This paper analyzes the political rhetoric of former U.S. Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, focusing on how both men constructed and employed a framework of American idealism during their presidential campaigns. Contrary to the widespread notion that Donald Trump represents a complete break from previous Republican nominees, the study reveals that key elements of populist rhetoric—such as the juxtaposition of the “ordinary citizen” against an elite or intrusive power structure and the appeal to traditionally Democratic voters—were already present in the rhetoric of Nixon and Reagan. The analysis highlights how both presidents drew on American foundational narratives and historical symbolism to evoke a nostalgic yet forward-looking vision of the nation. These rhetorical strategies not only appealed to core values and national identity but also played a crucial role in their broader campaign strategy and political success.
Die Hausarbeit untersucht die politische Rhetorik der beiden ehemaligen US-Präsidenten Richard Nixon und Ronald Reagan und analysiert, wie beide eine Ideologie des amerikanischen Idealismus in ihren Wahlkämpfen rhetorisch inszenierten. Entgegen der weitverbreiteten Annahme, Donald Trump habe als Republikaner einen radikalen Bruch mit seinen Vorgängern vollzogen, zeigt die Analyse, dass zentrale Elemente populistischer Ansprache – insbesondere die Gegenüberstellung von „gewöhnlichem Bürger“ und „Elite“ sowie der Rückgriff auf nationale Gründungsnarrative – bereits integraler Bestandteil der Kampagnen Nixons und Reagans waren. Im Fokus steht dabei, wie beide Präsidenten die Vergangenheit Amerikas rhetorisch mobilisierten, um eine visionäre Zukunft zu entwerfen und das kollektive Werteverständnis der Wählerschaft anzusprechen. Die Arbeit beleuchtet, wie dieses rhetorische Instrumentarium nicht nur identitätsstiftend wirkte, sondern auch strategisch für den politischen Erfolg beider Männer genutzt wurde.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Richard Nixon
2.1 Crafting and Presenting a Conservative Message After Eisenhower
2.2 Nixon as an Ideological Warrior – and Electoral Strategist
2.3 Assuaging and Fueling the Electorate’s Appetite for Change
3. Ronald Reagan
3.1 The Conservative ‘Great Society’ – the Ideological Elevation of the Individual
3.2 Remnants of the New Deal and Mayflower – Reagan’s Populist Rhetoric
3.3 Reagan’s Rhetoric of the Jeremiad
4. Conclusion and Outlook
5. Bibliography
1. Introduction
“For those without skills, we’ll find a way to help them get new skills. For those without job opportunities we’ll stimulate new opportunities, particularly in the inner cities where they live. For those who’ve abandoned hope, we’ll restore hope and we’ll welcome them into a great national crusade to make America great again.” What sounds very much like a passage from a speech or rally by Donald Trump during his first campaign for the presidency is actually part of Ronald Reagan’s speech at the 1980 Republican National Convention in Detroit, Michigan,1 where the former actor, governor of California, and presidential candidate accepted his party’s nomination for the presidency and expressed his vision for the nation. While we have gotten used to descriptions of Donald Trump’s rhetoric and messaging as explicitly populist, the impression that is created in current discourse is often one in which Trump represents a complete departure from the appeals of previous Republican nominees. While that may be true in some respects (particularly in terms of public ‘outspokenness’ and demeanor), Republican appeals to the ‘ordinary citizen’ set against a powerful elite or intrusive power structure as well as to traditionally Democratic voters precede the political rhetoric of Donald Trump. This study will examine the rhetoric of two former Republican presidents: Richard Nixon (1913-1994), who served as President from 1969 until his resignation in 1974, and Ronald Reagan (1911-2004), who served as President from 1981 to 1989. Striking parallels can be made out in the political careers of both men: Both started out in California politics, ran against each other once in a Republican primary, failed very narrowly in one of their presidential campaigns (Nixon in his narrow and somewhat disputed loss to John F. Kennedy in 1960, Reagan in his narrow loss to incumbent Republican Gerald Ford in the 1976 Republican primaries), pulled off political comebacks several years later (Nixon in his 1968 victory against Democrat Hubert Humphrey, Reagan in his 1980 landslide win against incumbent Democrat Jimmy Carter), won reelection in a 49-state landslide (Nixon in 1972, losing only Massachusetts; Reagan in 1984, losing only his opponent’s home state of Minnesota), and shaped the ideology of the modern Republican Party to a greater extent than very few (if any) other Republican nominees of the previous century. However, the political rhetoric and messaging of Reagan and Nixon is characterized by a wide array of similarities as well, as both men carefully developed and utilized a rhetorical framework of American idealism, in which they made references to the American past, employed uniquely American founding narratives (dating back to the first settlements), and endowed monumental events such as the American Revolution with new resonance and relevance. Particularly during their campaigns for the presidency, both men evoke the idealism of a past America whose values and ideals either reverberate in the current America or whose spirit needs to be ignited and harnessed anew as the nation’s past becomes a source of inspiration, strength, and progress for the present and the future. In their framework of American idealism, both Republicans attach importance to the people and their values and spur the electorate to affirm the uniquely American ideals in the upcoming election. Such a rhetorical and ideological framework served as more than a mere adornment of the candidates’ political speeches; in fact, it fulfilled significant political functions with regard to the campaign strategy of each man, as a closer examination of the rhetoric of the two Republicans will show.
2. Richard Nixon
2.1 Crafting and Presenting a Conservative Message After Eisenhower
Nixon’s rhetoric of an American idealism has to be examined against the backdrop of the political coalition he intended to create in his presidential bids as early as 1960, and particularly in 1968 and 1972. After almost 20 years of Democratic domination at all levels of government during the presidencies of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman, Republican Dwight Eisenhower had managed to recapture the White House for the Republicans in 1952 (with then-Senator Richard Nixon as his running mate), but Nixon could not count on Eisenhower’s popularity to propel him to victory in his first race against Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy (D) in 1960, as Eisenhower’s success depended on overwhelming levels of crossover support and personal popularity which Nixon had little hope of replicating, a middle-of-the-road tone which pursued a moderate, less emphatically conservative ideological approach to governing and did not place particular importance on party building (Eisenhower’s lack of coattails in the Congressional races in his 1956 landslide reelection and his party’s subsequent, dramatic midterm losses in 1958 would prove a major challenge for Nixon if he was to win, as Congress was dominated by Democrats to an even greater extent in 1960 than before Eisenhower took office), and similarly played on Eisenhower’s background as an outsider and highly regarded military commander during World War II — quite the contrast to the loyal party insider Nixon, who had been well-connected in Republican circles since the 1940s (Rorabaugh 120).
While Nixon embraced the record of the popular Eisenhower and centered his campaign message on the continuation of ‘peace and prosperity,’ he also faced the challenging and immensely consequential task of promoting a clear ideological vision and political message of his party that not only unambiguously defined the Republicans in opposition to a Democratic Party that was increasingly fraught with its own ideological tensions and slowly starting to bleed support in its former heartland of the South as well as the Plains and Rockies, but also strove toward a natural and long-lasting conservative majority, which envisioned a reliable Republican coalition in the 1960s that would be less dependent on crossover support based on personal popularity such as in Eisenhower’s case. In a manner similar to his previous Congressional campaigns for the House (1946, 1948) and the Senate (1950) in California, Nixon believed that a successful message should include and connect a variety of campaign themes, both at the domestic level and in the area of foreign policy, and now (on the national stage) increasingly incorporated the cultural context of the 1960s2 into the conception of such a message:
Before Reagan, even before Wallace, Nixon correctly gauged the coming mainstream of the American political river. He put together a new political base revolving around animosity toward a strong interventionist state, adult fears of a young people without any sense of values, a popular resurgence of love of country, and a hatred of his old nemesis, Communism in its varied forms. … [H]e helped crystallize his fellow citizens' desire for a return to the values of a homogeneous neighborhood, a stable traditional family, and a patriotism fused with power. His reelection in 1972 confirmed the obvious—he not only was in the mainstream of the American political tradition, he now was setting the boundaries and the agenda of that very tradition. (Riccards 743)
Such a broad message had to be condensed into a rhetorical framework which not only held together its different elements but could be adduced to either underscore any of the themes in a campaign speech or ad or to make them more palatable to a national audience. For this reason, Nixon’s consistent references to ideals portrayed as uniquely American that were often embedded in the evocation of a nostalgic past were of considerable importance. When Nixon rallied his audience for the cause of containing the spread of communism and a powerful domestic federal government alike, he could invoke the “great American tradition of concern for those less fortunate than we are … [by] helping them to achieve their aspirations for a life of human dignity,” which was based on the principle that “our primary aim must be not to help governments, but to help people, to help people attain the life they deserve.”3 In this passage of Nixon’s 1960 acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention, the fight against Communism (in this particular context with regard to American support for revolutions in South America, Asia, Africa) is framed as an explicitly ideological battle with a rhetoric reminiscent of a modern Manifest Destiny4 in which American values had to be extended to the whole world and the spread of American ideals was a prerequisite for success against the Communist forces. At the same time, the passage simultaneously evokes an additional, associative layer of meaning of the term ‘government’ that implies the interventionist, overreaching American federal government and further underscores the general contrast between government and people that Nixon had emphasized earlier:
