Beliefs and borders. Challenges to freedom of religion in the postmodern era

Scientific Study , 2025 , 81 Pages

Sociology - Religion

Freedom of religion, secular law, religious education, and the sociology of religion are central issues that represent some of the most important challenges facing modern and postmodern societies. These areas are closely interconnected, and they exert a fundamental influence on the ways in which we organize our legal regimes of human rights, our educational systems, and our community spaces. In an era of globalization and digitalization, the tense dynamics between these fields are becoming increasingly palpable, as new spiritual movements and forms of identity emerge alongside traditional religious communities.

The aim of this book is to explore the complex system of relationships between freedom of religion and secular law, with particular consideration of the relevance today of religious education and phenomena linked to the sociology of religion. As a fundamental human right, the freedom of religion is a sort of depository of individual freedom of conscience, but when confined to the framework of secular law, it can lead to conflicts that can only be interpreted through the prism of modern pluralism. How can these conflicts be addressed? How can the principles of religious diversity and the neutrality of the state be reconciled?

Religious education is also a key issue that affects educational policy, the futures of religious communities, and processes of identity formation among members of the younger generations. From the perspective of the sociology of religion, it raises interesting questions about the roles of religion and spirituality in the postmodern social context. How are religious communities confronted with new influences in a digitalized world? How do the global spaces in which we live and move transform our value systems and our understandings of social norms?

When venturing answers to these questions, we are not simply engaging in academic or theoretical debate. We are addressing an important social responsibility. If we can arrive at a synthesis of the relationship between the state, the individual, and religious communities, we can nurture a social harmony in which pluralism and respect for human dignity are equally respected. It is my sincerest hope that the essays in this volume will contribute to the debates on this subject and help us better navigate a world in which tradition and innovation are both present.

Content

Preface

Krisztián Dombrádi: Intersecions of secularization and the evolution of law Europe

János Talabér – Péter Antalóczy: The Liberty of Religious Rights and Religious Education in the Frame of the State Legislation in Hungary

János Talabér: Educating Catholic Children in the Case of Parental Divorce, Cohabitation and Re-marriage

Krisztián Dombrádi: The sociology of religion as a sociology of knowledge, trends and challenges

Preface

Freedom of religion, secular law, religious education, and the sociology of religion are central issues that represent some of the most important challenges facing modern and postmodern societies. These areas are closely interconnected, and they exert a fundamental influence on the ways in which we organize our legal regimes of human rights, our educational systems, and our community spaces. In an era of globalization and digitalization, the tense dynamics between these fields are becoming increasingly palpable, as new spiritual movements and forms of identity emerge alongside traditional religious communities.

The aim of this book is to explore the complex system of relationships between freedom of religion and secular law, with particular consideration of the relevance today of religious education and phenomena linked to the sociology of religion. As a fundamental human right, the freedom of religion is a sort of depository of individual freedom of conscience, but when confined to the framework of secular law, it can lead to conflicts that can only be interpreted through the prism of modern pluralism. How can these conflicts be addressed? How can the principles of religious diversity and the neutrality of the state be reconciled?

Religious education is also a key issue that affects educational policy, the futures of religious communities, and processes of identity formation among members of the younger generations. From the perspective of the sociology of religion, it raises interesting questions about the roles of religion and spirituality in the postmodern social context. How are religious communities confronted with new influences in a digitalized world? How do the global spaces in which we live and move transform our value systems and our understandings of social norms?

When venturing answers to these questions, we are not simply engaging in academic or theoretical debate. We are addressing an important social responsibility. If we can arrive at a synthesis of the relationship between the state, the individual, and religious communities, we can nurture a social harmony in which pluralism and respect for human dignity are equally respected. It is my sincerest hope that the essays in this volume will contribute to the debates on this subject and help us better navigate a world in which tradition and innovation are both present.

Krisztián Dombrádi Krisztián Dombrádi Intersecions of secularization and the evolution of law Europe

Introduction

Over time, religious faith has undergone a process of simplification through increased institutionalization. In earlier eras, religion was one of the main pillars of society. Today, however, it has been transformed by secularization trends that have been underway now for centuries, which have included the secularization of politics and the secularization of the moral and ethical rules of the private sphere. These trends themselves have developed into a new force for legitimacy. The European legal order has not forgotten its traditional source of authority and legitimacy, however, and it has increasingly relied on discourses based on social consensus. Moreover, in many cases, the interpretation of morality and values has been linked to the democratic state institutional system, which stands as the theoretical framework of social cooperation. However, although the aims of the “monist” and “pluralist” concepts of democracy are similar, the aim of the former is to maintain the moral integrity of the society as a whole, whereas the aim of the latter is the uncompromising maintenance of individual freedoms (such as legal equality, the freedom of religion and speech, etc.). The concept of the “democratic state” is characterized by being somehow “overburdened”.¹ This study points at the unique areas of the application of specialized knowledge and the importance of interdisciplinary research on knowledge patterns in an environment where morality, norms, religion, and the legal order are seeking a new basis for legitimacy. This quest for a new foundation for legitimacy it underway in no small part because Europe, under pressure from secularization trends, is being forced to modify its traditions with the incorporation of unconventional forms of melting cultures. The evolution of legal traditions is taking place at a highly forced pace. In their study “Law, Morality, Religion,” Nándor Birher and Ferenc Janka have offered a more precise definition: “Europe, which seems to be too lazy to defend herself (...) is faced with a religious, moral, legal, and demographic challenge triggered by Islam.”²

Secularization, legal order, normative evolution, meeting of cultures in today’s Europe, framework, network model, addition to complexity map.

1. Current trends

Glancing at the social changes of our time, we could rightly say that they are taking place under the influence of globalization and multiculturalism, which often pose radical challenges to the subsystems of society, religion, morality, and law. Thanks to technological developments, the expansion of international trade, the evolution of communication networks, or in a word, globalization, different parts of the world are much more closely connected to one another as for economy, society, culture, and politics are concerned than ever before.

Alongside technological innovation, economic expansion, and a rise in living standards, the diverse global cultural palette has also come to the forefront, creating opportunities for people from different cultural backgrounds to live together and also encouraging mutual respect and acceptance. The integration into mainstream European society of people from different cultural backgrounds has not been an entirely smooth process, however, and indeed it may well be a source of many conflicts. According to the advocates of globalization and multiculturalism, however, society should support the integration of newcomers while steadily striving to preserve its own cultural identity. In their view, cultural diversity can contribute to economic growth, as people from different backgrounds create new markets and offer new business opportunities.

Today, globalization and multiculturalism are inseparably intertwined; globalization promotes the spread of cultural diversity, while multiculturalism strengthens the positive effects of globalization and makes it easier to handle the challenges it presents. At the same time, due in no small part to globalization and improvements in information technology, liberal values have spread to an unprecedented extent and have had considerable impacts on the social organization of individual countries today.

In recent centuries, the religious and social structures of Europe have undergone significant changes,³ since the continent, the cultures of which have deep Christian roots, is increasingly becoming secular (or “post-Christian”), suggesting that Christianity as a dominant religious and cultural force is gradually receding and becoming something of a private matter. In this post-Christian Europe, the role of Christianity in public life and politics has significantly declined, while religious pluralism has increased via globalization and migration.⁴

Owing to the presence of (and comparatively higher birthrates among) Muslim immigrants, Islam is the fastest growing religion in Europe, posing new social and political challenges, including religious integration and the questions raised by cultural diversity. In addition, Buddhism, Hinduism, and other Eastern religions are also becoming increasingly popular, especially among young people and intellectuals. These shifts pose new challenges to the religious, moral and legal evolution of post-Christian Europe. It is thus both necessary and even pressingly urgent to reflect upon the relationships among the factors mentioned in the title of this chapter, as well as the wide-ranging problems posed by this process of evolution.

Based on the trends described above, traditional concepts of law, morality, and religion alone are not adequate means with which to ensure fruitful cooperation among diverse cultural groups in a multicultural society. Furthermore, a society with a frail legal, religious, and moral identity is unable to cooperate with foreign cultures. It is thus essential today that we raise these admittedly old questions concerning the potentials and limits of multiculturalism and that we reexamine the relationships among law, morality, and religion.

1.1. Law, morality, religion: connections and differences

The role and place of law, religion, and morality in society raises a rather complex question, since these three sources of authority sometimes overlap and sometimes compete, each playing a decisive role, both for the individual and for the life of a given society.

Furthermore, there are several systems of norms in a society at any given time, of which the common feature is that each belongs to the category of rules of conduct. They do show a significant difference, however, in the ways in which they were created, their social weight, the ways in which they find manifestation, and their impacts.

For centuries, religion played a determining role in the formation of moral norms and social order. In addition, religious precepts formed the foundation of legal regulations, and religion also served as one of the main sources of community cohesion. According to cultural history, this unique relation among religion, morality, and law was first broken by the conflict between clerical and secular power and then later by wars among different congregations triggered by the Reformation.

As a consequence, secularization dramatically changed the social role of religion significantly, since in these societies, religion was often squeezed into the private sphere. Although religion often continued to play important roles in the lives of individuals, public and legal regulations were increasingly independent from religious regulation.

In secularized societies, moral pluralism is common, meaning that different moral value systems and norms exist side by side. This pluralism enables individuals and communities to live according to different moral principles, but it also presents challenges for community cohesion and the preservation of shared values.

Furthermore, it is also interesting to note that religion still provides defining moral guidelines for both the individual and the community, and from this perspective it has a significant impact on the development of moral values. At the same time, however, in secularized societies morality is increasingly considered autonomous, which means it can be interpreted without religious foundations or authority.

In addition, the relationship between law and morality is also a complex and often debated issue. While the law consists in principle of formally binding rules, morality refers to the system of individual and community norms and values. Legal regulations often reflect the moral values of a given society, but they are not always identical with these values. While in the European legal system, law was often based on religious and moral rules, in secularized society this has undergone a fundamental change. Basically, legal systems are founded on a social contract created by the consensus among citizens, and thus law has become an autonomous system ensuring social order.

In contrast, in secularized societies, the relationship between the legal system and religious precepts is usually minimalized. Religion might play a role in shaping the moral values behind legal regulations, but legal decision-making and law-making are usually independent of religious regulation.

In conclusion, the relationship among religion, law, and morality in secularized societies is complex and dynamic. Whereas religion traditionally played a determining role in the formation of moral norms and legal regulations, in the course of secularization, law and morality became largely autonomous areas. Regardless of this, religion continues to have a significant impact on an individual’s moral life and beliefs.

1.1.1. Religion

Several experts have attempted to define the concept of religion. Péter Antalóczy offers perhaps the most concise definition when he contends that “religion is a system of sufficiently declared beliefs and principles that others are required to follow, and it shapes the life of the given community and the ways in which and conditions according to which one can belong to it.”⁵

Moreover, we can conclude that the role and importance of religion around the world may be different in each culture and historical period, but this role is unquestionably not static, as religion itself is constantly evolving as a result of social, political, and economic changes.

Religion essentially determines the values and norms accepted for individuals and communities, and it actively influences social behavior as well as relationships among individuals. As a crucible of ethical norms and value systems, it also underlines what is considered right and wrong in a given society. In addition, these principles serve as a compass for navigating between behavioral norms and decision-making processes. Thus, in Christian teachings, human dignity, justice, and love play an important role, whereas in Islam, justice, solidarity and respect for divine law are in the forefront.

Furthermore, religion also performs a community-building function in society, as it contributes to the formation of the identity of the members of the fold. Religious communities are seen as central participants in social life, since they often take an active part in education, health care, social assistance programs, and charity activities and also provide support for the needy due to their special legal status granted by the state, which allows them to remain important participants in maintaining social prosperity and stability. Finally, one should not forget that religions, as traditions and institutions with significant political and social influence (even if also with varying characteristics and varying amounts of influence, depending on their history and place in a given society), can have a significant impact on legislation, social norms, and the functions of institutions.

1.1.2. Morality

Although the concept of morals (or morality) is closely related to religion, it does have exclusively religious origins. It includes the rules of acceptable acts as a normative system valid for citizens and society. Morality is a system of norms which regulates what is considered right and wrong.

Moral norms and values determine accepted principles and values in a society and contribute to the stability of society as a cohesive force. Moreover, consensus on common moral fundaments helps people unite and achieve common goals. Also, we cannot disregard the fact that moral principles often serve as the basis of legal norms. Many legal systems, moreover, are exclusively based on basic moral principles (e.g. the principle of good faith, dishonest behavior, good morals, etc.).

In such cases, the role of moral principles is essentially duplicated, as morals are integrated into the system of legal norms.⁶

As far as the philosophy of law is concerned, the relationship between morality and law can be seen from three different perspectives. According to advocates of the fusion of morality and law (or in other words, those who see these two concepts as essentially synonymous), laws are derived directly from moral norms. Based on the theory of St. Thomas Aquinas, natural law is the order created by God, which arises from human nature and moral percepts. Furthermore, in a system of natural law, the basis of law lies in universal moral principles that the human senses are able to discover. In contrast, Hart and Austin, as representatives of legal positivism, define morality and law as two completely separate systems of norms.⁷ According to them, the validity of legal norms does not depend on moral norms. Hart, who belongs to the more radical trend, states that law is nothing but the rules created and enforced by the state, regardless of whether these rules are morally justifiable or not.

Finally, those who consider the relationship between morality and law dialectical emphasize the difference between the two and believe in their dynamic interaction. According to this understanding, moral norms influence legislation, and law can also form moral values, which in this case means that law has a feedback effect on moral values.

In our view, this interaction is particularly important if we seek to address the challenges posed by legal reforms, moral pluralism, and legal relativism today.

1.1.3. Law

The function of law in society is basically to maintain social order, ensure justice, and protect the rights of individuals and communities.

In addition, according to the broadest approach, law is a specific, general rule of conduct ensured by means of state enforcement, in which the intention and will of the state appear. Nevertheless, in the process of legislation, this also means that the state bodies opt for different methods and choose the one that best suits the goals to be achieved. During this procedure, however, these bodies must also pay attention to the coherent nature of the legal system, which means that different rules must be in an elemental unity with one another.

Over the course of many years, basically two theories have stabilized in debates concerning the philosophy of law concerning the concept of law. Hans Kelsen, the best-known representative of the normative approach, defines law merely as a normative system, separated from social and moral norms.⁸ In contrast, representatives of law sociology (e.g. Eugen Ehrlich) emphasize that the real source of law may be found in social practice and customs. According to this approach, the law is viewed as a social institution serving to maintain social order and coordinate individual interests.

Regarding the validity and moral foundations of law, we have already mentioned the legal positivism represented by Hart, according to whom the validity of law is independent of its moral foundations. Legal systems, however, often involve morally questionable rules that are nonetheless valid in a formal sense. Furthermore, trends resting on the notion of natural law see a close connection between law and morality. They contend that the law can only be considered valid if it corresponds to universal moral principles and the basic requirements of justice stemming from human nature. According to this approach, the legal validity of a precept is inseparable from its moral validity. According to St. Thomas Aquinas, who is the most prominent representative of this school of philosophy, law stems from the human nature and the divine order, and it is therefore necessarily based on moral foundations.⁹

When examining the roles and nature of law, one notes that the legal systems created throughout history were dynamically adapted to social, economic, and political changes. This adaptation is the process that has mostly formed and steadily continues to form the development of society today. Nowadays, globalization and multicultural society pose more and more challenges for the legislator, who is steadily pressed to find the solutions best serving the social order and ensuring political and economic stability in a complex intermeshing of varying interests. Therefore, in this context, a burning issue arises as to how international legal norms could correspond to national sovereignty and local cultural differences.

Conclusion

Post-Christian Europe is currently undergoing a transformation, part of which is a constant search for balance between the traditions of the past and the challenges of the present. Although religion does not dominate the social and political spheres as much as it used to, it still plays an important role in individual and community identity. Moreover, in order to build a sustainable future, European societies have to find their path in the tangled web of religious pluralism, secularization, and ethical issues.

This path is full of challenges and opportunities to reconsider and rethink the relationship among law, religion, and morality, each of which will undoubtedly continue to play significant social roles in the future.

Bibliography

Péter Antalóczy (ed.): Fundaments of state church law, Budapest 2012 Aquinas, Thomas: On Law, Morality, and Politics. Hackett Publishing, 1988.

Nándor Birher - Ferenc Janka: Law, morality, religion. in.: Deliberationes. X./2. 2/2/2017

Johanna Fröhlich: Expanding the interpretation range of the concept of democracy: relativization or guarantee? in.: IAS, 2010/3.

Hart, H.L.A: Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 1983.

Kelsen, Hans: General Theory of Law and State. 1945.

Péter Bodnár Miskolczi: The close relationship between morality and law in Civil Review 4-6 (2015) 27-33.

JÁNOS TALABÉR-PÉTER ANTALÓCZY The Liberty of Religious Rights and Religious Education in the Frame of the State Legislation in Hungary

(a comparative legal study)

1.1. Introduction

In this short essay, the authors would intend to present the possible opportunities of religious education in the frame of the state legislation. Based on the current legislative issues, every faithful is entitled to get the proper religious education related to his/her own belief. However, the scale of the religious congregations might be very wide, hence the state must create a frame to fit the small churches into it. On the other hand, only the historical churches are based upon appropriate hierarchical legal structures, which of course, could be fitted into the legal frames. Therefore, it is highly recommended to deal with the Catholic legislation, and then opening up the scope towards the other historical as well as smaller churches.

1.2. The canonical education

According to the present canonical legislation, the Catholic Church is free to found any kind of school or institution. This means, that the Code simply claims the right of the Church, proclaiming that the Church, as the possessor of universal mission is free and of right to found institutions for education.¹⁰ Moreover, this canon notes that these schools can wear the name catholic only if the church authority gives written permission. Normally, in addition, a catholic school is directed by the authority or other legal persona iuridica. But what makes a catholic school special nowadays, and why do we need catholic schools?

Religious education is a fundamental element of a comprehensive education and upbringing. In more than a few countries, Catholic schools to this day of their existence to the fact that government schools do not guarantee this basic right, so that Catholic institutions of Catholic children their only opportunity to be reared in their faith.

