Secondary markets for event tickets have generated persistent dysfunctions across European jurisdictions.
This thesis identifies four, each rooted in the primary market's deliberate underpricing strategy. These include asymmetric information between primary purchasers and secondary buyers concerning ticket validity and the risk of organizer-side cancellation. They also include substantial rent extraction by professional resellers who capture the gap between face value and consumer willingness to pay, as well as platform-based market power exercised by concentrated resale intermediaries. Finally, distributional and access concerns arise as speculators, whose participation is unrelated to the underlying event, displace the fan audience the organizer sought to reach.
These failures share a common structural origin: The rent that a deliberately below-clearing primary price generates renews at each on-sale and cannot be neutralized by regulation of the downstream market alone. France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Germany have each responded with distinct regulatory instruments. Yet each response shares a decisive limitation that this thesis identifies analytically: All operate downstream of the primary-market underpricing that generates the underlying rent and their empirical records accordingly show sustained enforcement coexisting with persistent operational non-compliance.
Against this record, the thesis asks whether smart-contract-based ticket issuance, using non-fungible tokens (NFTs) as the underlying technical layer, offers an alternative governance pathway that addresses the dysfunctions at their source. The analysis develops the architectural alternative as an ex ante intervention operating within the organizer's own jurisdictional reach — encoding resale-price ceilings, restricted transfer through authorized channels, and identity-binding at issuance directly into the ticket's technical infrastructure rather than relying on downstream enforcement. Drawing on the distinction between governance through law and governance through code, the thesis argues that architectural intervention addresses each of the four dysfunctions at its structural source rather than at its symptomatic surface.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 The Structure and Functioning of Secondary Ticket Markets
2.1.1 The Legal Nature of a Ticket
2.1.2 The Contractual Chain
2.1.3 Secondary Ticket Market on the Example of Viagogo
2.1.4 Secondary Market vs. Black Market
2.1.5 The Primary-Market Underpricing Issue
2.2 Market Dysfunctions / Market Failures
2.2.1 Asymmetric Information and Intransparency
2.2.2 Platform-based Market Power and Two-sided Fee Extraction
2.2.3 Rent-seeking by Professional Resellers
2.2.4 Distributional and Access Concerns
2.3 Preliminary Conclusion
3 Regulating Secondary Ticket Markets in Europe – A Comparative Analysis
3.1 France
3.2 Italy
3.3 United Kingdom
3.4 Germany
3.5 Institutional Competition
3.6 Limitations of Regulatory Approaches
4 The Primary-Market Alternative: Smart-Contract Architectures
4.1 Top-Down Regulation vs. Bottom-Up Governance
4.2 NFT-Ticketing and Smart Contracts
4.2.1 Mechanism
4.2.2 Smart Contract Rules
4.3 Assessment Against the Dysfunctions of Chapter 2
4.3.1 Asymmetric Information
4.3.2 Platform-based Market Power
4.3.3 Rent-seeking by Professional Resellers
4.3.4 Distributional and Access Concerns
4.3.5 Prevailing Risks and Limitations
4.4 Comparative Assessment
5 Doctrinal Feasibility under German Contract and Competition Law
5.1 The Contractual Foundation: AGB-Kontrolle and the Bundesligakarten line
5.2 Competition Law
5.2.1 Art. 101 (1) TFEU
5.3 Art. 102 (1) TFEU
6 Conclusion
Research Objectives and Core Themes
This master's thesis investigates the persistent market failures in secondary event ticketing across Europe and evaluates whether blockchain-based smart-contract architectures offer a superior alternative to traditional state-led downstream regulation.
- Economic foundations of primary-market underpricing and resulting secondary-market arbitrage
- Comprehensive identification of secondary ticketing market dysfunctions, including informational asymmetry, platform market power, and rent-seeking
- Comparative analysis of regulatory frameworks across France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Germany
- Exploration of NFT-ticketing and smart contracts as an ex-ante technological governance mechanism
- Doctrinal feasibility analysis under German contract law (AGB-Kontrolle) and European Union competition law (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU)
Excerpt from the Book
4.2.1 Mechanism
The mechanism of how primary and secondary market would function in the same ecosystem within a smart contract architecture can be briefly summarized in four stages.
First, the organizer mints each ticket as a unique non-fungible token (NFT) on a blockchain, attaching a smart contract that encodes the conditions of issue, transfer and use. The blockchain functions as a decentralized ledger that records ownership and every subsequent transfer in a manipulation-proof and transparent manner, thereby creating a single record of the ticket's lifecycle.
Second, primary buyers acquire tokens through the organizer’s official sales channel, with each token bound to a digital wallet. Where personalization or regulatory compliance is required, the wallet may be linked to the purchaser's verified identity through the ticketing platform, while the blockchain itself records only the wallet address. This distinction allows identity verification without necessarily exposing personal information on the public ledger.
