The Transition from Bilateral to Multilateral Free Trade Agreements as a Multiplier Process

Multifarious Impacts on Economy and Business in context of ASEAN Countries (with extensive appendix)

Scientific Essay, 2010

27 Pages, Grade: 97.5%


Table of Figures



1. Introduction

2. The Fundamental Perceptions of the ASEAN Community and its Improvement Opportunities

3. Economic Incentives to Engage in Bilateral Free Trade Agreements

4. The Transition to Multilateral Free Trade Agreements and their Economic Impacts

5. Challenges and Prospects

6. Bibliography

7. Appendix


Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten


Figure 1 - Stable and Efficient Complete Network.

„When we are in competition with ourselves, and match our todays against our YESTERDAYS, WE DERIVE ENCOURAGEMENT FROM PAST MISFORTUNES AND BLEMISHES. Moreover, the competition with ourselves leaves unimpaired our benevolence TOWARD OUR FELLOW MEN. “

Eric Hoffer

1. Introduction

Stemming from the ongoing globalization, the process of global integration and international trade has accelerated ever since. Where back in the days the trade was more or less bounded to inter-regional trade with customers, partners and countries in close proximity, nowadays goods are shipped throughout the world, costs of transportation have decreased, time to market has increased and thus the needs and desires can be served almost instantly throughout the world particularly because of the continuous support of the WTO, where “a plethora of bilateral and regional trading and economic cooperation agreements have been mushrooming globally, and increasingly in the Asia-Pacific, generating a wave of“new regionalism” in Asia” (Sen; Srivastava 2009: 194). Concerned by the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998, the ASEAN countries were under the impression of a slowdown in pace of trade liberalization and thus this put pressure on these countries to engage sustainably in mutual beneficial trade and economic integration. By that, “at a theoretical level regional economic integration is being taken to mean deepening of intra-regional trade, expansion of mutual foreign direct investment (FDI) and harmonization of commercial regulations, standards and practices.” (Ekanayake; Veeramacheneni 2009: 2). This proceeding integration in ASEAN has mainly been motivated by the intention to create an attractive production base and to satisfy the rising competitive challenge on the part of China and India for both, domestic and foreign companies. (Hew; Sen 2004: 1-2). The impact especially of the ASEAN countries has raised over time, mainly in comparison to the OECD countries. “At the same time that developing Asia’s share in ASEAN trade has been rising substantially (from about one-third to nearly one-half of total ASEAN exports and imports over the 1990-2004 period), the share of major OECD countries has fallen commensurately.” (Naya; Plummer 2006: 231). As a reason for that “both trade and financial liberalization are believed to have propelled faster the long-run economic growth of the East Asian economies.” (Masron; Yusop 2008: 292).

Admittedly, to a great extend these goals have been achieved with the help of WTO. This institution’s underlying endeavor is to incept a tariff reduction and complete customs elimination (Sudsawasd; Mongsawad 2007: 339). Hereby, the WTO’s regulations not only helped to accelerate trade and thus highly contributed to a sophisticated worldwide network of bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements, but it also was conducive to a divergence of national policies which supported the political opening. Nevertheless, this perceived aim for trade liberalization is not a smooth process. There still exist plenty trade barriers which impact supranational harmonization in terms of trade. By May 2004 over 200 different agreements have been enforced of which 80% are purely bilateral declarations. By that, the ASEAN countries moved ahead of the WTO in a way that they started initiating regional as well as bilateral free trade agreements (Sudsawasd; Mongsawad 2007: 339). The reasons for that are the persisting conflicts among WTO countries. As an overall effect, this could negatively impede the expedition of agreements since the countries block the agreements on a vice versa basis.

Nonetheless, the tempo of proliferation of mutually stipulated bilateral agreements has been boosted since the inception of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) in 2001, nowadays “most of the new agreements involve Asia-Pacific economies, many of which have earlier been averse to FTAs, reflecting the increasing frustration of these countries with the multilateral process of trade liberalization.” (Sen; Srivastava 2009: 194). In addition, this trade liberalization process can be seen by the steadily progression of negotiated FTAs by ASEAN countries. To date, these contracts widely range from limited trade in goods with distinctive limitations on specific products to “highly comprehensive bilateral agreements, especially of Singapore, that cover not just trade in goods, but also services, investments, non-tariff barriers, and regulatory measures for trade and investments.” (Sen; Srivastava 2009: 196). It becomes clear, that positive and negative effects impact the ASEAN countries at the same time, slowing down the integration process.