However, Religious instruction and education form a fundamental respect of the identity of catholic schools even in countries where it is effected by public schools too.¹¹ It is just as securely anchored as any other school subject in sound didactics and methodology, can draw on qualified teaching aids and trained teachers and clearly distinct from, though supplementary to, parish catechesis. As such, the Educational Congregation documents¹² treat it as an integral element of the Catholic School Project. From a perspective earned by practical experience and differentiated theory, these pronouncements may adhere to be rather general and unsystematic.

Nevertheless, the mere fact that the Congregation has tried to define a general guideline for religions instruction in Catholic schools is connected to personal relevance. The 1979 bishop's Synod and the resulting Apostolic Exhortation, Catechesi Tradendae, laid down several principles of cc religious instruction. however, these fall far short truly defining its religious objectives and pedagogical methods in the present situation. Therefore even if the outcome is not perfect, the attempt is remarkable enough in itself and is likely to meet a genuine need in some countries. It is vital to the catholic school education to keep religious instruction, with its independent status, from dwelling away into the limbo of a separate subject. In aiming for a synthesis of faith and culture, much depends on whether it can be integrated or not.¹³ The training background of present teachers and the customary pedagogic approach do not have ideal conditions for this. There is thus a particularly pressing need for improvements in this area.

However, it is not forgotten that Catholic schools are affected by the challenges which typically confront faith and Christian living in a plural secular society. For this same reason, the striving to turn school into a realm of Christian living becomes all the more important. For many children and young people no longer have a continuous relationship with their parish, school faces the double challenge of giving them access to the sacraments and opening the door to their own participation in local parish life.

2.2. Primer rights to found schools

After defining the primer right to found schools, the canons talk about those who are responsible for founding and controlling them. Moreover, the canon names the appointment of religious teachers and list the key features which all teachers must meet. As we have already seen it before, the key figure in this process is the diocesan bishop and as for appointing religion teachers the local ordinary has the right to act. What are the conditions for being employed as a religion teacher? What is the mission of a catholic school, what are the principles of religion education?

We must be ready to repeat the basic essentials over and over again, so long as the need is present. We need to integrate what has already been learned, and respond to the questions which come from the restless and critical minds of the young. We need to break through the wall of indifference, and at the same time be ready to help those who are doing well to discover a "better way", offering them a knowledge that also embraces Christian wisdom. The specific methods and the steps used to accomplish the educational philosophy of the school will, therefore, be conditioned and guided by an intimate knowledge of each student's unique situation.¹⁴

2.3 Education in Hungary and in the USA

The more the members of the educational community¹⁵ develop a real willingness to collaborate among themselves, the more fruitful their work will be. Does anyone think that there are real education communities in the field of religious education? In the USA, either in UK and Germany, we have already experienced educational workshops, but all of these worked separately. For instance in Hungary, there are not such workshops functioning, thus, apart from some seminars for religion teachers, the principles of everyday practice is hardly ever discussed. Moreover, the key problem we would mention here is that there are not any international crossbars between these workshops, thus it is very difficult to maintain connection with religion teachers in the world. Even when the Internet is open and getting to be available for greater part of the society, it is still a key problem to discuss pedagogical as well as practical affairs with other religion teachers. Achieving the educational aims of the school should be an equal priority for teachers, students and families alike, each one according to his or her own role, always in the Gospel spirit of freedom and love. Therefore channels of communication should be open among all those concerned with the school. Frequent meetings will help to make this possible, and a willingness to discuss common problems candidly will enrich this communication. The daily problems of school life are sometimes aggravated by misunderstandings and various tensions. A determination to collaborate in achieving common educational goals can help to overcome these difficulties and reconcile different points of view. A willingness to collaborate helps to facilitate decisions that need to be made about the ways to achieve these goals and, while preserving proper respect for school authorities, even makes it possible to conduct a critical evaluation of the school - a process in which teachers, students and families can all take part because of their common concern to work for the good of all.¹⁶

The New Hungarian Constitution in Article VII (2) denotes that the Church and the Hungarian State work separately. This means that the Church cannot interfere into state affairs, and mutually the state is not interested in church discipline.¹⁷ Parents, moreover, has the duty to find the mutual cooperation with the sate employee at a public school.¹⁸ The school principals at catholic schools must provide the best and the most modern education, since the catholic school is supposed to keep up steps with public schools.¹⁹

It is obvious, for all this, that a state-owned school cannot correspond faith-addicted ideas and moral. Some experts, however, would like to highlight the importance moral education. Today however, still we could not speak about moral agenda at public schools, though many would like to initiate moral education.²⁰

Most programs of moral education in the public schools, and virtually all character education programs, ignore religion. Of course, the same might be said of the entire public school curriculum - apart from history courses and historical literature read in English courses. The conventional wisdom of educators appears to be that students can learn everything they need to learn about whatever they study (other than history) without learning anything about religion. In the Hungarian and American deeply religious culture this has not gone unnoticed. Indeed, many religious conservatives are outraged by it, and they take the absence of religion from textbooks and the curriculum to imply hostility to religion. This has fueled the culture wars that now divide many communities, undermining the educational mission of our schools. Much of the culture-war debate about religion in public education has been framed in terms of the combat between two polarized groups: those religious conservatives who would restore prayer to school activities, add creationism to the curriculum, and drop sex education from it; and those liberals who would keep prayer out of schools, keep religion out of the curriculum, and keep sex education in it.²¹ Battles in this culture war are fought regularly in courtrooms, direct-mail campaigns, local school board elections, and national politics.²²

Indeed, we believe that religion need not be nearly so controversial as it now appears to be. In the following, we sketch a general theory of moral education that emphasizes character education but goes beyond it to a conception of liberal education as moral education that allows us to address controversial and foundational moral questions. Then, we will be discussing what we take to be the proper, indeed, the essential role of religion in both character education and in moral education more generally.

Religion must be taken seriously in the public school curriculum, including in moral education, for two fundamental reasons - or families of reasons.

First, there are civic reasons. For instance, the American experiment in liberty is built on the conviction that it is possible to find common ground in spite of deep religious differences. It is rooted in the civic agreement we share as citizens, in our principled commitment to respect one another. Properly understood, this means that we not exclude religious voices from the public square or from public education, but that we take one another seriously. For much of our history, Protestantism enjoyed a favored status in the ceremony, rhetoric, and often in the curriculum and textbooks of public schools. That was unjust; it meant that education did not take others of different (or no) religious convictions seriously. In the 20th century the curriculum has often excluded religion.²³ In public schools this is unjust; it means that we don't take religious people seriously. All sides need to recognize that we cannot resolve the current battles by promoting a particular religion or by excluding all religion from the curriculum.

The civic framework for the role of religion in public schools is provided by the religious liberty.²⁴ For more than 50 years, ever since it first applied the First Amendment to the states, the Supreme Court has held that government, and therefore public schools, must be neutral in matters of religion. It is not proper for public schools to take sides on religiously contested questions. We argue that if schools are to be truly neutral they must be truly fair - and this means including in the curriculum religious as well as secular ways of making sense of the world when we disagree. Government may no more inhibit religion than promote it.²⁵ Second, as we shall see shortly, there are educational reasons for taking religion seriously across the curriculum. A good liberal education should expose students to the major ways humanity has developed for making sense of the world - and some of those ways of understanding the world are religious. An exclusively secular education is an illiberal education.

For both civic and educational reasons, then, public-school educators must think carefully about the treatment of religion in moral education. Of course, this will not be easy given the confusion and controversy surrounding the role of religion in public schools that has been with us since the founding of public education. The challenge is to move beyond both the "sacred public school" where one religion is preferred in school practices and policies and the "naked public school" where religion is kept out in the name of a strict separation of church and state. Both models are unjust and, we believe, unconstitutional.²⁶

In the USA, the Supreme Court added to the Amendment that as government institutions, public schools must be religiously neutral - in two senses: they must be neutral among religions (they can't privilege one religion over another); and they must be neutral between religion and non-religion (they can't privilege religion generally over non-religion).

On the other hand, religion was haunted out of the schools for 40 years during the regime. For all the efforts, in 1990 after the change in the political system, religion was back in the schools. Act 1990. IV, which is also addressed as “religious liberty act”, clearly states that every faithful has the right to exercise his/her religion and could not be discriminated etiher in school or at workplace. The new act (Act 2011.CCVI) embodies the previous act as well as the New Constitution, Article VII (1) and the Act §1 (1).²⁷

1.2. Neutrality at schools

What is not often appreciated is the fact that neutrality is a two-edged sword. Just as public schools cannot promote religion, neither can they inhibit or denigrate religion.²⁸ The courts have also been clear about this - but, of course, here is where the conceptual waters become muddy. What counts as inhibiting or denigrating religion?

We argue that it is anything but neutral to ignore religion. Neutrality cannot mean hostility or even silence. It is, of course, true that public schools cannot be in the business of religious indoctrination; faith formation is properly the province of the family and religious institutions. But at the same time, schools have an obligation to make sure that religion is taken seriously. Neutrality requires fairness to religion. Moreover, we suppose that justice requires that the curriculum of public schools be neutral in a pluralistic democracy. When the public disagrees deeply, public schools should not promote, much less institutionalize, one view and remain silent about others. Unlike private schools, public schools must take the public seriously. For example, because we disagree deeply about which political party has the better policies, it would violate our sense of justice for public schools to take sides, teaching only the policies and values of one party, leaving the other out of the discussion. We also disagree deeply, often on religious grounds, about how to make sense of our lives and the world; hence, public schools should not promote, much less institutionalize, any particular way of making sense of the world be it religious or secular. If public schools are to be built on common civic ground, they must be neutral when we disagree; they must take everyone seriously.

A civil public school is also one that recognizes, in the words of the Statement of Principles, that parents have "the primary responsibility for the upbringing of their children, including education." This means that parents should be informed and involved when the school addresses religion and religious liberty. Of special interest to parents, especially religious parents, are school policies concerning accommodation of student religious needs and requirements.²⁹ Most school officials will try to accommodate requests of parents for excusal of their child from classroom discussions or activities for religious reasons if the request is focused on a specific discussion, assignment or activity. To be sure, the school has a important interest in teaching a child to read. But giving the child an alternate assignment for one book or a few stories is a good way to accomplish the school's educational goal while still protecting the child’s rights.

This does not mean that school officials can or should accommodate all opt-out requests, especially when such requests are extensive. For example, schools could not accommodate parents who want their child to be excused from the world history class every time religion is mentioned, because religion frequently comes up (or ought to) in the study of world civilizations. Courts have recognized that public schools do not have to accommodate every request to opt out of portions of the curriculum. Of course, it isn't always clear just where educators should draw the line. But when parents limit their request to particular lessons or activities, schools should try to provide an alternative for the student.³⁰

Fairness and neutrality concerning religion in the curriculum are possible only when teachers have a clear understanding of their role under the Constitution. Teachers in public schools are employees of the government (or, better, they are there to act on behalf of all citizens). In that capacity, they are subject to the Establishment clause and thus required to be neutral concerning religion while carrying out their duties as teacher. This does not mean, of course, that teachers should be neutral about values. Teachers can and should model and teach the civic values and virtues of citizenship, as well as the core moral values and character traits widely agreed to in the community.

This constitutional requirement of neutrality limits in some respects the academic freedom of the public school teacher. Teachers have the freedom, indeed the obligation, to expose students to the marketplace of ideas. They may not, however, either inculcate or denigrate religion. When teaching about religion, the teacher, like the curriculum, does not take sides concerning religion.³¹

Does this mean a teacher may never mention personal religious views? What should happen when, for example, students ask the teacher to reveal his or her religion? We think that teachers should be free to answer the question, but must consider the age of the students before doing so. Middle and high school students may be able to distinguish between a personal view and the official position of the school; very young children may not. In any case, the teacher may answer with a brief statement of personal belief but may not turn the question into an opportunity to proselytize for or against religion. Teachers, like students, bring their faith through the schoolhouse door each morning. In our view, the Establishment clause does not prohibit teachers from reading a religious book during non-instructional time, saying a quiet grace before meals, or wearing religious jewelry. If a group of teachers wishes to meet for prayer or scriptural study during the school day, we see no constitutional reason why they should not be allowed to do so as long as the activity is outside the presence of students and doesn't interfere with the rights of other teachers.³²

The neutrality required of teachers by the Constitutions intended to prevent the government from imposing religious or anti-religious views on students. True, in settings beyond the school, courts have let stand some traditional acknowledgments of religion in government settings.³³ There are, of course, both secular and religious ways of asking, reflecting on, and answering these unavoidable existential questions. Whether or not we think the various answers that religious traditions have given to these existential questions are reasonable, we must acknowledge the profundity of the attempts, their powerful influence on people's thinking and lives, and the universality of the concerns they address. In fact, it is extraordinary to think that we can claim to educate students while ignoring religious approaches to the deepest questions of human existence.

Of course religion continues to possess a good deal of vitality in our culture. Indeed, because many intellectuals continue to give religious answers to the profound existential questions of life there is a vast contemporary religious literature that explores the implications of religion for virtually every subject in the curriculum: politics and economics, nature and psychology, literature and the arts, sexuality and morality. This literature rarely finds its way into the curriculum, however; instead, we teach students to think about virtually all aspects of their lives and the world in secular categories-uncritically, as it were. And so we have our third reason for taking religion seriously: the study of religion enables students to think critically about what they learn in their secular studies. To see the significance of this a little background may prove helpful.³⁴ As a result, public education nurtures a secular mentality. Indeed, when educators provide students with secular conceptual nets only, when religion is ignored (except in a "safely" historical context) students learn, in effect, that secular nets are adequate for catching all of reality. The conventional wisdom of modern education is that students can learn everything they need to know about every "subject" they study yet know nothing about religious ways of making sense of it. As a result, religion has been intellectually marginalized, rendered irrelevant. No doubt most educators don't intend to do this, yet this is the result.

We have argued that character education cannot (implicitly) give the impression that religion is irrelevant to morality. Even young children should learn that important moral virtues and values can be found in the world's religions. Children's stories about love and romance and marriage and the family should include religious literature.

Character education builds on moral consensus, but obviously there is also a good deal relating to sexuality about which we disagree, often strongly - abstinence and birth control, abortion and homosexuality, for example. Not surprisingly, we also disagree about what to teach students about these things; indeed, we often disagree about whether to teach about such things at all. Our claim is this: if controversial issues are to be included in this education curriculum, then, as always, students must hear the different voices--secular and religious, conservative and liberal; that are part of our cultural conversation.

Finally, as a result we could say that state owned schools are not yet prepared enough to speak about religion. Still we can find places where religion is dealt with as something different, as something unreal. We have to work on religious education. We all know, however, that we cannot interfere into state affairs, and that the state recognizes the church control over Christian education. In Hungary, the church is not really present in public school life, though students would be open to church agendas. In many big cities, for instance, the parish rather hold religious classes on weekends in the church building or parish home, than priest would go to schools to teach. As an explanation, they say that the school management would like to make the classes difficult for religion education, and that they organize out-of-class activities for students in the afternoons in order not to leave enough rooms for religion education. We could, of course, see this problem from both sides. Legally, however, the Codex notes that parents must rely on those schools where the religion education is free and not blocked.³⁵ On the other hand, we could imagine those parents who are continuously facing defense triggered out by this false legislated situation. During our research in Germany, Hungary, United Kingdom and the United States³⁶ in America, we could come across many interesting evidences and proofs for the existence of these difficulties, that later on had formed to encourage us to write this essay. They spring from the natural law in the sense that they are the application to Matrimony of the laws that regulate all contracts and arise from the very nature of things. Ecclesiastical law cannot intervene directly; it is limited to pointing them out and applying opportune measures to prevent as far as possible marriages affected by these different forms of defective consent. The Codex clearly defines the obligation of parents in choosing catholic schools, or if it is not available in the exact territory, they are still supposed to chose an institution in which the catholic education is freely available.³⁷ However, what if there are not any catholic or religion supporting schools in the exact territory? Moreover, we have to be very aware of the fact that public schools are to maintain neutrality. How could they then support religious education? Giving an answer to it, we could only say that the Codex offers one other alternative for it: if there is not any possibility to choose, children could get the proper education within the church as well as parish buildings at the weekends.³⁸ It is, however, not only up to the parents, though the Code clearly points at the obligation of them. This would mean, according to canon 798, that only parents must take the responsibility for it. Therefore, if a failure might come up, parents could be witnessed as those of having responsibility. Notable then, parents are blocked by the environment, so their absolute responsibility could be questioned.³⁹

Parental lack of knowledge certainly causes many problems – and could lead to inadequate or non-existing education of children. It is very difficult, honestly, to bridge over this situation, therefore we must find some other alternatives.

In broken marriages obviously a many questions arise in education. In the Codex, as we have already mentioned throughout our essay, there are not any instructions for broken marriages. It is, on the other hand, does not mean that we cannot find many examples for these special cases from our everyday practice. In these environments the responsibility hangs on the parent who spends most of the time with the children. Thus, a young mother is absolutely taking the responsibility for education, even in the case she is devoted to another person illegally in canonical sense. However, as the legislation having gaps in this field, it is very hard to figure out acceptable solution in these cases. This leads to an obstacle which might prevent the young mother (or father – rarely) to act in time. The essence of this obstacles lies in the illegality of the relation. A mother, for instance, in such situation could not see the sacramental status of a marriage, thus could not be the example before her children – not mentioning other elements. Her attitude to faith would easily change, and then having fear of the situation, she will not come up with the best choice for the children. Moreover, we have not yet mentioned the other party (e.g. her ex-husband, or other), who could form easily a barrier before catholic education by simply being against it. To find a canonically acceptable solution is very difficult. Not just because there is not anything about these relations in the Code⁴⁰ , but because amongst many priests it is handled as a tabu. Some experts may say that these situations can be cured by a good clerical attitude⁴¹ , but we do think that ‘force’ of the other illegal party could lead to an insufficient or non-existing catholic education.

When we would like to discuss juridical obstacles in a deeper way, we should first define what we consider them to be. The term juridical, obviously, is derived from law, thus expressing that these obstacles are in connection with legal affairs. However, here we have to observe many other criteria in order to show which legal field insufficiency might lead to an obstacle. Nevertheless, many would think that we will be dealing with lacuna legis and other anomaly in canonical legislation, but our choice here is a bit complicated. Therefore, we would intend to speak not only about the scriptural failures in the Codex or in civil legislation, but to put under a magnifying glass the following sources of obstacles:

1.Civil legislation in public schools and its impacts on catholic education, including Hungarian, German, English and American civil laws.
2.University education in civil as well as catholic connotation, including the possibilities of Christian youngsters to choose the most appropriate university – talking about advantages or disadvantages of catholic or church owned universities
3.Conserving state neutrality while supporting church universities? How handle this antagonism? (Connecting canon 793 §2 to this affair)
4.The mandate to teach theological disciples and its impacts on catholic education. It should also be observed in connection with human rights of freedom and legally obtained rights.

