The quest for international criminal liability with regard to corporations

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Part I: International criminal liability for corporations: an illustration of its necessity and advantages.
Chapter 1: Nullum crimen sine lege: A closer look at the international crimes as defined by the Rome Statute
1.1. Introduction
1.2. Preliminary considerations in relation to the mental element of international crimes
1.3. Crimes against humanity
1.4. War Crimes
1.5. Genocide
Chapter 2. Examples of corporate involvement in international crimes.
2.1. German industrialists at the Nuremberg Tribunal: the I.G. Farben-, Krupp- and Flick Trials.
2.2. Cases under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act
Chapter 3. Advantages in comparison to the existing regimes
3.1. Advantages of liability of the corporate entity, as opposed to the liability of individual employees and/or management.
3.2 Advantages of an international criminal liability regime for corporations as opposed to national criminal liability.
3.3. Advantages of criminal liability
Chapter 4: A bump in the road: counterarguments and possible difficulties.
Chapter 5: Preliminary conclusion.

Part II: An analysis of the concept’s current feasibility
Chapter 1: Discussions on the Court’s jurisdiction: The Draft Statute and the Rome Conference.
Chapter 2: Obstacles identified at the Rome Conference and their current status
2.1. Introduction
2.2. Fundamental obstacles
Chapter 3: Preliminary conclusion.

Part III: Attribution models
Chapter 1: Models of attribution
1.1. The vicarious liability approach.
1.2. The aggregation model
1.3. The identification approach.
1.4. Organizational liability: the self-identity model.
Chapter 3: Preliminary conclusion
2.1. Legal arguments.
2.2. Political acceptability: aspiring to a future amendment of the Statute.

Part IV: Corporate complicity
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Solicitation and induction.
Chapter 3: Aiding and abetting.
Chapter 4. Preliminary conclusion

Conclusion

Annex I: Top 100 economic players 2010

Annex II: An interview with Judge Chris Van Den Wyngaert

Annex III: Nederlandstalige samenvatting

Bibliography

Acknowledgements

The author would like to express her sincere gratitude to the following people, without whose kindness, support, advice and/or patience, the process of writing this master’s thesis could not have been completed.

First and foremost, my kind-hearted parents, whose limitless love and support I cannot even describe, for not only encouraging me, but most of all for providing me with the opportunity of an education, which I never have and never will take for granted.

Secondly, Karel Vincent, who courageously weathered each moment of despair and whose calming personality I have come to love.

Thirdly, I would like to preserve a special thanks for Ilona Truyts, Liesbeth Haak, Charlotte Jacobs and Valerie Demedts, for their kind support, willing suggestions and most of all for their valued friendships.

Furthermore, I wish to express my deep gratitude to Judge Chris Van Den Wyngaert, for providing me with an eye-opening interview, as well as a peek inside the International Criminal Court.

And last but not least, particular acknowledgment is due to Prof. Dr. Tom Vander Beken, for his guidance and insight, to soon to be Doctor Wendy De Bondt, whose valuable advice leaves me indebted to her and Prof. Dr. Gert Vermeulen, whose enthusiasm is simply contagious.

Introduction

The first and foremost purpose of the establishment of the International Criminal Court^[1] was to call a halt to the mounting impunity for international crimes. Although the Court has accomplished remarkable strides in this regard, its Statute currently still does not provide it with adequate jurisdiction to address all perpetrators. Legal persons, more particularly large multinational corporations, wield enormous power. In fact, when comparing the gross domestic products (GDPs) of the most prosperous nations with the revenues of the largest global corporations, one can conclude that in 2010, 40 of the world’s 100 strongest economic forces were corporations.^[2] As such, WAL-MART ranks higher than, e.g. Denmark or Austria and the revenues of ROYAL DUTCH SHELL exceed the combined GDPs of both Hungary and Qatar. A report by the Institute for Policy Study, launched in 2000, shows that the then combined revenues of the 200 most successful transnational corporations exceeded the combined GDPs all States, minus the top ten.^[3]

In the pursuit of profit, morality is often lost and as a result, examples of corporate involvement^[4] in international crimes are numerous and will be discussed throughout this dissertation. It is in this framework that this master’s thesis, which consists of four parts, will consider an expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction to include legal persons. In the following paragraphs the structure of this dissertation will be set apart, offering a brief introduction to each of its four parts.

Firstly, an evaluation will be made as to whether there exists a genuine need for international criminal liability for corporations. In this regard, the author has firstly provided an overview of the relevant aspects of the international crimes, as an understanding of the mental and physical element(s) of each of these crimes is essential. Additionally, some examples of corporate involvement in international crimes will be considered and existing regimes of accountability will be discussed, clarifying the advantages the suggested model offers. Lastly, considering the advisability of extending the Court’s jurisdiction, some counterarguments presented by relevant learned authors will be evaluated.

Secondly, an assessment of the current feasibility of the concept is made, after careful consideration of the obstacles presented at the 1998 Rome Conference. Here, the most prominent obstacles appear to be the lack of an international standard in corporate criminal liability, its theoretical counterpart represented in the complementarity principle and the propriety of the existing sanctions. Another hindrance identified by the delegates at the Rome Conference, namely the attribution of mens rea to corporations, will form the focal point of the third and most important part of this dissertation.

It is true that many learned authors have commented on the need for international criminal liability for corporations, however few are prone to elaborate on how this can actually, practically be achieved. The author aims to bridge this gap by attempting to suggest a model for attribution, which not only represents the best legal alignment with the concept of international criminal liability, but in addition is most likely to be politically acceptable for all States Parties to the Rome Statute. Such model will be identified, only after a thorough examination of the four existing attribution models.

Lastly, as most corporate involvement in international crimes takes the form of corporate complicity, the final part of this dissertation will bring to light a number of difficulties inherent to the application of the current phrasing of the concept of participation in article 25 of the Rome Statute to corporate entities.

Throughout the pages of this dissertation it will be the attempt to not only present a plea for corporate responsibility for international crimes, but additionally and more importantly, to offer practically workable solutions for the existing legal problems surrounding this subject. It is the author’s impression that the inquiry made in this dissertation had not been attempted in the existing doctrine thus far. As such it is our sincere aspiration that the esteemed reader will be presented with a new take on this subject, which can serve as a point of departure for further jurisprudence.

Part I: International criminal liability for corporations: an illustration of its necessity and advantages.

In this part we aim to build a case for the possible expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction to legal persons, as there is no point in answering a question no one is asking. However, in a first and introductory chapter the reader will be provided with an overview of the physical and mental element(s) of the international crimes. A thorough knowledge of the different elements composing each of these crimes will make for a better understanding of the legal considerations presented at a later stage.

Throughout the second chapter the qualification of the concept of international criminal liability for corporations as a resounding social need will be illustrated through a rendition of some of the numerous cases in which corporations engage in international crimes. These instances of corporate involvement for the most part take the form of corporate complicity.

