This paper examines how young people in Germany are confronted with hegemonic orders and processes of othering on social media. Drawing on the concept of post-digitality developed by Jandrić et al., theories of platform capitalism, Gramsci’s and Hall’s theory of hegemony, and Giroux’s critical pedagogy, social media are understood as informal educational spaces in which meanings, belonging and devaluation are continuously negotiated. An analysis of quantitative studies on media use shows that young people do not merely observe these processes in their post-digital lifeworlds but are often directly affected by them. Social media therefore function as informal educational spaces in which hegemonic ideas of belonging, normality and deviation are conveyed and reinforced. Finally, the findings are discussed in the light of critically reflective media education, which is understood as a key prerequisite for enabling young people to recognise digital power relations, question processes of othering and develop democratic forms of agency in digital publics.
Table of Contents
List of Figures
List ofAids Used
1 Introduction
2 State of Research
3 TheoreticalFramework
3.1 Postdigitality
3.2 Platform Capitalism
3.3 Hegemony Concept according to Gramsci and Hall
3.4 Online Othering
3.5 Critical Education according to Giroux
4 Central Categories
4.1 HateCommunication
4.2 Harassmentcommunication
4.3 Violence Communication
5 Analysis of Recent Empirical Findings
5.1 Young People and Social Media
5.2 Answering the Research Question
5.2.1 Hate Communication
5.2.2 Harassment Communication
5.2.3 Violence Communication
6 DiscussionofResults
7 Conclusion and Implications for Media Education
8 Bibliography
List of Figures
Figure 1: How much time do adolescents spend on social media privately?
Figure 2: Digital violence is an everyday occurrence
Abstract
Diese Arbeit untersucht, wie Jugendliche in Deutschland in den sozialen Medien mit hegemonialen Ordnungen und Prozessen des Othering konfrontiert werden. Ausgehend vom Konzept der Postdigitalität nach Jandric et al., des Plattform-Kapitalismus, der Hegemonietheorie nach Gramsci und Hall sowie der kritischen Bildung nach Giroux werden soziale Medien als informelle Bildungsräume verstanden, in denen Bedeutungen, Zugehörigkeiten und Abwertungen kontinuierlich ausgehandelt werden. Die Analyse quantitativer Studien zur Mediennutzung verdeutlicht, dass Jugendliche diese Prozesse in ihrer postdigitalen Lebenswelt nicht nur beobachten, sondern häufig selbst davon betroffen sind. Soziale Medien wirken damit als informelle Bildungsräume, in denen hegemoniale Vorstellungen über Zugehörigkeit, Normalität und Abweichung vermittelt und verfestigt werden. Abschließend werden die Resultate im Lichte einer kritisch-reflexiven Medienbildung diskutiert. Diese wird als zentrale Voraussetzung verstanden, um Jugendliche zu befähigen, digitale Machtverhältnisse zu erkennen, Othering-Prozesse zu hinterfragen und demokratische Handlungsspielräume in digitalen Öffentlichkeiten zu entwickeln.
Schlagwörter: Kulturelle Hegemonie; Soziale Medien; Jugendliche; Online Othering; Plattform-Kapitalismus; Postdigitalität; Medienbildung; Digitale Gewalt
Abstract
This paper examines how young people in Germany are confronted with hegemonic orders and processes of othering on social media. Drawing on the concept of post-digitality developed by Jandric et al., theories of platform capitalism, Gramsci’s and Hall’s theory of hegemony, and Giroux’s critical pedagogy, social media are understood as informal educational spaces in which meanings, belonging and devaluation are continuously negotiated. An analysis of quantitative studies on media use shows that young people do not merely observe these processes in their post-digital lifeworlds but are often directly affected by them. Social media therefore function as informal educational spaces in which hegemonic ideas of belonging, normality and deviation are conveyed and reinforced. Finally, the findings are discussed in the light of critically reflective media education, which is understood as a key prerequisite for enabling young people to recognise digital power relations, question processes of othering and develop democraticforms of agency in digital publics.
Keywords: Cultural hegemony; Social media; Adolescents; Online othering; Platform capitalism; Postdigitality; Media education; Digital violence
List of Aids Used
Illustrations are not included in the reading sample
1 Introduction
Social media have become an integral part ofthe lives of young people in Germany, with almost all 12- to 19-year-olds using a smartphone every day and spending on average almost four hours a day on it (Medienpadagogischer Forschungsverbund Sudwest, 2025, p. 14, p. 25). Their five favourite apps are WhatsApp, Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok and YouTube - instant messaging and social media services whose boundaries are increasingly blurred (Medienpadagogischer Forschungsverbund Sudwest, 2025, p. 26, p. 31). Social media function for teenagers both as spaces for social interaction and as arenas for identity construction, self-presentation (Kneidinger-Muller, 2022, p. 207) and opinion formation (Stark et al., 2022, p. 226). Digital media have thus profoundly transformed everyday cultures (Thimm, 2022, p. 264), and these changes are taking place within a post-digital lifeworld in which digital and analogue practices, human and algorithmic actions can no longer be clearly separated (Jandric et al., 2018, p. 295). Young people move with ease between chats, likes, videos and offline interactions without drawing clear distinctions between what is “online” and what is “real”.
At the same time, these post-digital spaces are not neutral environments. They are organised by platforms that operate according to the logics of digital capitalism: data are collected, analysed and exploited as an economic resource (Srnicek, 2018, p. 45), including in state contexts (Knox, 2019, p. 361). Since the political campaigns surrounding Donald Trump’s first election campaign, it has become clear how much social power large tech companies exercise through their platforms. This power does not primarily operate through open coercion, but through the invisible steering of visibility and attention. Platform logics privilege certain types of content, styles and interpretations, while marginalising or algorithmically suppressing others (Stoica & Chaintreau, 2019, p. 580). In this way, social media can shape what is perceived as normal, attractive, successful or acceptable.
For young people, this means that their self-images, sense of belonging and social relationships are formed in environments that are structurally geared towards selection, competition and commodification. Phenomena such as cyberbullying[1] or cybergrooming[2] are therefore not random side effects, but manifestations of hegemonic orders and processes of online othering in which certain groups are devalued or excluded by users and platform logics (Colliver et al., 2019, p. 24).
Against this background, the present paper examines how social media used by young people in Germany reproduce hegemonic power relations within platform capitalism and how processes of othering form part of this order. To answer this question, recent empirical studies on young people’s media use are analysed. The analysis is theoretically grounded in the concept of post-digitality developed by Jandric et al., Srnicek’s approach to platform capitalism, and the concept of hegemony formulated by Gramsci and further developed by Hall. In addition, the concept of online othering is employed in order to capture digital forms of exclusion, devaluation and violence in analytical terms.
The paper is structured into seven chapters: following this introduction, there is an overview ofthe state of research and a presentation ofthe theoretical framework in the third chapter. Chapter4 presents the findings ofthe investigation, which are discussed in the fifth chapter. Finally, the sixth chapter offers a conclusion, drawing out implications for educational science.