We succeed where they fail. You know why? Because we put, as Governor Rockefeller said in his remarks, we put our primary reliance not upon government, but upon people for progress in America. That is why we will succeed. And we must never forget that the strength of America is not in its government, but in its people; and we say tonight that there is no limit to the goals America can reach, provided we stay true to the great American traditions.5
Nixon reinforces this sharp contrast in all of his presidential bids, thus foregrounding a major tenet of the conservative message—small government characterized by limited governmental interference—and placing its antithesis (big government, excessive governmental control and regulation) in direct opposition to the proven values and sacred ideals of the people: “We are a great nation. And we must never forget how we became great. America is a great nation today not because of what government did for people—but because of what people did for themselves over 190 years in this country.”6 Nixon’s message of intrusive government(s) hampering the progress of nations and the individual’s freedom and pursuit of happiness is thus integrated into a battle cry for a fight against communism in which American ideals are being tested on a global stage (“The most effective proponents of freedom are not governments, but free people”) but also into subtle cultural messaging and appeals to patriotism by emphasizing the importance of the moral code of every individual American, from whom ought to emanate the spirit absorbing those ideals, in this global battle: “and this means that every American—every one of you listening tonight—who works or travels abroad, must represent his country at its best in everything that he does.”7 By drawing a connection between the fate of the individual and the role and form of government while expanding the framework of his anti-government message to include a mobilization against the Communist menace, an interventionist federal government, and an appeal to the morality and patriotism of each American, it becomes easier for Nixon to then advertise standard conservative economic philosophy of free enterprise, effective investment, and maximum growth:
First, we must take the necessary steps which will assure that the American economy grows at a maximum rate so that we can maintain our present massive lead over the Communist bloc. How do we do this? There isn't any magic formula by which government in a free nation can bring this about. The way to assure maximum growth in America is not by expanding the functions of government, but by increasing the opportunities for investment and creative enterprise for millions of individual Americans.8
To add an evocative layer to his rhetoric of American idealism, Nixon evokes past national events central to America’s foundation and cultural heritage and endows them with new significance for the present, for instance in his 1968 campaign message of law and order amidst rising crime rates in cities, lenient courts, and the protests of 1968, which was in large part designed to appeal to traditionally Democratic voters:
My friends, we live in an age of revolution in America and in the world. And to find the answers to our problems, let us turn to a revolution, a revolution that will never grow old. The world's greatest continuing revolution, the American Revolution. The American Revolution was and is dedicated to progress, but our founders recognized that the first requisite of progress is order.9
When Nixon employed the rhetorical framework of the American Revolution, he skillfully interweaved themes of foreign and domestic policy by connecting the cultural clashes and internal tensions within the United States to the broader cause of preserving American idealism abroad, in which America had to act as a ‘beacon of hope’ and shining ‘city upon a hill’ for the rest of the world. His appeal coopts the revolutionary sentiment of its times and embeds it in a message of order (at home and abroad):
The American Revolution was a shining example of freedom in action which caught the imagination of the world. Today, too often, America is an example to be avoided and not followed. A nation that can't keep the peace at home won't be trusted to keep the peace abroad. A President who isn't treated with respect at home will not be treated with respect abroad. … If we are to restore prestige and respect for America abroad, the place to begin is at home in the United States of America.10
Similar to his messaging about the ideal role of government, Nixon again uses a rhetorical framework (the American Revolution) and succeeds at broadening his campaign message and target audience through the thematic and associative expansion of said framework, which connects various elements of his campaign message (in this example: law and order, peace through strength, the ideological nature of the battle against the Communists, and a restoration of moral values).
2.2 Nixon as an Ideological Warrior – and Electoral Strategist
For Richard Nixon, carefully crafting a message of American idealism was also an attempt to undermine his opponents’ attacks and improve his reputation among the national electorate. Nixon’s ambition, his years of experience in public office and electoral politics in California, and his ties to Republican leadership made it less challenging for his opponents—both in Republican primaries and in general elections—to paint him as a calculating political insider detached from ordinary Americans and the embodiment of the (often nonideological, merely power-driven) political establishment:
It was his podium persona that gave him trouble. Although his admirers saw him as a political warrior, combining high intelligence, shrewd political instincts, and courageous combativeness, his critics saw only the Trickster, a master of bathos (e.g., the ‘Checkers’ speech), a political hatchet man without conscience, a mixture of Uriah Heep and Grendel the Monster. Throughout his career, in almost every speech he made, he tried to burnish the bright image of the political warrior but avoid sounding like the Trickster. (Gavin 358)
By presenting himself as an idealogue who could harness the idealism of past generations and ordinary Americans into a clear vision for his administration and the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, the Republican increasingly shifted his rhetoric from a pragmatic, less ideological-heavy approach to an idea-oriented message in which he could frame himself as an active visionary spurring the American people to dedicate themselves to timeless American values – a strategy Nixon would also adopt in his inaugural and State of the Union speeches, in which “it is Nixon who shapes the vision rather than allowing the vision to impose itself on us and on him” (Gavin 361). Transforming the political stigma of his own ambition, he developed a message in which the Leader of the Free World could only succeed through the ambition of the American people, and conditioned the prospects of success of any national leader on the extent to which his fellow American citizens would adhere to fundamental American ideals:
What will determine whether Senator Kennedy or I, if I am elected, was a great president? It will not be our ambition that will determine it, because greatness is not something that is written on a campaign poster. It will be determined to the extent that we represent the deepest ideals, the highest feelings and faith of the American people. In other words, the next president, as he leads America and the free world, can be only as great as the American people are great.11
Although social and cultural issues may not have been of the same salience in the 1960 campaign as in Nixon’s successful bids in 1968 and 1972, he nonetheless paved the way for subsequent Republican messaging tailored to culturally conservative and traditionalist voters with the rhetoric of his first campaign: “And so I say in conclusion, keep America’s faith strong. See that the young people of America, particularly, have faith in the ideals of freedom and faith in God, which distinguishes us from the atheistic materialists who oppose us.”12 The dichotomy Nixon creates between the adherents of American ideals and the “atheistic materialists” opposed to those values in his closing statement in this debate is significant in so far as it does not specify who precisely is meant by the latter—while a contrast between the United States and the Soviet Union (especially with the attribution of atheism) suggests itself, the criticism denoted by the term ‘materialist’—concern with material things and possessions over spiritual, cultural, and intellectual values—may additionally have served to create some distance between Nixon and what was by a large segment of the population perceived as the ‘northeastern establishment’ of political power, embodied not only by Kennedy, who was hailing from Massachusetts and relying on financial support from donors and a groundswell of popular support (especially among younger voters) in the urban Northeast, but also by Nixon, who “had cultivated wealthy executives for years” and now had to assuage conservative concerns that he would push the party in a more liberal direction similar to the ideological approach of New York governors Thomas Dewey and Nelson Rockefeller:
Conservatives had always worried that Nixon, like Kennedy, did not appear to have strong convictions. It was difficult to discern any Nixon ideology. … [Nelson] Rockefeller was determined to force both Nixon and the Republican Party in a liberal direction. Dewey’s liberal New York party had long dominated the national party. New York’s control was largely about Wall Street’s financing of Republican candidates. … Big business interests controlled the Republican Party in many states and often backed the party’s liberal wing in the belief that it had better odds of winning elections. (Rorabaugh 106)
In addition to transcending the personality-centered, less emphatically ideological approach of Eisenhower for a concrete vision which defined the Republicans against the Democrats, then, Nixon also had to navigate the difficult task of uniting his party’s liberal, moderate, and conservative forces and forging a path to victory that included inroads into conservative parts of the country which had been Democratic-leaning in the past (especially the peripheral South) without losing too much ground in electoral-rich Northeastern battleground states such as New York and Pennsylvania, where Kennedy was running strong in heavily populated urban centers and making significant inroads in traditionally Republican but rapidly growing suburban turf (especially in areas such as Long Island, which had been attracting many recent arrivals from the cities, including a significant portion of Catholics)13 and without losing Midwestern battleground states where Kennedy could count on strong support in industrial cities (Rorabaugh 160; 179-180).