The third chapter of this first part will be dedicated to weighing this potential model against existing models of individual liability for corporate officers and corporate criminal liability on the national level, as well as civil and administrative corporate liability regimes. Respecting the scope of this dissertation, we will refrain from going into detail on these alternative liability models, but rather focus on the advantages international corporate criminal liability could offer in comparison.

Embracing the idea of a well-rounded inquiry, a final chapter will introduce counterarguments presented by a rightfully skeptical doctrine. However, this chapter will only represent part of the counter-argumentation, as the second part of this dissertation offers an in-depth study of the obstacles identified by the delegates at the Rome Conference and how these still affect the concept’s achievability at the current time.

Chapter 1: Nullum crimen sine lege: A closer look at the international crimes as defined by the Rome Statute

1.1. Introduction

The preamble to the ICC’s Statute describes the acts, which give rise to international criminal liability as “the most serious crimes of concern to in the international community”.^[6] In the following pages three international crimes included in the Court’s jurisdiction, namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, incorporated in respectively articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute, will be examined. The crime of aggression, included in the enumeration adopted by article 5 of the Rome Statute will not be discussed, as no operative definition is yet in place.^[7][5]

This chapter will concisely set apart the criminal acts covered by each of the aforementioned articles, subsequently examining the required physical and mental element, also known as the actus reus and mens rea. This analysis will be based on the text of the Rome Statute, the jurisprudence of the existing International Criminal Tribunals as well as the Court’s own interpretation of the elements of the international crimes, which it, in accordance with article 9 of the Rome Statute, has further elucidated on in its dissertation Elements of Crimes.^[8] The order in which the crimes are discussed is inspired by the likeliness of corporate involvement in each particular crime.

1.2. Preliminary considerations in relation to the mental element of international crimes

Prior to commencing the study of the specific elements composing these three crimes, the author wishes to direct the reader’s attention to article 30 § 1 of the Rome Statute, which holds that:

Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.^[9]

This article, which defines the mens rea element in general terms, is referred to as the ‘default rule’. It is applicable whenever either the Rome Statute or the ICC’s ‘Elements of Crimes’ has abstained from introducing a more specific intent. This is confirmed by paragraph 2 of the dissertation’s general introduction:

Where no reference is made in the Elements of Crimes to a mental element for any particular conduct, consequence or circumstance listed, it is understood that the relevant mental element, i.e., intent, knowledge or both, set out in article 30 applies.

The mental element consists of two components, namely knowledge, the rational component and intent, the emotional component. The article continues by giving a more detailed description of both knowledge and intent:

2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:

(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.

3. For the purposes of this article, “knowledge” means awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.

The emotional element of intent, materialized in article 30 § 2, can pose difficulties with regard to attribution to corporations, as will be reflected in the assessment of the aggregation approach and self-identity model in the third part of this dissertation. This intent is referred to as the dolus generalis. ^[10] The article links this mental element to a material element in the form of conduct, consequence or circumstance.^[11]

1.3. Crimes against humanity

The first definition of crimes against humanity can be found in the Nuremberg Charter, which implies that an express prohibition of this crime by an international instrument has only been in existence for seven decades. Article 6 (c) of the Nuremberg Charter offered the following definition:

Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the law of the country where perpetrated.

The current definition of this crime, which defines the scope of the ICC’s jurisdiction, can be found in article 7 of the Rome Statute, the chapeau element of the first paragraph of which states:

For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack^[12]

Added is a list of 10 inhume acts, which has expanded substantially since the crime was first described in Article 6 (c) of the Nuremberg Charter, now also covering such crimes as rape,^[13] torture^[14] and imprisonment,^[15] which were first provided by Law No. 10, issued in occupied Germany. Additionally, the crimes of sexual slavery,^[16] apartheid^[17] and forced transfer of a population^[18] were added. The article’s second paragraph provides clarification on a number of terms utilized in the first paragraph.

The chapeau element of article 7 § 1 will be set apart in the upcoming paragraphs. This includes both a mens rea - and an actus reus -aspect. The material element of the crime sets a contextual threshold including two elements. Firstly, the criminal act must be part of a widespread or systematic attack and secondly, this attack must be directed against any civilian population. The mens rea element requires “knowledge of the attack”.

Firstly, there must be a “widespread or systematic attack”. The ratio legis behind such requirement is evident, namely to differentiate between crimes against humanity and isolated cases of rape, torture, murder, etcetera. Without such threshold, each of these cases could be deemed an international crime. Surely, such cannot be the concern of the International Criminal Court. Isolated cases must solely remain part of the national jurisdiction of the State.

What exactly is meant by ‘widespread’ and ‘systematic’? The term ‘widespread’ refers to the scale of the event as well as to how many victims are counted, although no fixed number of victims exists. Whether or not the threshold is reached must be judged in light of the circumstances of each case.^[19] The term has been addressed in the case law of the known criminal Tribunals, e.g. in the 1997 Tadic – Case, where the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia^[20] held the following:

[A] finding of widespreadness, which refers to the number of victims, or systematicity, indicating that a pattern or methodical plan is evident, fulfils this requirement.^[21]

The Tribunal reaffirmed this statement in its 2001 Kunarac – Judgment:

The adjective “widespread” connotes the large-scale nature of the attack and the number of its victims. The Commentary of the International Law Commission in its Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind describes this as follows:

‘Inhumane acts (must) be committed on a large scale meaning that the acts are directed against a multiplicity of victims. This requirement excludes an isolated inhumane act committed by a perpetrator acting on his own initiative and directed against a single victim.’^[22]

In addition, article 7 § 1 further illuminates the contextual threshold through usage of the term ‘systematically’. In earlier cases, more specifically the Akayesu – Case by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda^[23] and the ICTY’s Blaskic – Case, the international Tribunals provided high thresholds. Since, this vision has been abandoned as is illustrated by more recent cases, e.g. the Nahimana – Judgment. The requirements for a crime to be qualified as ‘systematic’ are now limited to the “organized nature of the acts of violence” and the “improbability of their random occurrence”.^[24]

It is worthwhile noting that article 7 calls for a “widespread or systematic attack”, implying that either one qualification would suffice. However, article 7 § 2 (a) of the Rome Statute contradicts such assumption, holding that a certain degree of organization is inherent to the concept of an attack:

‘[An] [a]ttack directed against any civilian population’ means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack^[25]

As a result of this definition, it is clear that a crime against humanity requires an attack that is both widespread and systematic. However, article 7 § 2 (a) has further implications. The clause “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack” represents the controversial ‘policy element’,^[26] implying that the commission of these crimes must bear some involvement of either a State or an organization^[27] and that it cannot be a random act. This causes an inconsistency in international criminal law, as it is in direct contradiction with the ICTY’s jurisprudence. The Appeal Judgment in the Kunarac– Case clearly states that:

[N]othing in the Statute or in customary international law[…] required proof of the existence of a plan or policy to commit these crimes^[28]

However, the ICC has since taken a contrary position and in further clarification of the contextual threshold provided in article 7 of the Rome Statute confirmed the requirement of a policy element, stating the following:

It is understood that “policy to commit such attack” requires that the State or organization actively promote or encourage such an attack against a civilian population.^[29]

In the spirit of lex posterior derogat legi anteriori and in light of the current dissertation, which focuses on the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, the policy element must be taken into consideration. However, it is clear from article 7 § 2 (a) that the required plan or policy is not limited to that of States, but indeed includes organizations, such as corporations. Additionally, it be noted that it is difficult to conceptualize a scenario in which a corporation is the primary perpetrator of a crime against humanity. As will be illustrated by the examples set apart in the next chapter, corporate involvement in crimes against humanity predominantly takes the form of corporate complicity. The corporation either solicits or induces crimes against humanity committed primarily by dictatorial regimes, or takes the role of ‘aider and abettor’. The concept of corporate complicity faces its own challenges under the Rome Statute, a rendition of which will be provided by the fourth and final part of this dissertation.