In the USA, all religious rights are derived from human rights of liberty, thus legally there is religious freedom. It is not surprising, since nowadays all constitutions⁴² denote the principle rights of liberty. However, taking religion into public schools have triggered out many political debates in America – even then, according to the recent survey, more than 70 % of American citizens consider themselves to be religious. The key problem, however, came up when US government wanted to initiate school prayer in public schools. Still, the pledge of allegiance also lies on religious roots, but as being highly connected to the American Nation, nobody would claim it violation of human rights of liberty.⁴³ Today, the First Amendment would intend to clarify the basic principles of religious education in American Schools.

This document does not prohibit purely private religious speech by students.⁴⁴ Students therefore have the same right to engage in individual or group prayer and religious discussion during the school day as they do to engage in other comparable activity. For example, students may read their Bibles or other scriptures, say grace before meals, and pray before tests to the same extent they may engage in comparable non-disruptive activities. Local school authorities possess substantial discretion to impose rules of order and other pedagogical restrictions on student activities, but they may not structure or administer such rules to discriminate against religious activity or speech.

Generally, students may pray in a non-disruptive manner when not engaged in school activities or instruction, and subject to the rules that normally pertain in the applicable setting. Specifically, students in informal settings, such as cafeterias and hallways, may pray and discuss their religious views with each other, subject to the same rules of order as apply to other student activities and speech. Moreover, students may also speak to, and attempt to persuade, their peers about religious topics just as they do with regard to political topics.⁴⁵

Professor Euart also notes that catholic schools must be aided by the state, since religious culture belongs to state culture as well, and that the state and the Church must work together for the common good.⁴⁶ This aspect, however, is highly against of the Constitution, though practically it somehow works. For instance, the Hungarian Constitution denotes that the state and church must be working separately. On the contrary, the state provides aid for religious institution, though only for the profane faculties. This means, for example, that theological disciples such as theology, philosophy and canon law cannot be supported by the state in general.

In Germany, the relation of the state and churches are observed from another point of view.⁴⁷ The German constitution is not separating church and state in cultural affairs, thus having a bit more lighter division. It emphasizes that the church and the state must find those mutual points by which they could serve common good together, thus promoting and fostering healthy social integration. To do this, for instance, the state has taken the effort to collect church’s donation.⁴⁸ The universal opinions about catholic universities is still negative, or viewed as strange phenomena in a society. For instance, in Hungary a catholic university does not correspond with quality in life, though the standard of education meets or even exceeds the average.⁴⁹ The state cannot be biased or partial for the sake of any religious institution, therefore she would like to stay neutral. However, as professor Listl notes in his preface to German concordats, the state can make concordats or contracts with the Church, and by doing this the balance of neutrality is not damaged.⁵⁰

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JÁNOS TALABÉR Educating Catholic Children in the Case of Parental Divorce, Cohabitation and Re-marriage

Introduction

According to a short legendary story, on the first day of the Vatican Council, John Pope XXIII stood up, walked to the windows, opened them and said, “The Church’s window should be always open so that the fresh air could come in.” With this statement he hinted at the Church’s having to be free and open towards the reforms, and serve the faithful of the modern life.⁶¹ The revision of the Code 1917 was in the light of the conciliar work during the council, and the topic education was also not an exception from this. The Code would like to treat this issue much more precisely that its ancestor had done. Within book III, title III is about catholic education, but it talks about the rights and duties in a general sense. Two basic documents of the council, however, are regarded to form the ground of the new Code dealing with education, such as Gravissimum Educationis and Dignitas humanae.⁶² In 1960, when the Pope presented his questions to the Commission, he pointed out some significant factors, such as the role of parents in educational process, and the duty of the State to provide support for these endeavors.⁶³

The initial plan for the preparatory work of the Council was for Constitution, De scholis catholicis,⁶⁴ and a draft of this completed in 1962. It was just thirty- six pages, and spoke about the topics as rights of the family in education, Church education, and other basic principles. The need of preserve, develop and help catholic schools and the cooperation with teachers and parents were also included. It also intended to talk about higher and academic education, and getting grades in the church. It has undergone many discussions, when at the end, the fourth version of it was sent to the Council fathers on 22 April, 1963. The schema was divided into three sections, such as education (1), catholic schools in general (2), and catholic universities (3). There were three other appendices attached to the document, involving some hints about the syntax changes in the Code. In 1964, a request was made that the schema should be treated as a votum, emphasizing the very importance of education and catholic schooling. Some weeks later, another request was issued, and other requirements were noted by the Holy See, including the key points for voting, and asking for another revision of the schema. Finally, in September 1964 the schema was ready for a vote. It proposed that the chapter “Catholic Schools” in the Code 1917 should be changed into “De scholis in genere” (The schools in general), with the addition of the fundamental rights and duties for catholic schools. The title of the schema was “Declaration on Christian Education”, presented by relator J. Deam, bishop of Antwerp.⁶⁵

It was not welcomed by great roars. Some bishops were absolutely against its methods, claiming that the whole text must be demolished and revised. Some others, on the other hand, wanted to go on with the discussion, stating that the time had been not enough to trigger out a so big change in the Code. Finally, however, the vote was taken. Among 2325 voters 2290 voted for “yes”, and 35 voted “no”. Thus, consequently, on 28 October, 1965 Gravissimum Educationis was promulgated in the seventh session of the Council.

The Declaration, as finally reached the Council, was regarded as a brief document. It focused on the importance of education, and the severe role of the Church in this field. The Council, in addition, had insisted on the right to make decision on behalf of the human dignity, and the education according to their ability. The true education, as it had also been stressed, aims at forming the whole person onto being a good Christian, and must be many-faceted.⁶⁶ It had put great demand on the emphasizing the role of parents, the Church, and also making place for the state as well as other educators, claiming to develop young holistically in mind, body, heart and soul.

In the aspect of the Council and the new code, the parental rights had been settled and it seemed to be absolutely clear what these rights and obligations had been. However, as this essay would like to show, there remained many questions opened. The major thing that kept us puzzle through our previous doctoral research as well was that how parental rights and duties can be exercised if the parents get divorced, or there is a partner of life (cohabitation) and also when one or both parents remarry. In these cases, the duties and the rights must be handled more precisely. We do think that the Code does not count on these in every detail. The problem might be that the CIC itself would not account for civil divorce and re-marriage. It only speaks about “legal” separation. However, in the case of a successful nullity case and positive decision, we must account for remarriage, or partnership where the duties and right must also be exercised, and the children must get the proper education.

Participants in education process

It is seriously worth talking about the people standing on the two opposite sides of the education process. First, we are supposed to define those people who are triggering out education, so those who are willing to educate. Second, we most drop some words about those who are the addressee of the education. It is a process – we have consumed; due to this fact, it has a beginning and an end.

The canon 266 in §2 would intend to name the first persons to educate. These are the parents of children.⁶⁷ From this step, therefore, we are willing to sketch up all the people around who could be viewed as educators.

Notably, parents are the first step in education. They are the first people in connection with offspring, and they form a familiar milieu in which a child spends his early years. There is not any other choice for them. Being a parent is equivalent to possessing duties. It is absolutely clarified in the Code. Parents are the basic educators, because they gave birth to their offspring.⁶⁸ On the contrary, it would not be absolutely proper to talk about each person separately. Experts keep saying that the family atmosphere the parents build up is the most important thing. Not only the things they talk about, but the way they behave. A family should be regarded as a small society.⁶⁹ In this small society, it is very notable how everyday life is going on. The interaction between parents and relatives would be the first acquisition of the newborn. Hence, it is not perplexing why the Code puts a great demand on the parental obligations.⁷⁰ Even before the child is due to be delivered, the Code suggest that the mother go to local parish priest for a short discussion. This is could be viewed as a preparatory work for the first initial step: the baptism.⁷¹ For baptism, being the first step to be the child of God, mainly depends on parents in the infant ages. Thus, for education, the parental attitude is very basic. We could observe the educational process from this point. Who could be also responsible for the catholic education the parents exclusive? The Code emphasizes that all Christian faithful must work on building up a Christian life, being entitled to teach and educate people. This is the mission which everyone gets when being baptized.⁷²

The Code denotes the importance of godparents. Godparents must be active members of Christ’s society, active participants in taking the sacraments, and active educators.⁷³ These are the main features that the godparents must sufficiently have. However, we are all aware of the fact that godparents, though being very important in the first years of a child, are actually the least effective persons. What could be the reason for this anomaly?

Though the Church claims a very lot if somebody intends to be a godparent, according to our research, godparents are not sufficient educators, even in a normal Christian family.⁷⁴ However, the Code does not say that they are supposed to take over the role of parents. Thus, the principle responsibility of a godparent is to give witness to the Christian faith by their lives, not, as it is often thought, to take over for parents if something happens to them. The role of godparent obligates one to a sacred responsibility for the whole of one's life. For all this, hereby we have to note one thing: in practice, this additional role of a godparent seems to be simplified as somebody who supplies the infant with goods and money, and will remain in the child’s mind as somebody who always sends presents as Christmas. On the contrary, we still can find many families where the traces of the sacramental status of being a godparent are still visible. Many attempts have already been made even in the frame of church legislation to make the godparental status more effective. Moreover, the new Code, as it has already been mentioned before, would like to define clearly the real candidate for godparents. Still, however, we cannot figure out any acceptable solutions for this matter.

There is one another aspect in this field. The Code says that one of the godparents must be active initiated catholic, the other could be the member of another church. In this case, this non-catholic parent has not any sacramental mission, but still has juridical importance. Therefore, he/she can be viewed as a witness in baptizing. Unfortunately, some experts say that the non-active catholic godparents downgrades him/herself to a simple witness.⁷⁵

Positively, the Code recognizes the non-catholic godparents as witnesses of the evidence of baptism without taking up sacramental positions. However, as denoted before, the catholic godparents could be degraded to witnesses, if they are not an active participants in the Church.⁷⁶

It is obvious that we must divide baptism into two major parts according to its participants. When we wanted to talk about the degrading of godparental status, we mainly concentrated on infant baptism.

The Code has brought back the institution of catechumenatus. Thus, if we are not regarding infant baptism, the candidate must go through a detailed teaching and education before his being baptized and accepted to the Church of Christ. Therefore, in this case, the candidate will intend to opt for his would-be godparent. Since the candidate is of near adult age, he could choose the most appropriate godparent. Because of this, his godparent will be the best example before him, and will fulfill his roles according to the law.⁷⁷

The next supportive people could be the grandparents. It is absolutely agreed that children could acquire a lot from their grandparents. The Code, however, does not mentioned them namely. On one hand, it could be listed as an insufficiency, since the Code ought to have talked about the presence of grandparents. On the other hand, we have to be aware of the fact that the Code follows another structural construction. In many countries, we talk about Family Laws or Family Acts in civil legislation. On the contrary, the Church talks about Marriage Law, where the sacred importance of marriage is underlined, and everything is built upon this.⁷⁸

Depending on the Code, the grandparental status could be derived from two points: first, it could stem from the parental status automatically,⁷⁹ second, it could be picked on where the Code talks about the rights and duties of every Christian faithful.⁸⁰

Still within the frame of a family, we could list many people. However, as denoted before, their duties and rights are listed generally in the Codex Iuris Canonici. Moreover, we must avoid stating evidences, since our work would like to deal with a special problem in this field. Outside the family, we could name – according to the Code – two significant layers of the society. One part could be marked as other non-familiar staff (such as nursery teachers, teachers, educators, etc) and non-familiar professional staff (such as ordinates, bishops, parish priests and religion teachers). Both layers are dealt with in the Code.

The Code talks about the rights and duties of every Christian faithful, and as drawn up before, the non-professional staff could be inserted in that category. In addition, the Codex itself puts them into this category, since it aims to talk about the role of parents, clergy, professional non-clerical staff, and the others. Within these structural categories, the role of parents, as we have talked about it before, is highly underlined and handled in many parts of the Code.⁸¹ The role of the professional staff is also forming a category.⁸² In this field the Codex defines two parts of education. The public education, and the academic one. It is highly similar to civil legislation. In Hungary as well as in western countries, the education is divided into the former two categories. This is very significant to be made difference. The Codex Iuris Canonici denotes this difference as well and the conditions are not the same as well.. It has already been a question of great debates whether the capacity of a university lecturer is degraded by canon 812 or not. However, what is absolutely sure is that the Code requires much more control on academic education than on public one. Why did the Code enhance this?

Notably, the Church while training professional staff is much more serious. This means, moreover, that the Church must have guarantee on her professional work, and so it is inevitably severe to have a wide overwhelming control.⁸³

Academic control, on the other hand, seems to be a great factor of contemporary debates. Many experts would tend to emphasize initiating mandate required in canon 812 will trigger out an enormous dilemma. Is it a concrete ban that simply makes the teacher incapacitas to teach holy disciples at the universities or it is just formal impediment?⁸⁴

To take everything into account when we regard the participants of education process, on the side of educators we were able to make out the following list:
- parents, who are congenitally responsible for the education of their offspring.
- godparents, who share sacred responsibility for education their godchildren, but not taking over the role of the parents, but standing as example of an active Christian faithful.
- other familiar people (e.g. grandparents and others, but as for the Code they take the responsibility of every Christian faithful.)
- other non-familiar, non-professional people (e.g. nursery teachers, teachers, friends)
- other non-familiar professional staff:

o diocesan bishops
o ordinates
o local ordinates
o monastery leaders
o parish priests
o other clerics
o monks, nuns
o layman religion teachers

On the other side we could not make such a long list. However, a simple division is produced by the Codex: the education process is viewed from the moment when the subject (e.g. the person) has been first educated. Hence, we could see the person from his/her infant baptism, so he/she is under Christian education from the very moment of his/her birth. Second, we could talk about adult education, when the person, after the catechumenatus, is initiated and further educated. As a result, however, both education must have the same aim: well- initiated, active member of the society of Christ’s.

Mission and preaching and their impacts on education

Our dealing with these two terms under a separate title might be systematically questioned. However, it is very important to clarify these two terms, and it is very notable that the Codex handles them separately as well. Hence, for us it was absolutely without any doubt to discuss them under this new title. Moreover, we consider that these termini must be talked of very carefully, since their functions are not totally in accordance with education.⁸⁵

The Codex as well as the Second Vatican Council denotes that the Church in herself is a mission, since her primer aim is to sow the seeds of Christianity all over the World.⁸⁶ This means that in general, the basic essence of Church, in herself, is mission. On the contrary, mission is a special work, by which the spell of God is spread amongst non-Christian peoples.⁸⁷

Thus, mission is a special kind of work, which requires specially trained staff. Notable, however, that the Code makes out a lists of people being

engaged with mission: the Pope, college of bishops, diocesan bishops, other bishops, members of consecrated institutions, missionaries, religion teachers, etc.⁸⁸

The Code avoids defining preaching, but it clearly identifies the people who are entitled to preach. Preaching requires someone who bears the sacrament of ordo. Hence, the capability⁸⁹ of preaching is derived from ordo consecration. However, the possibility to give permission for laymen to preach could be absolutely regarded as one of the innovative bombshells of the Second Vatican Council.⁹⁰ The Code says that all priests have rights to preach in every church, though they have to suppose the consensus of the proper rector ecclesiae.⁹¹ The Code then talks about the possibility given to layman, though it denotes that homily cannot be carried out if the person does not possess ordo sacramentale. As the Code clearly assumes that homily cannot be done by layman, the local ordinate has no rights to give suspension from this impediment.⁹² It is important since after the Council in some special cases, the ordinate was able to give suspension. On the contrary, the Code undoubtedly expresses that giving explanation on the spell of our Lord must require a sacramental capability, so without having this sacrament, the person is not able to carry homily out.⁹³

Throughout these canons about preaching, its time and place are mentioned. Every Sunday and Fest preach and homily are supposed to be done by the priest. These must not be omitted, only if there is a serious reason. It is highly recommended, if there are many people attended, especially in the period of Advent and Lent. It is also preferable during mourning masses or during other recommended fests.⁹⁴

Mission and preaching have impacts on education, though the Code as well as canonical experts are dealing with them in another aspects. What are then the consequences we have to denote? First, obviously their Christian essence. Mission, in general meaning, is the most preferable task for every Christian faithful, starting from parents to all people in the world. Mission, in special coherence, is the severe work of people in order to spread the seeds of the spell of our Lord in the non-Christian territories of the world. Both could be viewed as the roots of the primer education. In general meaning, the education is launched by parents because they have felt touched by the missionary intention of the Almighty. In special coherence, the seeds thrown by missionaries will form a basis in those non-Christian territories, and then they could stand as examples before would-be parents.

Preaching, on the other side, has a bit of difference in function. Since preaching itself is a kind of education. Whereas mission either in general or particular is a special work, preaching is absolutely functioning as education. The way, however, is different. Preaching has a time and place. Education has no these limits. Preaching is rather connected to a sacramental action (eg. holy mass), while education in itself is a process for a life time. That is why preaching is the sub-clause of education, a special kind, when the spell of Christ, throughout a holy mass, is transferred towards people.

When considering their impacts on education, both could be viewed as parts of it. Both as slices of a cake which together would make up a whole. Therefore, preaching and mission could not be handled separately. They must be there in our everyday life, and parents must be aware of their significance.

The valid (sacramental) marriage

In order for a valid marriage to occur, there are three basic requirements:
1. competent parties;
2. sufficient knowledge;
3. full consent.

