In the early 1980s, Robert Axelrod published several articles on The Evolution of Cooperation, discussing and interpreting the results of his well-known computer tournaments and of a series of subsequent simulations. Both the tournaments and simulations were conducted in order to find a suitable, evolutionary stable strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma, which is generally considered an appropriate model of a
certain type of social dilemma that arises when "the pursuit of self-interest by each leads to a poor outcome for all."
The results of the tournaments and simulations led to a generalized theory of the evolution of cooperation, which claims to provide an explanation for various historical, social and biological phenomena. Axelrod`s work contributed extensively to popularizing computer simulation as a scientific method in the social sciences. Besides the fact that his approach had an unquestionably high impact on succeeding research and ushered in the "simulation era" in the social sciences, the use Axelrod made of computer simulations raises questions about their methodological and epistemological
status: If, as Axelrod states in his paper "Advancing the Art of
Simulation in the Social Sciences", simulation can serve the purposes of prediction, proof and even scientific discovery, what need is there for conducting experiments any longer? Can't we simulate science?
Admittedly, this suggestion sounds somewhat exaggerated, but why exactly do most of us share the intuition that there are fundamental differences persisting between simulations and experiments? What are the characteristic features distinguishing them? Do computer simulations in general - and
Axelrod's tournaments in particular - resemble experiments insofar as their
potential to provide us with surprising results that permit further theorizing
is concerned? Or are they nothing else than mere "number-crunching techniques", using brute-force computational means in
order to generate data from theoretical knowledge and assumptions already built into the underlying model?
The question where to draw the conceptual line between simulation and
experiment has turned out to be of great interest to philosophy of science,
not least since the categorization might be relevant to the way the results
are assessed and used. The objective of this paper is to elaborate on the
distinctive characteristics of simulations in contrast to experiments.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
2 Axelrod’s computer tournament – a brief overview of its setup, results and further conclusions
3 Simulating science? Simulations versus experiments
3.1 Materiality
3.2 External validity and its justification
3.3 Interim findings
4 Are Axelrod’s conclusions externally valid?
5 Conclusion
Research Objectives and Core Themes
This paper examines the ontological and epistemological status of computer simulations in the social sciences, using Robert Axelrod's work on the evolution of cooperation as a paradigmatic case study. It aims to determine whether simulation should be classified as a form of theorizing, experimentation, or a distinct "third way of doing science" by analyzing the concepts of materiality and external validity.
- Comparison between computer simulations and traditional laboratory experiments.
- Evaluation of Axelrod's computer tournaments and their scientific conclusions.
- Analysis of the role of materiality in establishing epistemic power.
- Critique of the external validity of simulation-based models.
- Discussion on the methodological priority of experiments over simulations.
Excerpt from the Book
3.1 Materiality
Attempting to characterize the distinctive features of simulations and experiments, it is tempting to appeal to the fact that they do, prima facie, obviously differ in ontological respects: In an experiment, scientists intervene in a concrete, material system, whereas a simulation merely investigates an abstract, nonmaterial entity – a mathematical model.
Morgan (2003, p. 216) seems to have in mind this substantial disparity when she refers to simulations as “experiments without material intervention.” But apart from laboratory experiments and mathematical model experiments, which serve as limiting cases located at the opposed ends of an imaginary scale, Morgan (2003, p. 217) identifies two types of “modern hybrids”, computer simulations that, to a certain extent, rely on “semimaterial” inputs (e.g. photographs of real hipbone slices) or produce “pseudo-material” outputs, mimicking observations of a real-world process (e.g. stock market prices). Moreover, she conjectures that the degree of materiality directly correlates to an experiment’s or, respectively, a simulation’s epistemic power.
Although mathematical model experiments – like Axelrod’s exploration of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma – “may function both as tools for theory development and as tools for understanding the world” (Morgan, 2003, p. 218) and therefore may well surprise the simulationist, they lack the power to produce confounding results. Even though TIT FOR TAT’s success in both tournaments came as a surprise, it could be understood and reconstructed in the aftermath, considering its properties and the given set of competing strategies. Things seem to be the same in the field of economics: Mathematical models may yield unexpected results, but, “having been surprised, we can go back through the model experiment and understand why such surprising results occured. That possibility may not be open to us with material experiments.” (Morgan, 2003, p. 220)
Summary of Chapters
1 Introduction: Provides an overview of Robert Axelrod’s work on the evolution of cooperation and introduces the central philosophical question of whether computer simulations qualify as experiments.
2 Axelrod’s computer tournament – a brief overview of its setup, results and further conclusions: Details the structure of Axelrod's tournaments, the success of the TIT FOR TAT strategy, and the resulting evolutionary theory of cooperation.
3 Simulating science? Simulations versus experiments: Investigates the distinction between simulation and experiment, focusing on material intervention, external validity, and intermediate research findings.
4 Are Axelrod’s conclusions externally valid?: Critically assesses whether Axelrod's simulations provide a reliable basis for explaining real-world social and biological phenomena.
5 Conclusion: Summarizes the findings, asserting that while simulations are useful, they depend on external experimental knowledge and do not qualify as "crucial experiments."
Keywords
Computer simulation, Experimentation, Robert Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, Materiality, External validity, Epistemology, Prisoner’s dilemma, TIT FOR TAT, Theory-building, Model experiments, Scientific methodology, Philosophy of science, Game theory, Inductive generalization.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core focus of this research?
The paper fundamentally investigates the methodological and ontological differences between computer simulations and traditional experiments in the context of social science research.
What are the primary themes discussed in the work?
Key themes include the epistemic power of models, the role of material intervention, the justification of external validity, and the comparison of simulation methods to experimental practice.
What is the main research objective?
The primary objective is to determine whether computer simulation should be classified as a form of theorizing, experimentation, or a unique scientific activity, using Axelrod's tournament as a case study.
Which scientific methodology does the author analyze?
The author evaluates the simulation-based methodology used in evolutionary game theory and compares it against standard scientific experimental frameworks.
What is covered in the main body of the text?
The main body examines diverse philosophical proposals regarding materiality and external validity, specifically drawing on authors like Morgan, Parker, and Winsberg to critique simulation practices.
What are the characterizing keywords of the paper?
The paper is characterized by terms such as computer simulation, materiality, external validity, epistemology, and the theory of the evolution of cooperation.
Why does the author argue that experiments are epistemologically prior to simulations?
The author argues that simulations rely on abstract background knowledge, which must be established first through direct observation, measurement, or traditional experimental intervention.
Does the author consider Axelrod's conclusions to be externally valid?
No, the author concludes that Axelrod's results are limited because his model does not adequately represent empirical reality, and the results are too sensitive to initial conditions to justify broad generalizations.
How does materiality function in the distinction between simulation and experiment?
Materiality is seen as a key factor in controllability; experiments involving physical systems are often harder to control but provide a more direct link to the target system compared to nonmaterial mathematical models.
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- Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) Inga Bones (Autor:in), 2010, Simulating Science?, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/148996