2 State of Research
Research on social media has in recent years shifted from a narrow focus on use and effects towards a critical analysis of power, inequality and hegemonic relations. Current work describes social media as key sites of hegemonic power production. The platforms do not act in a neutral way, but privilege specific content, discourses and groups of actors through algorithmic logics, economic interests and moderation practices (Bucher, 2018, pp. 149-160; Gillespie, 2019, pp. 1-23). In this way, they generate hegemonic norms that have been examined in many different fields, whether in relation to consumer hegemony (Barros & Michaud, 2020, p. 578; Razick et al., 2023, p. 494) or to politics and strategic communication (Barassi & Zamponi, 2020, p. 592; Frieß & Gilleßen, 2022, p. 89). Studies on the discursive power of social media additionally show that populist, nationalist or extremist content is often favoured by algorithms because it generates high levels of interaction (Anastasiou, 2023; Khosravinik & Amer, 2023).
With regard to young people, their use of social media and hegemonic relations, a considerable body of work deals with the reproduction of gender norms on the platforms they use (Doring, 2023, pp. 11-17; Szulc, 2020, p. 5436). In particular, hegemonic representations of masculinity (Di Silvestro & Venuti, 2022, p. 57; Marshall et al., 2020, p. 570) and gender hate (Ging, 2019, pp. 45-67; Siapera, 2019, pp. 21-44) are the focus of current investigations. Research on femininity in social media also shows that platforms such as Instagram are strongly shaped by normative ideals of the body and beauty (Lane, 2023, p. 2440; Scarcelli & Farci, 2024, p. 93). Further studies on body dissatisfaction among adolescents indicate that social media play a major role in the internalisation of normative body ideals (Castellanos Silva & Steins, 2023, p. 1), but also demonstrate how prevailing narratives in this area can be shifted (Zavattaro, 2021, p. 281).
Other key strands of research focus on phenomena such as hate speech 3 (Castano-Pul- garin et al., 2021, p. 1; Matamoros-Fernandez & Farkas, 2021, p. 205), cyberbullying (Ray et al., 2024, p. 1; Singh et al., 2020, p. 1636), and violence on social media (Morales, 2023, p. 1; Recuero, 2024, p. 1). In addition, there is a substantial body of work on racism (Chaudhry & Gruzd, 2020, p. 88; Solanes Corella & Hernandez Moreno, 2025, p. 1) and far-right radicalisation in social media environments (Marwick et al., 2022, p. 2; Wahlstrom et al., 2021,p. 3290).
This overview shows that the field encompasses an extensive range of phenomena that are explored from numerous perspectives. However, a unifying analysis that systematically links hegemonic power relations, processes of othering and the ways in which young people in Germany use social media has so far been lacking. The present paper addresses precisely this research gap.
3 Theoretical Framework
To investigate how social media reproduce hegemonic power relations and the extent to which processes of othering form part of this hegemonic order, a theoretical framework is developed here. It combines three central perspectives: the concept of post-digitality, the approach of platform capitalism, and Gramsci’s concept of hegemony as further developed by Stuart Hall. Social media can thus be viewed not merely as technical infrastructures or communication spaces, but as powerful societal arrangements in which economic interests, cultural meaning-making and processes of subjectivation interlock. The concept of online othering is also part of this framework. Giroux’s approach to critical education additionally provides a link to educational theory, enabling implications for media education to be developed among male adolescents in social media, linking power relations, digital practices, and educational theory.
3.1 Postdigitality
The idea that digital technologies would one day become so commonplace as to be barely noticeable was already articulated by Nicholas Negroponte in the late 1990s (Negroponte, 1998). His notion initially gained traction around the turn of the millennium in musicological and art-historical discourses and has since around 2019 been increasingly taken up in educational sciences. Central to this is the concept of the postdigital, first used by Kim Cascone in the context of experimental music (Cascone, 2000, p. 12). It refers to a societal condition in which digital technologies no longer appear as a separate or virtual sphere, but are inextricably interwoven with social, cultural and everyday practices (Jandric et al., 2018, p. 893). The postdigital does not describe a clearly delineated state, but rather a contradictory and complex reality in which digital and analogue, technological and non-technological, as well as biological and informational elements intermesh (p. 895). Young people navigate this postdigital lifeworld with ease, seamlessly blending analogue and digital forms of communication, while clear distinctions between “online” and “offline” increasingly lose significance. The term “post”digital should therefore not be understood as a rejection of the digital, but as an indication of its complete integration into everyday life. At the same time, the postdigital is also discussed as a critical response to the dashed utopias of the early internet. In particular, the concentration of power in large technology companies, growing social inequalities, increasing commercialisation and ecological burdens come into focus (p. 895). In educational and scientific contexts, postdigitality manifests itself, among other things, in changed learning environments, new forms of work and collaboration, and the growing importance of data- driven research (pp. 895-896). Social media, too, must be understood in this context as educational spaces, since learning processes also take place there. From a postdigital perspective, the digital in education is no longer seen merely as a supportive tool, but as fundamentally intertwined with educational processes (Jandric & Knox, 2022, p. 785). This perspective critically challenges the assumption that digital technologies are merely neutral instruments or drivers of innovation. Instead, issues such as data economies, platform structures, surveillance, private-sector interests, and the material and ecological conditions of digital infrastructures move to the forefront. In this context, critical engagement with power relations, environmental impacts, working conditions, data policy and social inequalities is understood as a central task of educational science (p. 786).
These considerations should also take into account the concept of platform capitalism, which is outlined in the following subsection.
3.2 Platform Capitalism
According to Nick Srnicek, capitalism has fundamentally transformed since the financial crisis of 2008. With the growing availability of inexpensive digital technologies, new business models emerged that rely on the systematic collection and exploitation of data, such as platforms like Google or Facebook (Srnicek, 2018, pp. 43-46). At the heart of this “platform capitalism” lies the extraction, processing and use of data, which serve as a new raw material. For data to become economically viable, however, they must first be cleaned and converted into standardised formats (p. 41). Srnicek fundamentally distinguishes between data and knowledge: while data merely indicate that something has happened, knowledge provides explanations for why it occurred (p. 42). In this context, platforms are not simply technical infrastructures or neutral intermediaries, but new, powerful corporate forms that systematically collect, analyse, use and monopolise data (p. 45). Srnicek defines platforms as digital infrastructures that connect different user groups and act as intermediary instances. They often provide their users with tools to build their own products, services or marketplaces (p. 46). Platforms thus position themselves between users as sites of social and economic activity while simultaneously being able to comprehensively capture and evaluate these activities (p. 47). A key feature of platforms is so-called “network effects”: the more people use a platform, the greater its value becomes for everyone else (p. 48). This mechanism creates self-reinforcing cycles of growth and favours the emergence of monopolies. Since digital platforms face few natural limits to growth, they can continuously expand their market position. They also frequently employ “cross-subsidisation”, offering certain services at reduced prices or for free while other business areas offset the resulting losses (pp. 48-49). Crucially, platforms are not neutral spaces. Through their rules, algorithms and business models, they always embody a specific politics that determines which content, actors and interactions are made visible or marginalised (p. 49). It is precisely this combination of technical infrastructure, economic logic and normative steering that makes platforms central business models for data collection and control (p. 51). Srnicek classifies social media such as Facebook as “advertising platforms”: they gather and analyse information about their users and monetise it by selling targeted advertising space (p. 52). The necessary raw data are processed either by data analysts or by self-learning algorithms (p. 59).