In order to overcome any ideological divisions between the liberal and conservative forces, Nixon would have to perform a difficult balancing act of placating both to some extent14, partly through developing a broad campaign message which included a variety of themes and appeals to conservatives of various ideological stripes and simultaneously placated a more moderate center of the electorate15. By presenting himself as an ideologue eager to cement traditional American values which could be interwoven with a message against governmental interference, cultural conservatism16, and Soviet Communism17 alike, he created an ideological framework in which it was Nixon who was inspiring the American people to adhere to said framework but it was not Nixon, but the American people, on whom the success of such a vision hinged: “Above all, we must recognize that the greatest economic strength that we can imagine, the finest of government organizations — all this will fail if we are not united and inspired by a great idea, an idea which will be a battle cry for a grand offensive to win the minds and the hearts and the souls of men.”18
The self-portrayal of Nixon as a visionary mobilizing the American people for a common cause permeates his entire campaign rhetoric: “[T]he time when one man or a few leaders could save America is gone. We need tonight nothing less than the total commitment and the total mobilization of the American people if we are to succeed.”19 Nixon’s appeals, which shift agency from the Oval Office to the divinely inspired nation consisting of individuals who cherish the ideals of their forefathers and structure their life and philosophy accordingly, would prove particularly useful in his 1968 bid, in which he could exploit long-held resentment toward an ideologically increasingly liberal Supreme Court dominated by sitting Chief Justice Earl Warren by painting said justices as destructive authoritarians robbing the American people of their agency and overriding their deeply personal and long-held moral code: “Government can pass laws. But respect for law can come only from people who take the law into their hearts and their minds—and not into their hands.”20 Similarly, he could affirm his pro-Civil Rights stance while equivocating on the concrete actions his administration would take in the fields of Civil Rights and the extent to which it would promote the cause by deferring responsibility to the judgement of the American people: “A President can ask for reconciliation in the racial conflict that divides Americans. But reconciliation comes only from the hearts of people.”21
Such a shift in emphasis, which affirmed the wisdom of the ordinary American and presented the nation with an active choice between different cultural and ideological visions as well as between governmental and individual power, stood in marked contrast to the ideological conformity which had characterized the cultural atmosphere during the Second World War and later also found its expression in Eisenhower’s more nonideological approach to governing in the 1950s: “The ideological homogeneity that the Second World War had imposed on the United States had produced a severely restricted public language—one that not only disallowed a considerable range of political options, but that also encouraged reticence (‘Loose lips sink ships’), conformity, and total deference to military leaders” (Black 7). Nixon, while evoking ‘American’ ideals and embedding them in a nostalgic description of the nation’s heritage, could portray them as values that should not to be taken for granted and had to be affirmed by the nation, for instance in the ideological battle against Communism: “And it means, my fellow Americans, it means sacrifice, but not the grim sacrifice of desperation, but the rewarding sacrifice of choice which lifts us out of the humdrum life in which we live and gives us the supreme satisfaction which comes from working together in a cause greater than ourselves, greater than our nation, as great as the whole world, itself.”22 While America’s ideals had been an integral part of the national spirit since the arrival of the first settlers, the active affirmation of them would only redound to the timeless honor of the generation which now actively chose to embrace them for the future: “My fellow Americans, I believe that historians will recall that 1968 marked the beginning of the American generation in world history. … And by our decision in this election, we, all of us here, all of you listening on television and radio, we will determine what kind of nation America will be on its 200th birthday; we will determine what kind of a world America will live in in the year 2000.”23
2.3 Assuaging and Fueling the Electorate’s Appetite for Change
Nixon’s rhetoric of idealism also carried the advantage of providing the Republican nominee with an opportunity to encourage (1968) or respond to (1960, 1972) public desire for a change in leadership, in many cases through co-opting the sentiment of change created by his opponents’ campaigns or adjusting to a particular cultural context while nonetheless ascribing different or higher meaning to such a mood for change and framing the election as a vehicle for affirming the supremacy of American ideals and for channeling an American spirit to confront any major cause or concern facing the nation in the present and future.
With a message as inspirational as it was absolutist, he could counter Kennedy’s central ‘get the country moving again’ theme which highlighted the ‘New Frontier’ of the 1960s—a consistent message the Democrat would evoke in the context of his economic policy in the aftermath of the sharp 1958 recession as much as he would in response to the Sputnik Shock of 1957 and subsequent fears of a missile gap—by adding a spiritual and moral component to the choice he presented to each American and establishing a connection between the values the nation would represent and its prospects in a global battle with deep ideological implications.24 America’s source of strength lay not just in its economic and military might, but in the moral values embodied by each American, which had to be harnessed within the United States just as much as abroad: “And above all, in this decade of the sixties, this decade of decision and progress, we will witness the continued revitalization of America’s moral and spiritual strength, with a renewed faith in the eternal ideals of freedom and justice under God which are our priceless heritage as a people.”25 Nixon presented himself as a visionary just as committed to confronting Kennedy’s ‘unknown opportunities and perils’ and ‘uncharted areas of science and space’ of the New Frontier in what he, however, dubbed “the better America toward which we will strive”:
[W]e will develop to the full the untapped natural resources—our water, our minerals, our power—with which we are so fortunate to be blessed in this rich land of ours. And we shall provide for our scientists the support they need for the research that will open exciting new highways into the future, new highways in which we shall have progress which we cannot even dream of today.26
With the height of the counterculture during the late 1960s and early 1970s, George McGovern’s progressive grassroots campaign on the Democratic side, and America shaken by a cultural and generational clash, Nixon could tap into the sentiment of upheaval while simultaneously emphasizing the moral and spiritual component of the election when he encouraged Americans “not [to] turn away from greatness” and framed his reelection as possibly the last chance America had to lead the way to a lasting peace and order with a message that makes it hard to distinguish the incumbent from the challenger: “With faith in God and faith in ourselves and faith in our country, let us have the vision and the courage to seize the moment and meet the challenge before it slips away.”27 Similarly, he could tap into the cultural resentment propelling Alabama governor George Wallace to national prominence, strong popularity among blue-collar workers, and a robust third-party candidacy in 1968 while affirming an inspirational message for the American people.28 Nixon also employed the framework of American idealism to reject a different kind of change associated with progressive and youth revolt, which found one of its most visible expressions at the 1968 Democratic National Convention protests:
[T]hose who participated in the American Revolution had no peaceful way to regress their grievances. They had to have a revolution in order to do it. And then our Founding Fathers had the genius to set up a system of government which provides a method for peaceful change. Only once in the history of our country, a hundred years ago in the Civil War, did that not work. … But when you have a system that provides a peaceful method in which we change what we don’t like, I don’t believe there is any cause that justifies breaking the law or engaging in violence. … I believe it’s essential to get that across particularly in the college campuses.29
Here, Nixon demonstrates another use of his references to American national events of strong idealistic character, a framework which could be tailored to many contexts: In addition to previously (a) fueling or responding to the electorate’s mood for change, (b) adducing such evocative frameworks to promote and cement the thematical expansion of his campaign message, (c) endowing a present cultural context and electorate with timeless significance, Nixon now (d) articulates an exclusionary message which places the protesters in direct opposition to the idealism of their fellow Americans and the values of their forefathers.
3. Ronald Reagan
3.1 The Conservative ‘Great Society’ – the Ideological Elevation of the Individual
In his presidential bids, Ronald Reagan taps into Nixon’s portrayal of the American dedication to idealism and similarly (but even more intensely) depicts it as emanating not from political leadership but from the people themselves. Akin to the notion of a powerful Civil Religion in which all Americans should strive to adhere to deeply unifying ideals in a divinely inspired nation without violating the separation of church and state, Reagan identifies the shared values of the people as the common bond unifying the nation and providing the foundation of “the extraordinary strength and character of this breed of people we call American.”30 As a candidate who had always been eager to expand his coalition and who set out to dismantle then-President Jimmy Carter’s political base in the South (Carter had won every Southern state except Virginia in his close victory against incumbent Republican Gerald Ford in 1976 and was reliant on another strong showing in the region, which had still been largely dominated by Democrats at the state and local level in 1980), Reagan framed the choice in the 1980 election as one transcending mere partisan affiliation and as a stepping stone to a spiritual revival which was grounded in the moral strength, ceaseless optimism, and clear vision for the American people, who would reaffirm the timeless ideals that were so intrinsically a part of their nature and heritage:
Everywhere, we've met thousands of Democrats, Independents, and Republicans from all economic conditions, all walks of life, bound together in that community of shared values of family, work, neighborhood, peace, and freedom. They're concerned, yes. They're not frightened. They're disturbed, but not dismayed. They are the kind of men and women Tom Paine had in mind when he wrote, during the darkest days of the American Revolution, ‘We have it in our power to begin the world over again.’31
Quoting from Thomas Paine’s His Common Sense (1776) in what proved to be a powerful pamphlet for the cause of American independence from Britain and a call for political liberation, individual liberty, limited government, and free enterprise in opposition to an exceedingly and increasingly intrusive federal government which disregarded or disrespected the will of the people, Reagan could incorporate his evocation of the spirit of 1776 into his own campaign message, which was rooted abundantly in the affirmation of those exact same values (with the political liberation in this context representing one from the Washington establishment, an inept national leadership under the Carter administration and a Democratic Congress, and a federal government which had increasingly usurped powers not granted to it by the people).
To an even greater extent than Nixon, Reagan connects the various founding myths and narratives of the nation in his campaign message like a common thread. It was not just the ‘timeless’ American Revolution, which had already been evoked by Nixon and undergirded with a populist affirmation of originating in the judgment and wisdom of the individual American, which found its expression in Reagan’s rhetoric. Reagan also evokes America’s role as a ‘shining city on a hill,’ in which the nation’s current moral, economic, and military standing would decide whether America was to remain the beacon of hope and moral guidance for the rest of the world: “I have quoted John Winthrop's words more than once on the campaign trail this year—for I believe that Americans in 1980 are every bit as committed to that vision of a shining ‘city on a hill,’ as were those long-ago settlers.”32 Like Nixon before, Reagan rhetorically shifts agency from political leadership to the American people, who had it in their power to continue America’s modern Manifest Destiny: “I’m not running for the Presidency because I believe that I can solve the problems we’ve discussed tonight. I believe the people of this country can, and together, we can begin the world over again. We can meet our destiny – and that destiny to build a land here that will be, for all mankind, a shining city on a hill.”33
Reagan’s rhetoric displays other similarities to Nixon’s appeals to American ideals of the past and his emphasis on their relevance for present-day America: (a) The election is (above all for electorally advantageous reasons due to Democratic strength in voter registration, previous elections, and local governance) framed as a referendum on deeply-held and immensely significant values whose reaffirmation requires more than the mere expression of one’s party affiliation; (b) such appeals to a uniquely ‘American’ set of values are inextricably tied to the people who embody them, mostly because they serve as a framework to advertise the Republican platform to a broad coalition of voters (with each group, for example culturally traditionalist voters concerned about the Supreme Court and/or economically conservative suburban voters concerned about governmental interference, absorbing the message and associating the imagery with their personal priorities) or as a framework to articulate an inspirational message which complicates the opposition’s depictions of the candidate as a right-wing extremist similar to Barry Goldwater34 even as the message itself subscribes to Goldwater’s ideological positions; (c) the rhetoric bridges the gap between the detached political establishment and the ordinary American while restoring the confidence of Americans in themselves and their country; (d) the people are endowed with timeless American ideals in which past idealism serves as the foundation for meeting the challenges of the future, i.e., the past (often nostalgically evoked) can be harnessed as a source of progress for the future; (e) while both Republicans presented said dedication to idealism as an inherent fact shaping generations of Americans, the American voter was nonetheless asked to affirm this tradition and to ensure its continuation in and relevance for the future.