If one or more of these is missing, a valid marriage doesn't occur even if the ceremony takes place. For example, a drunk man cannot validly take wedding vows because he is not a competent party. That is what the "annulment" process investigates; was there a valid sacramental marriage or not. If the finding of the Church is that a valid marriage did not occur due to a particular defect, then the person is free to marry again, although they will certainly have to face the damage done by a broken "marriage". It may be necessary in a particular circumstance for a couple to separate for the safety and/or well being of one or both persons. Divorce, per se, then is not necessarily a mortal sin as it may be a necessary course of action (although it is certainly damaging to all involved). The problem comes in if one attempts to marry again. If the first marriage was in fact valid, then it is not possible to dissolve, and the couple are still married until death, even if the situation demands that they separate for the safety and/or well being of one or both persons. Such a person would need to be reconciled to their spouse, or if that is not possible, live contently.⁹⁵ The reason is that Christ elevated marriage back to its original status before the fall of Adam and Eve. Since the "two become one flesh," divorce is not like breaking two people apart, but like tearing one person in half. The New Testament clearly teaches that the dissolution of a valid marriage is not possible.⁹⁶

St. Paul addresses the marriage of "unbelievers." Since those who are not baptized cannot have a sacramental (e.g. supernatural) marriage but only a natural marriage, St. Paul is illustrating that a merely natural marriage is dissoluble, but a sacramental one is not.⁹⁷

Though the laws of the Old Ttestament did know about divorce in case of adultery, the New Testament would not allow that. If Jesus was not allowing divorce in the case of adultery, what was he saying? First of all, it must be pointed out that St. Matthew, writing to a Jewish audience, is the only one to record the "exception clause." None of the other passages of scripture that deal with this issue record any exception. Why is Matthew - writing to Jews - the only one to record a provision that would have been more important to convey to the Roman-Greco audience of the other authors? There are several possibilities: he may be saying that divorcing an adulterous wife is not what makes her adulterous because she is so already. Another possibility is that Jesus is referring to marriages that are not possible to begin with due to an insurmountable defect like incest⁹⁸.

Aside from all of the above arguments, there is a further argument from the point of view of simple practicality. If it were true, as some Protestant exegetes claim, that Jesus is allowing for divorce after adultery, then that would lead to some very strange church discipline. Anyone wanting out of a marriage could do so on the technicality of having to commit adultery first. They could always assure themselves of forgiveness later and could thereby rationalize following their whims and desires.

Indissoluble sacramental marriage, however, does not imply that there are no couples out of the frame of the marriage. Moreover, nowadays unfortunately 50 % of the marriages leads to civil divorce, even then the marriages were canonical ones. Therefore, for us it is inevitable to deal with those people who are living in cleft families. Cleft families, thus, are always in the focus of the catholic church, and even in these days when the respect of the sacramental marriage is put behind.

Many reasons could be piled up for interpreting why the marriage bond has broken up. Amongst these reasons there is adultery, alcoholic problems, financial failure, desertion, cruelty, sexual incapacity, and the disturbance of the in-laws. Rare is the case when break up was triggered by religious differences or other religious reasons. Still, we have to see that sometimes the separation of the spouses is not avoidable, and that for the good of the children it has been inevitable to provide.⁹⁹ We have to take into consideration, on the other hand, that parental rights and duties also change in such a situation. Let us, therefore, go through the main changes of parental obligations.

First thing that comes into our mind is about the sharing of the goods involving the most important phenomena: the children. Whenever a divorce takes place, the court has to decide who will give the residence for the kids. Notably we have used the word ‘residence’. It was not a fault or the slip of our tongue. It was rather to show that giving residence for the children is not equivalent to bringing them up or educating them. We have to continuously state that education hangs on the parents. As a child normally has two parents, one mother and one father, they have to mutually share the responsibility of education towards their offspring. But how and what extent do the divorced share this responsibility? The Code defines the parental obligation very clearly in canons 793-795. It does speak generally to the parents, and therefore to both of them. It does not take into account the possibility of the divorced couples; hence it is aimed at both parents. Thus, clear enough that both parents are responsible for education.¹⁰⁰ Notably, on the contrary, that the courts in general condemns the offspring for the mother on the first instance, and only if there is severe reason against the mother capability of bringing up the children could be the decision different on other instances. It means that normally the kids stay at the mother’s residence, and that the father gets only time intervals for visiting the children. (e.g. visit-hours). If the procedure of the divorce goes on freely and smoothly, the father gets every other weekend for visiting hours.¹⁰¹

Counting with these alternatives, it is obvious that the divorced parents cannot have equivalent possibilities to teach and educate their children. If we take a one-week period, the mother is in contact with the child for 6 days, whereas the father meets him/her only once for a day per week. Therefore, although according to the Code both parents are equally represented as educators, in practice it will not work. As the rate 6:1 is very significant for the mother’s sake, she must be the primer educator of the child. This would imply that the mother must take up the duty described in canons 793-795, and that the father – though not being with the kid – should be an additional person in education. Using a cliché, we should say that the mother is starring in this process, while the father is only a supportive character. The unique Church of God cannot let these families slip aside, and She has to support theses mothers or fathers bringing up children alone. However, to maintain the Christian dogmas and normative, the Church must not place them as example before faithful. On the other hand, she must embrace these cleft families and deal with the children coming from them in the same manner.¹⁰² How catechize the cleft families and how define the roles within them?

First, we have to define the hours and days related to the connection with the children. This means that we clearly must see how much time the children spend with the parents.

Second, we have to be aware of the age of the children. This must be a pillar in our work, since for children education the time of the divorce is very significant. If upon the time, a very early divorce could be more ‘beneficial’ than a school-time divorce. Up to the age of 5, the mother could easily take up the whole process of education without notable damage.¹⁰³

It is definitely very important to clarify the affection of the child. For instance, if the child’s residence is at those of the parents’ whom she/he like less, the bed of the conflicts is instantly implanted.

After these certain significant knowledge, we have to be aware of the religious background. If for instance the religious uptake is very strong in the parents (or the residential one), we could be almost certain that the basis of the Christian belief will be planted well. But here we have several possibilities – unfortunately. As what if the non-residential party is religious, and the residential is not. Imagine a situation in which the mother – with whom the child is put up – is not religious and therefore she does not want Christian education for child. The father, who has only visiting hours, would like to give religious education for his child. Thus, there will be a strict contradictory, a circulus viciosus, which could not be easily solved.¹⁰⁴ The other version, in which the non-residential party would stand against religious education will cause less problem, because in this case the residential party shares the highest responsibility for it.

Last, but not least, we must clarify the basic principles for education, and that if the couple has had canonically legal marriage there are no other chances for re-marrying. This, we would say, is the greatest problem nowadays. Young lonely mother would like to have someone beside her, and therefore would like to get married. As she cannot do this legally in the Church, she could only choose between three alternatives:
1. First, she forgets about the church, and therefore she neglects her parental duties in the field of Christian education. As a result, she will have an out-of-marriage relation, or she gets married civilly again.
2. Second, she takes up the whole responsibility for education, but she will hold up a connection with a man as a boyfriend, who will either be serious as potential stepfather or not, but the family will have this significant cripple, with many additional problems.¹⁰⁵
3. Third, she would run for the nullity process of marriage, and after being disappointed with the result, she would opt for the first two possibilities.

For canon lawyers, for us, these situations would trigger out many moral questions. Acting in accordance with the Code, we could only suggest two possibilities: nullity process or separation. Honestly, however, these would not solve the problem in roots. Nullity process, if it worked, would cause that the first canonical marriage has been not valid and that the parties are free in state again. This normally means that the time is rewound, and the couple is dealt with as if they were before the marriage. However, canon 226 § 2 reminds us of a very important thing: we call the parents parents not because of a legal marriage, but due to the action they have given life to their children. Thus, parents are responsible for Christian education because they delivered a child. Hence, according to this canon parental status is not derived from a legal marriage, nullity process will not abolish the parental rights and duties. Separation, on the other side, would not solve the problem either, since the young mother has the serious need of someone standing by her psychically as well as physically. In addition, being aware of the nature of human personage, physical need is much stronger than anything else. We would not, surely, ask every young lonely mother to live a monastery life, would we? And as the separation in the Codex does not let the party have any connections (e.g. the separation was made out for the wellness of the children and the mother in danger), the problem drawn up beforehand still remains an obstacle.¹⁰⁶ From a pastoral point of view, it is inevitable to observe the divorced families from the point of reasoning. Why did the divorce take place? What was the key circumstance leading to a civil divorce? It is sure, therefore, to make differences between the divorced. Thus, we cannot simply make judgments on divorced couples, young cohabiting mothers and fathers. Theologians and canonists insisted on the indissolubility of the marriage bond, and allowed only separation (divortium a mensa et thoro) for the gravest offences. Many marriages were declared null and void on various grounds. Judicial divorce for adultery was introduced at the Reformation, and in 1573 the Scots Parliament passed an act which allowed complete divorce on the grounds of desertion.¹⁰⁷

Since World War II an entirely new concept has been introduced as a basis for legislation on divorce on both sides of the Border. This is "the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage", on which the Divorce Reform Act, 1969 and the Divorce Act 1976 were founded. The application of the doctrine in practice might be thought to lead to highly subjective and controversial judgments or to endless enquiries into the nature of the "breakdown". The two historic ones of adultery and desertion, a new one of "behavior" which subsumes and extends the earlier pattern of cruelty, insanity, etc, and two completely new grounds of two years non-cohabitation (with consent) and five years non-cohabitation (without consent). Only two general remarks need to be made here. One is that only two of the grounds for divorce given in the Act are acceptable as being in accordance with Scripture and the Confession of Faith. The other is that as a result of this non-Biblical increase in the legal provisions for divorce, the Church will be faced with a correspondingly larger number of difficult problems.

This can be seen from the series of annual statistics published by the Registrar General. Away back at the beginning of the century less than 200 divorces were registered each year¹⁰⁸ , adultery being the most common ground. The introduction of cruelty and other grounds in 1964 caused the figures to jump out of the hitherto normal trend. Divorces in 1976, the last full year under the 1964 Act were:

Not just the evidence of cohabitation with another party could cause great problems, non-cohabitation (e.g. sexual failure of the parents) is now the largest single cause (48%), with behavior a close second. Desertion, which was the cause of more than half the divorces fifty years ago, has dwindled remarkably, and adultery accounts for only 13% of the total. It cannot be assumed, however that these fundamental matrimonial offences are in fact less common than before (quite the contrary, especially adultery) but in the divorce suits they may well be masked by non-cohabitation. Lest it be thought that civil marriages are much more likely to end in divorce than religious ones, it should be noted that of the divorces granted in 1985, 5739 (43%) terminated civil marriages.

As the divorce rate rises to the point where one marriage in four (one in three in England, one in two in Hungary) is dissolved by the courts, and sexual promiscuity abounds, we have to ask, as we did in the case of marriage when is a divorce valid? The Church can only answer: only if it is authorized by the Scriptures. Yet the Church cannot see the contemporary situation in pure black and white. Divorce on un-Biblical grounds will occur within its own borders; also problematic marriages following on such divorces. And there will be the growing number of broken homes, one parent families and other forms of human misery that are already a shame, as well as a cause for deep concern, to our secularized society.¹⁰⁹

At this point, and as a help to our understanding of the problems which confront us today, we once more may look more closely the New Testament teaching on divorce. There is, for example, the use of porneia (fornication) in Mt.5:31,32 and Mt.19:9 instead of moicheia (adultery). Foster points out that the former is the "more generic term for sexual uncleanness (and) may be used of all kinds of illicit sexual intercourse ... “¹¹⁰ The depths of depravity to which porneia could sink, are indicated in Paul's first letter to the congregation in that city¹¹¹ , and he adds “and such were some of you". They had been rescued by the power of the Gospel. Even so, Paul had to warn them against their environment.

Under such conditions adultery was not taken seriously by the majority. True, the older laws of Greece and Rome, as well as of the Jews, regarded marital infidelity as an extremely grave offence, but the wives were more tightly bound by the codes than the husbands. In New Testament times, a Greek wife was required to be docile and faithful, while her husband could consort with as many women as he pleased. Roman wives were claiming the same freedom as men, and things got to the point where the emperor Augustus had to banish his daughter to the Black Sea area because of her notorious adulteries. The Jews of the diaspora tended to become contaminated by the laxness of Gentile morals.

Divorce was permitted under the three legal systems already mentioned. Jewish, Greek and Roman - and in all three it had originally been the prerogative of the husband to repudiate his wife by a simple declaration or by letter (bill of divorcement). In New Testament times changes were taking place. Roman wives could initiate divorce proceedings at will; Greek wives could also take action, but with more difficulty. Amongst the Jews there was much less freedom for women: the only known case of actual divorce by a wife was that of Salame, sister of Herod the Great¹¹² , but the Herods were a law unto themselves.¹¹³ How did Paul and the other apostles deal with converts from such a background and with very doubtful antecedents? This is an important question for the Church today, when moral and social standards are deteriorating towards the low levels just described. From the verse already quoted Paul obviously knew the shameful record of some of his converts. "But' he immediately adds, "ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God". They were new men and women in Christ: the old file was closed and a new one opened. To an age steeped in porneia, no challenge would have been so strange as the Gospel's insistence on extra-marital chastity and fidelity in both partners to a marriage. The rapid spread of Christianity and the acceptance of its norms of conduct was proof of the Spirit's power behind the message. From that evidence we can take comfort and courage for the future as we face the widespread porneia of our own day.

For about a thousand years the Church had to walk in parallel with the State where marriage and, especially, divorce were concerned; not even Christian emperors would allow secular law to relax its control of matrimonial affairs. Today the Church is back to that position visa-vis the State, and some profit can be derived from a study of what happened in those early times. For example, we can guard against extreme views of the kind that developed as a reaction against external influences. In the very early days, while porneia was still a grave moral threat, Tertullian and others regarded marriage itself as unclean or even sinful: its sexual element could be justified only by the need to propagate the race so that God's saving purpose could be fulfilled. With regard to divorce, the Church's attitude gradually hardened against the facilities provided by civil legislation, until it finally formulated two principles that would seem un-Biblical: marriage is a sacrament and that it is completely indissoluble.

Divorce for adultery

When we consider the particular cases we are likely to come across in our pastoral work, we become much more aware of the presence of the secular law in its various aspects. As was the case with our predecessors of over a 1000 years ago, the State allows us to marry a man and a woman provided certain legal requirements are met, and we have a further freedom to refuse to officiate at a marriage if we know, or have reason to believe, that there are Biblical or moral reasons against its validity. But with divorce the State presents our with a fait accompli. It arrogates to itself the exclusive right to loosen the marriage bond, and, as we have seen, exercises that right on some grounds which the Church cannot accept. Nevertheless, each divorced person we meet has had to pass through the courts in one way or another, and if we have to deal with him or her in our pastoral capacity, or in relation to Church discipline, or as a party to a second marriage, we may well have to give anxious thought to factors which determined the civil court's decision.

It has to be emphasized at this point that these guidelines do not attempt to deal with the complicated web of judicial and legal procedures which surrounds actions for divorce and which only experienced lawyers can untangle with any confidence. The following paragraphs take up, in a general way, some salient points of current law which have a long history behind them and have been of importance to both Church and State. Are there recognizable defenses against charges of adultery?

The ancient canon law¹¹⁴ and, subsequently, civil law have always recognized that participation in adultery must be voluntary. A woman who is raped by a man other than her husband (a sad possibility nowadays) is not held to be guilty of adultery, nor is one who is forced by her husband to resort to prostitution. These exculpatory defenses must be clearly distinguished from other reasons for not granting divorce, such as collusion between the parties, or condonation of adultery (as defined by statute). Proof of adultery has always been recognized that in the nature of the case, positive, incontrovertible proof can seldom be established. Even in the case of the woman brought before Christ¹¹⁵ strict Jewish Law required a concurrence of independent testimonies which would be most difficult to obtain. This does not exclude, of course, the possibility of securing direct evidence. Direct admission by the particigants is acceptable as evidence, and if the courts are convinced that it is genuine, they will regard it as sufficient proof of adultery. There is the possibility, perhaps remote, that the admission is made with ulterior motives.

If the wife has a child by another man, this, in itself, should be irrefutable proof of adultery, but it is subject to some "ifs" and "buts”. The wife may be able to prove rape as defense. On the other hand, the father must be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt (or balance of probability) that he is not the father of the child. In law there is always a strong presumption that any child born by his wife is his.¹¹⁶ Modern science provides reasonably reliable proofs by means of blood and genetic tests, but at present the civil courts (as distinct from criminal courts) have no power to order them.

Sharing a hotel bedroom, and other situations which would give opportunity for adultery, may justify inference of guilt, provided adequate proof is forthcoming that the parties have been together in such compromising conditions. But such proof does not amount to positive proof of adultery: it only creates a strong presumption. For one thing, hotel cohabitation has been notoriously simulated in the past, and, again, people can find themselves in compromising situations by accident and not by design, and without any breach of moral integrity.

Divorce for desertion

What is the legal concept of desertion in relation to marriage? How is it biblically justified? These are questions which we have to explore a little before going on to current statutory provisions and the practice of the courts.

The medieval canon law would not grant complete divorce (a vinculo) for desertion, but it might take it into account along with extreme cruelty (saevitia) in granting separation (a mensa et thoro). If a man abandoned his wife and went to live elsewhere, efforts would be made to induce him to return to her, but if he could show some good reason for his conduct, such as infidelity on her part, he might be granted a decree of separation but not the right to remarry.¹¹⁷ They were then to notify the ecclesiastical authorities who if also unsuccessful, were to excommunicate him. The marriage could be ended by divorce provided the deserted spouse had always shown willingness to adhere.

The desertion must be willful, intentional - not just a prolonged absence, as in the case of a diplomat serving abroad, or a man serving a prison sentence. On the other hand, desertion need not involve a flight abroad or a new residence for the deserting party. He/she can remain under the same roof and deliberately seek to end the marriage by withdrawing from cohabitation. There is always the possibility that a husband or wife may leave home for a time without any idea of deserting, and then form the intention while away. For example, in an actual case, a wife went to stay with a relative on holiday. Some weeks later she informed her husband by letter that she had decided not to return. She was in desertion from that time. "Without reasonable cause" - This qualifying phrase has evidently been in the mind of Church and State for centuries. The "reasonable cause" most frequently put forward in the past was adultery. A husband or wife would rather leave home than bring an immediate action for divorce on learning of the other spouse's infidelity. In that case he/she could not be held to have deserted. Today, what is popularly known as "unreasonable behavior" (see next section) is a ground for divorce, and it would presumably qualify as a "reasonable cause" in a case of desertion. "A genuine and reasonable offer to adhere" - as we have seen, this concept of "adhering" is of ancient date. It meant that the deserted party was willing to preserve the marriage and to cohabit with the other if he/she returned. In practice the concept gave rise to many problems in the courts. Under present law, the deserted spouse, if seeking a divorce for desertion, must not have refused a "genuine and reasonable offer to adhere" from the deserter during the two year period of non-cohabitation, In other words, if a man abandons his wife and home for a period of two years, but during that time has made an offer to resume marital relations which was both genuine and reasonable, but which his wife did not accept, he is not in desertion.