At its core, this concept posits that platforms are not neutral information mediators; rather, their rules and operations follow an economic logic while simultaneously producing a specific political order. This makes Gramsci’s concept of hegemony directly applicable to the analysis of social media.
3.3 Hegemony Concept according to Gramsci and Hall
To capture the power dimensions of social media theoretically, this paper draws on Antonio Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony. Gramsci understood hegemony as a form of domination that functions not primarily through coercion, but through the active production of consent (Gramsci, 1991, p. 783 GH 4). Dominant societal groups secure their power by establishing theirvalues, norms and interpretations ofthe world as universally valid, so that they are adopted by the subordinated as self-evident and generally accepted.
Stuart Hall developed this approach further by conceiving the struggle over meanings as a central element of societal power relations (Hall, 2018, p. 33). Media play a key role in this process: they provide social groups with interpretive frameworks through which they form their ideas about others, about themselves and about social reality as a whole (Hall, 2020, p. 327). Their central function consists in selectively representing social reality and translating it into symbolic orders that define what counts as relevant, normal or deviant. By ordering, evaluating and embedding social information into preferred meaning systems, media structure societal knowledge and stabilise normative hierarchies (p. 328). According to Hall, media fulfil three interconnected functions within hegemonic orders.
First, they produce and structure societal knowledge by selectively representing social reality and translating it into images, narratives and categories. This selective construction of social knowledge makes the lifeworlds of other people discernible in the first place: media supply interpretive frameworks through which individuals form impressions of unfamiliar groups, social milieus and societal conditions, and assemble these into an apparently coherent overall reality. What counts as relevant, how certain groups appear and which events gain significance are thus the result of media selection and construction processes (p. 327).
Second, media function as instances of societal ordering and evaluation. They do not merely represent diversity, but simultaneously classify it into normative and evaluative categories. Lifestyles, political positions or cultural practices are compared, hierarchised and endowed with preferred meanings in the media. This creates a symbolic map of society in which it is determined what counts as normal, acceptable, problematic or deviant. Media thus do not reflect societal plurality in a neutral way, but integrate it into a system of hegemonic meanings (p. 328).
Third, media act as a mechanism of consensus formation. By selecting, combining and repeatedly rearranging representations, they generate a widely shared conception of how the societal order looks and how it should be understood (p. 328). While alternative and oppositional voices must remain visible, they are usually embedded in dominant interpretive frameworks, so that they do not fundamentally challenge the existing order. In this way, media secure the cultural leadership of ruling groups without resorting to overt repression (p. 329).
These three functions are technically mediated through encoding and decoding processes. In coding, events are interpreted using preferred codes derived from the dominant ideology, which appear self-evident or rational (p. 330). In reception, users frequently adopt these meanings, thereby reproducing and legitimising hegemonic interpretations (pp. 331-332). The ideological effect of media thus lies less in overt manipulation than in the ongoing stabilisation of a shared framework of meaning, a consensus that holds the existing order together (p. 333). In Hall’s sense, media are therefore not merely neutral transmitters of information, but central actors in the production, stabilisation and reproduction of hegemonic power relations. The construction of difference in social media is the subject of the following subsection.
3.4 Online Othering
The concept of othering is closely linked to critical debates about power, difference and identity. It describes practices and processes through which social groups are constructed as fundamentally “different” and hierarchically positioned. Othering encompasses both self-construction and one’s own positioning within a hierarchical order, as well as the construction and categorisation of “others”. Language and visual representations play a central role here, as they enable dominant groups to exert power over others (Lumsden & Harmer, 2019, pp. 14-15). Classic examples include the othering of women (p. 16) or non-Western cultures, as in orientalism (p. 17). Stereotyping is one aspect of othering: it reflects ideological assumptions and values while establishing hierarchical differences (p. 18). Critics, however, point out that othering tends to reduce subjects to theirmarginalisation (p. 19).
To analytically capture the harmful, exclusionary and discriminatory practices of othering in the context of digital technologies, Harmer and Lumsden introduced the concept of online othering. This encompasses not only explicit forms of hate, abuse or trolling, but a broad spectrum of toxic behaviours enabled, amplified or normalised by information and communication technologies. Online othering brings underlying power relations, the production of difference and social hierarchies into focus. The design of technologies also plays a role: it is often shaped by privileged groups, while potentially harmful usage possibilities are frequently overlooked. This results in technical infrastructures that facilitate or render online othering invisible - for instance, through inadequate moderation, lack of reporting mechanisms or algorithmic amplification of problematic content. The concept stresses that the severity of certain forms of online othering and their real impact on those affected must be taken seriously, even if social media companies or authorities do not always recognise these behaviours as problematic (p. 21). Another key feature of the concept is its rejection of a strict separation between “online” and “offline”. Online othering does not occur in a virtual vacuum, but is part of everyday social practice and has real consequences for the lives of those affected. According to Harmer and Lumsden, the dichotomy between virtual and real worlds obscures these continuities and contributes to the trivialisation of online violence (p. 22).
Online othering thus provides an analytical framework for understanding digital violence, discrimination and exclusion as powerful, relational and intersectional processes. It connects classical othering theories with the analysis of digital technologies and overcomes the division between online and offline. Combined with concepts such as postdigi- tality, platform capitalism and the hegemony concept of Gramsci and Hall, it enables a nuanced examination of the reproduction of societal power relations in social media. The pedagogical reflection ofsuch practices is a central concern of critical education.
3.5 Critical Education according to Giroux
From the perspective of Henry A. Giroux, education is not a neutral site of knowledge transmission, but is always embedded in cultural and economic contexts as well as power relations. It emerges from concrete societal struggles and focuses on how knowledge, power, desire and experience are produced under specific learning conditions. Pedagogy thereby operates as part of hegemonic struggles over meanings, forms of expression and subjectivation (Giroux, 2020, p. 2). Giroux thereby builds on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and describes education as a site where societal consensus is 4 ,,[...] trolling is a collective form of harassment perceived as having the malicious intent to provoke another user. Trolling is understood to be collective, in that despite being undertaken by indivi- duals, the strategies used by trolls are shared beyond that individual person or one interaction“ (Ortiz, 2020, p. 4). produced, but can also potentially be challenged (p. 3). Critical education starts precisely at this point. Giroux understands critique as a hegemony-critical practice - a form of analysis that allows texts, institutions, social relations and ideologies to be questioned in the context of existing power relations (pp. 2-3). The aim is to make contradictory structures visible and to shape learning processes in ways that promote political judgement and democratic agency (pp. 5-6).
