The author has compared the issue of abortion focusing on pro-life vs. pro-choice position in Rawls’s theory of justice and political liberalism and Dworkin’s discussion about moral problems of abortion. In the first and second parts of this paper, the author has analyzed the abortion issue from the standpoint of the original position, veil of ignorance, rights and interests, detached vs. derivative position, natural vs. human investment while criticisising the application of Rawls’s natural duties and Dworkin’s intrinsic (sacred) value to abortion. In the final part, Rawls’s and Dworkin’s positions on abortion issues are compared, drawing conclusions on similarities and divergence.
Table of Contents
PART I Rawls’s “A Theory of Justice”
Application 1 Abortion from the standpoint of the original position, veil of ignorance and maximin principle
Original position
Veil of ignorance
Maximin principle
Application 2 Abortion from the standpoint of natural duties (positive and negative)
Duty of mutual respect
Duty of mutual aid
Duty not to harm (injure)
Duties in conflict
Rawls’s “Political liberalism”
Application 1 Pro choice positioning “Political Liberalism” vs. pro-life position in “A Theory of Justice”
Application 2 No definitive conclusion on the abortion issue
PART II Dworkin’s “Life’s Dominion”
Application 1 Natural vs. human investment
Application 2 Rights or interests of the fetus
Application 3 Derivative vs. detached position
Application 4 Intrinsic or sacred value
Conclusion Comparison of Rawls’s and Dworkin’s argumentation lines
Research Objective and Core Themes
This paper examines and compares the philosophical perspectives on abortion held by John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. The study investigates how their moral and political frameworks address the permissibility of abortion, focusing on the evolution of Rawls's thought from "A Theory of Justice" to "Political Liberalism," and analyzing Dworkin's arguments regarding the sanctity of life and human investment.
- Analysis of Rawls's "original position" and "veil of ignorance" in the context of abortion.
- Examination of Rawlsian "natural duties" such as mutual respect, mutual aid, and the duty not to harm.
- Investigation of Dworkin's distinction between "derivative" and "detached" positions.
- Evaluation of the concept of "intrinsic" or "sacred" value regarding human life.
- Comparative critique of the political and moral justifications provided by both philosophers.
Excerpt from the Book
Application 1
Dworkin claims that conservatives are opposed to abortion because they value divine or natural investment in life, whereas liberals value human investment. Dworkin himself has given a liberal answer to the issue of abortion: a fetus dies before any significant human investment has been made (LD, 93), and therefore he defends individual liberty (LD, 239). Now I will elaborate on Dworkin’s argument that the death of a sixty-year old person is less bad than the death of a twenty-year-old, because we have invested a lot without reaping a return. I agree with Dworkin that little has been invested in a fetus, but the older the fetus becomes, the more investment is lost without return. Furthermore, I agree that there is more human investment in the mother. (Kamm, 2001: 222-223) However, I disagree with Dworkin that the death of a three-year-old child is less bad than the death of the adult (LD, 86-87) because it contradicts his own argument about human investment.
Summary of Chapters
PART I Rawls’s “A Theory of Justice”: This section explores how Rawls’s early principles, such as the original position and the veil of ignorance, generally imply a pro-life stance regarding abortion.
Application 1: Analyzes abortion through the lens of Rawlsian decision-making models, concluding that these frameworks often favor the prohibition of abortion.
Application 2: Discusses the conflict between natural duties—such as mutual aid and respect—and how these duties are applied to the moral status of a fetus.
Rawls’s “Political liberalism”: Examines the shift in Rawls’s thought, where he adopts a more pro-choice stance by emphasizing the political value of women's equality.
Application 1: Highlights the transition from the hypothetical constraints of his early work to his later focus on allowing a woman to decide on pregnancy.
Application 2: Addresses the ambiguity in Rawls’s later works regarding whether the abortion issue remains a central question of justice.
PART II Dworkin’s “Life’s Dominion”: Evaluates Dworkin's framework, which differentiates between divine/natural investment and human investment to justify abortion rights.
Application 1: Explores the concept of human investment as the primary justification for Dworkin’s pro-choice position.
Application 2: Critically analyzes the debate over fetal personhood and its relevance to the abortion discussion.
Application 3: Distinguishes between derivative claims (fetus as a right-holder) and detached claims (sacredness of life) in the abortion debate.
Application 4: Investigates Dworkin’s secular interpretation of the "sacred" value of life and the subsequent critiques regarding its vagueness.
Conclusion: Synthesizes the comparison, noting that both philosophers' views were influenced by the political climate of their respective eras.
Keywords
Abortion, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, A Theory of Justice, Political Liberalism, Life's Dominion, Original Position, Veil of Ignorance, Natural Duties, Human Investment, Sanctity of Life, Pro-life, Pro-choice, Fetal Personhood, Moral Philosophy.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this academic paper?
The paper examines the moral and political arguments regarding abortion presented by John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, comparing their evolving positions and theoretical frameworks.
What are the core thematic areas discussed?
Key themes include the application of Rawls's "original position," his concept of "natural duties," Dworkin's theory of "human investment," and the broader philosophical debate on the "sacredness" of life.
What is the central research question?
The research explores how these two philosophers justify their respective stances on abortion and why their positions have shifted or remained inconsistent across their major works.
Which scientific methodology is employed?
The author uses a comparative, analytical, and critical approach, contrasting theoretical frameworks against legal, ethical, and moral arguments found in the works of Rawls and Dworkin.
What does the main body of the text cover?
It covers Rawls's early stance in "A Theory of Justice" versus his later view in "Political Liberalism," followed by an in-depth critique of Dworkin's arguments in "Life's Dominion," including the distinction between natural and human investment.
Which keywords best characterize this work?
The work is defined by terms like abortion, Rawlsian justice, Dworkinian ethics, personhood, sanctity of life, and natural duties.
How does Rawls's perspective change between his two main books?
Rawls shifts from a seemingly pro-life position in "A Theory of Justice," derived from the original position, to a pro-choice stance in "Political Liberalism," where he prioritizes women's equality as a political value.
What is the "detached" vs. "derivative" position in Dworkin's work?
A derivative position argues that abortion is wrong because a fetus has rights, while a detached position argues that abortion is an offense against the "sacred" nature of human life, regardless of fetal rights.
Does the author agree with Dworkin's theory of "intrinsic value"?
No, the author finds the concept of "sacred" or "intrinsic" value to be problematic and overly vague, aligning with critics who argue that justice is a more significant framework than the sanctity of life.
- Quote paper
- Karina Oborune (Author), 2010, Abortion in J. Rawls’s “A Theory of Justice” and “Political Liberalism” and R. Dworkin’s “Life’s Dominion”, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/150396