The second part of the actus reus explained in the chapeau element of article 7 § 1 of the Rome Statute states that the crime should be part of an attack “directed against any civilian population”. From this statement three factors can be derived. The importance of the term ‘any’ dates back to the Nuremberg Tribunal and was introduced to include crimes committed against one’s own population, such as the criminal acts of the Nazi regime against German citizens of Jewish decent. Additionally, the word ‘population’, once again, entails a reference to scale. Lastly, the exact interpretation of the term ‘civilian’ gives rise to a number of questions, however this dissertation will avoid such discussion, as the question pertains mostly to the position of (former) combatants as victims and corporate involvement in international crimes would in normal circumstances be directed at civilians in the classical sense of the word.^[30]

The mens rea element of a crime against humanity lies in the perpetrators awareness of the contextual threshold. The perpetrator must have known that his act was part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population and through these actions have intended to further the attack.^[31] However, evidence of the perpetrator’s exact knowledge of every detail of the attack is not required.^[32] This mental element appears to be in line with the standard mental element of “intent and knowledge” provided by article 30 of the Rome Statute.

1.4. War Crimes

After a long history of prosecuting and convicting perpetrators of war crimes at the national level,^[34] the first international legal basis for prosecuting war criminals is found in article 6 (b) of the Nuremberg Charter, which defines war crimes as:^[33]

[…] violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages or devastation not justified by military necessity^[35]

Other instruments of international humanitarian law soon followed, including the four Geneva Conventions, which came into being in 1949. These are an expression of customary international law.^[36] The crime’s definition in relation to the ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction can be found in article 8 of the Rome Statute and includes an exhaustive list of no less than 50 war crimes, divided into four subcategories all of which are linked to armed conflict. The first two categories apply to conflicts with an international dimension, whilst the latter two concern internal armed conflict. The following paragraphs provide a concise overview of the mental and physical element of each category in more detail.

The first category, set apart by article 8 § 2 (a), qualifies as war crimes:

Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention^[37]

Subsequently, a limitative list of offences includes willful killing; torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health, extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly,^[38] compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial,^[39] unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement and taking of hostages.^[40]

The ICTY, in its Delalic – Judgment described grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions as containing two elements:

[T]he application of Article 2 [ICTY Statute] requires the satisfaction of two conditions; first, that the alleged offences were committed in the context of an international armed conflict; and, secondly, that the alleged victims were "persons protected" by the Geneva Conventions.^[41]

In line with this case law, the ICC’s ‘Elements of Crimes’ further elucidates on these elements, which are common to all offences under article 8 § 2 (a) of the Rome Statute. The dissertation provides that, firstly, the offence must be directed against person(s) or property enjoying the protection of one or more of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the perpetrator must be aware of the person or property’s protected status.^[42] Additionally, a nexus is required between the criminal conduct and an international armed conflict^[43] and the perpetrator must be aware of the existence of such armed conflict.^[44] This requirement aims to distinguish between war crimes and the criminal acts of murder, torture, etcetera, taking place during, yet unrelated to armed conflict.^[45] As such, the requirements for a war crime are dual, concerning both the victim and the circumstance. With regard to both requirements a physical as well as a mental component is set forth.

Firstly, the offences described by article 8 § 2 (a) must be committed against person(s) or property which enjoy the protection of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Those persons protected by the Geneva Conventions can be found in articles 13 and 24 to 26 of the first Geneva Convention (I) for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field, articles 13, 36 and 37 of the second Geneva Convention (II) for the amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea, article 4 of the third Geneva Convention (III) relative to the treatment of prisoners of war and articles 4 and 20 of the fourth Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war.^[46]

Additionally, article 8 §2 (a) (iv) qualifies the unjustified destruction and appropriation of property as a war crime. As such, it is vital to know what property is protected by the Geneva Conventions. Over several articles,^[47] enumerated in paragraph 81 of the 1995 ICTY decision on the defense motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction in the Tadic - Case,^[48] the Conventions set forth which property those engaging in conflict must refrain from destroying, attacking or appropriating. This includes medical units, property of aid societies, military hospital ships, civilian hospitals, etcetera.

This physical element is complemented by a mental element, namely that the perpetrator must also be aware of the protected status of the person(s) or property under the Geneva Conventions. The Preparatory Commission provided a footnote, indicating that “this mental element recognizes the interplay between articles 30 and 32”,^[49] which implies that a lack of knowledge concerning the protected status of a person or of property does not provide a negation of the mental element, as expressed in article 32 § 2 of the Rome Statute.^[50] Furthermore, particular attention is paid to the protected status provided by article 4 of the fourth Geneva Convention, namely:

[T]hose who, […], find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.

In this regard the Preparatory Commission clarified that it is sufficient for the perpetrator to know that “the victim belonged to an adverse party to the conflict”.^[51]

The second requirement of war crimes under article 8 § 2(a) is that of a nexus to international conflict, as well as the perpetrator’s awareness of such nexus. In this regard, the ICC’s Elements of Crimes clarifies that “The conduct [must have taken] place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict”.^[52] However, no definition of an international armed conflict is provided. The Court’s commentary was limited to the fact that the concept of an international armed conflict includes military occupation.^[53]

More interesting with respect to this requirement of international armed conflict is the mental element. With regard to the awareness of the existence of an armed conflict, the ICC’s ‘Elements of Crimes’ provides an exception to the article 30 default rule,^[54] establishing a lower threshold^[55] than the standard “knowledge and intent”. This is reflected in the introduction to article 8, and as such is equally applicable to the remaining three categories of war crimes. The text holds that:

(a) There is no requirement for a legal evaluation by the perpetrator as to the existence of an armed conflict or its character as international or non-international;
(b) In that context there is no requirement for awareness by the perpetrator of the facts that established the character of the conflict as international or non-international;
(c) There is only a requirement for the awareness of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict that is implicit in the terms 'took place in the context of and was associated with'^[56]

According to learned author Knut Dörmann the third paragraph implies that the perpetrator’s knowledge of the factual circumstances needs only extend to the nexus.^[57] The first two paragraphs set forth that, firstly, no legal evaluation of the situation is required. Additionally, the perpetrator must not be aware of the internal or international character of the conflict. The majority view of the working group on the elements of crimes holds that it suffices to demonstrate “that the accused was aware of at least some factual circumstances” implying an armed conflict, for instance through the hearing of gunfire or the observation of men in uniform. Although the wording of paragraph c is somewhat vague, the remarks of the Working Group clarify that the required mental element sets forth a lower threshold than that of ‘knowledge and intent’, provided by article 30. Regardless, when considering this requirement from a practical point of view one must note that it would be difficult for an accused to maintain that the offences listed in article 8 of the Rome Statute, committed amidst a zone of armed conflict, took place without the perpetrator’s knowledge of such circumstance.