Giroux further extends his focus to the broader culture, particularly digital media (p. 6). He points out that,,[...] privatized utopias of consumerist society offer the public a marketbased language that produces narrow modes of subjectivity, defining what people should know and how they should act within the constricted interests and values [...]“ (p. 102). Young people in particular are strongly exposed to these forces (p. 103). Giroux emphasises the need to integrate media and digital technologies into teaching: „This mode of education has become central to shaping the desires, values, and identities of young people, often in ways that not only depoliticize but also enhance tactics and reach of a larger corporate culture and its need to commodify everything“ (p. 117).
Critical education in a postdigital context therefore means analysing social media not merely in terms of usage skills or prevention, but systematically examining their role in reproducing power and exclusion relations. From this perspective, media education becomes a hegemony-critical educational task situated at the intersection of power, ideology and digital culture.
4 Central Categories
To address the question of how social media used by young people in Germany reproduce hegemonic power relations within platform capitalism, and the extent to which processes of othering form part of this order, a systematic categorisation of relevant phenomena is required. This paper distinguishes between the overarching categories of hate communication, harassment communication and violence communication, under which variously pronounced forms of expression of othering processes and hegemonic power relations are grouped. In this way, an analysis and evaluation system for current study findings is established.
4.1 Hate Communication
Definitions of online hate[4], hate speech and similar phenomena in social media are often unclear and overlapping, so that one term can encompass different manifestations. Malecki et al. demonstrate that online hate is frequently used in academic discourse as a catch-all for trolling, cyberstalking[5] or hate speech, even though these are distinct phenomena. They define online hate by its purpose: the aim is to express a negative attitude towards a person, group or object through a statement. This clearly distinguishes online hate from trolling, which seeks to provoke a reaction, and from cyberstalking, which involves targeted harassment (Malecki et al., 2021, p. 2). One study, for instance, describes online hate as the act of posting explicitly negative assessments online primarily to convey one's disapproval of a person or object, irrespective of whether it causes harm, provokes responses or devalues a social group (Malecki et al., 2021, p. 3).
On the basis of this definition, hate communication is understood as the umbrella term for all activities in social media that express a negative attitude towards persons, groups or objects. This includes online extremism, online racism and misogyny, provided they are limited to communicating hate and do not escalate into harassment or violence communication. Hate communication encompasses verbal, visual or multimodal actions that devalue, dehumanise or exclude individuals on the basis of actual or ascribed membership in social categories - such as origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation or disability - through othering. It is characterised by group-directed and ideologically driven devaluation, aiming to stabilise social hierarchies, legitimise exclusion or reproduce enemy images.
4.2 Harassment Communication
To distinguish it from hate communication, harassment communication is introduced, encompassing online abuse and online harassment. Watson describes online abuse as behaviours specifically aimed at harassing strangers on the internet, often targeting women, politicians or public figures, and sometimes involving the unauthorised dissemination of manipulated images (Watson, 2024, pp. 52-53). Here, ideology is not the primary driver; instead, the focus is on the intentional harming, controlling or intimidating of individuals. Examples include flaming[6] (p. 54) and trolling (Sambaraju & McVit- tie, 2020, pp. 10-11).
Harassment communication thus serves as the umbrella term for targeted or repeated verbal, visual or multimodal communication that harasses, intimidates or humiliates individuals. Unlike hate communication, it is not necessarily ideologically motivated and targets individuals regardless. It includes insults, bullying and stalking dynamics, unfolding its effects through repetition, visibility and social reinforcement. Harassment communication is embedded in othering processes: individuals are communicatively marked as “different” or inferior, for example through ridicule, sexualised insinuations or repeated questioning of their credibility and social position, thereby establishing or stabilising power asymmetries.
4.3 Violence Communication
As a third category, violence communication is introduced. This term encompasses all communicative acts in social media that explicitly or implicitly refer to violence, whether through threats, glorification, legitimisation or symbolic enactment. This includes, among others, cyberbullying and cyberstalking, but also threats, violent fantasies, calls to violence or the normalisation of violent acts against persons or groups.
Violence communication differs from hate and harassment communication through its central reference to violence and its potential to generate real threats or intensify existing relations of violence. It can occur independently or in conjunction with hate and harassment communication. In this context, othering is used to construct target persons or groups as threatening, inferior or outside moral norms, thereby lowering symbolic thresholds for violence and eroding empathy. Particularly in digital spaces, where distance, anonymity and audience dynamics interact, violence communication can contribute to escalation.
5 Analysis of Recent Empirical Findings
To address the question of how social media used by young people in Germany reproduce hegemonic power relations within platform capitalism, and the extent to which processes of othering form part of this hegemonic order, current study findings are evaluated in the following chapter.
5.1 Young People and Social Media
The time spent by German teenagers on social media varies considerably. Most young people use social networks for one to three hours per day. While 18 per cent of young people spend at most one hour on social media on weekdays, 20 per cent of them spend three to five hours per day on the apps. A not insignificant minority shows very high usage levels: seven per cent use social media for five to seven hours, and a further three per cent for more than seven hours per day (Fig. 1).7
Illustrations are not included in the reading sample
Figure 1: How much time do adolescents spend on social media privately? (ifo Institut, 2025)
The latest study by the “Bündnis gegen Cybermobbing ”8 examined children’s and young people’s social media use in greater detail. Ninety per cent of the 7- to 20-year-old pupils surveyed said they had their own social media profile, with communication and exchange being the main reason for their membership. At the time of the survey (2024), the proportion of cyberbullying victims was 18.5 per cent, meaning that two million pupils in Germany had been affected at least once. According to those surveyed, cyberbullying mainly occurs in the form of verbal abuse, insults, rumours or slander, but also through exclusion and rejection of contact requests (Dr. Beitzinger & Leest, 2024, pp. 75-76). Six per cent of pupils admitted to having engaged in cyberbullying themselves, but more than half of them had also been victims. They carried out their attacks via WhatsApp (77 per cent), TikTok (57 per cent), Snapchat (50 per cent) and Instagram (45 per cent). Twenty-two per cent of attacks took place via Facebook and 35 per cent via YouTube. The rest occurred on gaming platforms, in chatrooms, forums and by email (pp. 95-96). Overall, 82 per cent of cyberbullying attacks took place in the school environment and 69 per cent within the social circle (p. 92). Most victims knew the perpetrators (65 per cent), and 77 per cent of young people said they knew the perpetrators from their class. Only 27 per cent knew them from their social circle (p. 93).