Third, any subsequent transfer triggers the smart contract automatically, so that compliance with the encoded rules is a condition of the transfer occurring rather than a matter to be enforced retrospectively. For example, the contract may impose a resale price cap, restrict transfers to an authorized marketplace, require payment of a royalty to the organizer, or prohibit transfers after a specified deadline. Transactions that do not satisfy these predefined conditions are simply not executed by the network, see also section 4.2.2.
Fourth, validity at entry is established by reference to the blockchain rather than to a paper or PDF-ticket. Because the complete transfer history is permanently recorded, venue operators can verify both the authenticity of the ticket and its compliance with the programmed conditions. A token whose transfer history violates the encoded rules is therefore identifiable as invalid before the event rather than merely being refused at the gate.
Summary of Chapters
1 Introduction: Introduces the high-profile challenges of secondary ticket markets, such as the Oasis tour controversy, and outlines the thesis's core research question regarding NFT-based ticketing versus conventional regulation.
2 Theoretical Framework: Examines the legal nature of tickets, contractual distribution chains, and the economic causes of primary market underpricing, while detailing four structural market dysfunctions.
3 Regulating Secondary Ticket Markets in Europe – A Comparative Analysis: Analyzes the diverse national regulatory approaches in France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Germany, highlighting their common limitations in operating downstream.
4 The Primary-Market Alternative: Smart-Contract Architectures: Proposes NFT-based ticketing and smart contracts as an ex-ante technological governance model and assesses its impact against market dysfunctions.
5 Doctrinal Feasibility under German Contract and Competition Law: Evaluates the compatibility of smart-contract ticketing architectures with German standard contract terms (AGB-Kontrolle) and EU competition law (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU).
6 Conclusion: Summarizes the core findings, emphasizing that governance through code effectively complements governance through law by addressing issues at their upstream source.
Keywords
Secondary Ticketing Market, Online Ticket Resale Platforms, Ticket Scalping, Smart Contracts, Blockchain Ticketing, Non-Fungible Tokens, Market Dysfunctions, Regulatory Interventions, AGB-Kontrolle, Competition Law, TFEU, Governance Through Code
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this master's thesis?
The thesis investigates the structural dysfunctions of secondary event ticket markets across European jurisdictions and assesses whether blockchain-based smart-contract architectures offer a more effective alternative to traditional legal regulation.
What are the central thematic fields covered in the research?
The core themes include law-and-economics analysis of market failures, comparative regulatory approaches in major European countries, decentralized ledger technology in ticketing, and the doctrinal feasibility of technical enforcement under contract and competition law.
What is the primary research question or objective?
The study examines whether smart-contract ticket issuance as NFTs, by extending the organizer's control, can address secondary market dysfunctions more effectively than conventional legal interventions debated in Germany and adopted across Europe.
Which scientific and legal methodologies are applied?
The thesis adopts a doctrinal legal analysis informed by law-and-economics reasoning, relying on existing economic literature, comparative jurisdictional evaluations, and documented production deployments of NFT-ticketing technology.
What core topics are addressed in the main body of the work?
The main chapters cover the economic foundations and market failures of secondary ticketing, a comparative review of regulatory models in France, Italy, the UK, and Germany, the architecture of NFT ticketing systems, and their legal feasibility under German and EU law.
Which keywords characterize the academic contribution of the work?
Key terms include Secondary Ticketing Market, Online Ticket Resale Platforms, Ticket Scalping, Smart Contracts, Blockchain Ticketing, Non-Fungible Tokens, Market Dysfunctions, and Governance Through Code.
Why does the author focus on Viagogo as the primary running example?
Viagogo is utilized because of its marketplace business model and its extensive, well-documented history of consumer-protection enforcement actions and litigation across multiple European jurisdictions.
How do smart-contract architectures differ from traditional legal regulations regarding enforcement?
While traditional laws rely on ex-post downstream enforcement through courts and regulatory fines, smart contracts utilize ex-ante technical enforcement by embedding rules directly into the ticket transfer logic so non-compliant transactions cannot be executed.
What specific role do German contract law and EU competition law play in the analysis?
German contract law establishes the validity of organizer-imposed resale restrictions under standard terms (AGB-Kontrolle) following the BGH's Bundesligakarten jurisprudence, while EU competition law ensures that organizer-controlled resale channels do not unlawfully restrict market competition under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
What are the acknowledged limitations of adopting smart-contract ticketing?
Limitations include potential off-chain black market displacement, varying organizer incentives across event types, the necessity of supplemental identity-binding mechanisms, and consumer-side learning curves regarding digital wallet management.
- Arbeit zitieren
- Patrick Feser (Autor:in), 2026, The Wrong End of the Chain? A Law and Economics Analysis of Smart-Contract Ticketing as an Alternative to Secondary-Market Regulation, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/1781757