The second category is described by article 8 § 2 (b) as:

Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law^[58]

The paragraph is completed with a list of 26 offences, which can be traced back to a number of Conventions,^[59] such as the 1907 Hague Convention respecting the laws and customs of war on land,^[60] Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions,^[61] the 1899 Hague Declaration concerning expanding bullets^[62] and the Protocol for the prohibition of the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare (The Geneva gas protocol).^[63] Once again the conduct must show a nexus with armed conflict and the perpetrator must be aware of such nexus, a condition that was already examined under the foregoing paragraphs.

Categories three and four included in article 8 § 2 (c) and (e) extend the Court’s jurisdiction to war crimes committed in armed conflict, which lacks an international element. The third category, included in article 8 § 2 (c) refers to violations of common article 3, which was also included in the ICTR Statute. The chapeau element of this section reads:

In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause

It enumerates four categories of examples of prohibited conduct, including violence to life and person, mutilation, cruel treatment, torture,^[64] taking hostages,^[65] executions,^[66] etcetera. The ‘Elements of Crimes’ – dissertation adds to each of these offences a dual requirement which, once again, relates to the victims and circumstances. Firstly, the conduct must have taken place in the context of and be associated with “an armed conflict not of an international character” and the perpetrator must be aware of “actual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict”.^[67] In this regard, no exact definition is provided of what exactly can be viewed as “an armed conflict not of an international character”,^[68] although article 8 § 2 (d) does exclude “internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence”.^[69] The mental element, concerning the perpetrator’s awareness of the armed conflict, has yet been elaborated on when discussing the first category of war crimes. Additionally, the victim or victims must be “either hors de combat, or were civilians, medical personnel or religious personnel taking no active part in the hostilities”. Added to this is a mental element, stating that the perpetrator must “aware of the factual circumstances that established this status”.^[70]

Finally, the last category applies to “other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character”^[71] and provides an exhaustive list of 12 possible offences, highly reminiscent of those included in its international armed conflict - counterpart, the sources of which reside in the before-mentioned 1907 Hague Convention, as well as Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.^[72] The requirement of an armed conflict not of an international character, as well as the perpetrator’s awareness thereof, which was discussed under the foregoing category, is repeated.^[73]

1.5. Genocide

The term ‘genocide’ originated four years prior to the conclusion of the Genocide Convention, in a book by the Polish attorney Raphael Lemkin^[74] and has since been referred to as the ‘crime of crimes’.^[75] To preserve the legal application of this term for cases of the utmost gravity, it adheres to a most narrow and precise legal definition. Article 6 of the Rome Statute thus defines genocide as:

For the purpose of this Statute, "genocide" means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

This definition is a word for word copy of the definition included in the 1948 Genocide Convention^[76] and can also be found in the ICTY^[77] and ICTR^[78] Statutes.

The actus reus – element of genocide is addressed in article 6 (a) through (e) of the Rome Statute. Although article 6 does not provide a requirement related to scale, the ICC’s ‘Elements of Crimes’ adds to this definition, stating that in order for each of these specific acts to be qualified as genocide, it is required that:

The conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction.^[79]

Additionally, as for each of the international crimes, a mental element is required.^[80] However, in relation to the crime of genocide, the mens rea element deviates from the standard element provided by article 30 of the Rome Statute, a possibility specifically provided by the article’s opening clause. The chapeau element of article 6 requires a specific intent or dolus specialis,^[81] namely that the perpetrator operate “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”.^[82] This is referred to as the ‘genocidal intent’ and represents the foremost important element in distinguishing genocide as a separate crime.^{[83] [84]}

The concept of this specific intent was illustrated by the ICTR in its Musema – Verdict, where the Tribunal held:

The special intent of a crime is the specific intention which, as an element of the crime, requires that the perpetrator clearly intended the result charged.”^[85]

… [W]hich offence is characterized by a psychological nexus between the physical result and the mental state of the perpetrator.^[86]

The determination of the dolus specialis can at times prove most difficult for the Court. As such, the ICTR, in its Akayesu – Judgment, offered guidelines as to determine genocidal intent. The presence of certain factors is taken into consideration, such as a “general context of perpetration … systematically directed against that same group”, the scale and general nature of the acts, etcetera.^[87]

Finally, the International Criminal Court’s ‘Elements of Crimes’ has addressed the required mental element for genocide, stating that it will “be decided by the Court on a case-by-case basis”.^[88] However, a practical scenario in which a corporation would be endowed with the required genocidal intent is unlikely to occur.

Chapter 2. Examples of corporate involvement in international crimes.

The criminal activity of legal persons is not, as some may think, limited to white-collar crimes. To demonstrate this the following chapter will be dedicated to exploring a handful of the many examples of corporate involvement in international crimes. We will firstly review the German industrialists who faced prosecution before the Nuremberg Tribunal. In addition to these ‘original corporate perpetrators’ we will take a closer look at a number of corporate human rights abuse - cases prosecuted before U.S. federal district Courts under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act.

2.1. German industrialists at the Nuremberg Tribunal: the I.G. Farben-, Krupp- and Flick Trials.

The concept of the criminal enterprise is as old as that of international criminal law itself. The cradle of international criminal law, the Nuremberg Tribunal, offers us a beautiful point of departure for our list of corporate perpetrators, which is, naturally, non-exhaustive.

