The ongoing political and economic trends influencing the present
international order have led to the raise of new powerful actors which play actively in
the global arena. Next to economic giants such as China, India or Russia, a different
set of players is emerging thanks to the gradual process of regionalization. Regional
blocs mainly based on economic cooperation are reshaping the global fragmentation
of power, affecting in turn the status of their member states in the international order.
In this essay two main aspects are taken into account: the structuring of a “new”
multipolar order and the nature and role of regional blocs as actors operating in it.
Thus a third level of analysis is introduced, consisting of the linkage between the
emergence of regional blocs and the impact they have on the international strength of
their member states. In order to provide a better understanding the author means to
focus on the Central America Integration System (SICA) and evaluate whether or not
it has influenced the current Meso-American countries’ status in the “new” global
system’s structure, carrying out a comparison with the most developed regional bloc,
the European Union (EU).
IS REGIONALISM A WAY TO EMERGE IN THE “NEW” MULTIPOLAR ORDER? AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CENTRAL AMERICA INTEGRATION SYSTEM
Abstract: The ongoing political and economic trends influencing the present international order have led to the raise of new powerful actors which play actively in the global arena. Next to economic giants such as China, India or Russia, a different set of players is emerging thanks to the gradual process of regionalization. Regional blocs mainly based on economic cooperation are reshaping the global fragmentation of power, affecting in turn the status of their member states in the international order. In this essay two main aspects are taken into account: the structuring of a “new” multipolar order and the nature and role of regional blocs as actors operating in it. Thus a third level of analysis is introduced, consisting of the linkage between the emergence of regional blocs and the impact they have on the international strenght of their member states. In order to provide a better understanding the author means to focus on the Central America Integration System (SICA) and evaluate whether or not it has influenced the current Meso-American countries’ status in the “new” global system’s structure, carrying out a comparison with the most developed regional bloc, the European Union (EU).
Key words: “new” international order - regionalization process - regional blocs - Central American Integration System (SICA) - European Union (EU)
Speaking about the international system means to refer to the outcome of the interconnection between political, economic and social dynamics which determine the distribution of power among the actors playing at the international level. The actors’ behaviour, including formal and informal rules, expectations and reality’s perceptions, is determined by the structure of the international system, that in turn stemms from the way in which political wills, economic regimes and social constructions interact. The actors in the international system are decisive for the structuring of the system itself: essentialy and primarly for their number (Waltz, 1979), then for their nature (Fukuyama, 1992). Opting for an approach capable of merging quantity and quality character as regard to the actors operating in the international system, it would be possible to outline how it is evolving, what are the main features of the power structure in the making, what dynamics define it.
Even though the emergence of non-statal actors, like NGOs or corporations, has seemed to be the main character of the international system during the last twenty years (Barbé, 2007), the massive developing of civil society and its prominent entrance in the international arena will not be taken into account in this work. The author prefers to concentrate on the foundamental protagonist of the international system, which means the state, and try to understand to what extent the process of regionalization affects the state and its behaviuor in the international order.
Excluding the most developed one, namely the European Union (EU), none of the regional blocs show such an high degree of integration and breadth of implemented policies. Several international organizations on regional base, for instance the Central American Integration System (SICA)1, are mainly legal and institutional frames in which the members states do not go beyond the economic cooperation. Even if the EU has had exactly the same origin, it is by the moment one of the most relevant international player regards its economic strenght as well as the capability to have voice in. These features make it more than a simply economic bloc with regional extention: In fact the EU has by far a pivotal role in the mayority of the international affairs. This affirmed protagonism at international level not only involves the EU as a whole, but it also vests all the members states with the prestige adquired internationally.
Is it thus possible to intend the regionalization process as a mechanism through which different units converge towards a single frame of cooperation in order to maximize their strenght? How does the thrust to regionalization affect the “new” international system structure, even more decentralized and fragmented? And above all, does the regionalizing drive have an effect on the international relevance of the states in it involved?
Providing accurate answears through the explanation of the above mentioned concepts and making reference to the experience of the Central American Integration System will be the main purpose of the following lines.