Hereby the question arises: what are the underlying intrinsic motivations to engage in bilateral free trade agreements? Moreover, a closer look is inevitable on whether or not a bilateral agreement creates a stable and valuable outcome of highest utility for the enclosed trading partner. Under which circumstances could the transition to a multilateral and supranational agreement be a desired goal? To identify the reasons for such multiplier processes, the fundamental aim of this paper is to analyze the incentives to form different types of free trade agreements and their impacts on economy and business of the ASEAN developing countries. To get a broader and deeper understanding of how countries interact with each other and which factors play a decisive role influencing global connectivity and prosperity, it is inevitable to receive a heterogeneous insight of a multivariable world view, “So that I may perceive whatever holds. The world together in its inmost folds.” (Goethe 1808).

At this juncture, the second chapter will deal with a closer insight into the functionality of the ASEAN community, describing the underlying incentives to form free trade agreements in order to illuminate the fundamental perceptions of the ASEAN countries. The third chapter will introduce a model, which in the first instance analyzes the intrinsic incentives to form bilateral free trade agreements and then induces a transition to a fully integrated mutual beneficial multilateral network. The model will be based on network theory and was first described by Sanjeev Goyal and Sumit Joshi (2006). This part will be followed by chapter four, where a deeper factual and real-world based insight will be given, analyzing the intrinsic end economical driven incentives to further transition from bilateral to multilateral free trade agreements and its economic impacts on the participating countries. This paper will be rounded up with the analysis of forthcoming challenges and prospects, which the ASEAN countries will have to face in the near future and beyond.

2. The Fundamental Perceptions of the ASEAN Community and its Improvement Opportunities

Since its inception in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations became an excellent example of a successful confederacy (Sudsawasd; Mongsawad 2007: 340). Started with the five fastest growing Asian countries (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines) in 1967, nowadays the ASEAN community consists of 10 countries, where Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam were added over time (Tang 2005: 244). The main objective of ASEAN is to provide political security rationale as well as economic cooperation among members. This resulted in higher trade among the included countries and could only be facilitated by the countries’ industrialization process and their willingness to understand free trade as a welfare enhancement for both, the involved countries and the affected citizen. Supposedly, in 1993 the AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Agreement) was initiated in order to deepen economic integration and mutual cooperation while eliminating trade barriers in the ASEAN region. Unfortunately, many ASEAN members did not yet achieve satisfying integration in terms of tariffs (Sudsawasd; Mongsawad 2007: 340). The enhanced variety of products and international price convergence allow for comparative advantages and thus drive up the welfare. The ASEAN countries relied on trade ever since to boost economic growth and hereby induced a multiplier process where more thorough industrialization and political openness would lead to more trade. That being said it is surprising and convincing at the same time that these countries managed to generate impressive growth figures, hereby their pace of growth consistently exceeded that of other countries with similar patterns (Tang 2005: 244).