The Nuremberg Charter, more particularly article 9, provided a legal basis for the International Military Tribunals following World War II to qualify these corporations as criminal organizations:^[89]

At the trial of any individual member of any group or organization the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of which the individual may be convicted) that the group or organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal organization.^[90]

Despite its competence, the Tribunal refrained from applying this article.^[91] As such, the concept of international corporate criminal liability was not established, as the qualification was, firstly, never utilized and secondly, merely aimed to serve as a basis for individual liability of those who held membership to these criminal organizations.^[92]

Nonetheless, three of the twelve cases tried before the Nuremberg Tribunal are textbook examples of corporate involvement in international crimes, more specifically the trials of German industrialists, prosecuted for the severe harm they, through the vehicle of their corporate entity, had cost. These are the ‘United States of America vs. Carl Krauch, et al.’ – Trial,^{[93] [94]} better known as the I.G. Farben-Trial, the ‘United States of America vs. Alfried Krupp, et al.’ – Trial,^[95] and the ‘United States of America vs. Friedrich Flick, et al.’- Trial.^[96]

They were directed against the corporate officers of respectively the Interessen-Gemeinschaft Farbenindustrie AG, a large German chemical corporation with as its most notorious product, the highly poisonous Zyklon B gas, Friedrich Krupp AG, manufacturing arms and ammunition and the Flick Kommanditgesellschaft, a collective of corporations mostly involved in steel production. The men were charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity, including enslavement of civilians out of occupied territory and those imprisoned in concentration camps,^[97] deportation^[98] and coercing Jewish plant owners into giving up their property.^[99] The I.G. Farben – Case additionally included charges for the supply of poisonous gas for the extermination of, and drugs for medical experiments on, those enslaved and imprisoned in the concentration camps.^[100]

Although the defendants are individuals, the transcripts of e.g. the I.G. Farben - Indictment, on numerous occasions, includes clauses such as “[a]ll of the defendants, acting through the instrumentality of Farben…”^[101] and “in that they were […] members of organizations or groups, including Farben, which were connected with the commission of said crimes”.^[102] The absolute necessity of the corporate instrument for these crimes was later reaffirmed by the Second Circuit U.S. District Court in the 2010 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell - Case, where the Court held:

[It was the] corporation that made possible the war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by Nazi Germany.^[103]

So regardless of the fact that no legal person was held accountable at the Nuremberg Tribunal, these cases provide a clear example of corporate involvement in international crimes.

2.2. Cases under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act

The Alien Tort Claims Act is reflected in the U.S. Code provision that allows for district courts to hear civil claims of an alien “for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations…”^[104] The possibility to file claims against legal persons under ATCA was confirmed in the 2011 Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Corp. – Case,^[105] the Sarei v. Rio Tinto – Case^[106] and the Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp . – Case.^[107] Due to a contradicting case in a second district Court in 2010 the U.S. Supreme Court is expected to settle the possibility of corporate liability under ATCA later this year.^[108]

a. Shell’s actions in the Niger Delta

The Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum-Case, Wiwa v. Anderson - Case and Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum Development Company – Case were meant to be brought before the U.S. District Court of New York under the Alien Tort Claims Act. Defendants were Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell Transport and Trading Company. The original complaint included summary execution, crimes against humanity, torture, cruel inhuman or degrading treatment, arbitrary arrest and wrongful death. The cases ended in a 15,5 million USD settlement^[109] in 2009. The (alleged) facts of the case are as follows.

Shell, which began extracting the oil in the Niger Delta in the 1950’s, met with peaceful yet increasing resistance from the Ogoni, a tribe of indigenous people. In 1990, the non-governmental organization ‘movement for the survival of the Ogoni people’ was founded.^[110] Under the leadership of writer Ken Saro-Wiwa, they protested the numerous oil-spills and constant gas flares, polluting their land, water and air. As resistance grew, Shell was accused of conspiring with Nigeria’s dictatorial military regime to assure the movement would be silenced. With the coming into power of president Abacha a specific military task force, the Rover State Internal Security Task Force, was established exclusively to deal with the MOSOP and allegedly engaged in numerous human rights violations, varying from unlawful detention to execution.^[111] Besides frequent violent outbursts of the Nigerian military against protesting civilians, this led to the execution of the ‘Ogoni nine’. After a mock trial before a special military tribunal, which set into motion a wave of international outrage, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni-men were executed by hanging on November 10th, 1995.^[112]

b. Chevron^[113]

The Botowa v. Chevron Corp. – Case is very reminiscent of the Royal Dutch Shell – Case. Chevron Corporation is a multinational, American-based oil magnate. It was accused of colluding with the dictatorial Nigerian government and requesting the latter to intervene in a peaceful protest, where an estimated one hundred protesters occupied an offshore drilling platform. Chevron allegedly orchestrated the attack, even providing the Nigerian armed forces with company helicopters, from which they, according to witnesses, opened fire on the trapped protestors. Two men were killed, others were severely injured.

In 1999 the Botowa v. Chevron Corp.- Case was filed under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act. The original complaint, in its second claim for relief, includes crimes against humanity, referring to the willful killings, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention as part of a widespread and systematic attack on a civilian population. However, the U.S. District Court for the Northern district of California acquitted Chevron in 2008.^[114]

C. Rio Tinto^[115]

The facts of the Sarei v. Rio Tinto - Case take place in Panguna, a small village on the island of Bougainville, a province of Papua New Guinea. In the 1960’s the mining corporation Rio Tinto started constructing a massive copper- and goldmine in the village. As was the case in Nigeria after the arrival of Shell, local inhabitants suffered under the grave pollution brought about by the mine and began protesting. In 1988 the protest became increasingly intense and the mine had to be closed. The mining conglomerate had it be understood that unless the government acted to assure local cooperation, it would relocate. Fearing to lose its 19,1 % share of the profit, the government quickly took action by deploying a defense force in 1989. In response the Bougainville Revolutionary Army was formed and the two collided in a civil war, which lasted 10 years and claimed approximately 15 000 lives. All the while, the Papua New Guinean government was allegedly encouraged and offered logistic assistance by Rio Tinto PLC. Starting April of 1990 the government added a blockade of all medicine and humanitarian assistance to the region, which lasted seven years. Rio Tinto stands trial for its involvement in war crimes and crimes against humanity.

These examples represent just a minor selection of the many cases of corporate involvement, a notion of which covers a wide spectrum, ranging from corporations taking the role of primary perpetrator to several possible versions of corporate complicity. An example of the former are the ever-growing number of private security companies, also referred to as private military companies, which have made warfare a lucrative business activity. For instance, Academi, a corporation which caused quite the uproar under its former name, Blackwater, through its involvement in the shootings that took place in Bagdad on September 16th, 2007, claiming the lives of 17 Iraqi civilians. However, the majority of cases concern corporate complicity. The extent the practical examples of corporate involvement in international crimes will depend heavily on which definition of corporate complicity one chooses to apply, ranging from direct complicity, which is the approach wielded by the Rome Statute, to beneficiary or even silent complicity.^[116] Examples of corporate complicity, additional to the examples discussed under this chapter and dependent upon the applicable complicity approach, can be found in the actions of Canadian Oil company Talisman Energy Inc. and its alleged complicity in the forceful transfer of Sudanese citizens,^[117] the actions of Unocal in constructing its Yadana gas pipeline in Birma or the purchasing of so-called ‘blood diamonds’ by Western corporations in conflict zones, the revenues of which finance rebel forces and as a result, perpetuate civil wars in countries such as Sierra Leone.