Digitale Gewalt ist alltäglich
Anteil der Befragten, die digitale Gewalt beobachtet/erlebt haben (in %)
Illustrations are not included in the reading sample
Figure 2: Digital violence is an everyday occurrence (Brandt, 2024).
A study by HateAid also confirms that digital violence is a daily experience for young people. Around 55 per cent of 14- to 17-year-olds reported observing digital violence online, while 23 per cent had experienced it themselves (Fig. 2). In addition, numerous other dangers for young people exist on social media: from hazardous dietary trends (HNA, 2025), beauty trends (SWR, 2024) and fitness trends (Stein, 2025), through dangerous dares (Klicksafe, 2023) or depictions of violence (Kahr, 2016) - which have increased since the outbreak of the Ukraine war (HateAid, 2022) - to paedocriminals who deliberately drive children and young people to suicide (ZDFheute, 2025).
5.2 Answering the Research Question
The study findings in the preceding chapter demonstrate that social media are not merely spaces for interaction, self-presentation and identity work among young people. It is clear that the omnipresence of social media in their daily lives constitutes a postdigital lifeworld in which experiences of devaluation, exclusion and violence can no longer be clearly separated from “offline” life. The findings consistently show that problematic forms of communication by no means occur only marginally. Rather, they form part ofthe normal usage experience of social media for the vast majority of young people, since only a minority of those surveyed reported not encountering any problematic content online. The fact that such content is not restricted, moderated or prevented can be explained by the logics of platform capitalism. Social media are furthermore embedded in processes of power, inequality and exclusion, which manifest themselves in various forms of problematic content and communication. In order to understand these phenomena in a differentiated way as forms of reproducing hegemonic power relations and online othering, the findings from section 5.1 are now systematically assigned to the categories of hate communication, harassment communication and violence communication.
5.2.1 Hate Communication
As outlined in section 4.1, the category of hate communication encompasses all communicative acts expressing a negative attitude towards persons or groups and based on group-directed devaluation. The empirical findings from section 5.1 show that young people in Germany are highly exposed to such content on social media.
According to the JIM Study 2025, 47 per cent of 12- to 19-year-olds reported encountering hate messages in the past month. Fifty-nine per cent had come across extreme political views (Medienpadagogischer Forschungsverbund Sudwest, 2025, p. 25), and 46 per cent ofyoung people encountered conspiracy theories (p. 55). These figures demonstrate that hate communication cannot be regarded as a marginal phenomenon, but constitutes a fixed component ofyoung people’s everyday media experiences. From the perspective of hegemony theory, hate communication serves as a means of stabilising social hierarchies. Through the continuous visibility of group-directed devaluations, dominant norms are reproduced and established as self-evident. Young people are not merely passively exposed to this; algorithmic reach logics repeatedly confront them with similar content, contributing to the normalisation of such messages. From the perspective of online othering, hate communication activates central mechanisms of boundarydrawing between an implicit “us” and a constructed “other”. The study findings suggest that young people regularly perceive these processes, even if they are not directly targeted. Thus, othering becomes tangible as an everyday communicative practice that secures hegemonic power relations within and through platform capitalism.
5.2.2 Harassment Communication
As set out in section 4.2, harassment communication refers to targeted or repeated communicative attacks on individuals aimed at humiliation, intimidation or social exclusion. The findings from section 5.1 indicate that this form of digital communication also accounts for a significant portion ofyoung people’s problematic online experiences.
In the JIM Study 2025, 64 per cent ofyoung people reported perceiving insults online in the past month (Medienpadagogischer Forschungsverbund Sudwest, 2025, p. 25), and 11 per cent were personally affected (p. 55). Moreover, 26 per cent indicated that someone in their social circle had been targeted online in the past two years, and 9 per cent had experienced this themselves (p. 58). The relevance of harassment communication becomes even clearer in the study by the Alliance against Cyberbullying. Here, the proportion of children and young people who had been victims of cyberbullying at least once was 18.5 per cent, corresponding to around two million pupils in Germany. According to those surveyed, cyberbullying primarily manifests as verbal abuse, insults, rumours and slander, as well as social exclusion, such as rejecting contact requests (Dr. Beitzinger & Leest, 2024, pp. 75-76). Notably, 82 per cent of attacks occurred in the school context and 69 per cent within the social circle. Overall, 65 per cent of victims knew the perpetrators (pp. 92-93).
These results underscore the postdigital entanglement of online and offline spaces. Harassment communication functions here as an instrument of social control that sanctions deviations from normative expectations. Processes of othering manifest themselves less through stable ideological attributions and more through situational markings of difference or inferiority. Platforms act as amplifiers of existing power asymmetries by making attacks persistent, publicly visible and potentially viral.
5.2.3 Violence Communication
Section 4.3 showed that violence communication represents the escalated form of digital communication practices, where violence is explicitly or implicitly referenced. The study findings from section 5.1 demonstrate that this form of communication is by no means an exception foryoung people on social media.
The results on digital violence are alarming overall: according to the HateAid study, 54.5 percent of 14- to 17-year-olds reported observing digital violence online, and 23 per cent had experienced it themselves (Fig. 1). Violence communication is thus an everyday occurrence for a significant proportion of young people. Particularly grave are the findings on cybergrooming: in the longitudinal study by the Landesanstalt fur Medien NRW, 25 per cent of 8- to 17-year-olds reported having been personally affected at least once (Landesanstaltfur Medien NRW, 2024, p. 14). Almost all young people (91 percent) said they had been threatened by an adult (p. 12), and nearly as many (88 per cent) had been asked to undress in front of a webcam (p. 9). Overall, 86 per cent received unsolicited nude images (p. 11). By comparison, the Bundeskriminalamt recorded “only” 3,457 cases of cybergrooming in 2024. This suggests that police assumptions are correct that a high number of cases go unreported (Polizeiliche Kriminalpravention, n.d.).
Sexually motivated digital violence thus accounts for a significant share of violence communication and points to hegemonic gender concepts that cannot be explicitly addressed within the scope of this paper. It is clear, however, that these communicative acts go far beyond harassment and can potentially escalate into extra-digital violence.
Violence communication is particularly associated with radicalised othering processes. Those affected are not only dehumanised and symbolically devalued, but also constructed as available, controllable or unprotected. The distance and anonymity of digital spaces lower inhibitions and facilitate the normalisation of violent threats. Platforms here again function not merely as neutral mediators, but as infrastructures that, through inadequate moderation and reach logics, enable orfavoursuch forms of communication.