HOW TO DEFINE THE NEW WORLD ORDER
Even though several ongoing phenomena are undermining the basical concepts bearing the mainstreamed view of the world order, is it still accurate to speak about state-strategy and hegemony?
The idea of “complex interdependence” (Keohane & Nye, 1977) fits properly to the growing interconnection among finance, trade and need for resources which converge towards a so-called global economy. The globalizing drive seems to have liquefied the borders of the previous international structure (Appadurai, 1996; Castells, 1996), maximizing the dimension of the exchange - commercial as well as cultural, thanks to the powerful new means of communication. Also from the political standpoint, the coming of one democratization’s wave after other (Huntington, 1991) made the world more homogeneous. Regretfully this is just an ephemeral perception. As Robert Kagan has recently pointed out (2008), the liberal and democratic countries are now counterbalanced by overshadowing giants that have found in their political authoritarianism the way to ensure a prosperous economic growth. The democratic regime and its capability to produce wealth, although empowered with a glaze of universal legitimation, is now flanked by equally successful but totally opposite forms of government - the post-Maoist China is the sharpest example.
Thus we are at anything but “the end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992). The last decade of the XX century indeed experienced an historical speed-up that led to a true reshaping of the world order. First of all the collapse of the Soviet Union imposed a different outlook of the international scenario: The end of the bipolar world and consequently the vanishing of a set of global fears - the mutual nuclear destruction, the spread of Communism, planned economy and lack of liberty- produced a Western-oriented shift in which United States emerged as the mayor global actor. The US unipolar dominance after 1991 could be intended as “ dominance of a particular kind where the dominant state creates an order based ideologically on a broad measure of consent, functioning according to general principles that in fact ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading state or states … .but at the same time offer some measure or prospect of satisfaction to the less powerful ” (Cox, 1987: 7). Cox’s definition actually moved forward the understanding of the concept of hegemony, adding to the underlying coercitive element defining each power structures, the ideological and consensual aspect. This last feature, the Nye’s “soft power”, has adquired fundamental relevance for the comprehension of how international relations work after the end of the bipolar world.
As it is highlighted in the last part of the quotation, the US dominant role after 1991 has not filled the whole void of power left by Soviet Union in the international scenario. Next to the undeniable militar and economical supremacy, global tendencies against its hegemony got speed and started to define the “new” world order. The emergence of economic powers up until then relegated to second-rung actors and the ongoing process of regionalization marked the evolution toward an “uni-multipolar” structure of power (Huntington, 1996).
The concept of “uni-multipolarity”, despite its oxymorian appearance, reflects suitably what is going on at the international level. Let’s start with the first assumption. United States keeps on leading in the international affairs. First and foremost because of its militar puissance , backed by the variety and first-rank technological level of its weapons (nuclear devices included) and its conspicous military budget2. Secondly, in spite of the recent credit crunch and financial crisis, American economy is likely to prove to be resilient enough to face global competitiveness3. Nevertheless what makes Unites States even stronger is the ability and capability to matter in the international issues. His unquestionable relevance is not only the product of the overmentioned features. The “hard” element of his power is flanked by the worldwide legitimation of his principles and ideas, from the free- market regime to the discourse regarding human rights and democracy. Differently from the EU attitude in foreign policy, in the American case the persuasive power of his liberal speech, the “soft” element, is actually enpowered by the existence of an effective “hard” component. Wiser it will be the combination of both, “smarter” the outcome, relatively to national interest and foreign policy agenda.
[...]
1 The acronym stands for Sistema de Integraci ó n Centro Americano : www.sica.int
2 United States spend in defence the 4.1% of its GDP. Even though the percentage is lower than during the Cold War, this amount represents almost the 50% of the global defence spending (Zakaria, 2008).
3 During the last decades American GDP and productivity growth have been higher than other growing economies so that “ the United States is currently ranked as the most competitive economy in the world by the World Economic Forum ”. It is worth noting that United States still has a primary role in the high-technology industry and, according to the “smiley curve” theory it keeps on profiting by manufacturing outsourcing (Zakaria, 2008: 183).
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