These examples serve to illustrate that regardless of whether or not the concept of international criminal liability for corporations is practically feasible at this time, what will perspire in the following chapters is more than an academic exercise, but rather serves a genuine purpose. It is a reaction to a current and tangible problem.

Chapter 3. Advantages in comparison to the existing regimes

3.1. Advantages of liability of the corporate entity, as opposed to the liability of individual employees and/or management.

A corporation has a personality of its own distinct from the personalities which compose it, a ‘group personality’ different from and greater than ... the sum of its parts and [i]n the same way that a house is something more than a heap of lumber and an army something more than a mob a corporate organization is something more than a number of persons.^[118]

- Charles Abbott

Regardless of the individualistic nature of criminal law and without the pretense of aiming to replace the existing individual liability regime, the concept of corporate criminal liability offers a number of advantages, which we will enumerate and discuss, after first having identified the corporate entity as a subject of international law.

When weighing corporate liability against individual liability of the employee at an international level, the first thing that must be assured is the existence of corporations as a subject under international law.^[119] It is well known and all-round accepted that individuals can be held liable under international criminal law, as is confirmed by the jurisdiction of the Court , described in article 25 § 1 of the Rome Statute. Although the ICC currently has no jurisdiction over corporations, three reasons seem to justify that corporations are to be seen as subjects of international law. Firstly, because legal persons, like natural persons, enjoy the protection of rights under international law. Secondly, for the reason that corporations have standing before certain international Courts and lastly because they are the indirect subjects of international obligations. In the following paragraphs each of these three arguments will be explained in more detail.

Firstly, corporate entities, as legal persons, are the bearers of rights under international law. Most applicable in casu are human rights, as expressed in the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.^[120] The application of the rights proclaimed in such Convention is most clear with regard to article 1 of the Convention’s first Protocol. This appertains to the rights to private property. The article clearly states that “[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions”^[121] However, the fact that such provision is not included in each of the Convention’s articles cannot lead to the conclusion that it is merely the right to private property that applies to legal persons. In fact, article 1 of the Convention includes legal persons^[122] through its statement that “[t]he High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.”^[123]

The existence of corporations as subjects of international law is also illustrated by article 34 of the Convention, which grants them standing before the European Court of Human Rights:

The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto.^[124]

The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted this article to mean that the concept of a non-governmental organization covers corporate entities as well, and thus is broader than the concept of a NGO as would be interpreted in a United Nations context.^[125] When looking at the travaux préparatoires, it becomes quite clear that the article was always meant to include corporations. This can be deducted from article 7 (a) of the Convention’s 1948 draft version, which addressed a right of petition for any “natural or corporate person”.^[126] However the exact scope of the above-mentioned article is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the fact that the Court has always allowed corporations to take the position of applicant. The first corporate applicant is found in the 1991 Sunday Times versus United Kingdom case.^[127] Since, the Court has encountered numerous cases with corporations taking the position of private litigants.^{[128] [129]} In addition to the European Court of Human Rights, the North American Free Trade Agreement - more specifically articles 1115 to 1138 - allows for enterprises to defend their claims against Canada, the United States and Mexico,^[130] through arbitration.

It thus appears legitimate to say that on the international forum companies are not only protected by certain rights, including human rights, but can additionally call upon the juridical system if and when those rights are violated. However, this blade appears to be one-sided and corporate actors find themselves in a particularly beneficiary position. They bear the protection of rights, however when they choose to grossly breach the same rights they bear, they cannot be held accountable.

Furthermore, the before-mentioned claim is supported by the fact that international law obligations are imposed upon corporations, be it indirectly. In this regard, the international community often imposes on States the duty to assure its nationals’ compliance with international law, including that of its corporations. This has led to the instalment of domestic corporate liability regimes. The fact that corporations are the indirect subject of international law is reaffirmed through the preamble to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights,^[131] which reads:

Every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive […] to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance^[132]

[...]

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^[1] Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Court’ or ‘the ICC ’

^[2] This comparison was made by the author following the 2000 example of S. Anderson and J. Cavanagh in their “Top 200: the rise of global corporate power”. For further reference, please consult the bibliography included at the end of this dissertation.

^[3] S. Anderson & J. Cavanagh, Top 200: The rise of global corporate power, 2000, www.ips-dc.org/files/2452/top200.pdf, 9.

^[4] Throughout this dissertation, the term ‘corporate involvement’ will be used as an overarching term, covering both corporate complicity and the situation of a corporation as a primary perpetrator.

^[5] Article 22 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended January 2002), 17 July 1998.

^[6] Preamble Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended January 2002), 17 July 1998. para 4

^[7] An amendment of the Rome Statute to include a definition of the crime of aggression was filed by means of Resolution RC/Res.6 of the Review Conference of the Rome Statute on June 11th, 2010. The amendment has thus far been ratified by Liechtenstein and requires a total of 30 ratifications. Additionally, a vote shall take place by the Assembly of States Parties at its next meeting, in conformity with article 121 Rome Statute.

^[8] The Court applies the interpretations set forth in the Elements of Crimes in accordance with article 21 § 1 (a) of the Rome Statute

^[9] Article 30 § 1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended January 2002), 17 July 1998.

^[10] P. Akhavan, "The crime of genocide in the ICTR jurisprudence", Journal of International Criminal Justice 2005, (989) 992.

^[11] Mohamed Elewa Badar, "The mental element In the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A commentary from a comparative criminal law perspective", Criminal Law Forum 2008, (473) 475.

^[12] Article 7 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended January 2002), 17 July 1998.

^[13] Article 7 §1 (g)Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended January 2002), 17 July 1998.

^[14] Article 7 §1 (f) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended January 2002), 17 July 1998.

^[15] Article 7 §1 (e) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended January 2002), 17 July 1998.

^[16] Article 7 §1 (g) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended January 2002), 17 July 1998.

^[17] Article 7 §1 (j) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended January 2002), 17 July 1998.

^[18] Article 7 §1 (d) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended January 2002), 17 July 1998.

^[19] R. Cryer & H. Friman & D. Robinson & E. Wilmshurst, An introduction to international criminal law and procedure, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 236.

^[20] Hereinafter referred to as ICTY

^[21] International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 7 May 1997, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic aka "Dule" (Opinion and Judgment), para 648 [emphasis added].

^[22] International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 22 February 2001, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic (Trial Judgment), para 428.; International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 3 March 2000, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic (Trial Judgement), para 206.;International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 2 September 1998, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Opinion and Judgment), para 580.;R. Cryer & H. Friman & D. Robinson & E. Wilmshurst, An introduction to international criminal law and procedure, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 236 FN 32.

^[23] Hereinafter referred to as the ICTR

^[24] International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 28 November 2007, The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze (Appeal Judgment).

^[25] International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 3 April 2008, Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al. (Trial Judgment), para 122.

^[26] M. Boot, Genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes: Nullum crimen sine lege and the subject matter jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, Intersentia nv, 2002, 479.