Building on this rhetorical framework, Reagan paints an even starker ideological contrast than Nixon in his first race against Kennedy:
Jimmy Carter steeped in 1970’s pessimism—or realism—deeming America’s problems complex, and its resources limited. Still, he trusted government to help Americans overcome. Ronald Reagan was the candidate of 1950’s optimism, confident that the people who framed the Constitution, settled the West, freed the slaves, industrialized the continent, and crushed the Nazis could solve any problem. But Reagan believed that government was part of the problem, not the solution. (Troy 26)
Reagan goes even further than Nixon in elevating Americans to heroic status35 and consistently evoking an ‘American’ set of values in front of his audience: “Reagan’s all-American outlook defined his times. Reaganism was liberty-laden but moralistic, consumer-oriented but idealistic, nationalist but individualistic, and consistently optimistic” (Troy 4). The message was perfectly tailored to the cultural environment of the 1980s36, entailed the additional advantage of thwarting criticism of the president or his policies because it could be (implicitly and explicitly) construed as an attack upon the very meaning, foundation, and ideals of America with its “community of extraordinary individuals who can accomplish anything because of their faith in a broad heritage of self-evident morality” (Ritter 324), and further complemented the call for renewal of American idealism by embedding Goldwater’s ideologically conservative message in a heavily America-laden rhetorical framework which established 1980s’ conservatism as a direct continuation of the ideals and spirit of the Founding Fathers in an even more evocative and explicit manner than in Nixon’s rhetoric and similarly added a distinctively populist layer to the presentation of the benefits of such an ideology as it was meeting the needs of the people without viewing society as a collective whose conditions had to be ameliorated with the aid of a far-reaching government such as under Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society” reforms:
Isn't our choice really not one of left or right, but of up or down: down through the welfare state to statism, to more and more government largesse, accompanied always by more government authority, less individual liberty and ultimately totalitarianism, always advanced as for our own good. The alternative is the dream conceived by our Founding Fathers, up to the ultimate in individual freedom consistent with an orderly society.37
Equating the ideals of the Founding Fathers with conservative policies which would advance the unlimited potential of all Americans also required Reagan to blur the Founding Fathers’ distrust of the common man and their skepticism of democratic rule, which not seldom veered into outright contempt for the masses:
Conservatives had once believed that the class system was God’s construction – a deterministic ordering of society. Free-market theory, on the other hand, presupposed a more fluid society in which the individual shaped his own destiny. By implication, this meant that class differences were attributed not to fate but to real inequalities in ability – the rich were rich because they had talents the poor lacked. The duty of government, these conservatives believed, was to remove the obstacles to individualism and mobility, one of them being government itself. Removing obstacles would enhance individual liberty. Thus, the founding fathers were themselves redefined, with their contempt for the masses subsumed in favour of their belief in freedom. While government had previously been seen as a way to protect the masses from themselves, it was now seen as a way to set the masses free from those forces that constrained them. This also meant convincing the mob that they were poor because they were not free. The best government was by definition small – the smaller it was, the less it could interfere in the lives of the masses. In contrast, liberal social welfare, in trying to improve the lot of man, inevitably impeded the freedom of the individual. (DeGroot 14)
Reagan articulates this redefinition most explicitly at the 1984 Republican convention when he contrasts his party’s vision of ideal government with that of the Democrats: “Their government – their government sees people only as members of groups. Ours serves all the people of America as individuals.”38 While Reagan’s modification of the motives of the Founding Fathers was often embedded in the advertisement of his economic policies, it also served to connect an economically conservative message with the Republican platform on social issues, thus also broadening (like in Nixon’s case) the party’s coalition while fostering the inseparability of economic and cultural philosophy:
Conservatives discovered wisdom in the mob. The redemption of ordinary people meant the sanctification of the values they held dear, in particular family, God, tradition and patriotism. These were co-opted as conservative values. Those who adhered to traditional ideals were considered morally superior and therefore better equipped to succeed in the free market. Those ideals, once a matter of personal choice, became a social code. (DeGroot 14)
3.2 Remnants of the New Deal and Mayflower – Reagan’s Populist Rhetoric
While Reagan’s persuasion efforts affirmed the inherent freedom and wisdom of the American individual, his careful and consistent evocation of a faithful community adhering to a heritage of American ideals and incorporating said values into their personal lives simultaneously alleviated concerns that his platform was promoting harsh economic self-interest with little concern for the health of the overall community or nation and an indifference toward the needs of the economically struggling who relied on governmental protection or welfare benefits. It was further intended to aid his electoral strategy of expanding his coalition by winning over culturally traditionalist or conservative blue-collar workers (often referred to as ‘Reagan Democrats’). Reagan skillfully combines both layers of argumentation—the protection of the individual’s freedom and the appeal to a faithful community—in his portrayal of an American nation which courageously affirms the dignity of the individual while humbly extending its values to others who wish to partake to the fullest of the American Dream:
We don't celebrate dependence day on the Fourth of July, we celebrate Independence Day. We celebrate the right of each individual to be recognized as unique, possessed of dignity and the sacred right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. At the same time, with our independence goes a generosity of spirit more evident here than in almost any other part of the world. Recognizing the equality of all men and women, we are willing and able to lift the weak, cradle those who hurt and nurture the bonds that tie us together as a nation – one nation under God.39
Reagan therefore stirs his audience to free itself from the burden of an excessive literal government encroaching on the lives and potential of the individual American while simultaneously establishing a spiritual government which affirms the consensus of those values among its individuals and underscores their dedication to the ideals that have shaped the nation over generations.
Even while sharing the most essential tenets of his economic philosophy with them, Reagan does not present his economic policies as originating from a heartless, avaricious Milton Friedman or an extremist, ‘fringe’ Barry Goldwater and instead tailors his message to non-Republicans and non-conservatives who were fond of the benefits of the New Deal era and had a history of supporting Democratic candidates for political office:
What has happened to the Democratic Party's concern for protecting the earnings of working people and promoting economic growth? Unlike today's Democratic leadership, President John F. Kennedy's program cut personal income taxes by 22 percent – just about what ours did. Then he coupled that with new incentives for industry, which led to a surge in investment, productivity, jobs, real wages, and economic growth. Sounds like what's going on today, doesn't it? Well, sadly, our opponent's team is not in the tradition of President Kennedy and his predecessors – Truman, Roosevelt. Their policies never sent out an S.O.S. They proudly proclaimed U.S.A.!40
What had changed, since the New Deal era, was the social and cultural context in which governmental reforms were implemented, and Reagan’s own conversion from a Democrat into a Republican in the 1950s paints the picture of a candidate significantly more pragmatic than his detractors (and admirers) tended to acknowledge:
In truth, his conversion was not as dramatic as he pretended. At the core of his beliefs was a steadfast faith in individualism and self-reliance – he worshipped the revitalizing struggle symbolized by the frontier. That never changed. Since the greatest threat to social harmony in the 1930s was bankers and rapacious corporations, it was only natural that he supported Roosevelt. … Yet his support for Roosevelt never implied a theoretical conversion to Keynesian economics or social democracy. Reagan was pragmatic: New Deal reforms and aid seemed appropriate in the 1930s, but redundant after the war. By the 1950s, the welfare state was a tiresome guest who wouldn’t leave. (DeGroot 16-17)
Reagan’s vivid evocation of the faithful, humble American community embracing a renewed vision of government held together by a spiritual government plays on powerful associations with the Mayflower Compact by painting the envisioned principles as a continuation of the self-government and common consent perpetuated in the first documental framework of government in the territories and adhered to by each courageous subsequent American generation:
Three hundred and sixty years ago in 1620, a group of families dared to cross a mighty ocean to build a future for themselves in a new world. When they arrived at Plymouth, Massachusetts, they formed what they called a ‘compact’; an agreement among themselves to build a community and abide by its laws. This single act – the voluntary binding together of free people to live under the law – set the pattern for what was to come. A century and a half later, the descendants of those people pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor to found this nation. Some forfeited their fortunes and their lives; none sacrificed honor. Four – Four score and seven years later, Abraham Lincoln called upon the people of all America to renew their dedication and their commitment to a government of, for, and by the people. Isn't it once again time to renew our compact of freedom; to pledge to each other – to pledge to each other all that is best in our lives; all that gives meaning to them – for the sake of this, our beloved and blessed land? Together, let us make this a new beginning. Let us make a commitment to care for the needy; to teach our children the virtues handed down to us by our families; to have the courage to defend those values and virtues, and the willingness to sacrifice for them. Let us pledge to restore, in our time, the American spirit of voluntary service, of cooperation, of private and community initiative; a spirit that flows like a deep and mighty river through the history of our nation.41