In order to accelerate trade on a higher pace, the ASEAN countries implemented an own free trade area called AFTA in 1993, consisting of the former ASEAN countries. In addition to the expanding intra-ASEAN based on deregulations and the abolishment of tariffs, trade with non-member countries enhanced and thus not only created sophisticated relationships with already developed countries but also induced positive spillovers for the respective countries. Following the economic debates, the dismantling of ASEAN trade interactions created globally favorable effects with intensified business and trafficking (Tang 2005: 241). By that, the implication of accelerated trade liberalization should undergo a distinct analysis concerning the intention in negotiating of such agreements. Why is ASEAN eager to choose free trade negotiations, even though they are mostly negotiated on an individual basis? What are the perceived positive impacts? Incorporating the findings of economic theory, “there are several perceived benefits from entering into FTAs, apart from that of gaining greater market access, and lowering business costs by reduction of tariff barriers. One of the most important perceived benefits from FTAs is the ability to provide a positive signal towards enhancing economic and strategic cooperation, and addressing regional security concerns.” (Sen; Srivastava 2009: 207). Therefore, this perception not only helps to provide diversified market growth and the exploration of new (business) opportunities, but the intra and inter regional trade is supported by the various FTAs, which also assist to establish sustainable strategic linkages to both, countries inside the particular ASEAN region and with excluded countries outside that region. The implementation of free trade agreements showed statistically viable results implying that higher trade evolved among the ASEAN countries since the foundation of AFTA. But not only inter-ASEAN trade increased but also the trade with non-member countries, inducing positive global spillovers of these FTAs. Showing political development and the plainness to undergo structural changes, in 2000 the ASEAN countries intensively started attempts to establish and merge free trade areas with both, ANZCER and the EU, which have admittedly to date not yet been implemented thoroughly in achieving the fully depletion of tariffs (Tang 2005: 259). In addition, supposedly many studies spot that the ASEAN would also increase benefit by enhancing trade liberalization among themselves. Unfortunately, until recently the AFTA was unable to overcome the initial boundaries, since the “the agreement was restricted only to trade in goods and involved a phased elimination of tariffs on intra- ASEAN trade. AFTA is now by and large fully implemented for the older ASEAN countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) with the newer members expected to comply with it by the year 2010.” (Sen; Srivastava 2009: 195). That being said, 17 years after the initial inception of the AFTA, some of signatory members are still reluctant to implement the contracted free trade regulations. Therefore, it is not only the outward FTA cohesion but also the inward liberalization that matters. There are plenty significant indicators that the amplitude of the FTA positively correlates with the welfare the country gains (Sudsawasd; Mongsawad 2007: 340). This implication will be tested in the next chapter with a model, firstly described by Goyal/Joshi (2006), analyzing the theoretical applications of welfare gains through the amplification of bilateral networks.

Having these results in mind, one of the most crucial characteristics of the ASEAN community is their inability to set up free trade agreements with non-member countries holding good for complete ASEAN simultaneously. So far, the ASEAN member countries were rather willing and striving to agree upon individual agreements with non-member countries than trying to find agreements altogether. This individualistic attitude arose due the negative impression on the part of many Asian countries that the WTO was unable to achieve sustainable and benevolent results for these countries. In the Asian region this process accelerated in the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis of 1997-1998, which not only affected East Asia tremendously but has also shown the “inability of the WTO to yield any substantial outcome to improve growth prospects of the Asian economies.” (Sen; Srivastava 2009: 194). This also has to do with the slowdown of the US economy in 2001 and affected the recovery process of the ASEAN countries since “the United States was one of the main export destinations of ASEAN products. In overall, world real GDP growth process is not smooth and thus has a big implication on the ASEAN economic development path [see Exhibit 1].” (Masron; Yusop 2008: 293). Additionally, to date there is not a single existing hub including all the ASEAN countries in a free trade agreement with countries outside this group. Hereby, especially Thailand and Singapore strive for creating multiple FTA hubs themselves. This so called “Noodle-Bowl” is a real threat and may create negative spillovers in terms of sophisticated and value-adding trade agreements [See Exhibit 2]. Many of these existing contracts were negotiated without notifying the WTO and are therefore unable to be screened (Sen; Srivastava 2009: 206­208). Thus the question arises whether it is a desirable and more beneficial situation for the ASEAN countries to sign the agreements separately rather than collaboratively under the guise of ASEAN. The latter would ensure that none of the ASEAN members would be discriminated and thus everybody could benefit from these agreements.

“Even though a bilateral agreement may broaden market access, reduce trade barriers, increase investment opportunity and strengthen other cooperation between the two countries, it appears that a small country often loses bargaining power over a big country in arranging the agreement. ASEAN, as a group, would have more bargaining powers in negotiating with big FTA partners such as the United States, China, and Japan.” (Sudsawasd; Mongsawad 2007: 339-340).