Divorce for behavior

There is no Scriptural warrant for divorce on these grounds. This is quite clear. However, practically it exists and thus we have to deal with this possibility as well. The statute is disarmingly simple in its terms but cannot by legal authorities reveals hidden depths from which a multitude of practical problems will swarm to the surface as time goes on. Already the number of divorces granted for behavior greatly exceeds those in the older categories, and cases are bound to appear in congregations of all Churches. Ministers and presbyteries may find themselves faced with complexities which only a lawyer familiar with divorce proceedings can understand. This "behavior" heading subsumes sane states of mind or types of conduct which have engaged the attention of Church and State for centuries, and which are still very much with us. These guidelines disclaim any intention to expound statute law in detail: that is a task for lawyers. In this particularly tricky field only a few fairly obvious.¹¹⁸ There is considerable room for subjective criteria in making judgments of this kind.

Responsibility for education in these cases

What are then the rates of responsibility in these forms of relations? In the first case, after our defining the ground of the broken marriage, we must figure out the parties’ responsibilities. Generally, on the other hand, both parties are responsible for the problem. But we can count with the reason drawn up beforehand, and that the young mother will have a strong crave for an understanding soul. To sum up these, we must say that principally that party of the parents shares the highest responsibility for education whom the children are living with. It is to make it sure that the children will get the proper education, notably the Christian initiation. This means that in a cleft family priests, religion teachers, and other professional staff must have a very hard missionary work. This work, moreover, has to be pious, humble, Christian job, and we must not take any judgment on the family. On the contrary, we have to save the Christian values throughout our education, therefore it is inevitable to have a good connection with the parents, even in divorce, even in rows, and that we cannot support out-of marriage relationships or cohabitation. However, it is very difficult task for us, canon lawyers or religion teachers, because sometimes our feelings would dictate our deeds straightly opposite the canons. For instance, canons would exclude any relation of the young lonely mother or father, even in the case of adultery or desertion. We all know, however, that it would not work, that the Church cannot simply sentence a young, left mother to virginity. This gap, we have to admit, will never be bridged. The only thing pastors could do is to ignore the relation of the mother until it does not cause any obstacle in the education of the children, and as canon lawyers, we could only suggest running for a nullity process as a try. This is, to be honest, just some small amount of water onto the forest in flames, but yet it is the only acceptable solution.

Another question could arise if we accept the new relation of the young party. In this case, we could define the responsibility shared within the frame of cohabitation. For instance, the new boyfriend of the young lonely mother could build up a very good connection with his stepchildren, he could be an educator as well. Even in those cases when the marriage beforehand was with a man, who afterwards did not support religious education. Nowadays this kind of relation is not rare either. The canonical question is then whether this boyfriend (or girlfriend) could take over the task of the real parent or not. As canon 226 §2 informs us about the essence of being parents, this would exclude the educating task of a person in cohabitation. Canonically, we cannot find the answer in the Codex. As the Code just talking about the marriage as if it were going on precisely according to the Code¹¹⁹. Even, for example, child adoption is not mentioned either. Hence, there is again a lacuna legis, because the adopting parents could not meet the requirements of canon 226 §2 in a biological sense. However, nobody would deny the evidence of responsibility in the case of child adoption. Moreover, Pope John Paulo defines the overwhelming love in those parents who adopt an infant.¹²⁰ Deriving our thesis from this fact, we could say that a partner in the cohabitation would function in parallel with the parents who adopt a child. It seems to be a strict parallel, which might put up many other moral questions. How is it possible to view a partner in an illegal relationship together with parents who fully driven by love would like to adopt a child? Notably, before making out our theory in this field, we had to observe the canons, the papal letter very carefully. But in what way do the canons talk about adopting parents? In what way do the canons talk about godparents? They are, of course, different from one another. However, canon 872 denotes that godparents are to support the parents. This support, in certain cases, would mean that godparents must act instead of the parents if necessary. From this fact, we can come to a conclusion that adopting parents are acting instead of the biological parents in certain ways, thus they are responsible for the Christian education of the children. In addition, this task is highly idolized in the papal documents. The Church rather suggest adoption than assisted reproduction and it talks about adoption as the only solution for infertility. Honestly, this could also be a matter of long debates, but notably it is not our task to discuss now.

Getting onto our final consequence, a cooperating partner in a cohabitation could be observed as supportive person in education, highly similar to godparents or adopting parents. The relationship with the children, as later civilly stepfather or stepmother, could be as good as the real parent has had - or even more better, which for insuring the Christian education could not be neglected. Therefore, we cannot simply refuse anyone who, though living in a cohabitation, would intend to pursue the best opportunities for his/her kid, and thus the best possibility for catholic education. We cannot play he role of God, being totally equipped against such people. Rather we have to be cooperative with these people even in the case their marriage cannot be sanctified.

Bibliography

BAUM, G., Compassion and Solidarity, Montréal 1988.

BÁNK, I., Kánoni jog II., Budapest 1962.¹²¹

BARKET R., The Pitfalls of Imprimatur: A Gloss on Canon 827 §2, in Angelicum 77 (2000) 165-202.

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BERNARD, F., Ehe im Kirchenrecht nur Problemfall oder verheissungsvolle Lebensform?, in Bibel und Liturgie 72 (1999) 95-99.

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Krisztián Dombrádi The sociology of religion as a sociology of knowledge, trends and challenges

Introduction

In the study of the process of secularization, functional differentiation, which is a distinctive and even defining feature of modern societies, is particularly important. In this sense, different sectors of society (e.g. politics, economy, education) are becoming increasingly autonomous and no longer require religious legitimacy. According to Niklas Luhmann, who approaches sociology from the perspective of systems theory, social systems such as law, politics, and economics operate according to an autonomous logical mechanism. Two years after Luhmann’s death in 1998, André Kieserling published his systems theory interpretation of the sociology of religion, which was itself a theoretical milestone. Religion, Kieserling suggests, is a functional subsystem of modern society, which, like all other subsystems, is shaped by autopoietic and meaning-rich communication. Religion purports to explain, without contradiction, the relationship between the transcendent and the immanent in everyday life. Faith becomes a personal end product the power of which rests in its uniqueness and intimacy. In modern society, religion has become a social subsystem, now so complex that a separate science, theology, has been built around it.

The systems theory of religion addresses important issues ranging from meaning and development to secularization, and it turns decades of sociological assumptions on their head. It offers a new vocabulary and a fresh philosophical and sociological approach to one of society’s most fundamental phenomena.

1. Secularization

1.1. The impact of secularization on the social roles of religion

Before delving into the theoretical questions, we would do well to pause and consider the increasing pace of secularization in postmodern society. We must ask, in other words, how this process has affected the roles of religion in society.

As a social process, secularization has transformed the relationship of modern and postmodern societies to religion, with religion playing an ever smaller role in private and public life, including within various institutional systems. The accelerating pace of secularization under the influence of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has had a significant impact on the role and function of religion in society.

The concept of secularization itself can be interpreted in several ways. Essentially, it refers to the separation of religion from other spheres of society, most importantly politics, education, and the sciences. Max Weber, perhaps the single most prominent figure in the field of sociology to study this process, described secularization in terms of “disenchantment” (Entzauberung). Weber suggests that the world is becoming increasingly rational and increasingly understandable from the perspective of the sciences, while religious teachings are being pushed to the margins. Secularization thus refers not only to the decline in the influence of religious institutions; it also means the waning of religion as a social narrative and interpretative framework¹²⁸.

Émile Durkheim, another representative of the classical theory of secularization, also called attention to the waning role of religion, while the sciences and industrialization, he noted, were gaining ground in many spheres of life.

In the study of the process of secularization, functional differentiation, which is a distinctive and even defining feature of modern societies, is particularly important. In this sense, the different sectors of society sectors of society (e.g. politics, economy, education) are becoming increasingly autonomous and no longer require religious legitimacy. According to Niklas Luhmann, who approaches sociology from the perspective of systems theory, social systems such as law, politics, and economics operate according to an autonomous logical mechanism in which religion no longer plays a separate role.

The teachings of the Church unquestionably played a dominant role in social structures such as systems of government, education, and moral norms for centuries. As the process of secularization has progressed, however, these institutions have gradually lost their influence, especially in Western societies.

Perhaps the most significant event in this process was the separation of church and state,¹²⁹ which made it possible for political systems to function free of religious influence. This idea is one of the fundamental pillars of modern democracies. In principle, it is intended to ensure that government does not interfere in religious affairs and that churches and other religious groups do not influence decision making on the state level. The separation of church and state does not, however, mean that religion can be excluded from public life altogether, as the principle is based first and foremost on the clear division of powers and the common good.

Similarly, the sciences and scientific methodologies have become the guiding principle in educational systems. As religious festivals, rituals, and norms gradually became more a matter of personal preference than social (or even political) obligation, religious belief itself was increasingly a matter of personal choice and was relegated more and more to the private sphere.

In recent decades, however, several studies have suggested that secularization is not a uniform process and that it does not occur in all societies in the same way. Secularization, thus, has not meant the complete disappearance of religion from society, but merely a transformation of its functions and roles. While religion used to be the primary source of social norms and thus arguably could be understood as a centripetal force, today it has become dominated by pluralism and diversity. In modern societies, religion finds expression as a form of cultural identity rather than a binding belief system. In many cases, religious practices and systems of belief have lost their normative (centripetal) role and have become a matter of personal, individual choice. The decline in the influence of churches (broadly understood) does not necessarily mean the disappearance of faith, but rather has led merely to a transformation of how people experience faith in everyday life.¹³⁰

Secularisation thus has had a complex and multifaceted impact on the roles of religion in society. While religion has come to play a strikingly smaller role than it used to in political, economic, and educational systems, it is nevertheless still present in various social spheres, if in different forms. It can therefore be concluded that secularization does not mean the disappearance of religion but only its transformation, especially in the areas of individual religious practice and community life. The relationship between religion and secular society will remain dynamic in the future, especially given the transformations brought about by globalization and cultural diversity.

1.2. Theories of secularization

Theories of secularization venture explanations from an array of perspectives as to how and why religion has come to play an ever-smaller role in the lives of individuals and society. Below, I examine these theories in more detail and offer several examples.

1.2.1. Classical theories of secularization

Classical theories of secularization constitute an important part of modern sociological thought. These theories attempt to describe, first and foremost, the process by which religion and its influence have gradually become increasingly marginalized. Fundamentally, they suggest that, as a result of modernization, industrialization, urbanization, and scientific progress, religion has lost much of its social weight and has become more a part of the private life of the individual, while so-called rational and science-based thinking has come to play an ever more prominent role¹³¹ . Classical theories of secularization can be traced back to the writings of influential sociologists, such as Max Weber and Peter Berger.

1.2.1.1. Max Weber

Max Weber, one of the founders of German sociology and economics, is famous for his penetrating analysis of the interrelationship between modernity, religion, and capitalism. His theory of secularization is key to understanding the relationship between modernity and religion.

As noted above, Weber argued that secularization refers not simply to the decline of religion in society but also to the move away from religious worldviews brought about by modernization and the triumphs of rational thinking. According to Weber, religious worldviews were gradually losing their relevance as the advances of modernity led people to rely on rational approaches and scientific knowledge rather than religious explanations. Protestantism, Weber famously contended, and especially the Puritan work ethic played a key role in the development and spread of modern capitalism. In his milestone work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism , Weber showed that Protestant religious values such as the “Beruf” or “vocation” ethic and Puritan thrift were essential contributing factors to the development of modern capitalism. As capitalism emerged, religious social foundations gradually faded, and economic activities were increasingly organized according to rational calculations and market logic. This process itself was one of the main drivers of secularization, as the rise of rational thinking called into question the role of religion in everyday life. Traditional religions, which had been called upon to give meaning to human life and order to human coexistence, lost much of their influence in the modern world. People were less and less inclined to see nature and human life as guided by divine intervention or transcendental forces and tended more to understand the laws of nature and human life according to scientific methods.

1.2.1.2. Peter Berger

American sociologist and religious scholar Peter Berger was another prominent representative of secularization theory. According to Berger, the driving force behind the process of secularization was the development of modern societies and in particular scientific and technological progress. With the advent of modernity, people increasingly embraced a secular outlook, and scientific explanations of natural phenomena and questions of social life gradually came to replace religious explanations. Berger contended that the secularization of modern societies has been accompanied by a growing pluralism of worldviews, and this has posed a challenge to religion. The emergence of religious pluralism, furthermore, has stimulated the process of relativization, and this in turn has weakened the social influence of religion.

In his earlier theoretical work, Berger emphasized the “privatization” of religion, by which he referred to the tendency towards the relegation of religion to the private sphere, while other areas of (public) life became increasingly secularized. Later, however, Berger realized that religions was not necessarily being completely marginalized to the private sphere and in many cases could even reenter the public sphere, for instance in the United States or in the countries of the global south¹³².

1.2.2. Functionalist approaches

Functionalist theories of secularization examine how, with the emergence of new institutions, religion becomes increasingly peripheral in modern societies. These theories emphasize the differentiation of modern society, meaning the dominance of rational thought and the advances of the sciences, all of which contribute to the diminishing role of religion in society. As social life becomes increasingly specialized, religious institutions lose the importance they once enjoyed and are replaced by other spheres or institutions. This process can be described asstructural differentiation.From a functionalist point of view, secularization is a kind of social evolution in the course of which secular institutions based on rational thought take over various functions which had once been the prerogative of religion.

1.2.2.1. Émile Durkheim

French sociologist Émile Durkheimwas one of the most prominent figures offunctionalism.According to Durkheim,the fundamental function of religion was to maintain social cohesion and reinforce community norms.

Durkheim examined religion not solely as a system of beliefs but also as a social institution that plays a vital role in social cohesion and the maintenance of moral order. In his system, religion was understood as a fundamentally collective phenomenon. It was not simply a matter of individual belief but also concerned unity among people at the community level. Religion’s central role, Durkheim suggested, lay in the shared values, norms, and beliefs that hold society together. In other words, through shared rituals and symbols, it helps strengthen solidarity and unity between members of a community.

In his 1912 book The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Durkheim explained that religion is based on the distinction between the “sacred” and the “profane.” The “sacred” are things to which the community attaches special meanings which are reinforced through ritual and ceremony. These rituals, thus, not only serve spiritual purposes. They also promote social stability and unity¹³³.

According to Durkheim, industrialization, scientific progress, and the gradual division of social life into increasingly distinct fields all contributed to the decline of religion’s traditional role. Durkheim never suggested, however, that religion would disappear completely. Instead, he believed that certain functions of religion would be transformed and would continue to exist in secular forms. People would always need a common set of values and a collective consciousness. In secularized societies, he posited, these values would increasingly come from secular sources, such as notions of human rights, democracy, and scientific rationality. Durkheim was convinced that these principles could also be used to create the social unity that previously had been founded on religion.

1.2.2.2. Talcott Parsons

American sociologist Talcott Parsons, though not a figure who introduced a separate, comprehensive theory of secularization, nonetheless had notions concerning this process which can be inferred from his views on modernization and social differentiation. His best-known theoretical system is structuralist-functionalism, which considers the functioning, maintenance, and development of social systems. Secularization plays an important role in this. Parsons argued that modern societies are characterized by the emergence of increasingly distinct, differentiated social systems, a process in which different social institutions, including education, economics, and religion, become increasingly separate and specialized. This process is an integral part of modernization, and according to Parsons, the roles of religious institutions have also changed as a result of this differentiation.

According to Parsons, secularization essentially means a decline in the role and influence of religious institutions. Parsons did not interpret this process as, first and foremost, a decline of religion, but rather as a natural consequence of the structural transformation of society. In modern societies, certain functions which were once the prerogative of religion have been taken over by various specializations, and the traditional tasks of religious institutions, such as providing moral guidance or social care, are also being performed by other secular institutions. Parsons, thus, did not necessarily see secularization as a negative process. In his view, while it may have lost much of its direct social influence, religion could nonetheless continue to play a decisive role in the lives of individuals.

Parsons stresses that religious values and norms continue to play a role in society, albeit indirectly. Thus, he sees secularization as a transformation in which religious teachings and value systems are incorporated into the institutions and norms of modern society and thus continue to live on in them.

1.2.3. Post-secularization theories

In the 1990s, classical theories of secularization began to come under increasing criticism as religious revivals and resurgent religious movements began to emerge all over the world. Post-secularization theories reassess the roles of religion in modern societies, especially in light of social changes of the late twentieth century and the first decades of the twenty-first. These theories are based on critical confrontation with the fact that theories of secularization which posited a decline in the prominence and place of religion have not always been borne out. Secularization may have had a strong impact on many Western societies, but religion continues to play important roles and, in some situations, has even gained new momentum. Representatives of post-secularization theories thus also use the prefix “post” to indicate that theories of the separation between the religious and secular spheres are being rethought, since religious practices, beliefs, and institutions—far from having declined or receded—in certain social contexts have gathered new strength and even taken on new forms.

1.2.3.1. Jürgen Habermas

Perhaps the most prominent figure of this rethinking of the theoretical framework of secularization (implied in the term post-secularization) was German philosopher Jürgen Habermas. Habermas unquestionably believed that, since the Enlightenment, secularization has been one of the determining factors in the decline of the prominence and influence of religious beliefs and institutions. Religion, however, has not disappeared completely. Rather, it has rather been renewed, and modern societies must recognize that dialogue between citizens with secular beliefs and citizens who hold to religious faith must be placed on a new footing. Habermas pointed out that secular states do not need to exclude religion from public life altogether, but instead should provide opportunities for constructive dialogue between religious and secular views. According to Habermas, the “common language” is the language in which the secular citizen and the member of the religious fold can engage in debate. This is both a precondition for coexistence and also a guarantee of the integrity of democratic society. In the pluralistic world of modern democracies, each side must respect the other’s position. In other words, those of religious faith must accept secular arguments in public debates, while the secular citizen must acknowledge that religious beliefs can be a legitimate source of moral and ethical discourse. This theory, thus, seeks neither to refute nor deny secularization. It offers, rather, an opportunity for a new form of coexistence and dialogue between religious and secular values. Habermas derives this view primarily from pluralism and democratic political culture, in which different worldviews must learn from one another and cooperate.