This passage from Reagan’s 1980 address at the Republican National Convention is a prime example of political rhetoric employed strategically to achieve various objectives: (a) Reagan’s embedding of his vision of American society in the framework of a past compact which itself had been modelled after a Puritan church covenant and adapted to a civil situation reinforces the Republican’s appeal to socially conservative voters and connects the economic with a cultural message while elevating his current audience to the descendants of a divinely ordained community with a blessed past and heritage which had to be defended and harnessed (e.g. through the teaching and defense of the values handed down in the family) as a source for success in the present and future; (b) it represents an inspirational appeal to pride and patriotism (e.g. ‘our beloved and blessed land’) which can easily be separated from an overly political context and heightens the contrast between the present (along with its often perceived moral decay and lack of inspirational leadership) and the nostalgic past, thus fueling the desire for change among the electorate in a manner typical of Reagan’s campaigns42 ; (c) it advertises the Republican platform on the ideal, small government (as a government ‘of, for, and by the people’ which protects order and restores the moral and economic health of the nation by harnessing the creative potential of a collection of individuals of the ‘American’ breed and being unimpeded in its efforts by the burdens and regulations of a federal government) to a non-political audience with immensely evocative imagery which blurs the specifics of said philosophy for a broader cause; (d) it frames the election as a choice between morals and ideals rather than between party affiliations and as a continuation of the principles of the Founding Fathers rather than merely different political platforms, therefore robbing the election of its sheer partisan character and endowing it with timeless significance; (e) it presents the tenets of a conservative message with a more idealistic, inspirational, and optimistic rhetoric than that employed by Goldwater in his presidential bid, making use of recurring and intense populist appeals which replace a mere Goldwater-esque rejection of the ‘Great Society’ by foregrounding the new great Conservative society:
Americans, who have always known that excessive bureaucracy is the enemy of excellence and compassion, want a change in public life—a change that makes government work for people. They seek a vision of a better America, a vision of society that frees the energies and ingenuity of our people while it extends compassion to the lonely, the desperate, and the forgotten.43
Reagan’s populist appeal to ‘the forgotten’ was tailored not only to an audience of struggling blue-collar workers in the Midwest, but—not least because the thematic and associative expansion of his anti-Big-government message—was similarly adapted to reach a more affluent, suburban audience, e.g. in the Southern states, where lopsided margins in suburban areas (many of which had attracted transplants from other parts of the country) allowed Reagan to flip every Southern state Jimmy Carter had carried four years earlier, with the exception of Carter’s own home state of Georgia44:
Rooted in post-New Deal prosperity, this was a populism of the new American middle class, of the post-World War II phenomenon that created history’s first mass-middle-class society. Building on the tax revolts of the 1970s, the silent majority’s anxieties about the 1960s, and nostalgia for the 1950s, Reagan’s populism resonated with millions who left the slums for the suburbs but still felt like ‘forgotten men’—and women. (Troy 43)
While Reagan did not explicitly use the term ‘Creative Society’ in his bids for the presidency, his rhetoric of a sacred community which was actively renewing a spiritual compact and could count on government to discover and mobilize human resources (e.g. through the stimulation of industry and the removal of regressive taxes) without decreasing individual freedom or establishing an overarching power structure over them which would thwart its more ‘noble’ efforts was adopted from his 1966 gubernatorial manifesto in his first statewide campaign for governor against Democrat Pat Brown: “Using the word ‘society’ in a manifesto was a clever way of camouflaging the every-man-for-himself individualism that was the usual Republican fare” (DeGroot 148-149). In an illustration of the power of messaging, Reagan did not have to abandon the fundamental tenets of Goldwater’s conservative philosophy in order to successfully incorporate them into a populist message. He could sell his carefully constructed vision of the American community and the ideal government, always contrasted against the excesses of the federal government, to urban Columbus45, the steel-producing, unionized, blue-collar Mahoning Valley which had been hit hard by job losses46, could evoke the dynamism embodied by every part of New York (including its affluent suburbs and financial centers) while speaking from the center of a shoe manufacturing company in Endicott, New York47, and could embrace the cause of ‘states’ rights’ at a Mississippi county fair close to the location which happened to be the sight of the 1964 murders of three civil rights activists:
He utilized a consistent tool [anti-Big-government rhetoric] from past speeches to win over a regional audience and, as a result, could correctly claim that he meant no harm with his words. Additionally, Reagan’s skills as an actor served him well. When the time came for the declaration, he dropped his voice and quietly delivered, ‘I believe in states’ rights.’ Thus Reagan could again claim, regardless of location, that the words possessed no special meaning beyond what he had said so many times in the past. (Bates 28)
Reagan skillfully responded to criticism of his Mississippi visit by again evoking the exact same framework of anti-Big-government messaging, highlighting the failures of an intrusive federal government and endowing another place with significance by traveling to the heavily African American Bronx and standing “on the exact spot where President Carter had proclaimed four years earlier to make a commitment to urban renewal” and where “[t]he Carter programs had never arrived” (Bates 30).
3.3 Reagan’s Rhetoric of the Jeremiad
Reagan’s references to American ideals also served to reinforce a narrative pattern the Republican employed during his presidency and his campaigns for national office: a triad of demoralization and despair — in 1980 recounting the story of an America “wracked by inflation, strangled by big government, humiliated by Iranian fundamentalists, outmaneuvered by Soviet communists, betrayed by its best educated and most affluent youth,” followed by a turning point of Reagan “riding in to save the day, with a mandate for change” that was “building on century-old ideals, responding to decades-old frustrations, utilizing the challenges of the moment,” concluded by (especially in his 1984 reelection campaign and during his second term) the portrayal of an American renaissance and a “Morning in America” with the dawn of a rising stock market, the surge of patriotism, and the steady collapse of the Soviet Union (Troy 12). This narrative could be best condensed in the framework of American idealism in the rhetorical form of the jeremiad, which Reagan utilizes in a structure similar to that outlined by Ritter (328), who references the historian David Howard-Pitney:
1 . The promise, which stresses America’s special destiny as the promised land, literally, its covenant with God;
2. The declension, which cites America’s failure to live up to its obligations as its chosen people, its neglect of its mission, its failure to progress efficiently, its national sin of retrogression from the promise; and
3. The prophecy, which predicts that if Americans will repent and reform, the promise can still be fulfilled.
Reagan adapts this form and modifies it in two ways: First, he focuses less on painting the retrogression from the promise as a national sin and more as a national tragedy impeding every American’s potential and right to liberty and happiness, and secondly, he lays the blame for the declension not on the American people but on its leaders, therefore ensuring that the message is not robbed of its inspirational optimism and still fuels a mood for change among the electorate. In his 1980 election eve address, we find one such instance of this rhetorical strategy:
Not so long ago, we emerged from a world war. Turning homeward at last, we built a grand prosperity and hoped—from our own success and plenty—to help others less fortunate. Our peace was a tense and bitter one, but in those days the center seemed to hold. Then came the hard years: riots and assassinations, domestic strife over the Vietnam War and in the last four years, drift and disaster in Washington. It all seems a long way from a time when politics was a national passion and sometimes even fun. … A popular novel of the ‘60s ended prophetically with its description of a ‘kindly, pleasant, greening land about to learn whether history still has a place for a nation so strangely composed of great ideals and uneasy compromise as she.’ That is really the question before us tonight: For the first time in our memory, many Americans are asking: does history still have a place for America, for her people, for her great ideals? There are some who answer ‘no;’ that our energy is spent, our days of greatness at an end, that a great national malaise is upon us. They say we must cut our expectations, conserve and withdraw, that we must tell our children… not to dream as we once dreamed. … Duke Wayne did not believe that our country was ready for the dust bin of history, and if we’ll just think about it, we too will know it isn’t.48
Here, the promise which resonates in the post-WWII years (‘Not so … seemed to hold’) is followed by the declension—the description of the nation’s failure to progress efficiently, which is dispiriting the idealism of previous generations (‘Then came … in Washington’). Reagan then adds a turning point between the declension and the prophecy which frames the election as a way to affirm the heritage and divine inspiration of the nation (‘A popular novel … for her great ideals?’). He also faults the leaders for the declension (‘some who answer no’, ‘They say we must …. we once dreamed’) before closing with the optimistic prophecy (‘Duke Wayne … it isn’t’), thus spurring the electorate to vote out the current leadership in favor for a new one which will adhere to a spiritual government of courageous individual Americans dedicated to the ideals of the Founding Fathers.
