In einem ersten Schritt leitet diese Diplomarbeit (European Research Project, ERP) die Notwendigkeit von freiwilliger Unternehmenspublizität in strategischen und nicht-finanziellen Bereichen her. Es wird argumentiert, daß Unternehmen ein integraler Bestandteil einer gemeinsamen Umwelt sind und sich in einer Reihe interdependenter Beziehungen mit dieser befinden. Daher werden sie zunehmend als Interessengemeinschaften verschiedener Anspruchsgruppen gesehen, die nur dann optimal handeln können, wenn die Ansprüche umfassend beachtet und berücksichtigt werden. Dabei sind Informationsansprüche davon abhängig, wie die jeweilige Information zur Verbesserung von Entscheidungsprozessen genutzt werden kann. Dies wiederum wird vom Potential der Information bestimmt, Unsicherheit in den betreffenden Entscheidungsbereichen zu reduzieren. Unsicherheit besteht für externe Entscheidungsträger vor allem in den Bereichen, in die herkömmliche Unternehmensinformationen wenige oder gar keine Einblicke gewähren. Aufgrund der traditionellen, finanzorientierten Auffassung der Publizität gilt dies in besonderem Maße für strategische und andere nicht-finanzielle Aspekte. Entsprechende freiwillige Publizität kann daher Unsicherheit erheblich reduzieren, insbesondere dann, wenn sie im Rahmen von testierten Dokumenten stattfindet. Gängige Finanzberichterstattung und bestehende Pflichtpublizität sind dagegen nicht in der Lage, die Befriedigung der Informationsbedürfnisse der Anspruchsgruppen annähernd zu gewährleisten.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1 Problem Area and Objectives of the Work
1.2 Rationale
1.3 Conception of Strategic and Non-financial Voluntary Disclosure, Delimitation and Use of Terms
2. Demand for Strategic and Non-financial Voluntary Disclosure
2.1 Function and Role
2.2 Target Groups
2.3 Factors Affecting Demand
2.4 Contents and Relevance of Specific Voluntary Disclosure Areas
2.4.1 Strategic Disclosure
2.4.2 Non-Financial Disclosure
3. Supply-Side Factors Influencing Voluntary Disclosure Behaviour
3.1 Regulatory Environment as a Supply-Side Factor
3.1.1 Organisations Relevant to Setting Disclosure Standards
3.1.2 Legal Requirements
3.2 Potential Opportunities and Disadvantages of Voluntary Disclosure as Supply-Side Factors
3.2.1 Effects on Capital Markets
3.2.1.1 Processing of Information in Capital Markets
3.2.1.2 Executives’ Assessment of Effects and Resulting Disclosure
3.2.2 Effects outside Capital Markets
3.2.2.1 Management
3.2.2.2 Employees
3.2.2.3 Competitors
3.2.2.4 Customers, Suppliers, Creditors
3.2.2.5 Other Possible Benefits
3.2.2.6 Common Costs Related to Disclosure
3.2.3 Significance of Company Characteristics
4. Enhancing the Knowledge of Voluntary Disclosure
4.1 Necessity for a Better Understanding of Voluntary Disclosure
4.2 Unresolved Problems and Hypotheses to Examine
4.3 Specific Additional Knowledge to be Contributed
5. Determinants and Incentives for Strategic and Non-financial Voluntary Disclosure in Practice
5.1 Research Methodology
5.1.1 Research Site
5.1.2 Research Design
5.2 Review of Annual Reports
5.2.1 Items for Voluntary Disclosure and their Scoring (Dependent Variable)
5.2.2 Corporate Characteristics (Independent Variables)
5.3 Results of the Review of Annual Reports
5.3.1 Descriptive Statistics: Company Characteristics and Actual Disclosure by Companies
5.3.2 Multiple Linear Regression: Company Characteristics and Disclosure Scores
5.3.3 Conclusions and Discussion
5.4 Interviews with Executives
5.4.1 Obtaining the Data
5.4.2 Analysing the Data
5.5 Results of the Interviews with Executives
5.5.1 Influence of Company Characteristics
5.5.2 Additionally Perceived Incentives and Disincentives
5.5.3 Process of Decision-Making
5.5.4 Differences between Strategic and Non-Financial Voluntary Disclosure
5.5.5 Conclusions and Discussion
6. Conclusion
6.1 Summary of Results and Interpretation
6.2 Implications
6.3 Critical Assessment of the Research
6.4 Extension
Research Objectives and Themes
This research project aims to develop a comprehensive framework for understanding voluntary disclosure, specifically examining strategic and non-financial information in the context of publicly quoted football clubs in Europe. The study explores the incentives and disincentives that influence management decisions, assesses current disclosure practices, and identifies the key variables that determine whether companies choose to disclose additional information beyond mandatory requirements.