Habermas also warns that the maintenance of rigid boundaries between religious and secular worldviews can become a source of conflict¹³⁴.

1.2.3.2. Charles Taylor

Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor offers a theory of post-secularization that explores the dynamic interaction between religion and modernity, with a particular focus on the specific role of religion in a secularized world. The central idea of Taylor’s theory is that people in the secular world live within an “immanent framework,” meaning that they see the world only in terms of natural, material reality and that divine or transcendent reality is less obvious to them. This framework, however, does not exclude religious belief. It merely offers a different perspective. According to Taylor, people still feel a longing for the transcendent, which opens the way to post-secularization. This in turn implies the emergence of new, more flexible forms of religion. Religious experience is understood more as subjective and personal, and often it is not bound to traditional institutions or dogmas. This shift is part of a broader cultural trend that emphasizes the importance of individuality and self-realization. Taylor envisions post-secular society as a world in which different religious and secular worldviews coexist peacefully¹³⁵.

1.3. The critique of theories of secularization

Theories of secularization are strikingly varied and approach the decline of the role of religion from different perspectives. While classical theories have linked this process to modernization and the triumphs of rational thought, post-secular approaches offer a more nuanced picture of the position of religion in the global world today. Some criticize these approaches for allegedly overestimating the apparent resurgence of religion and ignoring the continued effects of secularization. Others contend that religion is present, but that its influence is still receding and the new forms it has taken are not as significant as before.¹³⁶

Secularization clearly is not a linear and universal process. It is, rather, a social, historical, and culturally context-dependent phenomenon. The more recent scholarship has increasingly acknowledged the complexity of this relationship and has focused on the dynamic links between religion and secularization.

The so-called “post-secular” theories point out that secularization does not necessarily mean the final decline of religion but only its survival in new forms. Habermas, the aforementioned German philosopher, argues that religion can continue to play an important role in modern societies, especially in public debates and moral discourses. Thus, in post-secular societies, religion can be reasserted, even if it takes on a new guise, different from the traditional forms it had previously taken.

This seems to be borne out in practice, as the process of secularization has not unfolded in the same way in all societies and cultures. While in Western societies and especially in the cultures of Europe the role of religion has declined significantly, in other regions, such as Africa, South America, and South Asia, it continues to play a prominent role. In many countries and particularly in the non-Western world, religion has claimed a stronger political role and is often closely linked to issues of national identity. This is true not only in the Islamic world, but also for other religious groups. One could think, for instance, of the political role of Hinduism in India.

1.4. The emergence of secularization in different cultural contexts

Research has shown that the process of secularization is not unfolding in the same way in different regions of the world. While in Western Europe the influence of religious institutions has declined significantly, religion remains strong in other regions, such as the Global South and Eastern Europe. Theories of secularization, thus, are not universally applicable, as different cultures and historical processes play significant and different roles in shaping the relationship between religion and society.

1.4.1. Western Europe

In Western Europe, a rapid and dramatic process of secularization began, and this process particularly gathered steam after the Second World War. Church attendance and religious beliefs declined dramatically, especially among members of the younger generations. The separation of church and state institutions and the rise of the welfare state also contributed to the marginalization of religion. Scientific and technological progress and the emphasis on individualism and cultural pluralism encouraged people to seek meaning and answers to their ethical and existential questions from sources other than religion.

1.4.2. Eastern Europe and Russia

In Eastern Europe, after the fall of communism, there was something of a religious revival, especially in Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism. After the collapse of the atheist ideologies of the socialist regimes, many people turned back to religion, although this attachment to religious belief and ceremony was in no small part cultural and not necessarily associated with deeply held religious belief. In Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church gained considerable political and social power and reasserted its importance as a defining part of Russian identity.

1.4.3. The United States

One can observe an interesting phenomenon in the case of the United States, which, unlike many Western European nations, has always had a strong religious vitality. Although secularization processes have been underway here too, churches still play a prominent social role, especially in evangelical and Protestant communities. The role of religion in the political sphere is also important. This distinctive feature of the American context is due in part to the American tradition of religious pluralism and religious freedom, which has allowed different religious groups to flourish and compete.

1.4.4. Latin America

In recent decades, a remarkable religious transformation has been underway in Latin America. Protestant movements and especially Pentecostalism have gained ground in this traditionally Catholic part of the world. This religious dynamism should not be misunderstood as secularization. Rather, it is part of the pluralization of religious life and the emergence of new religious movements.

1.5. Perspectives for the future

The future course of secularization will depend on an array of factors, including global political and economic developments, technological progress, and the internal dynamics of societies. While religion may continue to play an increasingly marginal role in some areas, in other regions and communities a strong religious identity may remain dominant. Given the immense diversity of the cultures of the world and the rise of cultural pluralism, the relationship between religion and secularization will continue to change, and both tendencies (the tendency toward religious faith on the one hand and the tendency towards a more secular worldview on the other) will continue to be present in modern societies. However, we must always keep in mind that the relationship between religion, secularization, and modernity cannot be understood and described as a simple one-way process, because as the world becomes increasingly interconnected and globalized, the role of religion is likely to change and religion itself will adapt to new challenges. But religion will unquestionably remain an important part of human experience, particularly in the areas of personal identity and community building. In the future, the balance between religion and secularization will determine the role of religion in society. The relationship between religion and secular society will in all likelihood remain dynamic and diverse, and this relationship will assume different forms in different regions and cultures.

2. Religious pluralism

One of the most important cultural and philosophical issues for modern societies is religious pluralism, meaning the coexistence of and interaction among different religious traditions. Contemporary social phenomena, including globalization, migration, and modernization, have all contributed to the rise of religious pluralism, since religious and cultural differences have become an increasingly marked part of everyday social life. Globalization has led to more and more encounters among different religious traditions, creating new challenges for societies from the perspectives of tolerance, acceptance and peaceful coexistence.

The development of information technologies (in particular the spread of the internet) has greatly facilitated the spread of religious ideas, practices, and teachings, leading to increasingly pluralized religious communities.

Religious pluralism is both a de facto recognition of religious diversity and a framework that promotes dialogue and respect across denominational lines.

Religious pluralism also extends to deeper issues, however, such as the relativity of religious truths, the relationship between faith and morality, and the role of the secular state among religious communities.

2.1. The concept of religious pluralism and its theoretical foundations

The concept of religious pluralism is based on the principles of religious diversity and the peaceful coexistence of different religious beliefs. This concept is not limited to this, however. It also implies mutual recognition of different religious traditions and acceptance of these traditions on an equal footing in society. Religious pluralism has taken various forms throughout history and has developed in different ways in different historical periods and civilizations.¹³⁷

Although there have been many examples of religious pluralism in the history of civilization, arguably the real turning point came in the sixteenth century with the Reformation. Reformation thinkers challenged the authority of the Catholic Church, and several new denominations were created, aptly dubbed Protestant (i.e. in protest). Religious conflicts erupted across Europe, which in the long term contributed to the emergence of new forms of religious pluralism. The bloody conflicts were resolved by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, when, in a spirit of religious tolerance, the different denominations gradually recognized one another’s right to exist. The first amendment to the constitution of the United States of America, which guarantees the right of religious freedom, offers a relatively recent landmark in the history of religious pluralism. The founding fathers themselves stressed the importance of the separation of church and state, and this furthered the emergence of a modern form of religious pluralism. The historical roots of the concept also go back to nineteenth-century philosophical and religious thought¹³⁸.

According to the British philosopher of religion John Hick, a prominent theorist of modern pluralism, religious pluralism is necessary if we seek to understand differences between religions not as absolute truths but as expressions of different perspectives. In other words, different religious traditions are different expressions of the same transcendent reality. According to Hick, all religions are thus directed towards the same transcendent reality, but they find form and expression in different ways in different cultural and historical contexts. Hick thus embraces the notion that no single religious tradition can stake a claim to absolute truth. Rather, each religious tradition is rooted in the diversity of human experience. Thus, one of the most important questions in this regard is whether religious truth is relative or absolute in nature. These questions have been the subject of much theological and philosophical reflection, especially in Western thought, where Christianity has played a dominant role for centuries¹³⁹.

Thus, in practice, religious pluralism means that a society or community accepts several different religions and ensures that they stand on an equal footing in society, without any single religion being exclusive. In this sense, religious pluralism is not simply a matter of tolerance but also implies the belief that all religions have the right to exist legitimately and each has its place in society, and each religion respects the beliefs, practices, and values of the others.

One of the most important philosophical challenges of religious pluralism is clearly the question of the relativity of truth. If several different religious traditions stake an exclusive claim to truth, how can they possibly engage in respectful dialogue with one another? It is precisely on this point that pluralism differs from syncretism, which seeks to blur the differences between religious traditions. According to the pluralist approach to religion, each religion reflects transcendent truth in its own way, even if the understandings of this truth sometimes differ in significant ways. Naturally, this view does not exclude the possibility of disputes and conflicts between different religious traditions.

2.2. Social impact and challenges

Religious pluralism obviously has many positive social effects, but it also presents a number of challenges. Perhaps one of the biggest challenges it raises is how to reconcile different religious traditions without infringing on identity and autonomy. Indeed, religious communities often seem to fear that pluralism undermines the specific characteristics and teachings of their faith, especially when coexistence requires compromises. Another difficulty for some religious groups is that pluralism is seen as leading to a kind of relativism that may weaken the strength and solidity of religious faith.

The issue of social and political integration is another major challenge of religious pluralism. Coexistence among different religious groups often depends on the political institutions that regulate the rights and opportunities of religious minorities. The achievement of religious pluralism therefore depends on the extent to which society and the state are able to develop policies that ensure equal rights and freedoms for religious communities. Religious pluralism unquestionably plays an important role in modern political systems, especially in democracies, where religious freedom is a fundamental human right.

In secularized states such as France and the United States, the challenge of pluralism is how to manage tensions among religious communities while ensuring individual religious freedom.¹⁴⁰ Religious freedom, after all, has come to be understood as a fundamental element of human rights, which means that the state must allow people to follow their religious beliefs freely and cannot interfere in religious practices as long as these practices do not infringe on the rights of others. Furthermore, religious freedom means not only the freedom to choose a religious belief but also the freedom to choose atheism.

In a secular society, the state should remain neutral in religious affairs as a matter of principle,¹⁴¹ but religious communities often ask for special rights and recognition, which can cause controversy and even tension. From a practical point of view, religious pluralism simply means a guarantee of social tolerance and religious freedom. Today, however, religious pluralism faces new challenges, especially in societies where religious fanaticism, ethnic and religious conflicts, and tensions related to migration have intensified.

In summary, mutual respect and dialogue among different religions are arguably in the interests not only of religious communities but also of society as a whole. Pluralism, however, does not mean the elimination of religious differences, but their recognition and respect.

2.3. The future of religious pluralism

The future of religious pluralism is closely linked to the processes of globalization and the ensuring social changes. Maintaining interfaith dialogue and mutual respect will also be essential for peace in the societies of the future. However, this will require religious communities to remain open to one another and ready to engage in dialogue. In a sense, religious pluralism can further social cohesion by creating opportunities for dialogue and mutual understanding among different religious groups. It also contributes to the protection of human rights by enshrining respect for individual religious freedom as a fundamental value. However, pluralism can also present challenges, for example in the management of interreligious tensions or the need to maintain a balance between secular and religious views¹⁴².

One of the great challenges of the future will be how different religions will cope with the growing effects of secularization and how they will be able to preserve their own identities in pluralistic societies.

3. Multiculturalism

Like religious pluralism, multiculturalism¹⁴³ is an important concept which also plays a significant but sometimes controversial role in modern societies. Both concepts are built on the recognition of diversity and the equality of different cultural and religious identities. In recent decades, as a consequence of globalization and migration, questions concerning the meanings, uses, and potential limitations of multiculturalism have been raised in an increasing number of countries and cultural contexts with an increasing sense of urgency, but the responses to these questions have varied. In the second half of the twentieth century, multiculturalism became an increasingly pressing issue, since, mainly as a result of international migration and the collapse for the most part of the colonial world, an increasing number of ethnic and cultural minorities emerged in Western societies. Multiculturalism, however, is not simply a social and political issue. It is also a philosophical one, raising complex problems of identity, pluralism, legal equality, and social cohesion¹⁴⁴.

3.1. The concept of multiculturalism and its theoretical background

The concept of multiculturalism refers to the peaceful coexistence and interaction of different cultural groups within a society, in which groups from different ethnic, religious, linguistic, and historical backgrounds seek to preserve their identities. The ways in which this concept takes political, social, and cultural form are the subject of considerable debate in public discourse and politics worldwide. At the theoretical level, the systems of the aforementioned Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor¹⁴⁵ and political scientist Will Kymlicka in particular have played an important role in defining multiculturalism. According to Taylor, cultural recognition is a fundamental aspect of human dignity, which ensures that individuals and communities alike can preserve their cultural identities. Kymlicka adds that the protection and recognition of minority cultures require various legal and political mechanisms.

3.1.1. Liberal multiculturalism

Theories of multiculturalism draw on a variety of philosophical and social science approaches. If we want to understand these approaches systematically, perhaps the first and most important among them isliberal multiculturalism, according to which the individual has the right to preserve his or her cultural identity and that the legal system should offer protections for cultural minorities to this end. This approach is based on the notion that in a democratic society people can come from different cultural, religious, ethnic and national backgrounds and that these differences are not only acceptable but desirable for the enrichment of society. Critics of this theory often argue that the emphasis placed on differences can increase segregation and that the alleged rights of minority communities can come into conflict with the interests of other groups in society.

3.1.2. Post-colonial multiculturalism

Postcolonial multiculturalism,another approach to the multifaceted concept of multiculturalism, focuses on the legacy of colonialism and the identity crises that came with this legacy. Postcolonial multiculturalism seeks to critically engage with the legacies of colonialism, with a particular focus on the cultural, economic, and political consequences of colonialism. As has been often discussed and thoroughly documented, the colonial powers exerted not only an economic but also a cultural influence, sometimes forcibly spreading their own languages, religions, and value systems. This long shadow of past is still visible today, particularly in the multicultural societies of the former colonies, where the coexistence of different ethnic and cultural groups remains fraught with tensions.

3.1.3. Critical multiculturalism

Finally,critical multiculturalism adopts a more pragmatic approach byfocusing on power relations and inequalities.In contrast to liberal multiculturalism, this theory does not simply call attention to the alleged virtues of multiculturalism as peacefulcoexistence of different cultural groups. It also examines the ways in which power imbalances are created between different cultural and ethnic groups within a society. This approach considers how social, economic and political systems affect different cultures, and it focuses on how inequalities can be dealt with to create a more just society.

3.2. The social impact of multiculturalism

The social effects of multiculturalism can be studied from different perspectives, including economic development, social cohesion, identity formation, and the transformation of political and legal structures. Multiculturalism also poses significant challenges for countries at the societal level. One major sociological question is simply whether cultural diversity promotes or hinders social cohesion. Some studies have suggested that multicultural societies may be at a higher risk of social conflict because of the tensions that can arise from interactions among different groups. Other studies suggests that cultural diversity stimulates innovation and economic growth.

Whatever the case, the impact of multiculturalism on social cohesion is now a hotly debated issue. Some theoreticians contend that cultural diversity nurtures understanding and cooperation within society, while others believe that tensions and antagonisms between different groups create insecurity. With regards to economic impact,cultural diversitycan have a stimulating effect on economic growth, particularly in industries in which innovation and creativity have an important role. At the same time, cultural differences and discrimination in the labor market can be significant obstacles. Cultural divisions can have a negative impact on labor efficiency from a social point of view if discrimination is not handled effectively.

One of the most important social effects of multiculturalism is the development of individual and community identities. Cultural diversity poses new challenges to traditional national identities, as different groups seek to preserve their own cultural values. On the one hand, a multicultural environment can have a positive impact, since it offers individuals the opportunity to develop a richer cultural self-image¹⁴⁶ . On the other hand, it can have a negative impact, as individuals may suffer an identity crisis and may be unable to find a balance between their cultural heritage and the norms required by the majority society. Finally, from the perspective of political and legal impacts, multicultural societies are particularly affected by major changes in the protection of human and minority rights. The same can be said of politics, where responses to the challenges posed by multiculturalism may vary from country to country. It is worth noting that efforts to reconcile minority cultural customs with notions of universal human rights can sometimes lead to conflict.

3.3. A critique of multiculturalism and the challenges it poses

While multiculturalism can be beneficial in some respects in a given society, it has also been made the subject of vigorous criticism. Some argue that it contributes to the fragmentation of society by isolating different cultural groups from one another. Others go further and contend that it can even lead to a weakening of the core values and norms of the majority society if it fails to create a shared platform for different groups. The examples of France and Germany have provoked particularly sharp criticism, where the integration of Muslim immigrants has been the subject of considerable social and political controversy. Some argue that these countries were not prepared to deal with the conflicts arising from cultural diversity in an appropriate way and that this may be the reason why assimilation models have failed. The most frequent criticisms are summarized below.

3.3.1. Social cohesion and the tensions of multiculturalism

The most common criticism of multiculturalism is that it threatens social cohesion. Critics argue that multiculturalism weakens efforts towards integration among different cultural groups and thus encourages the emergence of increasingly parallel societies, as newcomers are not always able to integrate into the majority society.

Ethnic segregation is becoming more and more evident in many Western European cities, and it is causing considerable tensions. Immigrant communities are often concentrated in neighborhoods where they can follow their own cultural traditions without having to maintain close links with local society. In the long term, this can erode mutual trust and increase the risk of ethnic conflict.

3.3.2. The crisis of national identity

Proponents of multiculturalism often contend that equal recognition of different cultural identities is important for minority groups. Others, however, perceive this as a potential threat to national identity, especially when the cultural values and norms of immigrants are fundamentally different from those of the host country. These kinds of clashes may arise, for example, between the values and traditions of Muslim communities and those of liberal democratic countries.