Reagan is aware that his criticism of the current political leadership necessitates a strategy that does not easily portray him as yet another politician that may not be trustworthy and, like Nixon, shifts the emphasis of agency to his fellow citizens, from whose judgement and values any spiritual renewal and ideological crusade would have to emanate:
Tonight, let us dedicate ourselves to renewing the American compact. I ask you not simply to ‘trust me,’ but to trust your values – our values – and to hold me responsible for living up to them. I ask you to trust that American spirit which knows no ethnic, religious, social, political, regional, or economic boundaries; the spirit that burned with zeal in the hearts of millions of immigrants from every corner of the earth who came here in search of freedom. Some say that spirit no longer exists. But I've seen it. I've felt it – all across this land; in the big cities, the small towns and in rural America. It's still there ready to blaze into life if you and I are willing to do what has to be done.49
The nation can only be as morally upright as the firmness with which each individual adheres to those values. The election is framed as a national test of said firmness, as Reagan implies when he quotes the 1775 words of Joseph Warren, a Boston doctor who was a key figure in the efforts toward independence and was shot by British soldiers: “[O]n you depend the fortunes of America—you are to decide the important question, on which rests the happiness and liberty of millions yet unborn. Act worthy of yourselves.”50 The idealistic reference to the past, which implies a connection in heritage and bloodline between the Americans participating in the revolution for their independence and the Americans of today, elevates the listener to heroic status, and suggests the horizon of a new independence which rejects the current leadership that has put America on the track of declension and restores America’s promise. The choice of the term ‘unborn’ in this context (at a time when Reagan was going to great lengths to court the Religious Right, whose priorities included the issue of abortion) further solidifies a powerful appeal to the voter concerned about the moral direction of the nation. The individual voter’s ballot is thus endowed with almost mystical significance: “Tomorrow morning, you will be making a choice between different visions of the future. Your decision is a uniquely personal one. It belongs to no one but you. It will be critical in determining the path we will follow in the years ahead.”51 Reagan would also use the form of the jeremiad in his reelection race, speaking from the later stage of the prophecy which traced the beginning of the establishment of the promise52 or looked back on the dispiriting times of the declension, which had now been overcome under his presidency.53
4. Conclusion and Outlook
While Ronald Reagan is often credited with shaping the modern-day ideological direction of the Republican Party and held up as a prime example of how to craft a successful conservative message and advertise it to a larger electorate, it was Richard Nixon whose electoral strategy, in which the rhetoric of American idealism played a prominent role, already paved the way for Reagan’s messaging. Even as Reagan went further than Nixon in elevating the individual American to heroic status, interweaving various American founding narratives in his campaign rhetoric, and portraying conservative ideology as a direct continuation of the ideals of the Founding Fathers, particularly in terms of the consistency and evocative intensity of his message, Nixon and Reagan both used references to the American past and timeless American ideals to expand the thematic and associative framework of their campaign message. Both Republicans tied the fight against Communism to the rejection of a powerful federal government at home, the moral values represented by the individual American to the nation’s prospects in an ideological battle on the global stage, and the free-market system to the ideals of the Founding Fathers. Nixon and Reagan placed the antitheses of their promoted message (interventionist government, excessive governmental control and regulation, a powerful welfare system which saw society as a collective mass, cultural anarchists opposed to law and order, ideologically liberal Supreme Court justices) in direct opposition to the proven values and sacred ideals of the people. Their framework of American idealism served to connect a broad campaign message consisting of appeals to conservatives of various ideological stripes and traditionally non-Republican voters and to underscore or obfuscate certain elements of the platform. It elevated the cultural context of the election to historical significance and the target audience to the heirs of an ‘American’ generation and the embodiment of timeless American ideals while spurring said audience to affirm the relevance of those values for the future through the support for the Republican nominee in the upcoming election. Nixon’s and Reagan’s messaging shifted agency and judgment from the presidential candidate to the voter and from the White House to the divinely inspired nation and its individuals who cherished the ideals of their forefathers and structured their life and philosophy accordingly.
From an electoral standpoint, the rhetoric of Nixon and Reagan served various purposes. It allowed both men to exploit cultural or political resentment while articulating an inspirational, forward-looking message; to portray themselves as visionaries who could harness the idealism of past generations and today’s ordinary Americans into a clear vision for their administrations; to undermine the perception of them as detached, nonideological, power-hungry establishment figures (Nixon) or dangerous, heartless extremists (Reagan); to frame the election as a referendum on fundamental ideals and values rather than mere party affiliations so as to facilitate Republican inroads into traditionally Democratic-leaning voting groups while rallying the base and not alienating the political center; to respond to and transform the opposition’s sentiment of change (e.g. during the counterculture of the 1960s) or ideology (e.g. by responding to Lyndon Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ programs with the conservative ‘Creative Society’); to fuel (particularly in the case of Reagan) a mood for change among the electorate through the evocation of a nostalgic past contrasted with the present; to further the party’s appeal to culturally conservative and traditionalist voters and illustrate the connection between cultural and economic ideology; to craft a message tailored to a particular cultural context (e.g. the disillusionment with ideological conformity after World War II and the Eisenhower presidency; an era of consumerism, media innovation, and advertisement culture; animosity toward interventionist government; suburban lifestyle changes), and to blur unpopular parts of the candidate’s platform.
In discussing the lessons of Reagan’s rise to the presidency and his enormous success at connecting with voters of all kinds, generating and exploiting anti-establishment sentiment, and creating a desired image of himself as a candidate and president (which, notably, has lasted well into post-presidency years until today) in his 2015 book Selling Ronald Reagan: The Emergence of a President, Gerard DeGroot offers an almost prophetic prediction of the future of modern liberalism at a time when Barack Obama was still president:
In 2008, Barack Obama managed to win the presidency with the most liberal platform since Lyndon Johnson. Liberals optimistically celebrated the apparent revival of their creed. The 2012 election seemed to confirm that interpretation. Yet given the deep divisiveness of so many of Obama’s policies, it is difficult to believe that he has managed to revive the old loyalties of the working class to the Democratic Party or to liberalism. His victories are more a measure of Republican weakness than Democratic strength. … In other words, Democrats today who carelessly dismiss the Republicans as too divided and ideologically stubborn to compete effectively on a national stage should beware of what Reagan achieved in 1966. His victory was not a miracle that can never be repeated. Reagan was special, but not unique. His victory simply demonstrates that modern politics is about people – that it is always a mistake to underestimate the power of personality. (267-268)
While it would be a mistake to attribute Donald Trump’s success in the 2016 presidential election solely to his populist, non-traditional message and rhetoric while downplaying other factors such as the unpopularity of his opponent, his brand and astonishing success at solidifying base support from his own party and a non-negligible percentage of the population which had previously been supportive of Democrats even during his presidency is yet another testament to the power of messaging and marketing in modern politics, even when conducted with less skill and success than in Reagan’s case. In “The Nixon Opportunity,” an editorial published after the 1968 election prophesizes that Nixon’s appeals to George Wallace voters and his attempts to exploit cultural resentment represent no viable long-term path for the Republican Party:
It would appear advisable, therefore, for President-elect Nixon to listen to the advice of California Lt. Governor Robert Finch, who, according to news-paper reports, maintains that the election of 1968 is the last that will be decided by the un-young, the un-poor and the un-black. (11)
In retrospect, it is clear that the 1968 election was not the last one decided by those segments of the electorate, and it is just as apparent today that predictions of a Republican demise were as premature in 1968 as they were in 2008 or 2012. As the success of both Nixon and Reagan demonstrates, party coalitions can and will change, and rhetoric and messaging are both integral components in this process, representing an indispensable strategy to any party eager to ensure its long-term relevance.
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---. “President Reagan's Remarks at a Reagan-Bush Rally in Columbus, Ohio on October 24, 1984.” St. Johns Arena, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. 24 Oct. 1984. Speech. YouTube, uploaded by Reagan Library, youtube.com/watch?v=XVC2jBh8ydI.
---. “President Reagan's Remarks at a Reagan-Bush '84 Rally in Endicott, New York on September 12, 1984.” 12 Sep. 1984. YouTube, uploaded by Reagan Library, youtube.com/watch?v=9qJChlT_D1E.
---. “Ronald Reagan's campaign remarks ‘To Restore America’ on March 31, 1976.” 31 Mar. 1976. YouTube, uploaded by Reagan Library, youtube.com/watch?v=4GEL1gl01Fo.
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Broadcast. C-SPAN, c-span.org/video/?453484-1/the-nixon-answer-michigan.
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1 Reagan, Ronald W. “1980 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.” Joe Louis Arena, Detroit, Michigan. 17 July 1980. Speech. C-SPAN, c-span.org/video/?4055-1/1980-presidential-acceptance-speech, 29:10-29:31.
2 The decade of the 1960s was characterized by a new wave of prosperity, consumerism, and lifestyle changes which found its expression in earlier marriages; the birth of many new children; a rapid increase in suburban commodities, housing construction, and ownership of automobiles; high industrial employment paralleled by the emergent development of a white-collar, service-oriented economy reliant on a college-educated workforce; the emergence of an upbeat popular culture and nightly entertainment brought to a record number of Americans through the medium of television; advertisement culture which propagated a conformity in national taste, and the perception of an expanding frontier, e.g. with supersonic air travel, new cures for diseases, and the moon landing on the horizon (Rorabaugh 28-29). Eventually, this kind of dynamic environment would culminate in the rise of the counterculture of the 1960s as well as a communitarian left perceived as overly intrusive by a large segment of the population, thus fueling social division (Black 9), especially amidst American excesses in Vietnam, the intense struggle for Civil Rights, and the increasing prominence of cultural issues.
3 “1960 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.” International Amphitheatre, Chicago, Illinois. 28 July 1960. Speech. C-SPAN, c-span.org/video/?4016-1/richard-nixon-1960-acceptance-speech, 49:17-49:33.
4 While this passage presents a more secularized version of the founding myth, the contrast between America’s divine heritage and the Soviet Union’s atheism is often implied if not outright stated by Nixon, who also identifies the ideals as divinely inspired and evokes the imagery of a sacred community adhering to this heritage with vivid imagery that will later be adopted by Reagan: “Above all, in this decade of the sixties, this decade of decision and progress, we will witness the continual revitalization of America's moral and spiritual strength, with a renewed faith in the eternal ideals of freedom and justice under God which our are priceless heritage as a people” (“1960 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 28:39-29:01).
5 “1960 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 29:49-30:22.
6 “1968 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.” Miami Beach Convention Center, Miami Beach, Florida. 8 Aug. 1968. Speech. C-SPAN, c-span.org/video/?4022-2/richard-nixon-1968-acceptance-speech, 28:31-28:48.
7 “1960 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 44:13-44:32.
8 “1960 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 41:31-41:52.
9 “1968 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 23:33-24:00.
10 “1968 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 22:42-23:18.
11 Kennedy, John F., and Richard M. Nixon. “Kennedy vs. Nixon: The fourth 1960 presidential debate.” New York City, New York (state). 21 Oct. 1960. Debate. YouTube, uploaded by PBS NewsHour, youtube.com/watch?v=-9cdRpE4KKc, 56:42-57:15.
12 ibid., 57:16-57:33.