6 Discussion of Results
The analysis of the study findings shows that problematic forms of communication on social media are not a marginal phenomenon of young people’s media use, but part of their everyday usage experience. Hate, harassment and violence communication do not occur in isolation, but form a continuum of digital devaluation and escalation processes. The high prevalence of such experiences confirms that social media are structurally embedded in relations of power and inequality and actively reproduce them. This is particularly evident in the normalisation of hate communication. From the perspective of critical education in Giroux’s sense, this normalisation should not be understood as mere habituation, but as the result of hegemonic pedagogical processes. Social media thus function as cultural learning spaces in which specific interpretive patterns, affects and boundaries are continuously produced and appropriated. Repeated exposure to hate and devaluation communication thus acts as informal pedagogy that introduces young people to dominant ideological order patterns without explicitly thematising or calling them into question. Platform logics oriented towards attention and interaction favour polarising content in this process and reinforce existing societal conflict lines.
Harassment communication points more strongly to microsocial power relations. The postdigital interweaving ofdigital and extra-digital spaces ensures that social sanctions, humiliations and exclusions have lasting effects and digitally perpetuate existing hierarchies from school and peer groups. Social media act here as amplifiers of social control by making attacks public, persistent and potentially escalatory. In Giroux’s sense, harassment communication can also be understood as a disciplinary form of informal pedagogy. Through humiliation, ridicule or exclusion, normative expectations regarding behaviour, body, gender or belonging are conveyed and enforced. Young people thereby learn not only who is devalued, but also which behaviours are sanctioned or rewarded. In this way, social media contribute to the pedagogical production of adapted subjects who internalise hegemonic norms.
Violence communication marks the escalation stage of these processes. The findings on digital violence and cybergrooming demonstrate that communicative boundary violations can generate real threat situations. In these cases, online othering appears in radicalised form, with those affected being dehumanised and constructed as available or unprotected. The results suggest that inadequate moderation mechanisms and economically motivated platform logics favour such dynamics. From an educational theory perspective, however, violence communication marks not only an escalation of digital interactions, but also the failure of democratic educational processes. When violent threats, sexualised assaults and dehumanisation become everyday, it becomes clear that hegemonic orders are no longer stabilised solely through consensus, but increasingly through fear and intimidation.
The clarity of these findings requires a reflective assessment of the empirical basis. This paper mainly relies on quantitative studies based on partly differing, partly overlapping definitions of problematic communication forms. Moreover, self-reports may only partially capture problematic experiences, as terms like cyberbullying and cybergrooming can be subjectively interpreted differently. Finally, the concrete role of algorithmic steering mechanisms remains largely unclear due to a lack of transparency on the part of platforms.
7 Conclusion and Implications for Media Education
This paper has shown that problematic forms of communication on social media constitute a central component of young people’s media use. Hate, harassment and violence communication are not marginal exceptions, but expressions of structural dynamics of digital publics that are deeply embedded in societal power and inequality relations. The analysis of the study findings clarifies that these forms of communication form a continuum of digital devaluation ranging from seemingly everyday hate speech to massive forms of digital violence. Social media thus function not merely as neutral communication spaces, but as cultural learning spaces in which norms, values and interpretive patterns are conveyed, normalised and reproduced.
From the perspective of critical education, it becomes clear that these processes must be understood as forms of informal pedagogy. Platforms, algorithms and popular media content assume pedagogical functions by privileging certain forms of expression, directing attention and stabilising social boundaries. The normalisation of hate and harassment communication should not be seen as an individual habituation effect, but as the result of hegemonic processes that introduce young people to dominant ideological order patterns without making them explicitly visible or negotiable. Social media thus act not only as mirrors of societal conflicts, but as active instances of their reproduction. Against this background, media education reduced to functional media literacy proves insufficient.
Approaches that primarily focus on individual behaviour, self-regulation or technical skills fall short, as they ignore structural power relations and individualise responsibility. Critical media education, by contrast, must be understood as a political and democratic educational task. It aims to enable young people to analyse social media as ideologically charged spaces, recognise power and inequality relations, and critically question communicative boundary-drawing. Moreover, the analysis has shown that devaluation and exclusion mechanisms in digital spaces are everyday occurrences. Media education must explicitly address this by enabling young people to identify othering processes, understand their societal function and experiment with alternative forms of solidary communication. The goal is to open up scopes for action in which young people can act not merely as consumers, but as reflective agents in digital publics.
In addition, the analysis points to the limitations of existing protection and regulation mechanisms, whose importance in a postdigital lifeworld should not be neglected - because violence in the digital never exists solely in the digital, especially not when perpetrators and victims are human. Dealing with hate, harassment and violence communication is therefore not merely a question of individual media use, but a comprehensive societal educational task.
8 Bibliography
Barassi, V., & Zamponi, L. (2020). Social media time, identity narratives and the construction of political biographies. SocialMovementStudies, 19 (5-6), 592-608. https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2020.1718489
Barros, M., & Michaud, V. (2020). Worlds, words, and spaces of resistance: Democracy and social media in consumer co-ops. Organization, 27 (4), 578-612. https://doi.org/10.1177/1350508419831901
Brailovskaia, J., Buchmann, J., Hertwig, R., Metzinger, T., Montag, C., Sadeghi, A.-R., Schneider, S., Spieckergen. Dohmann, I., &Waldherr, A. (2025). Soziale Medien und die psychische Gesundheit von Kindern und Jugendlichen. In Diskussion (Bd. Bd. 40).
MyCoRe Community. https://doi.org/10.26164/LE0P0LDINA_03_01307
Brandt, M. (2024). Wie verbreitetistdigitale Gewalt [Digitales Bild]. https://de.statista.com/info- grafik/32744/umfrage-zum-beobachten-bzw-erleben-digitaler-gewalt-in-deutschland/
Bucher, T. (2018). lf...Then:Algorithmic Powerand Politics (1st Edition). Oxford University PressNewYork. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190493028.001.0001
Cascone, K. (2000). The Aesthetics of Failure: “Post-Digital” Tendencies in Contemporary ComputerMusic. ComputerMusicJournal, 24 (4), 12-18. https://doi.org/10.1162/014892600559489
Castaño-Pulgarín, S. A., Suárez-Betancur, N., Vega, L. M. T., & López, H. M. H. (2021). Internet, social media and online hate speech. Systematic review. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 58, 101608. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2021.101608
Castellanos Silva, R., & Steins, G. (2023). Social media and body dissatisfaction in young adults: An experimental investigation ofthe effects ofdifferent image content and influencing constructs. Frontiersin Psychology, 14, 1037932. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1037932
Chaudhry, I., & Gruzd, A. (2020). Expressing and Challenging Racist Discourse on Facebook: How Social Media Weaken the “Spiral of Silence” Theory. Policy & Internet, 12 (1), 88108. https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.197
Colliver, B., Coyle, A., & Silvestri, M. (2019). The ‘Online Othering’ ofTransgender People in Relation to ‘Gender Neutral Toilets’. In K. Lumsden & E. Harmer (Ed.), Online Othering (pp. 215-237). Springer International Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030- 12633-9_9
Di Silvestro, E.,&Venuti, M. (2022). POPULIST LEADERS AND MASCULINITY: A MULTIMODAL CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY PERFORMANCES ON SOCIAL MEDIA. ESPAcross Cultures, 18,2021, 57-79. https://doi.org/10.4475/0062_4
Döring, N. (2023). Jenseits von Alpha Males und Insta Girls - Wie vielfältig sind Geschlechter- bilder in sozialen Medien? BzKJAKTUELL, 3.2023, 11-17.
