On February 2nd, 2010, the Swiss Peoples Party (SVP) launched a popular initiative for the election of the Swiss federal council by popular vote. It is the third attempt of this kind, the efforts of 1900 and 1942 having failed respectively. There are several reasons why this might be the right time to try once again. Foreign policy debacles like the recent Libya-crisis or the hasty de facto immolation of the Swiss banking secrecy amid growing pressure from the US and the EU have, on the one hand, led to harsh criticism addressed to Hans-Rudolf Merz, head of the federal department of finance and to the assessment of a leadership problem of the Swiss Federal Council as a whole on the other. While the effort of the SVP might as well be responding to such criticism, it will have the comfortable side effect of setting the agenda for the national council elections in 2011, framing the SVP in its usual oppositional role. In the meantime, the federal council puts forward its own proposal of government reform, shifting the focus to organization and away from procedure. The issue of reform, not being a new one, enables the Federal Council to draw from the results of the „Vernehmlassungsverfahren zur Staatsleitungsreform“ which had been initiated in November of 1998 and concluded in March 1999. This paper aims to discuss the SVP proposal in light of past attempts, conflicting democratic and federalist interests as well as rival proposals. Mainly, it tries to answer the question of whether the election of the federal council by popular vote might upset the federalist aspect of the current power sharing arrangement.
Table of Contents
Introduction
1. How federal is the Swiss Federal Council? - Custom vs. mandate
2. Past reform efforts – Mere failures or a strategic tool?
3. The 2009 SVP proposal
3.1 The proposal in detail
3.2 Pros and cons
3.3 The small print matters
3.4 In whose interest is the election by popular vote?
4. Reform light – Operation vs. procedure
5. The democratic vs. the federalist principle
Conclusion
Research Objectives and Core Themes
This paper examines the 2009 Swiss Peoples Party (SVP) proposal for the popular election of the Swiss Federal Council. It investigates whether such a change, in the context of past failed reform attempts and current political dynamics, would undermine the established federalist power-sharing arrangements of the Swiss political system.
- Analysis of historical reform efforts and their strategic use by political parties.
- Evaluation of the 2009 SVP proposal, including its mechanics and potential political implications.
- Assessment of the tension between parliamentary democracy and a presidential system.
- Investigation of the impact of popular election on federalist principles and language minority representation.
- Comparison of the SVP’s procedural reform approach against the Federal Council’s own incremental operational reform proposals.
Excerpt from the Book
3.2 Pros and cons
Arguments in favor of a popular majority vote cite the greater legitimacy that the executive body would gain. A popular vote of the federal council would thus lead to the equalization of legitimacy between the federal council and parliament. Proponents criticize a lack of separation of powers with the current system and note that there currently exists an inequality before law as the national council votes with 200 and the council of states with only 46 votes. Furthermore, they feel that a popular vote of the federal council would activate the political debate in the country and lead to higher turnouts.
Opponents fear that a popular election would bring with it an americanization of the voting process and a bias towards candidates with big budgets, giving even more power to the media and their coverage of favored candidates. Another fear is the possible election of populists and demagogues or more generally of outliers, not backed by a political party and a politics of personality in general. They see a turning away from the concordance principle to a situation of fierce competition between the candidates on the one hand and further polarization of the parties on the other. One of the more weighty arguments is that a popular vote would marginalize language minorities, disadvantage smaller cantons and weaken the position of the cantons in general.
Summary of Chapters
Introduction: Provides the context of the 2009 SVP initiative and sets the research question regarding the impact of popular election on the Swiss federalist power-sharing model.
1. How federal is the Swiss Federal Council? - Custom vs. mandate: Traces the historical development of the "magic formula" and explains how the composition of the Federal Council is determined by informal party agreements rather than constitutional law.
2. Past reform efforts – Mere failures or a strategic tool?: Analyzes the failed initiatives of 1900 and 1942, arguing that these were utilized by political parties as strategic tools to secure executive representation.
3. The 2009 SVP proposal: Details the specific mechanisms of the SVP's popular election proposal, assesses potential political scenarios and their consequences, and identifies the parties' varying interests.
4. Reform light – Operation vs. procedure: Discusses the Federal Council's own reform proposals which focus on operational efficiency rather than changing the election procedure, highlighting the status quo bias.
5. The democratic vs. the federalist principle: Explores the conceptual conflict between the democratic principle of majority rule and the federalist principle of protecting territorial and minority interests in Switzerland.
Conclusion: Summarizes that a popular election would likely trigger executive-legislative stalemates, disadvantage minorities, and weaken the parliamentary and federalist foundations of the Swiss political system.
Keywords
Swiss Federal Council, popular election, federalism, SVP initiative, magic formula, power sharing, direct democracy, concordance principle, parliamentary democracy, political reform, language minorities, institutional stability, political polarization, executive power, consensus democracy.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core focus of this research paper?
The paper evaluates the 2009 SVP initiative to introduce a popular election for the Swiss Federal Council and analyzes whether this procedural change would harm Switzerland's federalist structure.
What are the primary themes discussed?
Key themes include the history of executive reform attempts, the role of political parties in power-sharing, the conflict between democratic legitimacy and federalist stability, and the contrast between procedural and operational reforms.
What is the central research question?
The study primarily asks whether the election of the Federal Council by popular vote would disrupt the federalist aspects of the current power-sharing arrangement.
Which scientific methodology is employed?
The work utilizes a qualitative policy analysis, examining political proposals, historical precedents, and institutional theory to assess the systemic implications of the reform.
What is covered in the main body of the text?
The body covers the historical context of the "magic formula," a breakdown of the 2009 SVP proposal, the various party perspectives on government reform, and the theoretical tension between democracy and federalism.
Which keywords best characterize the work?
Essential keywords include Swiss Federal Council, popular election, federalism, concordance principle, power sharing, and political reform.
How does the author evaluate the Federal Council's own reform proposal?
The author views the Federal Council's proposal as an incremental, status-quo-oriented effort to improve operational efficiency, intended to steer the debate away from more radical procedural changes.
What is the author's final conclusion regarding the popular election?
The author concludes that a popular election would be detrimental to federalism because it would likely marginalize language minorities, diminish the influence of smaller cantons, and potentially lead to political gridlock.
- Quote paper
- Elena Holzheu (Author), 2010, Would the popular election of the Swiss Federal Council be detrimental to federalism?, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/150035