13 While Eisenhower had won suburban Nassau County by a 38-percentage-point margin over his Democratic opponent Adlai Stevenson in 1956, Nixon only carried it by a 10-point margin over John Kennedy in 1960, a margin insufficiently wide to outvote the heavily populated boroughs of New York City, therefore resulting in Nixon losing the state’s 45 electoral votes despite Governor Nelson Rockefeller’s efforts to deliver it for Nixon – no other state had a greater number of electoral votes at that time. Many Republicans used the party’s declining strength in the Northeast as an argument for pursuing a different, more conservative coalition nationally: “The East was deserting the Republican Party, which had dominated there since the 1850s. Even in eastern rural areas, the party was in decline. If the party could not win in the increasingly liberal East, then conservative Republicans argued that the party should become a more conservative party based in the Midwest, West, and South” (Rorabaugh 183).
14 “To many, the Republican Party seemed in terminal disarray in the early 1960s. Moderates like President Dwight Eisenhower had accommodated New Deal reforms in order to establish a political consensus near the centre of American politics. Those on the right, however, deplored this betrayal of conservatism; they complained that the party had become a poor imitation of the Democrats” (DeGroot 25).
15 In 1960, such appeals were centered on the continuation of Eisenhower’s record of “peace and prosperity,” in 1968, Nixon could contrast his message of a conservative idealism with the failures and governing style of an unpopular Johnson administration: “Nixon based his persuasive appeals on principles and values they [a large segment of the American populace] would readily accept. He identified his position with truth, morality, dedication to duty, and patriotism. The most important was truth, especially in light of the ‘credibility gap’ that had plagued the last years of the Johnson administration” (Bochin, “Richard Milhous Nixon” 258).
16 Such a culturally conservative message could be articulated in two ways: (a) As “Kennedy’s eastern brand of politics played poorly throughout the West” (Rorabaugh 184) and Nixon’s path to victory in the Electoral College necessitated a near-sweep of the Western states, a specter of cultural domination of the East could be evoked or implied on the campaign trail and contrasted it with the ‘Frontier spirit’ and individualism of the Western states: “He [Nixon] could contrast his own self-made individualism, earthy pragmatism, and western accent with Kennedy’s inherited wealth, Harvard-educated intellectuality, and eastern accent. Kennedy could not be certain of a single western state, and Nixon figured to win the vast majority, perhaps even make a clean sweep” (Rorabaugh 120); (b) In a manner similar to Nixon’s appeal to reject the values of the ‘atheistic materialists’ opposing fundamental American ideals, such a message could be (implicitly or explicitly) framed as an appeal to the voter to restore cultural and moral values, especially in a “year when conservative, traditionally Democratic Bible Belt Protestants began to shift permanently to the Republicans at the presidential level” (Rorabaugh 181). Nixon’s underlying moral messages, often again intertwined with references to American events, are indicative of this strategy: “A hundred years ago, Abraham Lincoln was asked, during the dark days of the tragic war between the States, whether he thought God was on his side. His answer was, ‘My concern is not whether God is on our side, but whether we are on God’s side’” (“1960 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 58:11-58:38).
17 Nixon’s deeply ideological framing of the Cold War in his second debate with Kennedy is yet another example of his rhetoric of a modernized, ideological Manifest Destiny: “[A]s America moves forward, we not only must think in terms of fighting Communism, but we must also think primarily in terms of the interests of these countries. We must associate ourselves with their aspirations. We must let them know that the great American ideals – of independence, of the right of people to be free, and of the right to progress – that these are ideals that belong not to ourselves alone, but they belong to everybody. This we must get across to the world” (Kennedy, John F., and Richard M. Nixon, “Kennedy vs. Nixon: The second 1960 presidential debate.” Washington, D.C. 7 Oct. 1960. Debate. YouTube, uploaded by PBS NewsHour, youtube.com/watch?v=fE61QJ3-GG8, 27:32-28:06).
18 “1960 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 45:02-45:26. Nixon makes a similarly intense appeal to the individual in his fourth debate with Kennedy: “We also believe that in the great field of ideals that we can lead America to the victory for freedom – victory in the newly developing countries, victory also in the captive countries – provided we have faith in ourselves and faith in our principles ” (“Kennedy vs. Nixon: The fourth 1960 presidential debate.” New York City, New York (state). 21 Oct. 1960. Debate. YouTube, uploaded by PBS NewsHour, youtube.com/watch?v=-9cdRpE4KKc, 9:26-9:43; emphasis added).
19 “1968 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 34:26-34:38.
20 “1968 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 34:39-34:48. While the politicization of the Supreme Court precedes the decade of the 1960s, the 1968 election and the wave of conservative opposition to the Warren Court throughout the 1960s arguably marked the most intense manifestation of such resentment in political discourse and paved the way for future presidential campaigns to turn control of the Supreme Court into a wedge issue in order to drive their voters to the polls.
21 “1968 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 35:02-35:11.
22 “1960 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 52:28-52:58.
23 “1968 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 31:23-32:23.
24 Nixon’s confirmation of the need for a peaceful competition between the Soviets and Americans serves as a prime example of this strategy, playing on an appeal which transcends, for instance, the kind of ‘atheistic materialism’ he referred to in the debate: “And we say, further, extend this competition, extend it to include not only food and factories as he [Khrushchev] has suggested, but extend it to include the great spiritual and moral values which characterize our civilization” (“1960 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 48:08-48:28). It should be noted that Kennedy, like most Democratic officials at that time, was for the most part just as explicitly anti-Communist in his rhetoric and voting record as Nixon and most other Republicans. Nixon could hardly succeed at undermining his opponent’s calls for change without adding an additional, ideological layer to his portrayal of the Cold War which could also be embedded in a cultural, domestic context, since the policy-related differences between the two parties were more about certain strategic decisions (such as the best way of preventing a Communist takeover of Quemoy and Matsu) than about the broader objective of an American victory without military confrontation between the two empires, i.e., ‘Peace through Strength,’ which relied on economic and military strength and insisted on peaceful negotiation without abandoning diplomatic firmness. Nixon evokes the idealistic contours of the conflict in his 1968 acceptance speech as well: “We believe this should be an era of peaceful competition, not only in the productivity of our factories but in the quality of our ideas.” (19:05-19:12).
25 “1960 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 28:39-29:01.
26 “1960 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 28:11-28:38.
27 Nixon, Richard M. “1972 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.” Miami Beach Convention Center, Miami Beach, Florida. 23 Aug. 1972. Speech. C-SPAN, c-span.org/video/?3911-1/richard-nixon-1972-acceptance-speech, 39:31-39:53. Nixon explicitly adopts the sentiment of change even in his reelection bid, even if it entails a different response to the various challenges of the time than the ‘radicalism’ with which he charges his opponent George McGovern: “The choice in this election is not between radical change and no change. The choice in this election is between change that works and change that won't work.” (10:53-11:07) Much like in his previous two races for the presidency, Nixon again ties prospects of American success abroad to progress at home, dependent both on social order and individual morality but also on the creative enterprise of Americans: “[T]he enormous creative energies of the Russian people and the Chinese people and the American people and all the great peoples of the world can be turned away from production of war and turned toward production for peace. In America it means that we can undertake programs for progress at home that will be just as exciting as the great initiatives we have undertaken in building a new structure of peace abroad” (36:52-37:25).
28 “[W]hen I look at Mr. Wallace’s candidacy, I would express the difference simply in this way: As I look at his candidacy, he is against a lot of things that American people are frustrated about. He is against the rise in crime, he’s against the conduct of our foreign policy, what’s happened to American respect around the world. I’m against a lot of those things, the difference is I’m for a lot of things. And that’s what we need now….” (“The Nixon Answer: Southern Town Hall.” Atlanta, Georgia. 3 Oct. 1968. Campaign Broadcast. C-SPAN, c-span.org/video/?453207-1/the-nixon-answer-southern-town-hall, 54:33-54:59).
29 “The Nixon Answer in Michigan.” Detroit, Michigan. 30 Sep. 1968. Campaign Broadcast. C-SPAN, c-span.org/video/?453484-1/the-nixon-answer-michigan, 10:47-11:27.
30 His description of the divinely inspired nation also contains pastoral elements: “It’s impossible to capture in words the splendor of this vast continent which God has granted as our portion of His creation. There are no words to express the extraordinary strength and character of this breed of people we call American” (Reagan, Ronald W. “1980 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.” Joe Louis Arena, Detroit, Michigan. 17 July 1980. Speech. C-SPAN, c-span.org/video/?4055-1/1980-presidential-acceptance-speech, 38:20-38:37).
31 “1980 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 38:42-39:18.
32 Reagan, Ronald W., and George H. W. Bush. “Ronald Reagan’s Election Eve Address ‘A Vision for America’ on November 3, 1980.” 3 Nov. 1980. Speech. YouTube, uploaded by Reagan Library, youtube.com/watch?v=fMx3KsU-Rcg, 17:03-17:17.
33 Anderson, John B., and Ronald W. Reagan. “Ronald Reagan and John Anderson Debate on September 21, 1980.” Baltimore, Maryland. 21 Sep. 1980. Debate. YouTube, uploaded by Reagan Library, youtube.com/watch?v=vxf8Exdie1w, 56:39-57:00.