In Europe, on several occasions immigrant communities, taking advantage of multicultural policies, have used their own legal systems (notably religious courts) to settle issues which they have seen as belonging to their internal affairs. This practice, however, can come into conflict with the legal system of the given state and with liberal legal principles, especially when religious laws differ from international human rights laws.

3.3.3. Migration and integration

Multiculturalism is often linked to the politics of immigration, especially in countries that have received large numbers of immigrants. In these societies, the question of integration has become a central problem, as multiculturalism policies often have not placed adequate emphasis on adaptation to the host society and have not sufficiently encouraged immigrants to integrate.

The principle of multiculturalism and the politics on which it rests, although positive in the goals it has set, nevertheless faces serious challenges and criticisms today. The problems of integration, crises of national identity, and the weakening of social cohesion all suggest that multiculturalism alone is not sufficient for the successful coexistence of different cultural communities.

4. Religious fundamentalism and radicalism

Throughout history, religion has been an important cornerstone of many societies and cultures, and it has exerted a profound influence on the lives of individuals and on social norms. Religious fundamentalism and religious radicalism are phenomena which also look back on a long history but which have been at the center of academic, political, and public debate, particularly in recent decades. These two key terms (fundamentalism and radicalism) are easy to conflate (and are often conflated in the public discourse), but it is important to draw a clear distinction between them. In the discussion below, I describe the characteristics, differences, and similarities between religious fundamentalism and radicalism, as well as their social and political implications.

4.1. Definitions and characteristics of religious fundamentalism and radicalism

4.1.1. Religious fundamentalism

Religious fundamentalism is an ideological phenomenon that emphasizes rigid adherence to religious traditions and a return to the allegedly “original” interpretations of these traditions. The term gathered both meaning and strength in twentieth-century American Protestant communities, which built strongly on the Calvinist insistence on the centrality of the word of God, meaning actual reading of the Scriptures rather than reliance on (Catholic) interpretations of the Scriptures. The proponents of this approach to religion held to their understanding of a literal interpretation of the Bible and rejected liberal theological views. Later, the term came to be applied more widely to strands of thought in other religions, including Islam. Fundamentalists claim to have arrived at interpretations of religious texts and prescriptions independent of historical context, while rejecting the norms of the modern state, such as secularism and feminism. The original aim of any fundamentalism is to restore religion to its allegedly pure form, which generally means a return to (power relations of) the past. The followers of fundamentalisms are often isolated from mainstream society. Religious fundamentalism is not necessarily violent, but it does constitute a closed, dogmatic worldview that is difficult to reconcile with a pluralistic, democratic society¹⁴⁷.

4.1.2. Religious radicalism

Religious radicalism, as a radical strand of religious fundamentalism, is an extreme ideological tendency that advocates radical social or political change based on religious foundations. It often insists on the transformation of political systems and the rejection of established secular power. Religious radicalism frequently embraces the use of violence to achieve its goals and thus differs from fundamentalism, which adopts a more passive approach. Religious radical groups do not shy away from terrorist attacks, armed struggle, or other forms of violence. They often create a clear and distinct image of their alleged enemies, which can be religious minorities, political systems, and even adherents of other religious movements. Radicalism and fundamentalism share common ideological roots, but radicalism has much more ambitious aims and therefore takes a more active, confrontational approach. Members of these groups often feel threatened by what they perceive as social injustice, discrimination, or geopolitical situations, and they encourage radical action to break the status quo.

4.2. Social impacts, security challenges

4.2.1. Social impacts

Globalization, migration, multiculturalism, and the emergence of various forms of religious fundamentalism and radicalism are closely intertwined phenomena, all of which significant impacts on modern societies. One could even go so far as to say that one is a consequence of the other, and thus they are causally linked and interact closely with one another.

Both religious fundamentalism and radicalism can have significant consequences for society. As a result ofglobalization, countries around the world are becoming increasingly interconnected economically, culturally, technologically, and politically. This creates opportunities for interaction among different religions, ideologies, and cultural identities, but it can also lead to serious tensions.

With the spread of globalization, many traditional societies feel that their identities, cultures, and religions are at risk. This can foster the spread ofreligious fundamentalisms, as globalization is often seen merely as another form of “Western hegemony.” Some communities return to their religious roots as a counterreaction to preserve their identities and traditions. Fundamentalism can lead to polarization and, as cultural conflicts become increasingly intense, can even create sectarian wars, and radicalism can lead to political instability, terrorist attacks, and in extreme cases even civil wars¹⁴⁸.

Social and political instability often provides fertile soil for both fundamentalism and radicalism, so understanding and precisely defining how to deal with them is a pressing challenge for social scientists and policy makers. If we seek to develop effective strategies with which to counter extremist ideologies, we must be able to discern the differences between religious fundamentalism and religious radicalism.

4.2.2. Security challenges

Both fundamentalism and radicalism pose challenges for security policy. I offer below a discussion of some of these challenges, without claiming to be exhaustive.

4.2.2.1. Cultural and political tensions

Religious fundamentalism can often lead to political tensions, especially in some of the countries of the Middle East, where fundamentalist forces try to influence politics and education, which can lead to internal political and social tensions.

Religious fundamentalism is particularly likely to cause cultural tensions in societies in which different religious groups live alongside one another. In these societies, the strict religious norms demanded by fundamentalists may be difficult to reconcile with the norms of other religions and cultures and may call into question the viability of religious and cultural pluralism. In such circumstances, fundamentalist groups often perceive other religious communities or social strata that do not respect religious differences as enemies.

4.2.2.2.2. Terrorism

Religious radicalism includes movements or individuals who encourage extreme political or social change based on religious beliefs. Radicalism is not necessarily violent, but it often encourages actions in this direction.

Religious radicalism is often linked to terrorism, as radical groups such as the Islamic State or Al-Qaeda launch violent attacks in the name of religion. Their primary aim is to change the political system or impose religious dictates in place of secular political structures. These attacks are particularly threatening because they destabilize societies and pose a direct threat to both state and international security.

4.2.2.3. Migration and the refugee crisis

Migration and the refugee crisis are intertwined with questions of religious radicalism and fundamentalism. Migration has brought westward large numbers of people from other religious and cultural backgrounds, especially from conflict zones in the Islamic world, such as Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. These people are often fleeing religious persecution or civil war, where radicalism is common.

Fears of a rise in radicalism can often gather strength in societies which have welcomed refugees, as some radical groups (e.g. ISIS) have identified refugees as potential targets of manipulation in the service of their aims.

Conflicts ignited by religious radicalism in the Middle East have contributed significantly to the international refugee crisis. Millions of people have been displaced, causing a major migration crisis, particularly in Europe and other regions.

Fundamentalist regimes and groups usually persecute people who do not share their views. In many cases, this has triggered waves of refugees. For example, under the terror of the Islamic State (ISIS), many non-Muslims or Muslims whose attachment to their faith is regarded as insufficient by the regime have been forced to flee their homes¹⁴⁹.

4.2.2.4. The destabilization of the social order

Religious fundamentalist and radical movements often constitute a threat to national and regional stability, especially when a given group gains significant support in a given country. Armed uprisings and revolutions can then break out, destabilizing the country or region.

The fight against religious fundamentalism and radicalism presents many challenges, as both phenomena are deeply rooted in individual and community identities and are often linked to perceptions of social injustice, political oppression, and economic disadvantages.

Changes in global politics and the social environment have made religious fundamentalism and religious radicalism an increasingly important issue that can only be kept under control through internationally coordinated strategies.

Summary

In recent decades, the discipline of the sociology of religion has undergone significant changes due to global social and cultural shifts. One of the most obvious consequences of secularization has been the decline in the role of religious institutions. It was therefore particularly important to take a closer look at the changes at work in the depths of postmodern society and the ways in which these various changes have been intertwined, with particular reference to religious pluralism, secularization, multiculturalism, and, finally, religious fundamentalism. The study of these trends and shifts reveals numerous challenges and causes for concerns, but there are also encouraging signs.

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¹ FRÖHLICH JOHANNA: A demokrácia fogalom értelmezési tartományának bővítése: relativizálódás, vagy garancia? In IAS, 2010/3. 17-24.

² BIRHER NÁNDOR – JANKA FERENC: Jog, erkölcs, vallás. in.: Deliberationes. X./2. 2017/2. 188.

³ In Western society, this process started centuries ago at least. The Enlightenment questioned the exclusivity of religious dogmas and put rational philosophy and the scientific method in the foreground. This was followed by the gradual separation in many western states of church and state. Urbanization caused by the industrial revolution also reduced the role of religion. Finally, the postmodernist trends of the twentieth century further weakened traditional religious institutions and beliefs.

⁴ When we talk about a decrease, we must also be aware that the cultural heritage of Christianity is deeply embedded in European societies via religious holidays, traditions, and moral standards.

⁵ In PÉTER ANTALÓCZY: A gondolat, a lelkiismeret és a vallásszabadság elméleti megközelítése, in Antalóczy Péter (ed.): Az állami egyházjog alapjai, Budapest 2012, 101.o.; See also: DR. ANTAL ÁDÁM: Bölcseletek, vallások, jogi alapértékek, Pécs 2015.

⁶ Péter Miskolczi Bodnár explores the phenomenon in detail, see. PÉTER MISKOLCZI BODNÁR: Az erkölcs és a jog szoros kapcsolat in Polgári Szemle 4-6 (2015) 27-33.

⁷ HART, H.L.A: Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 1983.

⁸ KELSEN, HANS: General Theory of Law and State. 1945.

⁹ AQUINAS, THOMAS: On Law, Morality, and Politics. Hackett Publishing, 1988.

¹⁰ LÜDICKE, K., 796/3; canon 803.

¹¹ ILGNER, R., The Catholic School Education Project. Aspects of Development of Catholic School Theory since Vatican Council II , in Seminarium 35 (1995) 425.

¹² CS 49-52, LC 56-59, RE 6G-97

¹³ ILGNER, R., 426.

¹⁴ KEVIN, S., Religion Teachers, New York, 2000, 23-45.

¹⁵ Vatican Council II, in Seminarium 35 (1995) 425.

¹⁶ KEVIN, S., 54.

¹⁷ As professor Schanda notes it seems to be just a theoretical device. The state neutrality does not mean state ignorance, thus the state does not forget about the churches in her territory. Therefore, for instance, in Hungary the there is a sum for the churches in the state budget every year. (SCHANDA, B., Magyar Állami Egyházjog , Budapest 2000, 61; and SCHANDA, B., Világi jog az Egyházban – egyházjog a világi jogban ?, in Kánonjog 1 (1999) 781.)

¹⁸ canons 798-799.

¹⁹ Nowadays, fortunately public schools must make up for catholic schools, since the quality of education is high above the average. Certain statistics show that even in Eastern-European countries catholic schools could provide wider view of education, and thus having greater respect amongst parents. Parents are continuously searching for places where they offspring could get moral, faith and adequate knowledge. (See www.catholicshools.com )

²⁰ SZÜDI, J., 3.

²¹ In Hungary, for instance, prayer in school was only during the radical right regime (e.g. fascist rule), thus for 60 years prayer has been exiled from public schools.

²² Still in Hungary, even within the frame of a history lesson, religion seems to be a “taboo” for teachers. Therefore, to do the best, they avoid talking about it. But can we agree to it?

²³ See also: ANTALÓCZY P., Felekezeti Egyházjog alapjai (Engl. The Basis of Congregational Church Law) , Patricinium, Budapest, 2011.

²⁴ Clauses of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution . Also in Hungarian Constitution in Article VII (1). Also Act 1990/IV. (Liberty act on religion and churches).

²⁵ DESTRO, R., Development in the Law of Religious Liberty in the United States , in European Journal for Church and State Research 4 (1997) 209-210.

²⁶ There should be a ‘golden way’. However, it is still difficult to decide. Touring in Germany or Austria, we can easily find crosses (crucifixes) on the wall of public school rooms, either can we come across with religious posters in the halls of public, state-owned schools. What is then the separation of state and church?

²⁷ See. ANTALÓCZY, P. Az állami egyházjog forrásai (eds., Engl. The Sources of State Church Law)., Patrocinium, Budapest, 2012.

²⁸ See SCHANDA, 62.

²⁹ canon 799.

³⁰ A number of schools have added another dimension to their excusal policies - one that is popular with many parents: opt-in. This involves requiring parental notification and permission for students to be involved in potentially controversial lessons or activities.

³¹ Could the teacher tell students his own ideas about religion? Could the teacher say, for instance, “Well, this is Jesus whom I trust” or just simply add, “I usually go to church services on Sundays”. Would this be the violation of state neutrality? If yes, then the teacher is not a real believer if he does not confess his belief, if not, students might feel that it has been a religious propaganda? Even practically, could the teacher say, “Well historically proved that Jesus was a real person, but not a real God”? As we see, there are a lot of questionable things in the field of neutrality. Even though professor Destro would like to find the healthy border between neutrality and religion. Where is this border then?

³² Constitutional problems arise when the teacher decides to use the classroom to either promote or denigrate religion. Parents in a North Carolina school district recently complained that their daughter's social studies teacher took every opportunity to make negative and sarcastic remarks about evangelical Christianity. On the other end of the spectrum, a Virginia teacher had to appear before the school board to answer complaints that she was using the curriculum, especially in December, to encourage students to accept Christ. In both instances, the behavior of the teacher was unconstitutional and unprofessional.

³³ Imaginable anomaly, however that the Supreme Court itself opens with prayer. But when a captive audience of "impressionable young minds" is involved, the courts are stricter about practices that suggest state endorsement of religion. In Hungary, it is not acceptable. Even at a court, the witnesses cannot swear the oath on God or Jesus. The last lines, “Isten engem úgy segéllyen” (engl. God help me to act like that) was removed at the beginning of the communist era and was not put back at the time of the political changes.

³⁴ Theologians, by contrast, have constructed different kinds of conceptual nets for catching dimensions of reality that, they claim, escape scientific nets. Within all religious traditions moral and religious experiences are taken to provide knowledge of a transcendent dimension of reality. The Western religions - Judaism, Christianity, and Islam - have made sense of the world not in terms of universal causal laws, but narratives: events become intelligible not because they are law-like, but because they fit in the plot of a story (as miracles might). In fact, how reasonable or "objective" a claim is--indeed, whether it makes sense at all--depends on the conceptual nets we bring to the discussion. There is more to a worldview than the conceptual nets (or methodology) used by scientists or theologians or philosophers; still, we might say that what is issue is worldviews.

³⁵ See canon 798. If this would not work, children must get the proper education outside the school building. This canon is over-generalized by the cities we mentioned, where they do not even take the effort of trying to teach within the school building. As a contradictory, please also note that in Hungary, during the communist regime the state granted two hours per week for religion education within school. (BÁNK, I., 23.)

³⁶ Information was collected also from New Zealand, Ireland, Scotland, France, Spain and Italy.

³⁷ Canons 796, 797.

³⁸ Canon 798. Notably, parents are supposed to find the appropriate place for education, thus this obligation is highly up to the parents. However, what if there are not any facilities for the children to learn? Still there are many small villages where there is only one public school, which according to the state legislation could not provide the acceptable religious education?

³⁹ Canon 125 notes that actions done by an extrinsic force are not valid, if the person could not resist. Inversing this canon, we could say that the actions which should have been done by the faithful suffered failure due to extrinsic factors must not be viewed as the failure of the actor. Thus, we consider that parents in these situation do not share the responsibility.

⁴⁰ Having an empty space in the Codex about it is not really the greatest problem, since the Code knows the term of lacuna legis . Moreover, the Code gives alternatives to fulfill this lacuna. (Canon 19.)

⁴¹ CSANÁD, B., 43.

⁴² In Hungary, for instance, the previous Constitution, religious attitude was hunted. (See Alkotmány : 1949. évi XX. törvény )

⁴³ See in connection with human rights: JEYASEELAN, Human Rights of Dalit Christian and the Code of Canon Law , Diss. Roma, Pont. Univ. Greg., 1988

⁴⁴ Note please this section in the document is talking about private speech of students in school, therefore it is emphasizing that institutionally the school must be neutral. In the following, we may see all the principles of state neutrality as well, so afterwards we have to discuss only the key differences in Hungarian, German, and English education.

⁴⁵ Could we draw parallel between political and religious propagandas? Students have freedom to persuade their schoolmates as if they were talking about political aspects.

⁴⁶ EUART, S.A., 167-177.

⁴⁷ See Bayerisches Gesetz über das Erziehungs- und Unterrichtswesen (BayEUG), 670: Schulrecht (vom 31. Mai 2000) (Source: GVBl. S. 414) In Germany, however, the legislation of school education may vary according to the laws of the provinces. Therefore, it might occur that religion is supported in different ways, getting different aims and help. In some provinces, catholic education is highly supported (e.g. in Bayern), but in some other places protestant education is more favorable.

⁴⁸ It has certainly caused many debates over collecting money, and according to recent surveys the support of the catholic church in Germany has been hunched back. However, by doing this the state had also private intentions: it led to religious donation on one side, but those who denied their religion had to pay a sum as cultural tax for the state, hence nobody could bet away without paying the cultural burden of the German state. Many discussions were made out, many proposals were handed in, but the state was very strict in this question. Though some church leaders also came up with innovative ideas, the concordats were soon laid.

⁴⁹ The problem has very serious roots, and we all know that catholic universities and colleges in Hungary may need more time to get used to the unique situations. Even though, unfortunately, we have to conclude that at profane faculties we could come across morally questionable teachers , and that this might be the major source of conflicts. For instance, in the biggest catholic academic institution, there is a faculty at which teachers with communist pasts are allowed to teach profane subjects. (at a catholic university?) This might question the evidence of canon 809, which notes that subjects taught at universities must respect the principles of catholic religion. It has, on the contrary, many other reasons. The state intends to support financially profane subjects, thus she gives the same sum to the catholic universities. This means that the profane subjects are financed equally, whereas theological disciples are neglected. That is why canons 809-810 may be violated when there is a strong need to found universities. To maintain an average in the church budget, catholic colleges and universities are in rush to be founded. This leads to an overwhelming crave for profane teachers, which could only be satisfied if the religious attitudes of the teachers are not observed. For future information about the ways of founding catholic universities, and about the financial aids to them, please see LETSON, D., 188 and LIGOT, C., The Juridical Determination of Material and Formally Catholic Educational Institutions , Diss. Pamplona, 1999.

