The Operational Art of Counter-Insurgency

Introduction

This hand book is primarily the Cliffs Notes for counterinsurgency and is meant to serve as a guide for experienced practioners. It contains outlines and key points.

The knowledge of the past is a prerequisite for understanding the present

There will be mini-seminars or lectures that precede some sections. My intent is to show historical background. There are also a small series of lectures that I have given at the Counterinsurgency Training Center in Kabul and or at a remote training locations to Coalition partners.

When I put this together I made the assumption that those that would read this would have already read basic doctrinal manuals and sources on counterinsurgency such as Galula, Sandmann, Warburton, Kitson, and the US Counterinsurgency Manual. The US Department of State has also created a manual that can be downloaded for free from this link www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf^[i]

You can also get a copy of the most recent manual for free from the web site, Federation of American Scientists.

I use the US references not as a slight to any one particular nation but because for the last ten years American doctrine has been the basic framework for not only training the Iraqi and Afghan Forces it is the baseline for training across coalition partners.

I had the great privilege of working, advising and training with the German, Norwegian, Swedish, British, French, Afghan, Croatian, Dutch, Australian, and New Zealand Militaries. US Doctrine was the basic framework used for understanding and translating basic concepts and principles.

Additionally, I have made an assumption that those that decide to read this manuscript will have had experienced at least one tour as a practioner of civil-military operations, stability operations and or counterinsurgency in a truly integrated operating environment by working with the locals, law enforcement, International, government and non-government organizations and agencies.

There are also several figures used in this document. These are author source documents created at the Counterinsurgency Training Center and presented by the author during various training and advising missions during a 4 year period in Afghanistan.

Doctrinal Insurgency Fundamentals (FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency).

This chapter synthesizes and summarizes key historical and doctrinal elements. You should have a copy of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency and FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency with you as references Both these manuals are very good, look at them carefully and look at every page. Look at the suggested additional readings, read the foreword, the introduction and notes and then use Google Scholar or Wikipedia to link it with other open source material

The key doctrinal elements you will need to reference from FM 3-24 is Chapter 1, Chapter 3 (The entire Chapter 3 needs to be read with intent but specifically look at paragraph 3-61 and the discussion on “Social Capital” your Homework is to Google and Wikipedia all the open source stuff you can on Social Capital and then link it with the fundamentals of insurgency, counterinsurgency and stability operations), and Appendix B.

From FM 3-24.2 look at and read with intent Appendix A.

You must first and foremost understand the war in which you are about to embark. Understanding the insurgent and motives of the insurgency is the critical first step.There are elaborate preparation models that can be used such as the IPB processand TCAPF but even these methods rely on the “basics” and the basics are:

- What is the root cause?
- To what extent does the insurgent have internal support (physical, moral, economical, political, social, informational, etc, etc)
- To what extent does the insurgent have external support (physical, moral, economical, political, social, informational, etc, etc)
- What is the Insurgent Narrative, ideology and story? How is this appealing to the local and international audience?
- What is their level of will and commitment?
- What are the weapons and tactics?
- What is the operational environment and surrounding areas of influence?

What type of Approach do they use? Protracted, urban, identity, conspiratorial, a composite of these approaches? (See Annex A )

How does the insurgent mobilize the means to support and sustain the insurgency ( Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information; PMESII)?

- Persuasion
- Coercion
- Abuses, and reaction to abuses
- Foreign Support
- Crime
- All of the above?
- Who are and what are the elements of the insurgency? (Leaders, combatants, cadre, supporters, auxiliaries and mass bass)

Insurgency’s are also shaped by the eight dynamics below and is also connected to your basic planning framework. The basic planning framework starts with the elements of PMESII framed as questions to gain a basic understanding of the means and how these means might be mobilized frame the elements of PMESII with these basic dynamics:

- Leadership
- Objectives
- Ideology and Narrative
- Environment and Geography
- External Support
- Sanctuary
- Timing
- Phases

This is a synthesis of successful counterinsurgency Practices and the convergence of trends.

- Emphasize Intelligence
- Focus the operational design on the population’
- Establish and expand your secure area’s
- Isolate the insurgent from his internal and external support
- Conduct continuous information operations
- I/O linked to ALL ACTIONS AND OPERATIONS
- Put the Host Nation in the Lead
- Train and build capacity with the host Nation
- Embed quality advisors
- Seek unity of effort; not to be confused with unity of command, unify effort of all the players, actors, agencies in your AO. Leverage each other’s strengths and weaknesses

Back to the Future:some commonalities with past insurgencies/counterinsurgencies and today’s environment.