34 Reagan was an ardent supporter of Goldwater and gained national prominence with his speech at the 1964 Republican National Convention, also known as ‘A Time for Choosing,’ or simply ‘The Speech,’ which outlined fundamental tenets of the conservative philosophy. Most of Reagan’s messaging is derived from Goldwater’s The Conscience of a Conservative (1960), especially the emphasis on the inherent connection between the economic and spiritual aspects of man’s nature (one cannot be spiritually and economically free/efficient if they are ‘enslaved’ politically) as well as the contrast between the legitimate (e.g. protection of internal order and free enterprise) and the unintended (e.g. excessive regulation and taxation, an authoritarian power structure which threatens the individual’s creativity, liberty, and pursuit of happiness) aspects of governments. Goldwater had already drawn attention to the fundamental issues facing conservative candidates for political office, e.g. the need to demonstrate the relevance of a proven conservative philosophy to the problems of the current times and the needs of the ordinary citizen. In retrospect, the discrepancy between the results of 1964 (with Goldwater’s landslide defeat) and 1980 (with Reagan’s landslide win) is, even while acknowledging significant differences in the political and cultural context of those election years, a remarkable testament to the power of presentation, marketing, and campaign strategy.
35 “Well, we, the living Americans, have gone through four wars. We’ve gone through a Great Depression in our lifetime that literally was worldwide and almost brought us to our knees. But we came through all of those things and we achieved even new heights and new greatness. The living Americans today have fought harder, paid a higher price for freedom, and done more to advance the dignity of man than any people who ever lived on this earth” (“Ronald Reagan and John Anderson Debate on September 21, 1980.”, 56:01-56:28).
36 Gil Troy particularly highlights America’s “epidemic consumerism” during the 1980s: “New technologies, ideologies, and bureaucracies, along with revolutions in economics, marketing, advertising, and conceptions of leisure, had transformed the cautious American customer, once wary of chain stores, into the 1980’s sale-searching, trend-spotting, franchise-hopping shopper. Spurred by Reagan’s gospel of progress and prosperity, Americans happily indulged themselves” (Troy 3). In a decade characterized by its sprawling information age, trickle-down economics, and a “new society and political culture obsessed with the pursuit of happiness,” Reagan’s message of the individual’s liberty and potential set against an overreaching federal government proved resoundingly effective: “Reagan served out dollops of traditional American fare promising limited government and maximal salvation in modern, media-friendly packages. A politics of postures and images, alternating with a focus on a few discrete issues that engaged him fully, stirred an audience exhausted by the grandiose promises of yesteryear and distracted by Entertainment Tonight ” (Troy 14).
37 Reagan, Ronald W. “1984 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.” Dallas Convention Center, Dallas, Texas. 23 Aug. 1984. Speech. YouTube, uploaded by ReaganFoundation, youtube.com/watch?v=fRpL0dgz1b4, 42:16-42:58.
38 “1984 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 4:48-4:57.
39 “1984 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 43:05-44:01.
40 Reagan, Ronald W. “President Reagan's Address to the Nation on the Eve of the Presidential Election -11/5/84.” 5 Nov. 1984. YouTube, uploaded by ReaganFoundation, youtube.com/watch?v=RoYEKvtC-WU, 8:55-9:40. Such ‘I-did-not-leave-the-party-but-the-party-left-me’ appeals pervade Reagan’s rhetoric, including in the realm of foreign policy, for instance when he assuages concerns about his military intervention in Grenada: “Democratic candidates have suggested that this could be likened to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the crushing of human rights in Poland or the genocide in Cambodia. Could you imagine Harry Truman, John Kennedy, Hubert Humphrey or Scoop Jackson making such a shocking comparison?” (ibid., 22:49-23:19).
41 “1980 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 09:17-11:17.
42 In his 1966 gubernatorial campaign against incumbent Democratic governor Pat Brown, he employs this strategy as well, especially in front of audiences consisting of senior citizens: “The main thrust of his appeal to senior citizens, however, played upon their pride in America and their fears of moral decline. Reagan presented himself as the person who would rescue the past, appealing to the old to ‘help us bring back what you feel America and California should be’. Polls showed that the law-and-order issue ranked high among the concerns of the elderly, therefore Reagan’s emphasis upon this problem resonated well with that constituency” (DeGroot 92).
43 “Ronald Reagan’s Election Eve Address ‘A Vision for America’ on November 3, 1980.”, 4:38-5:00. Such an inspirational, optimistic message is also articulated at the 1984 Republican National convention, for instance: “The choices this year are not just between two different personalities, or between two political parties. They are between two different visions of the future, two fundamentally different ways of governing - their government of pessimism, fear, and limits, or ours of hope, confidence, and growth” (4:20-4:41).
44 The Democratic path to victory in the South at that time is not to be conflated with the Democratic path nowadays, which relies on a growing and increasingly liberal suburban and urban vote in Virginia and Georgia in particular. The 1980 Senate race in Georgia, for instance, is a stunning illustration of how fast political geography can change in four decades, representing almost an exact reversal of the county maps of the 2020 presidential race and the 2021 Senate runoffs. It should be noted that even in defeat, Jimmy Carter won the majority of counties in the South, including the Deep South.
45 Each campaign really contained an anecdote about the place or endowed it with a nostalgic and timeless mysticism grounded in the values of its community: “You know, visiting you here makes me especially happy because it's very much like being at home. I'm from the Midwest, and I've always felt that the Midwest, states like this one, are kind of the heartland of America. Here there is steadiness of purpose, an appetite for good, honest work, and love of country. And Ohio is definitely a part of America's heartland” (Reagan, Ronald W. “President Reagan's Remarks at a Reagan-Bush Rally in Columbus, Ohio on October 24, 1984.” St. Johns Arena, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. 24 Oct. 1984. Speech. YouTube, uploaded by Reagan Library, youtube.com/watch?v=XVC2jBh8ydI, 5:48-6:21). The Midwest played a prominent role in Reagan’s life and rhetoric: “This son of small-town Illinois had spent his life running away from the Midwest while glorifying it. But Reagan was happiest when occupying that Midwest in his mind, that nostalgia-soaked village where people were friendly, life was smooth, choices were clear, values were eternal, and the sunshine was golden. Reagan conjured that vision often and effectively, moving his party toward celebrating those honest Joes and Janes who were the legendary backbones of those mythical towns” (Troy 42-43). It is this ‘heartland’ of America which Reagan portrays as embodying the American dedication to patriotism, virtue, liberty, and prosperity, for example in his description of the patriotic return of American soldiers imprisoned in Vietnam in his 1980 election eve address (at a time when the Iranian hostage crisis was occupying the nation): “I asked Nancy, ‘where did we find such men?’ The answer came to me as quickly as I had asked the question. We found them where we've always found them. In our shops, on our farms, on our city streets, in our villages and towns. They are just the product of the freest society the world has ever known” (“Ronald Reagan’s Election Eve Address ‘A Vision for America’ on November 3, 1980.”, 14:02-14:25).
46 William Binning looks back on Reagan’s visit to Youngstown, Ohio, in a 2006 edition of The Ripon Forum, and his assessment rings familiar bells with today’s reader: “The second and third generation children of the various ethnic and racial groups who had migrated and immigrated to the area to make steel and work in the mills were very anxious and uneasy about their future. These groups had inherited and held dear very conservative social values. Their families and their churches were the center of their lives. ... Politically, many also inherited loyal support for the New Deal and the Democratic Party of Franklin D. Roosevelt. … In their meeting with Reagan, they emphasized they did not want welfare, they just wanted to work. … Reagan told the workers: ‘We’ve got to protect this industry and all industries against dumping’ of below-cost foreign steel in the U.S. market, ‘and we’ve got to get rid of those thousands of regulations that make it impossible for us to compete’ with Japanese and European producers.’ His message of hope, support and understanding delivered, Reagan departed the Mahoning Valley shortly after this speech. … He was an outsider and he campaigned as an outsider. His mind was not cluttered with inside-the-beltway-policy-wonk-double-talk. For the troubled people in the Mahoning Valley, he seemed like a man who spoke their language and understood their problems.”
47 “Traveling today, we've flown over a good part of the Empire State. New York is lovely this time of year. And I thought, looking down from that altitude, that I detected just a touch of color beginning to appear in the trees. And there were great rivers like the Susquehanna threading their way across the land. And I couldn't help thinking of those majestic towers of Manhattan, the hard-working, patriotic neighborhoods of the boroughs, and the thriving cities and towns that dot your upstate – places like Rochester, Buffalo, Syracuse and, yes, Binghamton, Vestal, Johnson City, and Endicott” (“President Reagan's Remarks at a Reagan-Bush '84 Rally in Endicott, New York on September 12, 1984.” 12 Sep. 1984. YouTube, uploaded by Reagan Library, youtube.com/watch?v=9qJChlT_D1E, 12:46-13:51).
48 “Ronald Reagan’s Election Eve Address ‘A Vision for America’ on November 3, 1980.”, 10:04-12:29.
49 “1980 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 39:56-40:48.
50 “Ronald Reagan’s Election Eve Address ‘A Vision for America’ on November 3, 1980.”, 22:34-22:50.
51 “Ronald Reagan’s Election Eve Address ‘A Vision for America’ on November 3, 1980.”, 22:51-23:05.
52 “Our alliances, the strength of our democratic system, the resolve of free people—all are beginning to hold sway in the world. We've helped nourish an enthusiasm that grows each day, a burning spirit that will not be denied: Mankind was born to be free. The tide of the future is a freedom tide” (“President Reagan's Address to the Nation on the Eve of the Presidential Election -11/5/84.”, 16:37-16:59).
53 “But worst of all, worst of all Americans were losing the confidence and optimism about the future that has made us unique in the world. Parents were beginning to doubt that their children would have the better life that has been the dream of every American generation. We can all be proud that pessimism is ended. America is coming back and is more confident than ever about the future” (“1984 Republican National Convention Acceptance Address.”, 17:01-17:25).
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