⁵⁰ See Die Konkordate und Kirchenverträge in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (hrsg. J. Listl) Berlin 1987 .

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⁵² eng. The Christian Pedagogy

⁵³ eng. Church Law

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⁵⁵ eng. Moral and School

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⁵⁷ eng. Hungarian State Religious Law

⁵⁸ eng. Civil Law in Church – Church Law in the State?

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⁶² POHLSCHNEIDER, J., Declaration on Christian Education , in H. VORGRIMLER (ed.), Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II , New York, 1969, 2.

⁶³ HAYES, M. A., As Stars for all Eternity: A Reflection on canons 793-795 , in Studia Canonica 23 (1989) 412.

⁶⁴ POHLSCHNEIDER, J.,3.

⁶⁵ POHLSCHNEIDER, J.,2. and HAYES, M. A., 415.

⁶⁶ HAYES, M. A., 416.

⁶⁷ see canon 226 §2: “Parentes, cum vitam filiis contulerint, gravissima obligatione tenentur et iure gaudent eos educandi; ideo parentum Christianorum imprimis est Christianam educationem secundum doctrinam ab Ecclesia traditam curare. “

⁶⁸ Ibid

⁶⁹ CSANÁD, B., Keresztény Valláspedagógia , Budapest 1991, 78-79.

⁷⁰ MORRISEY, F.G., 433. Notably, the fact that in the first paragraph in can. 226 the parental rights are mentioned first must not mislead us. The text reads “parents have the most serious obligation and the right to educate them…” This obviously expresses that obligation is the most important thing. This twist of obligations and rights – unlike in civil legislation – is normal in the Code. On the contrary, Morrisey notes that the canon makes comments only on the right itself, and would not intend to comment obligation. The Codex feels like giving reasons to rights, but supposing that obligation is absolutely clear. It is, Morissey adds, because reasoning with obligation was the teaching of the Council beforehand, but highlighting rights had not been included. This is, amongst many others, the renewal of the new Codex Iuris Canonici. Therefore, for us it is inevitably understandable that - in canonical aspects - obligations are put before rights, though the essence of talking about rights systematically cannot be questioned.

⁷¹ Can 867. § 1: “ Parentes obligatione tenentur curadi ut infants intra priores hebdomadas baptizentur; quam primum post nativitatem, immo iam ante am, parochum adeant ut sacramentum pro filio petant et debite ad illud praeparentur.”

⁷² Can. 210, 794, 799. In these canons all the Christian believers are mentioned. However, the Code also notes that teaching about the truth of Church could not be effectively enhanced, only if the person who teaches has already gotten the basic education. This must be coordinated by the professional personal staff such as bishop conferences, local ordinate, local priests and religion teachers.

⁷³ Can 872. “ Baptizando, … detur patrinus, cuius est baptizando adulto in initiatione Christiana adstare, et baptizandum infantem una cum parentibus ad batismus vitam christinam baptismo congruam ducat obligationesque eidem inhaerentes fideliter adimpleat”

⁷⁴ SMITH.,C., Baptism: Godparents and Sponsors , Internet: www. Stjosephcc.net/cliff8.html (21.07.2002): “The Church requires only one godparent for baptism, whether the person to be baptized is an infant or adult. The godparent must be a fully initiated Catholic, having received the Sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation and Eucharist; they must be at least 16 years of age; and they must be good, practicing Catholics. Since the primary role of godparents is to assist parents "in their duty as Christian mothers and fathers," where two godparents are selected, they must be a man and a woman, so as to imitate the image of father and mother.

⁷⁵ Ibid.; See also HIEROLD, A., Taufe und Firmung , in LISTL, J. – MÜLLER, M. - SCHMITZ, H., Handbuch des katholischen Kirchenrechts , Regensburg 1983, 669.

⁷⁶ Some experts are still perplexed about this. However, as Cliff Smith remarks, we must observe the status of the catholic godparents from two aspects: juridical and functional ones. It is obvious that the aim of the Code is if both aspects meet eachother, so godparents interact according to the law. In this case, godparents could stand as real patrons of the baptized. However, in some cases in practice, these two aspects will not meet. Thus some catholic godparents could be viewed as godparents lawfully (they fulfill the requirements for being a godparent), but functionally not. In this case, legally they are godparents, but could not meet all the requirements prescribed by the Codex.

⁷⁷ There are still pros and contras about infant baptism. We all know that in the ancient Church only adult baptism existed. Throughout the history of Church, according to the core of baptism, the church had started to baptize children. It was, for other reasons as well. Since the mortal rate amongst children was so high up till the middle of the 20th century, the Catholic Church had persisted in emphasizing the importance of infant baptism.

⁷⁸ See. Can. 1055. The church underlines the sacred evidence of marriage, and from this all consequences are derived. Hence, the sacramental marriage is a contract between the spouses triggered out by the consensus, which in evidence enhances a dissolvable eternal connection between a man and a woman. In §2 the Code denotes that “inter baptized” the marriage is also a sacrament in itself, without depending on what the spouses had thought about it. This means that the sacramental effect of marriage functions automatically. See.: BURKE, C., The Sacramentality of Marriage: Canonical Reflections , in Mon. Eccl . 119 (1994) 547.

⁷⁹ BURKE, C., The Sacramentality of Marriage: Canonical Reflections, 550.

⁸⁰ However, it is very questionable whether the parental rights and duties are subjected to the general rights and duties or not. The Codex denotes that all the Christian believers baptized and accepted to the Church have the right to teach and educate. (Can. 217) Moreover, all Christian believers must work on living a sacramental life. (Can 210) Those who are living in marriage are obliged to live a sacramental, improving life; and parents – for the reason they had given life to their offspring – have a severe duty and right to educate them. (Can 226) These canons stand right before the exact list of parental rights and duties of education – which this essay would like to focus on. On this, as a conclusion we are absolutely able to make comments. The question is, however, whether the parental right are subjected or not. The purpose of the Code was to draw up a hierarchy when regarding parental duties. That is why it remarks “severe duty” ( gravissima obligatione ) to educate children. Getting back to our first question, in this canon grandparents are not included, so in our opinion the grandparental status has to be viewed from the other aspect, so grandparents are dealt with in the Codex equally to other participants in enhancing education.

⁸¹ Parental domination upon their offspring: can. 98; rights to educate offspring: cans. 225, 774, 793, 796, 797, 798; education before baptism: can. 851, 867; their permission to their children’s baptism: can. 868.

⁸² Religion teachers: can. 776, 780. (This one is talking about training professional staff. See also: can. 796 § 2: the religion teachers or other teachers must work together with parents in education. Other academic teachers and the conditions of their teaching process: cans. 229, 239, 261, 812, 819, 820.

⁸³ Note please that although the parish priest is responsible for coordinating the pastoral as well as educational work within his territory, the local ordinate is obliged to employ religion teachers, and also does he take the responsibility for training and educating them. (see. cans. 776, 780) Later in our essay we will return this point, when we will be discussing the historical importance of bishop-hood.

⁸⁴ ORSY, L., The mandate to Teach Theological Disciplines , in Theological Studies 44 (1983) 476-480. See also. SapChrist 27. This “problem” will be discussed in our work later on.

⁸⁵ Note please that all these terms are discussed in Book III in the Codex, but are observed from different aspects. Preaching and catechism are dealt under the same title, whereas mission is discussed separately. It is very important since mission it itself is a special kind of work, and it needs specially trained staff. See. cans. 782-788.

⁸⁶ ERDÖ, P., Egyházjog , 320.

⁸⁷ Can. 781. “ Cum tota Ecclesia natura sit missionaria et opus evangelizationis habendum sit fundamentale officium populo Dei, shristefideles omnes, propriare responsibilitatis conscii, partem suam in opere missionali assumant .” This canon talks about the general mission of Church, which is upon the Christian faithful. Every believer must have his mission work, which he is supposed to fulfill according to his/her awareness. However, the Codex talks about another kind of mission, actio proprie missionalis , which is metioned in can. 786. As a conclusion, it is very inevitable to denote that

⁸⁸ See cans. 782-788.

⁸⁹ LG 25, can 762.

⁹⁰ ERDŐ, P., Egyházjog, 316. See also can. 766.

⁹¹ Can. 764.

⁹² Can. 767. See also STOFFEL, O., Die Verkündigung in Predigt und Katechese, in LISTL, J. – MÜLLER, M. - SCHMITZ, H., Handbuch des katholischen Kirchenrechts, Regensburg 1983, 543.

⁹³ What if a layman, for all the ban described in the canon, does carry homily out in the church during God service. Hence, some experts tend to say that canon 767 are not talking about capability or incapability to do layman homily, but it would intend to ban layman to carry it out. This means, in other words, that this impediment is a pure ecclesiastical. However, please note that in this case the layman who acted against canon 767 must face its consequences. For canon 1384 prescribes that “Qui sacerdotale munus vel aliud sacrum misterium illegitime exsequitur, iusta poena puniatur” . This means that homily by layman has the proper penitential consequences.

⁹⁴ Can 767.

⁹⁵ 1 Cor. 7:10-11. See canons 1055-1061.

⁹⁶ 1 Cor. 7:10-11.

⁹⁷ 1 Corinthians 7:10-15 . The Code knows the case of Privilegium Paulinum , when for the belief of one of the spouses, the marriage could be solved. This, however, does not mean that amongst Christians marriage is free to solve, but that amongst those who are not baptized if one of the couple would like to be Christian faithful, and the other is straight against it, the marriage (eg. civilly legal) could be solved.

⁹⁸ . Jesus uses the word " Porneia," which has a broader range of meaning than " Moicheia," which means adultery. In other words, he says, " Whoever divorces his wife, except for porneia, commits moicheia." If He was giving an exception for adultery, He could have used the more specific " moicheia " instead of porneia . It is argued by some that porneia here refers to incest and is used by St. Matthew to inform those who may be converting to Judaism/Christianity that they are obligated to discontinue marriage arrangements contrary to Jewish law in Levitians 17-18 .

⁹⁹ FOSTER, M.S., The Promotion of the Canonical Rights of Children in Situations of Divorce and Remarriage , Diss. Catholic University of America 1994, 19.

¹⁰⁰ OGUNSUSI, C., Parental Obligation According to Canon 793, in The Nigerian Journal of Theology 15 (2001) 60.

¹⁰¹ See The Constitution of the United States of America , on the Internet: http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/ (04.05./2002.) and also Family Act on the same web-site. Obviously, this is the legislation in divorce in many Western countries, including Hungary as well. (See Családjog § 18)

¹⁰² FOSTER, M.S., 22. In the cleft families the process of catechesis hangs on other aspects. First, we have to be aware of the relationship between mother and kid. In many cases, the children are longing for their fathers, and even sometimes they have greater affection to the father than to the mother. Thus, the role of the father could not be neglected either.

¹⁰³ This would, however, not mean that the child has not any damages, but starting the systematic Christian education is still in time.

¹⁰⁴ Unfortunately, in these cases civil courts cannot decide for the sake of the religious party, since this would interfere the basic of state neutrality. See The Constitution of the United States of America , on the Internet: http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/ (04.05./2002.)

¹⁰⁵ BERNARD, F., 98.

¹⁰⁶ There is an theological anomaly as well. In 1 Corinthians 7 St. Paul denotes that a man should have someone with whom he could mitigate his passion, and that a woman must also have a man for mitigation. To mitigate passion is very important in this section. The apostle reminds us of the sacred status of chastity, but says that if it is not possible, people must have someone to live with. However, the only possibility he is thinking of is the frame of a legal marriage. From the text, on the other hand, the importance of monogamy could be heard out, but he does not mention the case of the divorced. The anomaly we have pointed at is whether this need of someone for mitigation could be applied in those cases where a young lonely mother is touched or not.

¹⁰⁷ These two causes for the termination of marriage were inserted in the Westminster Confession (Chapter XXIV) and remained the only two grounds for divorce in Scotland until 1938 when cruelty, incurable insanity, sodomy and bestiality were added by Act of Parliament. Again it has to be remembered that from 1563 to 1830 all actions for divorce were handled by the Commissary Court which began by applying the principles of the canon law (where they did not conflict with Reformed doctrine) and built up an enormous body of case law, together with a series of rules on procedure. It may be noted too, that until 1857 no complete divorce could be obtained in England except by the very expensive process of a private Act of Parliament. The Scottish decision was the first in Europe.

¹⁰⁸ All data are about Scotland and Wales. Source: www.lectlaw.com

¹⁰⁹ FOSTER, M. S.,47.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 56. He could have added that pomeia was the besetting moral evil of the Hellenistic world into which the Christian Church was born. Promiscuity was practiced on a scale never known before - or since. Prostitution was an integral part of some pagan cults and obtained an "respectability" in the hetairai (courtesans) of the Greek cities. Corinth was a proverbially notorious center of vice.

¹¹¹ 1 Corinthians 6.9

¹¹² see JOSEPHUS, Antiquities XV, vii, 10.

¹¹³ Where there were divorces, there were remarriages more numerous than even in the Hollywood of today. One ancient historian records that a Roman woman had 8 husbands in 5 years.

¹¹⁴ BOUSCAREN, T. L., History of Code of Canon Law , in MC DONALD, W. J. - MC GUIRE, R. P. - WHALEN, J. P. - MAGNER, J. A.(eds.), New Catholic Encyclopedia III, Washington D. C. 1981, 973.

¹¹⁵ John 8:3-11

¹¹⁶ The questions "Is the woman guilty of adultery?" and "Is the husband the real father of the child?" become more complicated nowadays because of A.I.D. (Artificial Insemination by Dono r) and I.V.F. (in vitro fertiliz ation). (It has already been ruled in a court action that a woman who is pregnant by A.I.D. is not guilty of adultery, even when she has been inseminated against her husband's wishes).

¹¹⁷ In Scotland the Reformers just allowed divorce for adultery, as we have seen in the previous section, and then in 1573 the Scottish Parliament passed an Act which allowed complete divorce on the grounds of desertion. The procedure required by the Act was surprisingly elaborate: the civil authorities were to make every effort to apprehend the deserter and oblige him to return to his wife and home; if they failed, they were to declare him an outlaw. See also. TALABÉR J., Obstacles to fulfilling the Parental Duties in the Field of Catholic Education (dissertation PPKE – ANCRA), Budapest-San Diego, GRIN VERLAG, Germany, 2011.

¹¹⁸ Note that divorce is granted for behavior of such a kind that one party to the marriage cannot reasonably be expected to cohabit with the other who has behaved in that way. The adverb "reasonably" applies to the verbal phrase "cannot be expected". The popular expression "unreasonable behavior' is not strictly accurate.

¹¹⁹ See canons 1055-1057.

¹²⁰ See IOANNES PAULUS II, Adhortatio Ap. Familiaris Consortio (22 Nov. 1981): AAS 73 (1981), S. 81-191

¹²¹ eng. Canon Law

¹²² eng. The Christian Pedagogy

¹²³ eng. The Religious Education According to Church Law

¹²⁴ eng. Church Law

¹²⁵ eng. Church and Religion in the Contemporary Hungarian State Law

¹²⁶ eng. The Church at the Universities

¹²⁷ eng. Hungarian State Religious Law

¹²⁸ Berger, Peter L. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York: Anchor Books, 1967. 78-81.

¹²⁹ The most famous example of the separation of church and state was the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which stated that the state could not enact laws that promoted or hindered the practice of a religion. This principle ensures that all citizens are free to practice their religion, while guaranteeing the neutrality of the state in religious matters.

¹³⁰ Casanova, José: Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. 45-52.

¹³¹ Habermas, Jürgen: Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008, 93-96.

¹³² Berger, Peter L.: The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York: Anchor Books, 1967.

¹³³ Durkheim, Émile: Professional Ethics and Civic Morals. London: Routledge, 1957.

¹³⁴ Habermas, Jürgen: "Notes on Post-Secular Society"(2008). In New Perspectives Quarterly , 25(4), 17-29.

¹³⁵ Taylor, Charles: A Secular Age. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007.

¹³⁶ Due to space constraints, we cannot go into a detailed critical analysis of the theories of secularisation, so in this chapter we will focus only on the main lines.

¹³⁷ One of the most significant ancient examples of religious pluralism was the Roman Empire, whose expansion brought different peoples and religions under Roman rule. Roman rulers generally showed a high degree of tolerance for the religious customs of the peoples they conquered. The state supported many religious cults, and many new gods from different parts of the empire were introduced into the official Pantheon.

¹³⁸ Habermas, Jürgen:"Religion in the Public Sphere" (2006). In European Journal of Philosophy , 14 (1), 1-25.

¹³⁹ Miller, D. (2015). "The Role of Religion in Modern Democracies." Ethics & International Affairs , 29 (4), 487-501.

¹⁴⁰ This is referred to in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community, in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance."

¹⁴¹ This also means that the state cannot take a position on theological issues. And neutrality means that the state does not give preference to any religion, but keeps an equal distance from all of them.

¹⁴² Habermas, Jürgen:"Religious Tolerance: The Pacemaker for Cultural Rights" (2003). In Philosophy , 79(1), 5-18.

¹⁴³ Multiculturalism, as a political and social ideal of peaceful coexistence and mutual respect between different cultural groups, became the dominant ideology in the Western world in the second half of the 20th century. In the 1960s, under the influence of the civil rights movements and globalisation processes, several countries, notably the United States, Canada and many European nations, began to introduce multicultural policies aimed at protecting the rights of minorities and promoting social diversity.

¹⁴⁴ Steger, M. B.: Globalization: A Very Short Introduction . Oxford University Press., 2017.

¹⁴⁵ Taylor, Charles. Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition " (1992) . Edited by Amy Gutmann. Princeton University Press.

¹⁴⁶ Taylor, Charles.Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition"(1992). Edited by Amy Gutmann. Princeton University Press.

¹⁴⁷ Bruce, Steve: Fundamentalism, Polity Press, Cambridge 2000.

¹⁴⁸ Ken Booth és Tim Dunne (szerk.)The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations,(2008). Co-authored with John Baylis and Steve Smith, Oxford University Press, 2008.

¹⁴⁹ Ken Booth és Tim Dunne (szerk.)The Globalization… 68-70

• Authors: Krisztián Dombrádi (Author), János Talabér (Author)
• Publication Year: 2025
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