Dr. Beitzinger, F., & Leest, U. (2024). Cyberlife Studie 2024. Bündnis gegen Cybermobbing e.V. https://buendnis-gegen-cybermobbing.de/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Cyberlife_Stu- die_2024_Endversion.pdf
Frieß, D., & Gilleßen, R. (2022). Agonistische Online-Öffentlichkeiten: Vorschlag einer inhaltsanalytischen Operationalisierung von Agonismus. Publizistik, 67 (1), 85-108. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11616-021-00704-w
Gillespie, T. (2019). Custodians ofthe Internet: Platforms, Content Moderation, and the Hidden Decisions That Shape Social Media. Yale University Press. https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300235029
Ging, D. (2019). Bros v. Hos: Postfeminism, Anti-feminism and the Toxic Turn in Digital Gender Politics. In D. Ging & E. Siapera (Ed.), GenderHate Online (p. 45-67). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96226-9_3
Giroux, H. A. (2020). On CriticalPedagogy (2nd ed). Bloomsbury Publishing Plc.
Gramsci, A. (1991). Gefängnishefte (Kritische Gesamtausgabe in 10 Bänden) (K. Bochmann, W. F. Haug, & P. Jehle, Ed.). Argument.
Hall, S. (2018). Ideologie, Identität, Repräsentation (J. Koivisto &A. Merkens, Ed.; 5th Edition). Argument Verlag.
Hall, S. (2020). 10. Culture, the Media, and the “Ideological Effect” [1977]. In D. Morley (Ed.), EssentialEssays, Volume 1 (S. 298-336). Duke University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781478002413-016
HateAid. (2022, April 13). Report: Desinformation und digitale Gewaltim Ukraine-Krieg. https://hateaid.org/desinformation-propaganda-ukraine-krieg/
HNA. (2025, Oktober 17). 87 ProzentderJugendlichen fallen darauf rein: TikTok-Ernährungs- trends mit gefährlichen Folgen. https://www.hna.de/welt/folgen-87-prozent-der-jugendli- chen-fallen-darauf-rein-tiktok-ernaehrungstrends-mit-gefaehrlichen-zr-93988996.html ifo Institut. (2025). Ifo Institut [Dataset]. https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/stu- die/1622924/umfrage/taegliche-nutzungsdauer-von-social-media-in-deutschland/
Jandric, P., & Knox, J. (2022). The postdigital turn: Philosophy, education, research. PolicyFuturesin Education, 20 (7), 780-795. https://doi.org/10.1177/14782103211062713
Jandric, P., Knox, J., Besley, T., Ryberg, T., Suoranta, J., & Hayes, S. (2018). Postdigital science and education. EducationalPhilosophyand Theory, 50 (10), 893-899. https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2018.1454000
Kahr, R. (2016, Dezember 9). Gewalttaten in den Medien | Medienpolitik. bpb.de. https://www.bpb.de/themen/medien-journalismus/medienpolitik/172077/gewalttaten-in- den-medien/
Klicksafe. (2023, Juni 27). Challenges bei TikTok, YouTube & Co. - Mutproben im Netz. https://www.klicksafe.de/challenges
Kneidinger-Müller, B. (2022). Identitätsbildung in sozialen Medien. In J.-H. Schmidt & M. Taddi- cken (Ed.), Handbuch Soziale Medien (pp. 191-212). Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25995-2_4
Knox, J. (2019). What Does the ‘Postdigital’ Mean for Education? Three Critical Perspectives on the Digital, with Implications for Educational Research and Practice. Postdigital Science andEducation, 1 (2), 357-370. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42438-019-00045-y
Landesanstaltfür Medien NRW. (2024). KinderundJugendliche als Opfervon Cybergrooming. Zentrale Ergebnisse der4. Befragungswelle 2024. KB&B Family Marketing Experts. https://www.medienanstalt-nrw.de/fileadmin/user_upload/For- schung/LFM_Cybergrooming_Studie_2024.pdf
Lane, L. (2023). Strategicfemininityon Facebook: Women’s experiences negotiating gendered discourses on social media. FeministMedia Studies, 23 (5), 2440-2454. https://doi.org/10.1080/14680777.2022.2056754
Lumsden, K., & Harmer, E. (Ed.). (2019). Online Othering: Exploring Digital Violence and Discrimination on the Web. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3- 030-12633-9
Malecki, W. P., Kowal, M., Dobrowolska, M., & Sorokowski, P. (2021). Defining Online Hating and Online Haters. Frontiers in Psychology, 12, 744614. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.744614
Marshall, K., Chamberlain, K., & Hodgetts, D. (2020). Male bodybuilders on Instagram: Negotiating inclusive masculinities through hegemonic masculine bodies. JournalofGender Studies, 29 (5), 570-589. https://doi.org/10.1080/09589236.2020.1722620
Marwick, A., Clancy, B., & Furl, K. (2022). Far-Right Online Radicalization: A Review of the Literature. The Bulletin of Technology & Public Life. https://doi.org/10.21428/bfcb0bff.e9492a11
Matamoros-Fernandez, A., & Farkas, J. (2021). Racism, Hate Speech, and Social Media: A Systematic Review and Critique. Television & NewMedia, 22 (2), 205-224. https://doi.org/10.1177/1527476420982230
Medienpadagogischer Forschungsverbund Sudwest. (2025). Jim-Studie 2025:Jugend, Information, Medien (No. 2025). https://mpfs.de/app/uplo- ads/2025/11/JIM_2025_PDF_barrierearm.pdf
Morales, E. (2023). Ecologies ofViolence on Social Media: An Exploration of Practices, Contexts, and Grammars ofOnline Harm. SocialMedia + Society, 9 (3), 20563051231196882. https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051231196882
Negroponte, N. (1998). Beyond digital. Wired, 12. Januar. https://web.media.mit.edu/~nicho- las/Wired/WIRED6-12.html
Ortiz, S. M. (2020). Trolling as a Collective Form of Harassment: An Inductive Study of How Online Users Understand Trolling. SocialMedia + Society, 6 (2), 2056305120928512. https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305120928512
O’Sullivan, P. B., & Flanagin, A. J. (2003). Reconceptualizing ‘flaming’ and other problematic messages. NewMedia & Society, 5 (1), 69-94. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444803005001908
Polizeiliche Kriminalprävention, (n. d.). Cybergrooming: SexuellerMissbrauchim Internet. Polizei-Beratung. Abgerufen 7. Januar2026, von https://www.polizei-beratung.de/themen- und-tipps/gefahren-im-internet/cybergrooming/
Ray, G., McDermott, C. D., & Nicho, M. (2024). Cyberbullying on Social Media: Definitions, Prevalence, and Impact Challenges. JournalofCybersecurity, 10 (1), tyae026. https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyae026
Razick, F. R. A., Sila, U. D., & Mesthri, M. W. (2023). Consumer Hegemony on Social Media in the Digital Disruption Era. Journal ofHuman Resource and Sustainability Studies, 11 (03), 494-510. https://doi.org/10.4236/jhrss.2023.113028