^[27] R. Cryer & H. Friman & D. Robinson & E. Wilmshurst, An introduction to international criminal law and procedure, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 238 FN 44.

^[28] R. Cryer & H. Friman & D. Robinson & E. Wilmshurst, An introduction to international criminal law and procedure, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 239 FN 49. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 12 June 2002, IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic (Appeal Judgment), para 98.

^[29] R. Cryer & H. Friman & D. Robinson & E. Wilmshurst, An introduction to international criminal law and procedure, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 238-239.;Elements of Crimes, International Criminal Court 9 September 2002.

^[30] R. Cryer & H. Friman & D. Robinson & E. Wilmshurst, An introduction to international criminal law and procedure, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 241.

^[31] Elements of Crimes, International Criminal Court 9 September 2002. 5 - 6

^[32] Elements of Crimes, International Criminal Court 9 September 2002. 5

^[33] See also K. Dörmann, Elements of war crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Sources and commentary, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

^[34] T. McCormack, "From Sun Tzu to the sixth committee: The evolution of an international criminal law regime" in Timothy McCormack & Gerry Simpson (ed.), The Law of War Crimes, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1997, (31).

^[35] Article 6 (b) Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis ("London Agreement"), 8 August 1945.

^[36] R. Cryer & H. Friman & D. Robinson & E. Wilmshurst, An introduction to international criminal law and procedure, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 274.

^[37] K. Dörmann, "War crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, with a special focus on the negotiations on the Elements of Crimes" in A. von Bogdandy & R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck yearbook of United Nations law, 7, The Hague, Kluwer International Law, 2003, (341) 344.

^[38] Article 50 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949. Article 51 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Second Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949.

^[39] Article 130 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949.

^[40] Article 147 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949.

^[41] International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 16 November 1998, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Mucic aka "Pavo", Hazim Delic, Esad Landzo aka "Zenga", Zejnil Delalic (Trial Judgement), para 201.

^[42] Elements of Crimes, International Criminal Court 9 September 2002. 13 - 17

^[43] Elements of Crimes, International Criminal Court 9 September 2002. 12 FN 34 K. Dörmann, "War crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, with a special focus on the negotiations on the Elements of Crimes" in A. von Bogdandy & R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck yearbook of United Nations law, 7, The Hague, Kluwer International Law, 2003, (341) 358.

^[44] Elements of Crimes, International Criminal Court 9 September 2002. 14 - 18

^[45] K. Dörmann, "War crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, with a special focus on the negotiations on the Elements of Crimes" in A. von Bogdandy & R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck yearbook of United Nations law, 7, The Hague, Kluwer International Law, 2003, (341) 358 - 359.

^[46] International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 2 October 1995, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic aka "Dule" (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), para 81.

^[47] Articles 19, 33, 34 and 35 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949.; Articles 22, 24, 25 and 27 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Second Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949.; Articles 18, 19, 21, 22, 33, 53 and 57 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949.

^[48] International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 2 October 1995, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction) para 81.

^[49] Elements of Crimes, International Criminal Court 9 September 2002. 13 FN 33

^[50] E. Van Sliedregt, Individual criminal responsibility in international law, Oxford Oxford University Press, 2012, 283.;R.S. Clark, "The mental element in international criminal law: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the elements of offences ", Criminal Law Forum 2001, iss. 3, (291) 330 - 331.

^[51] Elements of Crimes, International Criminal Court 9 September 2002. 13 VN 34

^[52] Elements of Crimes, International Criminal Court 9 September 2002. 13 - 18

^[53] Elements of Crimes, International Criminal Court 9 September 2002. 13 FN 34

^[54] The possibility of exceptions to article 30 of the Rome Statute is provided by the article’s first clause (“Unless otherwise provided”)

^[55] K. Dörmann, "War crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, with a special focus on the negotiations on the Elements of Crimes" in A. von Bogdandy & R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck yearbook of United Nations law, 7, The Hague, Kluwer International Law, 2003, (341) 362.

^[56] Elements of Crimes, International Criminal Court 9 September 2002. 13

^[57] K. Dörmann, "War crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, with a special focus on the negotiations on the Elements of Crimes" in A. von Bogdandy & R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck yearbook of United Nations law, 7, The Hague, Kluwer International Law, 2003, (341) 362.

^[58] Article 8 §2 (b) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended January 2002), 17 July 1998.

^[59] K. Dörmann, "War crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, with a special focus on the negotiations on the Elements of Crimes" in A. von Bogdandy & R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck yearbook of United Nations law, 7, The Hague, Kluwer International Law, 2003, (341) 344.

^[60] Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the laws and customs of war on land 18 October 1907.

^[61] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.

^[62] Hague Declaration (IV,3) concerning expanding bullets, 29 July 1899.

^[63] Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare, 17 June 1925.

^[64] Article 8 §2 (c) (i) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended January 2002), 17 July 1998.

^[65] Article 8 §2 (c) (iii) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended January 2002), 17 July 1998.

^[66] Article 8 §2 (c) (iv) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended January 2002), 17 July 1998.

^[67] Elements of Crimes, International Criminal Court 9 September 2002. 31 - 34

^[68] K. Dörmann, "War crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, with a special focus on the negotiations on the Elements of Crimes" in A. von Bogdandy & R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck yearbook of United Nations law, 7, The Hague, Kluwer International Law, 2003, (341) 397.

^[69] Article 8 § 2 (d) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended January 2002), 17 July 1998.

^[70] Elements of Crimes, International Criminal Court 9 September 2002. 31 - 34

^[71] Article 8 §2 (e) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended January 2002), 17 July 1998.

^[72] Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977.;K. Dörmann, "War crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, with a special focus on the negotiations on the Elements of Crimes" in A. von Bogdandy & R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck yearbook of United Nations law, 7, The Hague, Kluwer International Law, 2003, (341) 344.

^[73] Elements of Crimes, International Criminal Court 9 September 2002. 34 – 42;K. Dörmann, "War crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, with a special focus on the negotiations on the Elements of Crimes" in A. von Bogdandy & R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck yearbook of United Nations law, 7, The Hague, Kluwer International Law, 2003, (341) 400.

^[74] R. Lemkin, Axis of rule in occupied Europe; Laws of occupation, analysis of governent, proposals for redress, Washington, The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd, 1944, 79.

^[75] International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 4 September 1998, The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda (Judgement and Sentence), para 16.

^[76] Article II Genocide Convention, UN General Assembly 9 December 1948.

^[77] Article 4 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (as amended on 17 May 2002), 25 May 1993.

^[78] Article 2 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (as last amended on 13 October 2006), 8 November 1994.

^[79] Elements of Crimes, International Criminal Court 9 September 2002. 2 - 4

^[80] Article 30 § 1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended January 2002), 17 July 1998.

^[81] International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 21 May 1999, The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana (Trial Judgement), para 91.;P. Akhavan, "The crime of genocide in the ICTR jurisprudence", Journal of International Criminal Justice 2005, (989) 992.