- Theoretical analysis of supply-side factors and user demand for voluntary information.
- Statistical assessment of the extent and determinants of voluntary disclosure in football club annual reports.
- Qualitative investigation into executive decision-making processes regarding disclosure.
- Evaluation of the impact of company characteristics such as size, profitability, and ownership structure on disclosure behaviour.
- Comparison of strategic versus non-financial disclosure approaches.
Excerpt from the Book
3.2.1.2 Executives’ Assessment of Effects and Resulting Disclosure
Having illustrated that the release of company information may influence share prices, it is worth examining this part of literature that sees voluntary disclosure as mainly being a function of its potential effects on capital markets.
Early analytical research in capital markets has shown that in the absence of any disadvantages, i.e. costs related to voluntary disclosure, full disclosure obtains (see Grossman, 1981, and Milgrom, 1981). While some see this as a starting point, the assumption of an absence of costs is far from realistic and in the eyes of the author, models based on it cannot be seen as useful, although models always have to simplify. In the case of the present problem, however, costs seem much too important to be ignored. This is true for collecting, preparing and supplying the information as well as for possible negative consequences which may follow the action of disclosing.
Reflecting this, authors have subsequently introduced the concept of disclosure-related costs into their research. As a result, they postulate that executives come to voluntary disclosure decisions by weighing up between the related costs and the interest the company has in publishing the information in the eyes of the executive in terms of market value. The determination to disclose would be increasing with the positive content attributed to the information and decreasing with the estimated costs, executives deciding to either withhold or release an information on the basis of its effect on a risky asset’s market price. As an explanation of discretion in disclosing, Verrecchia (1983) puts forward disclosure-related costs that he calls “proprietary costs” encompassing costs that arise in the stage of preparing and disseminating the information and when information is revealed that potentially damages the firm.
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: Outlines the research problem, objectives, and the scope of voluntary disclosure within corporate reporting.
2. Demand for Strategic and Non-financial Voluntary Disclosure: Discusses the function and role of disclosure, identifying key target groups and factors influencing their demand for information.
3. Supply-Side Factors Influencing Voluntary Disclosure Behaviour: Examines regulatory influences and the costs and benefits of disclosure on and outside capital markets.
4. Enhancing the Knowledge of Voluntary Disclosure: Explores the necessity for a better understanding of disclosure practices and defines the research questions and hypotheses.
5. Determinants and Incentives for Strategic and Non-financial Voluntary Disclosure in Practice: Details the research methodology, including the quantitative analysis of annual reports and qualitative interviews with executives.
6. Conclusion: Summarizes the study’s findings, draws implications for various stakeholders, and critically assesses the research limitations while proposing areas for further study.
Keywords
Voluntary disclosure, Strategic information, Non-financial information, Football clubs, Corporate reporting, Capital markets, Management decisions, Proprietary costs, Disclosure behavior, Annual reports, Stakeholders, Information asymmetry, Agency theory, Financial communication, European markets.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core focus of this research?
The research focuses on the phenomenon of voluntary disclosure of strategic and non-financial information by publicly quoted football clubs in Europe.
What are the primary themes addressed?
The work addresses the demand for information by various stakeholders, supply-side factors influencing disclosure decisions, and the influence of company characteristics like size and profitability.
What is the ultimate objective of the study?
The primary goal is to develop an intellectual model that explains how executives make voluntary disclosure decisions based on cost-benefit assessments and company attributes.
Which methodology is employed in the work?
The study uses a mixed-methods approach, combining a quantitative statistical analysis of annual reports with qualitative telephone interviews with financial executives.
What topics are covered in the main body?
The main body examines regulatory environments, the impact of disclosure on capital markets, internal decision-making processes, and specific determinants of disclosure behaviour across European clubs.
What are the characterizing keywords of the research?
Key terms include voluntary disclosure, football business, management decision-making, strategic reporting, non-financial information, and corporate governance.
How do football clubs manage voluntary disclosure in the absence of strict regulations?
The study reveals that disclosure is largely determined by executive intuition and perceived benefits, such as building a favourable company image or demonstrating future viability, rather than purely by formal regulatory mandates.
What role does profitability play in the disclosure of strategic information?
Profitability is identified as a significant factor, where more profitable companies tend to disclose more information as a signalling mechanism to distinguish themselves from less successful competitors.
Why are non-financial disclosures, such as those related to Human Resources, often limited?
Executives often perceive non-financial data as having low relevance for shareholders and being potentially cumbersome to collect, leading them to prioritize strategic information over human capital or social policy reporting.
- Quote paper
- Patrick Roy (Author), 2000, Voluntary Disclosure of Company Information - Costly Additions or a Step towards Competitive Advantage? , Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/185698