Therefore, the self-opinionated bilateral agreements that several ASEAN countries agreed upon individually with outside countries may lead to welfare losses in the long run. They might hinder rather than encourage the forthcoming ASEAN economic integration. This stems from the fact that the unmanageable and inconclusive diversity of these respective agreements will lead to a “Noodle-Bowl” sort of agreement pattern, creating undesirable externalities such as increased transaction and opportunity costs resulting from extended communication channels and ambiguous trade rights. Instead, the agreements should have some consistency in their composition to support a supra-national agreement body including all the ASEAN countries right away (Sudsawasd; Mongsawad 2007: 340). This is also supported by the fact that there is a great amount of overlapping negotiations and contracts within the ASEAN countries. For instance, Singapore negotiates bilateral FTAs on an individual basis with Australia, India, Korea, Japan and New Zealand while simultaneously being a participant of the ASEAN-wide incentives to implement contract-clusters including all ASEAN countries (Sen; Srivastava 2009: 205). That being said, Sudsawasd and Mongsawad identified that, overall speaking, the ASEAN members would experience higher gain from the Japan-China-ASEAN FTA than from the Japan- ASEAN and China-ASEAN FTA’s itself (Sudsawasd; Mongsawad 2007: 341). Following these results, the rush forward towards bilateral agreements in the Asia-Pacific region is understood as an economic and foreign policy. By that, “the recognition of the fact that Asia needs greater economic coordination and cooperation to manage globalization challenges in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis provided an important strategic impetus for countries to enter into such agreements.” (Sen; Srivastava 2009: 195). Supporting this point of view, the already mentioned Doha Development Agenda initially aimed towards the commitment to take into consideration the problems and needs of developing countries, which accounted for 29% of the worldwide export in 2001 (Kym 2006). Since the inception of DDA, thirty-three newly declared agreements were notified to the WTO during the period of 2001-2003 alone. In 2007 all WTO members except for Mongolia now belong to one or more of these agreements. Subsequently, in the aftermath of the DDA, Singapore and New Zealand signed one of the very first comprehensive bilateral contracts involving “no exclusion of products for tariff elimination and covered liberalization and facilitation of trade in services, investments, trade facilitation, government procurement, and intellectual property protection as part of the negotiations.” (Sen; Srivastava 2009: 194-196). In addition, it is increasingly difficult to determine the exact number of negotiated FTAs involving the ASEAN countries. Official sources indicate that over the period of 2001-2006 a total of fifty or more of such FTAs were either proposed or reside to be negotiated [See Exhibit 3 and 4] (Sen; Srivastava 2009: 196). A total number of officially existing Asian free trade agreements are provided by the Asia Regional Integration Center (ARIC 2010).

Nonetheless, even though AFTA facilitated high trade among its member especially in the late 90’s, the full ASEAN free trade effect will only be realized as more AFTA provisions will be thoroughly implemented (Tang 2005: 245). Such effects, like the complete elimination of prohibitive tariffs and the permutation of a stable transitive multilateral network will be discussed in detail in chapter three.

3. Economic Incentives to Engage in Bilateral Free Trade Agreements

After having shown the “Noodle-Bowl” kind of situation in Asia on the part of the ASEAN countries, the focus now will be on the underlying incentives for the respective countries to engage in bilateral free trade agreements. In the course of worldwide globalization of intra and inter industrial trade, the observation of formation and composition of trade agreements come to the fore. Hereby the free trade agreements play a decisive role when it comes down to the synthesis of distributive trades. Fortunately, “both intra-regional and inter-regional trade agreements are proliferating in East Asia.” (Park 2008: 171). In general, the WTO administrates a high diversity of free trade agreements in all of their complexity. Thus, the following model should mainly show the intrinsic economic incentives for countries to firstly engage in a bilateral free trade agreement and hereby achieving a superior outcome through overcoming an initial autarkic economic situation.