- Political Nature defies Codification
- Difficult to understand the relationship between political and military action
- Fundamental Social Reengineering
- Public critical of operations
- Divide and Conquer Strategy: Allegiance not readily apparent
- Leniency Regarded as Weakness
- Small Wars: Domestic Life not threatened
- Good deeds insufficient to counteract collateral damage

Why the past is important and an elaboration on “Back to the Future”

Here is my mini-lecture or seminar on this topicWe have failed to recognize our past as important to understanding the present and the future. There is a broader historical context that must be explored because this historical context is woven into the narrative and ideology of the insurgents. Right wrong or indifferent, the broad historical context must be studied and understood. A good example is to read the peasant versions of insurgency in “The prose of Counterinsurgency”

Second: History, strategic history has a way of surprising us. No need to elaborate here. This is one of those items that’s needs to be an informal and casual professional development discussion over food and coffee.

Thirdly, revolutionary war, insurrection, small wars, rebellions, interventions must also be recognized for what they are not! War! These are not total war, although they might lead to such, these are “social movements” there are political, economic and other grievances when never addressed become change through the end of a barrel of a gun

No body of counterinsurgency theory existed prior to WW II.

The USMC Small Wars Manual, first published in 1935, was based on the work of C.E Callwell, “Small wars: their principles and practice” which was published in 1906 and the USMC Experience in Central America at the turn of the 20th century.

For historians the difficulty is with continuity in the past; seemingly on closer study of the past, , revolutions, small wars, insurrections, seem to be more an episode than a war and Governments and militaries have treated these small wars and Stability Operations as annoying distractions instead of preparing for the “big one”.

Even strategy treated as an idea with a continuous history is interesting, and results of success seem to be more plausible than definitive, while failure becomes an object lesson in what not to do. On the other hand, the careless use of history will mislead you terribly, especially when we attempt to seek historical connections where none may exist. ( this is going to spark serious uproar but in the interest of academic discourse I offer that our slow response to getting it right in Afghanistan and Iraq was a result of also seeking historical connections where none exist. For instance rather than focusing on Malaya and Vietnam we should have studied British Colonial example from 1837 to 1900 and we could have also used the Portuguese examples from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea.^[ii]

In the classic, “The Prose of Counterinsurgency” the agency or change for resistance comes in two simultaneous forms. While resistance for the “elites” and politicians is often legalistic in its nature, “subaltern” resistance is often violent and while elites may simultaneously promote both legalistic and violent approaches uncovering the history, culture and “trace” of the resistance is ideologically distorting and partial if we only rely on the “official” versions.^[iii]

History, ideology and Culture mold ones approach to counterinsurgency, hence sometimes we have a tendency to miss the overarching political, social, psychological, and now religious elements that make revolution possible. Taking a note from Political Geography, Culture sits in places and the defense of a place or an insurgency is a social movement. Case in point; the first question that is asked in the TCAPF is; have there been population changes in your village in the last year? Culture and land equal identity. Placelessness (no land to own, IDP;s) and culture threatens my roots, my culture, my identity and the fear that it will be displaced or lost.^[iv] This all feeds the Narrative for the insurgent.

History does not determine destiny but it does have a powerful predisposition; History is tied to culture and both provide the narrative. The basic doctrinal conundrum centers on the relative role of political, social and military action.

Insurgency Fundamentals (Gramsci). ^[v]

1783-1900 India, 110 known rebellions in 117 years

1837-1900 Queen Victoria’s small wars: 233 interventions, 75 in the East India Company.

On a sliding scale of conflict insurgency is the violent portion of any social movement. If we view insurgency as a social movement that seeks political, economic and or military change then all the indicators are, and have been clearly there. Social movements usually begin with protests, demonstrations, harsh political rhetoric and when they don’t achieve what they seek then change is sought from the end of a barrel of a gun.

Each insurgency is unique and although there are many similarities the root cause can usually be traced to political, economic and or military change.

Histories tend to exclude the insurgent as a subject of that history: your ASCOPE/PMESII Crosswalk will only address the superficial aspects if your not careful

Landlords as Money Lenders? Rent of some kind, to include transit rents for nomads. Rent can be in kind and not just cash

“Identity or distance is expressed in differentials of wealth, status and culture

Terrorism is an organized form of violence that includes the concept of collective liability. Collective liability means that a group or members of the offenders group or social category are held accountable for the offenders conduct. ^[vi]

This relationship of dominance-subordination is a political relationship. First attempts to work within the system usually fall on attempts at justice thru the police and or courts; absent that the problems escalate.

