An example of how domestic pressures can influence international preferences. In the case of Germany, domestic reservations of the population towards sending troops to Iraq reduced Schröder’s readiness to cooperate on the international level in the face of nearing elections. Endowed with a small win-set Schröder could refer to internal pressures, hence use a bargaining advantage for receiving concessions from the other side, and thus secure in the first place (his) domestic goals
Table of Contents
1. Introduction to the Two-Level Game Approach
2. Application to the Case of Germany and the Iraq War 2003
3. Determinants of the German Win-Set
4. Conclusion
Objectives and Topics
This paper aims to analyze the decision-making process of the German government regarding the 2003 Iraq war through the lens of Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory, examining how domestic political pressures influenced international negotiation outcomes.
- Theoretical foundations of Robert Putnam’s two-level game approach.
- Interaction between domestic (Level II) and international (Level I) negotiation pressures.
- Analysis of the German political landscape and public opinion regarding military participation.
- Strategic use of a small "win-set" as a bargaining advantage in international relations.
Excerpt from the Book
Application of the Two-Level Game Approach
As illustrated in the case of Germany, it was then Chancellor Gerhard Schröder who had to balance such conflicting pressures regarding the decision of going to war in Iraq. On the international stage (= level I) he faced the desire on the part of the United States to be supported by its allies in this mission, on the other hand he was simultaneously exposed to various, generally opposing groups inside the country (= level II), in Germany’s case resulting in a 2/3rd majority of the population rejecting this idea (Bosolt and Oppermann 2006, p. 8). Actors like churches, unions, human rights groups and the Green Party initiated demonstrations and protests, hence massively raised public awareness and mobilizing the German people against war (EKD 2003, Uni-Kassel 2003, Der Spiegel 2003), even though the German press remained rather controversial about abstaining from participation. Hafez notes thereto that important conservative newspapers like FAZ criticised Schröder for “harming German-US relations through his heavy-handed diplomacy” (Hafez 2003, p. 5).
The circumstance of the above described double pressure implicates that in this two-level game the interests of neither group should be neglected too much. Otherwise, a concession made to one group might have negative consequences for the group on the other level, which in turn would finally result either in (worst case) no agreement at all or in disciplining the negotiator, respectively the leaders, e.g. within the next elections (see Putnam 1988, p. 434).
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction to the Two-Level Game Approach: This chapter introduces Robert Putnam's core theoretical framework, defining the concepts of Level I (international) and Level II (domestic) negotiations and their reciprocal causation.
2. Application to the Case of Germany and the Iraq War 2003: This section applies the theory to the specific context of Germany’s 2003 Iraq policy, detailing the domestic pressures and public opposition faced by Chancellor Schröder.
3. Determinants of the German Win-Set: This chapter analyzes the factors that constrained Germany's "win-set," including domestic institutions and the specific bargaining strategies employed by the government.
4. Conclusion: The concluding section synthesizes how the German government utilized domestic constraints as a bargaining advantage to achieve its internal political goals while managing transatlantic relations.
Keywords
Two-level game, Robert Putnam, international negotiation, Germany, Iraq war, Gerhard Schröder, win-set, ratification, domestic politics, transatlantic relations, bargaining advantage, foreign policy, diplomacy.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this paper?
The paper examines how national leaders navigate the conflicting demands of international stakeholders and domestic interest groups using the two-level game model.
What are the central themes discussed?
The central themes include diplomatic strategy, the impact of public opinion on foreign policy, and the structural constraints of domestic ratification processes.
What is the core research question?
The research explores how the German government, specifically under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, managed domestic opposition to justify its non-participation in the 2003 US-led Iraq war.
Which scientific framework is applied?
The study applies Robert Putnam’s "two-level game" theory, which posits that negotiators must simultaneously satisfy both international counterparts and domestic constituents.
What aspects are covered in the main section?
The main section details the pressure from the US for military support versus the 2/3 majority of the German population opposing the war, and how this led to a specific "win-set" constraint.
Which terms best characterize this work?
Key terms include two-level game, bargaining advantage, win-set, transatlantic relations, and domestic ratification.
How did Germany use its domestic opposition to its advantage?
Schröder used the domestic refusal to support the war as a "bargaining advantage," signaling that he could not commit to military action due to internal democratic pressures.
What was the eventual outcome for German-US relations?
The decision not to participate in the Iraq war resulted in a temporary cooling-down of transatlantic relations between the two countries.
- Quote paper
- Natalie Züfle (Author), 2009, Putnam Two-level games , Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/180074