The model was initially introduced by Goyal/Joshi (2006) and is based on mathematical network-modeling. „This article examines the incentives of countries to form bilateral free-trade agreements and the effects of these agreements on the welfare of third parties. “ (Goyal/Joshi 2006: 749). In the original model the number of countries considered to be infinite and therefore the full network includes n countries (the complete itemization of the variables can be found in the Table of Symbols). Furthermore, only bilateral trade agreements are considered and thus neglect the possibility of so-called free trade zones that are initially formed on the basis of multilateral agreements (Note: whereas a direct multilateral agreement is not possible, a complete network consisting of a maximum of mutual bilateral links represents a multilateral situation). Nonetheless, this does not imply that the ultimate result could open out into a multilateral situation. The proposition is that initially either nothing or only non-transitory bilateral agreements are able to be negotiated. In terms of market structures there is only one company in each country, which can distribute a homogeneous product on both, the domestic and foreign market. Each of these companies resides in a special case of the "Cournot-Oligopoly" - market environment and is thus a monopolist. In addition, this capability to join a foreign market depends on the tariffs, which, per definition, ex ante are prohibitive in autarky (a restriction only in the basic model, explanation follows). Important to notice is the idea that countries are always able to make sovereign decisions and therefore engage in FTAs on the basis of intrinsic motivation. These anticipated constrains are beneficial, since “it allows to explicitly considering individual country incentives and the spillovers bilateral trade agreements generate for third parties" (Goyal/Joshi 2006: 751). The model is constructed with the aid of network techniques and derived on the basis of equilibrium and welfare maximization solutions. This basic model acts on the assumption of balanced markets, in which all markets are equal in size. Accordingly, the objective of the government is to maximize the social welfare of their country. The social welfare is defined as “the sum of consumer surplus and the total profits of the domestic firm. “ (Goyal/Joshi 2006: 750). A particular importance is attached to the tariffs. Per definition the tariffs are prohibitively high and are completely eliminated when signing a bilateral trade agreement and thus are completely endogenized. This implies a complete absence of trade when no FTA is signed between the countries (Goyal/Joshi 2006: 750). The linear pricing in the Cournot-Oligopoly is defined by:

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

where Pi defines the price of product i, a the market size and Qi the output of the product i. Further, the production costs are linear, the market size exceeds the constant marginal costs and is therefore characterized as:

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

and the prohibitive high tariffs are symbolized by:

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

In the oligopolistic Cournot competition, the price is the dependent variable and is determined by the market size and output quantity. Therefore, the price cannot exceed a, deriving a price of at least zero or greater. This implies that in the absence of a FTA the tariffs prevent international market expansion and can only be eliminated only through a commercial arrangement. „The assumption that T > a ensures that a firm i sells in Country j if and only if there is a trade agreement between the two countries” (Goyal/Joshi 2006: 754). To examine these effects on the formation of bilateral free trade agreements and thus the impacts on the social welfare, it is inevitable to have a closer look on the welfare function. In the original model the welfare function for a Country i is defined as:

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

In this case, the first part of the formula describes the aggregated consumer income; the second part describes the company's profit in the home-country and the third part describes both, the corporate profits abroad and the own country’s customs revenues. „This formulation of social welfare places equal weight on consumer surplus and producers profits. We will assume that the government seeks to maximize the social welfare function when it makes decisions on whether or not to form FTA’s” (Goyal/Joshi 2006: 754). However, since the prohibitive tariffs prevent all trade with countries with which the analyzed country has no FTA, the social welfare function can be modified in a way that:

(Note: the prohibitive tariffs are only an assumption of the basic model. The extended model allows for non­prohibitive tariffs, which do not change the result overall and are presumed here only for simplistic reasons.) As a result, the redundant term of the tariff revenue can be eliminated due to the fact that in a state without an existing FTA between the Countries i and j there is no existing trade between those two countries and the whole formula can be compressed since there can never be a revenue generated by tariffs. Thus, the first term describes the consumer surplus which is subject to the amount of operating companies in their own country and the second term is the business profits resulting from the Cournot-competition of the domestic firm in the home country and abroad. (Goyal/Joshi 2006: 753-755). In order to identify the prevalent effects, which have a direct impact on the stipulation of a FTA, the following differentiation of these effects is necessary:

I. A free trade agreement completely eliminates the prohibitive tariffs, removes entry barriers for businesses and thus conveys competition on the involved markets.
II. The domestic companies gain accesses to a bigger market hereby boost their market position.
III. The domestic consumers benefit from lower product prices and a higher variety of products, resulting from a rising market competition.