Despite the fact that their concept of power may not rise above localism, sectarianism, and ethnicity does not take away the fact that it is still all a problem of political character but defines the quality of the politics by specifying its limits and limitations.

What are the pillars of politics for your AO? (think strategy deficit and the link to operational design and tactics: ..a failure to perceive war/conflict and politics as a unity which war/conflict is fused with political considerations that include social and religious dimensions ^[vii]

Your starting point: take the Rebel-Peasants awareness of his world view as he sees it and his will to change that view as your point of departure.

War of Position: the primacy of the elements of media, perception and ideology linked and messaged with your operational design.

Counterinsurgency Principles and Post Conflict Transition:

The COIN Principles listed below might also be considered a guide to your post conflict transition. They are also part of your planning and design phase and can potentially become elements of PIR’s or Priority Information Requirements. If we are unable to effectively implement principles in packs then potentially the transition is effected.

If we assume that Counterinsurgency is effectively one element on the spectrum of “Social Movements” the ability to transition effectively is not only affected by how we influence the principles but the type and types of transition. Full spectrum Operations is some kind of “transitional shift”. There will be progress and regression in these shifts. The shift might be a relative priority of elements of offensive, defensive and some combined elements of stability but transition might be one of six types:

- War to Peace transitions
- Power transitions
- Societal transitions
- Political Democratic transitions
- Security transitions
- Economic transitions

War to peace transitions or conflict to peace transitions will include the other five elements to varying degrees. The added complexity comes from the external factors of support to insurgents from Nation States and or the regional intrastate players.

Power transitionsmight include the relative power change among players in the international system and will most certainly pertain to the regional and local players as well

Societal transitionsoccur as relationships and interactions among societal groups change as a result of conflict as displaced persons; as inadvertent dependencies are created by development and or foreign assistance

Political Democratic transitionsoccur as change occurs at varying speeds or through the process itself such as: the act of intervention; If an perceived urgent issue is not addressed, differences over the governmental procedures and methods; weak performance and or incompleteness of the transition itself.

Security transitionsare a broad subject in itself and require a myriad of resources and capacity building. Security transitions is linked to the other five elements.

Economic transitionsarethe dynamic changes within the economic system itself such as more control, less control, liberal, open-market and speed of recovery.

For instance a key doctrinal counterinsurgency / stability operations / security force assistance (COIN/SO/SFA) principle isgaining legitimacy. This is both an historical principle and a contemporary principle and yet is also linked to the type or types and smoothness or intensity of the transitions above.^[viii]

Six potential indicators of legitimacy might include: (Notice how these are linked to the transitions above; notice how they overlap)

- The ability to provide security for the populace (including protection from internal and external threats).
- Selection of leaders at a frequency and in a manner considered just and fair by a substantial majority of the population that you are there to protect and serve.
- A high level of popular participation in or support for political processes.
- A culturally and locally acceptable level of corruption.
- A culturally and locally acceptable level and rate of political, economic, and social development.
- A high level of regime acceptance by major social institutions.

[...]

^[i] Accessed this link on Jan 5 2011

^[ii] Some examples to study include: Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War 1961 to 1974, John P. Cann; see also: Heavens Command, an Imperial Progress, Jan Morris and Pax Britannica: the Climax of Empire, Jan Morris for a contrary view, or a so called peasants view see: Selected Subaltern Studies by Ranajit Guha. Also by Ranajit Guha is a classic called the Prose of Counterinsurgency.

^[iii] Ranajit Guha is a classic called the Prose of Counterinsurgency; Elite according to Guha is “Foreign Elite, and Indigenous Elite such as feudal magnates, industrial and mercantile magnates and upper levels of bureaucracy.

^[iv] Culture sits in places: reflections on globalism and subaltern strategies of localization, Arturo Escobar, Department of Anthropology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Political Geography, 20, (2001), pp 139-174

^[v] Elementary Aspects ofpeasant Insurgency in Colonial India, Ranjit Guha

^[vi] USAWC Guide to Strategy to National security Issue, Vol I Theory of War and Strategy, P98

^[vii] Ibid p98

^[viii] Harnessing Post-Conflict Transitions: A Conceptual Primer, PKSOI Paper,