Since 1964, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a nuclear power and its government increasingly became the internationally acknowledged and legitimate bearer of power. In 1971, the PRC replaced the Taiwanese representatives in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The PRC is now one of five permanent members in the UNSC and seemingly holds this status due to its possession of nuclear weapons. Thus, is it true that China’s permanent UNSC-membership stalls improvements in complying with disarmament and non-proliferation policies? George Tsebelis’ theory (Veto Players) supports the finding of an answer.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
2 Theory and History
3 Chinese Nuclear and Veto Power
3.1 Chinese Multilateralism
3.2 Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation Policies
3.3 Organisational Matters in the UNSC
4 Conclusion
5 Bibliography
5.1 Printed Sources
5.2 Internet Sources
5.3 Secondary Literature
Objectives and Topics
This paper examines whether China's nuclear weapons policy and its compliance with non-proliferation regimes are negatively influenced by its position as a permanent member with veto power in the UN Security Council (UNSC). By applying institutional theories to Chinese foreign policy behavior since the Cold War, the study investigates the nexus between strategic status and international cooperation.
- Institutional analysis of veto players within the UNSC
- Evaluation of China's participation in multilateral nuclear non-proliferation frameworks
- Comparison of Cold War behavior versus post-1990 diplomatic strategies
- Assessment of the impact of US-Chinese relations on nuclear policy
- Discussion on the necessity of UNSC reform regarding permanent membership
Excerpt from the Book
3.3 Organisational Matters in the UNSC
As we have seen, China’s status in the UNSC as a member of the P5 is probably not the main obstacle when the country should comply with disarmament and non-proliferation policies. Financial gains through nuclear proliferation have seemed to be more tempting to the Chinese government than providing international security and refraining from trading with nuclear weapons. After the Cold War, China’s nuclear arsenal shrank in accordance with a general wave of nuclear disarmament in the 1990s anyway. But, the country later began to moderately enhance its nuclear capabilities which has more to do with US nuclear resources than with a fierce defence of the own UNSC veto power (see Lampton 2008: 52). In fact, P5 veto power is better secured by the UN-Charter than by atomic weapons: Article 108 states that amendments need to be adopted by a qualified majority of two thirds of the UNGA members and ratified by two thirds of the UN-members, “including all the permanent members of the Security Council” (UN 2010). In order to effectively separate UNSC veto power from atomic power, the UNSC must be re-organised. For this reason, Article 108 is a serious obstacle.
Summary of Chapters
1 Introduction: Provides a historical overview of nuclear proliferation following World War II and introduces China’s specific position within the P5 of the UN Security Council.
2 Theory and History: Establishes an institutional framework using George Tsebelis' "Veto Players" theory to analyze the decision-making dynamics and interaction within the UNSC.
3 Chinese Nuclear and Veto Power: Analyzes China’s multilateral behavior, its shifts in non-proliferation policy, and the organizational challenges regarding UNSC reform.
4 Conclusion: Synthesizes the findings, arguing that China's policy changes are driven by strategic interests rather than being solely constrained by its UNSC membership status.
Keywords
China, UNSC, Veto Power, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, International Relations, Institutional Theory, George Tsebelis, P5, Multilateralism, Cold War, Foreign Policy, Disarmament, Security Council Reform, Strategic Deterrence
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary subject of this paper?
The paper explores the relationship between China's nuclear weapons policy, its compliance with international non-proliferation standards, and its status as a permanent veto-holding member of the UN Security Council.
What are the central themes discussed?
The core themes include institutional power in the UN, the evolution of Chinese foreign policy, the efficacy of non-proliferation regimes, and the strategic interaction between China and the United States.
What is the core research question?
The research asks how China's nuclear weapons and non-proliferation policies are influenced by its membership and advantages as a P5 veto player in the UNSC.
Which methodology is employed?
The author uses an institutional approach, specifically George Tsebelis' "Veto Players" theory, to analyze the policy-making constraints and interactions within the Security Council.
What topics are covered in the main body?
The main body covers theoretical foundations, a historical analysis of China’s multilateralism, an investigation into nuclear proliferation regimes, and a discussion of the procedural obstacles to reforming the UNSC.
Which keywords best characterize the work?
The work is best characterized by terms such as China, UNSC, Veto Power, Non-Proliferation, Institutional Theory, and P5.
Does the author conclude that veto power hinders non-proliferation?
No, the author finds that China's compliance with non-proliferation policies is primarily shaped by external diplomatic and economic bargains rather than a direct negative influence of its UNSC veto power.
What is the significance of the "policy of no first use"?
It serves as a key indicator that China's leadership has sought to clarify the purpose of its nuclear arsenal, helping to dispel international concerns regarding its nuclear intentions.
Why is Article 108 of the UN Charter considered an obstacle?
Article 108 requires the consent of all permanent members to pass amendments, which makes a meaningful reorganization of the UNSC and the distribution of power extremely difficult to achieve.
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- M.A. Manuel Irman (Autor:in), 2011, China as Nuclear Power and its UN Security Council Membership, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/181143