This results in an ambivalent picture concerning the advantages of free trade agreements. Increased competition in the respective domestic markets has a negative effect on the negotiation of a FTA. On the other hand, the expansion of the sales market and the consumers’ utility gain due to decreasing prices and greater product variety creates positive spillovers (Goyal/Joshi 2006: 750-751). So as to thoroughly analyze this interdependencies, first of all the country’s intrinsic incentives to form bilateral agreements and thus to break out of autarky needs to be dissected. Starting as so-called “singleton components”, two previously autarkic Countries i and j have the same symmetric welfare function in the form of:

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Thus, there is significant mathematical evidence that, under the designated conditions and at any time, the closing of a first free trade agreement and thereby the transition from an autarkic situation to a situation with trade leads to an increase of the social welfare function of each involved country (Goyal/Joshi 2006: 755). This leads to the conclusion that a situation ceases, in which each country in the network will engage in a bilateral contract with each other country of the examined network. Hereby, the final outcome has to undergo a closer analysis. If this acceleration of bilateral free trade agreements is an intrinsically given process, what would the final outcome be like? Is there a stable outcome which determines a specific network? In order to clarify this matter, the equilibrium conditions need to be analyzed. Hereby, the differentiation of stability and efficiency is inevitable. “In a symmetric setting the effects of (...) ‘the domestic firm gets greater access to the foreign market’ and (...) ‘domestic consumers benefit from greater competition in terms of lower prices’ dominate the effect of ‘the domestic firm is faced with greater competition from a foreign firm’” (Goyal/Joshi 2006: 750751). Thus, this implies that an outcome and thus the network would be stable if the following two conditions hold:

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Both conditions illustrate the stability condition, where no mutual incentives exist to withdraw the established ties (9). In case that there are economical driven incentives to engage in further free trade agreements as to achieve a superior outcome, these incentives cannot be mutual but can only be experienced either by one of the FTA partners (10). Since all countries are autonomous in the sense of engaging in new FTAs, nobody can be forced to engage in a free trade agreement which would only be one-sided beneficial. If these conditions are satisfied, this network will remain stable (Goyal/Joshi 2006: 754). After having shown that every country has the economic incentive to engage in at least one FTA and is willing to overcome the primary autarkic situation, it was derived that a network is only stable outcome if conditions (9) and (10) are satisfied. In the final step it has to be proofed that the countries not only have incentives to form a single FTA but also that there is a multiplier effect accelerating the formation of further FTAs. In order to show this assumption, the model makes use of the comparison of the situation with and without a FTA:

In this formula the upper part shows the difference in sales volume with an existing FTA and without, the middle part the difference of the domestic company’s revenues on the home market and the lower part the domestic revenues on the foreign market, which can only exist in a situation with an FTA, since otherwise the prohibitive tariffs do not allow for trade. After rearranging the formula one can show that the condition

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

is satisfied if and only if the following condition holds:

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

This is the case if [Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten]

This leads to the conclusion that if a country is involved in at least one FTA - which is implied by since the own country counts as well - then the stable equilibrium requires the existence of intrinsic and thus economical driven incentives to engage in further FTAs and hereby creating a superior outcome. Therefore, only the complete network can be a stable outcome, creating the highest achievable social welfare and hereby indicates maximum efficiency. „The incentives of countries to have FTA’s increase as they enter into more agreements. It shows that bilateral trade agreements can be a step toward a global Free Trade Regime” (Goyal/Joshi 2006: 754 - 756).


Excerpt out of 27 pages


The Transition from Bilateral to Multilateral Free Trade Agreements as a Multiplier Process
Multifarious Impacts on Economy and Business in context of ASEAN Countries (with extensive appendix)
Ottawa University
Multinational Business Policy
Catalog Number
ISBN (eBook)
ISBN (Book)
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2010 KB
Bilateral, Multilateral, Free Trade Agreements, Multiplier Process, Economy, Business, ASEAN, Asian, Free Trade, Gametheory, trade, agreement, vertrag, bilateralismus, goyal, joshi, equilibrium, spieltheorie, game theory, WTO, World Trade Organization, Allgemeines Zoll- und Handelsabkommen, Tariff, Zoll, GATT
Quote paper
Eugen Dimant (Author), 2010, The Transition from Bilateral to Multilateral Free Trade Agreements as a Multiplier Process, Munich, GRIN Verlag,


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