its contrast to the One and hence define the One as the most superior principle of all being.⁷ Plotinus opens Ennead III 8 by saying that all things, i.e. rational and irrational living beings, desire contemplation.⁸ However, before discussing this assertion seriously it is first to be taken as meaning “playing”.⁹ But what kind of playing? Surely, this playing is not supposed to mean that this assertion has no validity at all, but rather that the point of departure will develop its depth within the further investigations of what is to be said. In fact, Plotinus already defines contemplation when he says that no matter what we are or what we do, i.e. whether we play like children or are sincere like adults, contemplation is always the final purpose. It is a) the very essence of our embodied nature, since it involves all our actions and our existence, and b) it is not fully realized in our physical existence, since otherwise there would be no need for us to desire it.¹⁰ Furthermore, since for Plotinus it is not only our desire and lack of perfection that strives towards contemplation, but also trees, plants and all other irrational things, for contemplation applies to the whole domain of embodied nature.¹¹

Despite this brief overview of chapter one, we are nevertheless able to offer a brief definition of what Plotinus indicating when he talks of contemplation. A: Contemplation is a final purpose, which irrational and rational living beings desire.¹² B: It must therefore be something which they do not yet fully possess. C: Contemplation must also be something which is able to give a more complete definition of embodied nature, e.g. trees, plants and the human body.

Definition B and C are an outcome of A. The fact that there is some kind of desire towards something must necessarily include that a) the beginning state of affairs is somehow insufficient and b) that the goal can redeem this deficiency. Nature is therefore no longer the realm of concrete existence, but rather the domain of abstract being.

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¹ Cf. Dodds, E.R.: Select Passages illustrating Neoplatonism, trans. with an introduction by Dodds, E.R., B.A., The Macmillian Co, New York and Toronto 1923, p. 27-28; Halfwassen, J.: Plotin und der Neuplatonismus, Verlag C.H. Beck, München 2004, p. 32-128; Gerson, L.P.: Plotinus, Routledge, London 1994, p. 14-104; Deck, J. N.: Nature, contemplation and the One, University of Toronto Press 1967, p. 7-81.

² Cf. Plotin: Seele, Geist, Eines, übers. v. Harder, R., eingeleitet v. Kremer K., Verlag Felix Meiner, Hamburg 1990, p. XIII – XXXVII. 3

³ This perspective must guide our understanding of Plotinus if we are to appreciate his philosophy. In fact, when Lloyd P. Gerson introduces the One, the Nous and the Soul as immaterial, universal, independent principles, he is interpreting the Plotinean idea from the pure perspective of the One (Gerson 1994, p.3) and is therefore correct. But without mentioning the initial transition, which is necessary for gaining a detailed understanding of Plotinean philosophy, such an assertion evidentially raises a methodological and systematic problem. For if an analysis begins with what needs to be proved, i.e. the final result qua One, the whole argument becomes a circulus vitiosous and therefore invalid. The systematic problem lies in the position of the One within Plotinean comprehension. The One can only be kept in its validity as an absolute negative moment, if we explore it from the perspective of its lower parts. Only then does such inexpressibility of the One make sense.

⁴ Jens Halfwassen expresses the main purpose of the neoplatonic tradion as follows: “Der Neuplatonismus will die abschließende Synthese der gesamten antiken Philosophie sein. Diese Synthese erfolgt jedoch erklärtermaßen unter dem Vorzeichen Platons: alle anderen Lehren werden in den Theorierahmen des Platonismus eingeordnet und von ihm aus interpretiert.“ (Halfwassen 2004, p.13) As this quote points out, the neoplatonic tradition is not only an interpretation of Plato but also an attempt to include other Greek theories. This essay examines to what extent Plotinus’s interpretation of III 8 can stand on its own.

⁵ “… ¢rc¾ kaˆ toà ¢lÒgou aƒ toà p£qouj prot£seij.” Plotins Schriften: Text und Übersetzung der Schriften 30 -38 (1964), übers. v. Richard Harder, Felix Meiner Verlag Hamburg, IV 4, 44, 5-6.

⁶ Armstrong writes that Plotinus takes Aristotle’s concept of theoria as the starting point of his discussion but uses it in a much broader sense. Armstrong, A. H.: Plotinus, George Allen & unwin LTD, London 1953, p. 361.

⁷ Detailed information of the systematic construction of III 8 can be found in Roloff, D.: Plotin Die Großschrift III, 8 V, 8 V, 5 II, 9, Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte, hrsg. v. Dörrie H. u. Moraux P., Walter de Gruyter & Co, Berlin 1970, p. 1.

⁸ “p£nta qewr…aj ™f…esqai kaˆ e„j tšloj toàto blšpein, oÙ mÒnon œlloga ¢ll¦ kaˆ ¥loga zùa” (III 8, 1)

⁹ “Pa…zontej d¾ t¾n prèthn prˆn ™piceire‹n spoud£zein” (III 8, 1)

¹⁰ Cf. “qewr…aj ›neken Ð mn pa…zein, Ð d spoud£zein...”, III 8, 1, 14.

¹¹ cf. III 8, 1, 4; 18-24

¹² Cf. qewr…aj ›neken, III 8, 1, 14 and p£nta qewr…aj ™f…esqai kaˆ e„j tšloj toàto blšpein, oÙ mÒnon œlloga ¢ll¦ kaˆ ¥loga zùa, III 8, 1, 2-3