This paper will investigate what implications this new position poses to Quong’s rejection of Otsukas stance on the moral impermissibility of killing the innocent aggressor and the innocent threat in self-defence, as well as the implications it might have on Thomson’s own 1991 views (Quong 2008:6)
1 In the case of the bystander-Trolley-case
1
The Ethics of Killing Killing in Self-Defence
My conclusion on this shall reveal that I generally agree with the conclusions of Quong, though I disagree with the way he reaches these conclusions. In doing this, I shall present some scenarios which might not fit neatly into the proposed categories of Thomson, in order to examine whether the categorisation hitherto used is adequate and to investigate the possible implications this might have for a theory of killing in self-defence
Table of Contents
1. The problem
2. Killing Innocent Aggressor/Threat
3. Man on the track vs. man on the overpass. The moral (in)difference
4. Causalities
5. Killing five vs. killing one
6. Violating spaces. Violating rights.
7. The Agent-relative (un)importance
8. Conclusion
Objectives and Research Focus
This paper investigates the moral permissibility of killing in self-defence, specifically focusing on the categorization of innocent aggressors and threats, and examines the implications of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s recent views on the trolley problem regarding Jonathan Quong’s arguments.
- Analysis of moral distinctions between killing in self-defence and innocent threats.
- Critical examination of the trolley problem and its relevance to moral decision-making.
- Evaluation of rights-based approaches and agent-relativity in ethical theory.
- Investigation into the causality of killing vs. letting die in extreme scenarios.
- Assessment of the validity of the Principle of Defensive Killing (PDK).
Excerpt from the Book
Man on the track vs. man on the overpass. The moral (in)difference
The rejection of The Narrow Thesis is based on a moral difference between what Quong calls man on the track and man on the overpass (Quong 2008:7). Is there really a moral difference between the two cases? The difference is “…presumably explained by the fact that you would be using or intending the death of the large man in a way you do not use or intend the death of the man in Man on the Track” (Quong 2008:8). I believe that Quong here wrongly focuses on intentions, when he should be focussing on actions: “the agents have to do something to bring that outcome about”, in the words of Thomson (2008:373). It is doubtful whether there really is a moral difference between the two scenarios; what is more plausible is that the perceptions of the means are highly asymmetrically distorted.
In Man on the Overpass you seem to play a much more active role by performing an extremely physical infringement on his rights, while in the case of turning the trolley, there is a much greater distance both in moral space and time, causing us to adapt the (maybe naive) attitude that you “bring about that more life merely by turning a trolley”(Thomson 2008:374).
Chapter Summaries
1. The problem: Introduces the philosophical debate regarding the moral permissibility of killing innocent aggressors and threats in self-defence.
2. Killing Innocent Aggressor/Threat: Discusses Thomson’s rights-based approach and Otsuka’s counter-argument concerning shared moral properties of bystanders and innocent threats.
3. Man on the track vs. man on the overpass. The moral (in)difference: Critically evaluates the alleged moral distinction between diverting a trolley and pushing a man from an overpass.
4. Causalities: Explores a transplant variant scenario to challenge existing arguments about initiating lethal sequences.
5. Killing five vs. killing one: Questions the moral adequacy of the "Killing Five vs. Killing One" principle and its application to extreme scenarios.
6. Violating spaces. Violating rights.: Examines whether rights violations necessitate moral responsible agency through the hypothetical "Peanut cake" scenario.
7. The Agent-relative (un)importance: Analyzes the weight of agent-relative values in self-defence and warns against the potential "slippery slope" of this approach.
8. Conclusion: Summarizes the findings, acknowledging that no definitive theory yet explains all cases while emphasizing the need for greater clarity between killing and letting die.
Keywords
Self-defence, moral permissibility, innocent aggressor, trolley problem, rights-based approach, agency, causality, killing vs. letting die, agent-relativity, ethics, moral responsibility, transgression, defensive killing, Thomson, Quong.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core subject of this paper?
The paper examines the ethics of killing in self-defence, specifically exploring when it is morally permissible to harm or kill others, including innocent threats or aggressors, to save lives.
What are the central themes discussed?
The central themes include the rights-based approach to self-defence, the role of moral agency, the distinction between killing and letting die, and the moral relevance of agent-relative considerations.
What is the primary research goal?
The goal is to test the adequacy of current categorization theories in self-defence and to investigate the implications of specific ethical arguments (such as Quong's and Thomson’s) on the permissibility of killing.
Which scientific methodology is applied?
The author uses normative ethical analysis, specifically conducting thought experiments and evaluating existing philosophical arguments through logical consistency and counter-examples.
What topics are covered in the main section?
The main sections cover the trolley problem variants, the analysis of causal responsibility in medical and physical scenarios, and a critique of the Principle of Defensive Killing.
Which keywords characterize this work?
Key terms include self-defence, moral permissibility, innocent aggressor, trolley problem, rights-based approach, and agent-relativity.
How does the author view the "man on the track" vs. "man on the overpass" dilemma?
The author argues that there is no significant moral difference between the two, suggesting that the perceived difference is a result of cognitive distortion regarding distance in time and space rather than true moral distinction.
What is the significance of the "Peanut cake" scenario?
It is used to challenge the assumption that responsible agency is strictly required to violate someone’s rights, suggesting that causal involvement can be sufficient for a violation.
What does the author conclude about the Principle of Defensive Killing?
The author argues that the "Peanut cake" case creates problems for the validity and correlativity of the Principle of Defensive Killing, as it suggests that someone might be "defensible" in ways that seem intuitively wrong.
- Quote paper
- Soren Andersen (Author), 2009, Killing in self-defence, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/146963
