Metonymy in language - traditional and cognitive approaches

Contents

1 Overview Paper
1.1 Introduction
1.2 The traditional view
1.3 The cognitive approach
1.3.1 Introduction
1.3.2 Langacker´s model of reference-point construction
1.3.3 Reference- point construction
1.4 Where and when does metonymy occur?
1.5 Are there any preferred routes?
1.5.1 Principles governing the selection of the preferred vehicle
1.6 What leads to the selection of other routes?
1.6.1 Conclusion
1.7 Metonymy vs. Metaphor
1.7.1 Introduction
1.7.2 Examples

2 Selected Bibliography

1 Overview Paper

Effective communication is a key process in everyday life. Not only do we need to communicate about business and public affairs but also about ourselves and the things which concern us personally. In each case, it is highly interesting to analyse how we try to convey the information we want to get across: Naturally enough, we make use of conventional language but we are also creative and constantly invent new words, phrases and formulations. This, according to Andreas Blank, is due to the fact that: “Linguistic ( and even non-linguistic) communication can be seen as a process whereby people try to maximize their communicative success by minimalizing their linguistic effort” (1993, p. 6). Metonymy is a response to both demands and the nature of metonymy will be investigated in some depth in the following overview. For his purpose, it is necessary to compare traditional and cognitive approaches to metonymic theory and also to clearly distinguish the linguistic device of metonymy to one that can be considered as being rather similar- metaphor. It will be shown, however, that there are important differences between the two, which account for their specific linguistic usage and behaviour.

1.1 Introduction

For centuries, the study of metonymy and metaphor has been regarded purely a matter of style and rhetoric. In addition to that, research into metonymic relationship traditionally has been put only second to the phenomenon of metaphor. However, things have changed a little over the past decades. Especially after Lakoff/ Johnson had published their influential work on metaphor and conceptualisation (Metaphors we live by, 1980) research into cognitive aspects of language gained more ground in linguistics. Deeper insight into the way we structure our perception of the world has led to the conclusion that both, metaphor and metonymy, must be regarded as cognitive phenomena. As such they illustrate the fact that “fundamental cognitive abilities and experientially derived cognitive models have direct and pervasive linguistic manifestations” (Langacker, 1993, p.1) and, conversely, that by ways of examining language we can analyse important aspects of the way our mind is structured. This view of metonymy is clearly opposed to the traditional one, both of which I will present in more detail in the following.

1.2 The traditional view

Metonymy was traditionally regarded as a figure of speech that involves a process of substituting one linguistic expression for another, i.e., metonymy was viewed as a relation in which one linguistic expression “stands for” another. The best-known cases of metonymy in this traditional sense are expressions that are used for the purpose of indirect referring. For example, there was a convention that the referential noun-phrase

(1) the White House

could be used to refer to the executive branch of government of the US, a spokesperson of that branch, or even the President himself but was not synonymous with any of these.

More recently, with the advent of cognitive linguistics, it has been recognised that the traditional view of metonymy was too narrow and that metonymy, like metaphor, is a conceptual tool that operates with relations between entities rather than with substitutions. In cognitive theory, these relations have been described within “idealized cognitive models” (ICM). These play a fundamental role in the cognitive approach and will be referred to below.

1.3 The cognitive approach

1.3.1 Introduction

Especially after Lakoff/ Johnson had published their seminal work on the role of metaphor in conceptualisation, which sparked a vast amount of research in cognitive linguistics, it has increasingly become apparent that metonymy is a cognitive phenomenon that may even be more fundamental than metaphor. The most basic assumption cognitive linguists made was that metonymy does not simply mean that one entity stands for another but that the entities involved are (and stay) related to each other. What kind of relation is this? What gives rise to metonymies?

According to Andreas Blank the underlying relation is a “contiguity of senses”, i.e.: an association between (intralinguistic) semantic features of two words (1999, p. 6). Blank’s statement can be seen as referring to the cognitive notion of “frames” or ICM: Within metonymy, words deriving from one frame are related and can be used to refer to each other. Let me exemplify this.

illustration not visible in this excerpt

Consider, for example, the words “steering wheel, tank, back-seat and brakes”. Apparently, all of these words share important semantic features: they have got something to do with “car”. Hence, the single elements can be conceptually integrated into an overall structure (>car).

Cognitive linguistics calls such a structure frame and defines it as “the mental representation of the way things are felt to cohere and function”^[1]. Frames are of special importance for the understanding of metonymy as, according to Langacker (1993) metonymy relies on such a relation. I will now present Langacker's model of metonymic understanding.

1.3.2 Langacker´s model of reference-point construction

Most cases of metonymy can be used to adduce evidence for the assumption that metonymy occurs when an expression that “normally designs one entity is used instead to designate another, associated entity. The requisite association is quite variable in nature” (Langacker, 1993, p.29) as the following examples^[2] illustrate:

1. Part for whole: “The coach is going to put some fresh legs in the game ^[3] ”+.
2. Whole for part: “My pencil broke”+. ( > only the lead point is broken)
3. Possession for owner: “The ship left the harbour”+.
4. Institution for person: “He phoned the hospital”+.

(…)^[4]

Interesting about all these examples is the question why we understand what the speaker means. According to Langacker this is due to the fact that metonymy is a reference-point phenomenon: The entity that is designated by a metonymic expression serves as a reference-point affording mental access to the desired target. Langacker´s approach to metonymy is illustrated under figure 1:

[...]

^[1] On top of categories and frames, cognitive linguists also make use of the word “conceptual domain”. A conceptual domain is defined as the area relative to which categories and frames can be categorised.

^[2] Most examples are taken from: Langacker, 1993, p.29 ff..

^[3] All speech samples of this term paper are taken from the BNC unless marked otherwise by “+”.

^[4] There are various other examples such as „producer for product”: „She bought Shakespeare for $2”.