Recuero, R. (2024). The Platformization ofViolence: Toward a Concept of Discursive Toxicity on Social Media. SocialMedia + Society, 10 (1), 20563051231224264. https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051231224264
Rüdiger, T.-G. (2024). Digitale Risiken für Kinder und Jugendliche. MonatsschriftKinderheilkunde, 172 (10), 872-878. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00112-024-02016-5
Sambaraju, R., & McVittie, C. (2020). Examining abuse in online media. Socialand Personality PsychologyCompass, 14 (3), e12521. https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12521
Scarcelli, C. M., & Farci, M. (2024). Negotiating Gender in the Digital Age: Young People and the Representation of Femininity and Masculinity on Social Media. Italian Sociological Review, 93-113 Pages. https://doi.org/10.13136/ISR.V14I1.645
Siapera, E. (2019). Online Misogyny as Witch Hunt: PrimitiveAccumulation in theAge of Techno-capitalism. In D. Ging & E. Siapera (Ed.), GenderHate Online (pp. 21-43). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96226-9_2
Singh, S., Thapar, V., & Bagga, S. (2020). Exploring the hidden patterns ofcyberbullying on social media. Procedia ComputerScience, 167, 1636-1647. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2020.03.374
Solanes Corella, Á., & Hernández Moreno, N. (2025). Racism in the Digital Age: The Impact of Social Media Algorithms on Public Discourse. The Age ofHuman Rights Journal, 25, e9603. https://doi.org/10.17561/tahrj.v25.9603
Srnicek, N. (2018). Plattform-Kapitalismus (U. Schafer, Translator; 1st Edition). Hamburger Edition.
Stark, B., Magin, M., & Geiß, S. (2022). Meinungsbildung in und mit sozialen Medien. In J.-H. Schmidt & M. Taddicken (Ed.), Handbuch Soziale Medien (pp. 213-231). Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25995-2_23
Stein, A. (2025). Pumpen und fasten wie die Influencer: So wird der Fitnesstrend für Jugendliche zur Gefahr. DerTagesspiegel Online. https://www.tagesspiegel.de/gesundheit/pum- pen-und-fasten-wie-die-influencer-so-wird-der-fitnesstrend-fur-jugendliche-zur-gefahr- 13401676.html
Stoica, A.-A., & Chaintreau, A. (2019). Hegemony in Social Media and the effect of recommendations. Companion Proceedings ofThe 2019 World Wide Web Conference, 575-580. https://doi.org/10.1145/3308560.3317589
SWR. (2024, Mai 27). Riskante Trends aufden sozialen Medien: Wie gefährlich sind Schönheitstrends fürJugendliche? https://www.swr.de/leben/gesundheit/wie-gefaehrlich-sind- schoenheitstrends-fuer-jugendliche-soziale-medien-psychologin-franziska-klemm- 100.html
Szulc, L. (2020). Digital GenderDisidentifications: Beyond the Subversion Versus Hegemony Dichotomy and Toward Everyday GenderPractices.
Thimm, C. (2022). Soziale Medien und Partizipation. In J.-H. Schmidt & M. Taddicken (Ed.), Handbuch Soziale Medien (pp. 251-269). Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25995-2_11
Wachs, Sebastian. (2014). Cybergrooming—Erste Bestandsaufnahme einerneuen Form sexu- ellerOnlineviktimisierung. Julius Beltz GmbH & Co. KG. https://doi.org/10.3262/EEO18140331
Wahlström, M., Törnberg, A., & Ekbrand, H. (2021). Dynamics of violent and dehumanizing rhetoric in far-right social media. New Media & Society, 23 (11), 3290-3311. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444820952795
Watson, S. (2024). Online abuse ofwomen: An interdisciplinary scoping reviewofthe literature. FeministMedia Studies, 24 (1), 51-69. https://doi.org/10.1080/14680777.2023.2181136
Wilson, C., Sheridan, L., & Garratt-Reed, D. (2022). What is Cyberstalking? A Review of Measurements. Journaloflnterpersonal Violence, 37 (11-12), NP9763-NP9783. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886260520985489
Zavattaro, S. M. (2021). Taking the Social Justice Fight to the Cloud: Social Media and Body
Positivity. Public Integrity, 23 (3), 281-295. https://doi.org/10.1080/10999922.2020.1782104
ZDFheute. (2025, Juni 18). Mann soll Kind in den Suizid getrieben haben. https://www.zdf-heute.de/panorama/kriminalitaet/hamburg-missbrauch-suizid-kind-100.html
[...]
1 „Cyberbullying is a kind of mysterious and physical harassment or bullying to someone, especially through social media platforms. Cyberbullying is also called online bullying or online harassment“ (Singh et al., 2020, p. 1637).
2 Cybergrooming is understood as a process in which an adult uses digital technologies to select a minor and their social environment and gradually prepare them, through deception and manipulation, forsexual abuse (Wachs, 2014, p. 3).
3,,[...] any communication that disparages a person or a group on the basis of characteristics such as race, color, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, nationality, religion, or political affiliation“ (Castano-Pulgarin etal., 2021, p. 1).
4,,[...] the activity of posting online an explicitly negative assessment of a person or an object primarily for the purpose of expressing one’s negative attitude toward that person or object, independently of whether this will cause actual harm to a concrete person, provoke others to respond or whether it will diminish the value of a given social group“ (Malecki et al., 2021, p. 3).
5 Cyberstalking involves a series of repeated and unwanted behaviours by a cyberstalker over an extended period, deliberately intended to instil fear in the victim (Wilson et al., 2022, pp. 97689769).
6,,[...] a highly negative message that functions like a metaphorical flamethrower that the sender uses to roast the receiver verbally“ (O’Sullivan & Flanagin, 2003, p. 70).
7 The unsolicited sending of pornographic or obscene content is also referred to as “cyberflashing” (Rüdiger, 2024, p. 873).
8 The “Bündnis gegen Cybermobbing” (Alliance against Cyberbullying) groups various forms of bullying under this term, including verbal abuse, insults, spreading lies and rumours, as well as exclusion, extortion, threats, sharing embarrassing photos or videos, and creating fake profiles (Dr. Beitzinger & Leest, 2024, p. 91).
Jetzt kaufen
- Arbeit zitieren
- Daniela Haindl (Autor:in), 2026, Teenagers and Their Post Digital Lifeworld. Hegemony and Othering on Social Media, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/1697629