^[82] Article 6 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended January 2002), 17 July 1998..

^[83] International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 27 January 2000, The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema (Judgement and Sentence), para 164.

^[84] Because a legal definition only came into being in 1948, the Nuremberg Tribunal’s jurisdiction was limited. Many crimes that fit the legal definition of genocide were tried as either war crimes or crimes against humanity. As such, no conviction for genocide can be found in the Nuremberg Judgment. Also, the ICTR, in its Kayishema – Judgment, stated quite literally that genocide is “a type of crime against humanity”

^[85] International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 27 January 2000, The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema (Judgement and Sentence), para 164.; See also International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 2 September 1998, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Opinion and Judgment), para 518.

^[86] International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 27 January 2000, The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema (Judgement and Sentence), para 166.

^[87] International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 2 September 1998, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Opinion and Judgment), para 523.

^[88] Elements of Crimes, International Criminal Court 9 September 2002. 2

^[89] K.J. Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, 131.

^[90] Article 9 Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis ("London Agreement"), 8 August 1945.

^[91] Ole Kristian Fauchald & Jo Stigen, "Corporate responsibility before international institutions", The George Washington International Law Review 2009, (1027) 1034 - 1035.

^[92] L. Van Den Herik, "Corporations as future subjects of the International Criminal Court: An exploration of the counterarguments and consequences" in C. Stahn & L. Van Den Herik (ed.), Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, The Hague, Asser Press, 2010, (350) 352.

^[93] UN War Crimes Commission, Law reports of trials of war criminals: Volume X: The I.G. Farben and Krupp Trials, Londen, 1949.

^[94] L. Van Den Herik, "Corporations as future subjects of the International Criminal Court: An exploration of the counterarguments and consequences" in C. Stahn & L. Van Den Herik (ed.), Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, The Hague, Asser Press, 2010, (350) 352.

^[95] UN War Crimes Commission, Law reports of trials of war criminals: Volume X: The I.G. Farben and Krupp Trials, Londen, 1949.

^[96] UN War Crimes Commission, Law reports of trials of war criminals: Volume IX, Londen, 1949, 1 - 59.

^[97] UN War Crimes Commission, Law reports of trials of war criminals: Volume IX, Londen, 1949, 2.;UN War Crimes Commission, Law reports of trials of war criminals: Volume X: The I.G. Farben and Krupp Trials, Londen, 1949, 4 - 5 Count III and 69 - 70.

^[98] UN War Crimes Commission, Law reports of trials of war criminals: Volume IX, Londen, 1949, 2.

^[99] UN War Crimes Commission, Law reports of trials of war criminals: Volume IX, Londen, 1949, 2.;UN War Crimes Commission, Law reports of trials of war criminals: Volume X: The I.G. Farben and Krupp Trials, Londen, 1949, 4 Count II.

^[100] UN War Crimes Commission, Law reports of trials of war criminals: Volume X: The I.G. Farben and Krupp Trials, Londen, 1949, 4 - 5 Count III.

^[101] UN War Crimes Commission, Law reports of trials of war criminals: Volume X: The I.G. Farben and Krupp Trials, Londen, 1949, 3 Count I, 4 Count II and Count III.

^[102] UN War Crimes Commission, Law reports of trials of war criminals: Volume X: The I.G. Farben and Krupp Trials, Londen, 1949, 4 Count II.

^[103] United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 17 September 2010, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell.

^[104] Alien Claims Tort Act, 1789.

^[105] United States Court of Appeals for the seventh circuit 11 July 2011, Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co.

^[106] United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit en banc, Sarei v. Rio Tinto.

^[107] United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia Circuit 8 July 2011, John Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corporation.

^[108] Stephen M. Nickelsburg & Erin Louise Palmer, "Supreme Court To Decide Corporate Liability Under Alien Tort Claims Ac", The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel 2011, (6) 6.

^[109] M. Krauss, Shell Settles ATCA Nigeria Suit, http://www.ratical.org/corporations/OgoniFactS.html (consultatie 28 April 2012).

^[110] Hereinafter referred to as ‘MOSOP’

^[111] B. Manby, Shell in Nigeria: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Ogoni Crisis, unpubl., 5 - 6.

^[112] B. Manby, Shell in Nigeria: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Ogoni Crisis, unpubl., 1.

^[113] C. Bassiouni, International enforcement, 3, Leiden, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2008, 436.

^[114] X, Bowoto v. Chevron Trial Blog http://bowotovchevron.wordpress.com/ (consultatie 23 April 2012).

^[115] N. Beisinghoff, Corporations and Human Rights: An Analysis of ATCA Litigation against Corporations 81, Frankfurt, Gilbert Gornig, 2009, 148 - 149.;J.G. Holt, "The international law exception to the act of State doctrine: Redressing human rights abuses in Papua New Guinea ", Pacific rim Law and policy journal 2007, afl. 2, (459) 463 - 464.

^[116] For more information on these theoretical approaches to corporate complicity, please consult International Commission of Jurists Expert Legal Panel, Corporate Complicity & Legal Accountability: Volume 2: Criminal Law and International Crimes, Geneva, 2008.

^[117] United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 2 October 2009, The Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.; S.J. Kobrin, "Oil and politics: Talisman Energy and Sudan", International law and politics 2004, (425).

^[118] C.C. Abbott, The rise of the business corporation, Edward Brothers Inc., 1936, 15 - 16.

^[119] For authors opposed to this concept, please see C.M. Vazquez, "Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations Under International Law", Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 2005, (927).

^[120] European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, United Nations Treaty Series 4 November 1950.

^[121] Article 1 Protocol 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 20 March 1952.

^[122] M. Emberland, The human rights of companies: Exploring the structure of ECHR protection, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, 2, FN 16 -17.

^[123] Article 1 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, United Nations Treaty Series 4 November 1950.[emphasis added]

^[124] Article 34 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, United Nations Treaty Series 4 November 1950.

^[125] E.g. European Court of Human Rights 24 October 1991, Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom.

^[126] M. Emberland, The human rights of companies: Exploring the structure of ECHR protection, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, 2, FN 20. A. Robertson, Collected Editions of the ‘Travaux Préparatoires’ of the European Convention on Human Rights Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff 1975.

^[127] European Court of Human Rights 24 October 1991, Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom.

^[128] E.g. the Case of Agrotexim and others v. Greece

^[129] M. Emberland, The human rights of companies: Exploring the structure of ECHR protection, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, 2, FN 21.; R. Slye, "Corporations, veils, and international criminal liability", Brooklyn Journal of International Law 2008, afl. 3, (955) 958.

^[130] R. Slye, "Corporations, veils, and international criminal liability", Brooklyn Journal of International Law 2008, afl. 3, (955) 958.

^[131] R. Slye, "Corporations, veils, and international criminal liability", Brooklyn Journal of International Law 2008, afl. 3, (955) 959.

^[132] Preambe Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948.