Excerpt
I Table of Contents
II List of Figures
1 Introduction
2 Agency problem and shareholder protection
2.1 The scope of managerial discretion
2.2 Concentrated ownership
2.3 Legal shareholder protection around the world
3 Inside ownership and firm valuation
3.1 Managerial incentive alignment and entrenchment
3.2 Empirical analyses with basic regression models
3.3 Model expansion, intermediates, and endogeneity issues
3.3.1 Investment policy
3.3.2 Leverage policy
3.3.3 Dividend policy
3.3.4 Determinants of managerial ownership and unobserved firm heterogeneity
4 Conclusion
5 References
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- Marco Klapper (Author), 2012, Ownership Structure and Investor Protection, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/196274
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