The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), formerly titled the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership, is a free trade agreement currently being negotiated that could represent the world’s largest multilateral free trade bloc in terms of gross domestic product (GDP). This agreement, if successfully ratified, would establish stronger economic ties between various Pacific Rim countries. Originally signed by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore in 2005, the list of members participating in the TPP negotiations has since grown in size to include Australia, Peru, the United States, and Vietnam in 2008, Malaysia in 2010, and Canada and Mexico in 2012. From 2010, Canada had been an observer of the negotiations but could not participate as it had been blocked by New Zealand and the United States from joining the talks. This was due to its domestic agricultural policies and intellectual property rights standards. In addition to the current negotiating parties, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and South Korea have also expressed interest in joining the discussions. [...]
Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION
2. TWO-LEVEL GAME THEORY
3. LEVEL I: CANADA’S LOBBY OF THE UNITED STATES
4. LEVEL I: RESTRICTIONS ON CANADA
5. LEVEL I: NEW ZEALAND AND THE UNITED STATES
6. LEVEL II: CANADA’S SUPPLY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
7. LEVEL II: CANADA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STANDARDS
8. CONCLUSION: CANADA’S TWO-LEVEL GAME
9. REFERENCES
Research Objectives and Themes
The primary objective of this work is to analyze Canada's entry into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations through the lens of Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory. The research investigates how the Canadian government manages the tension between domestic policy constraints—specifically its agricultural supply management system and intellectual property regulations—and international pressures to secure a foothold in the rapidly growing Asia-Pacific markets.
- Application of two-level game theory to Canadian foreign trade policy.
- The impact of agricultural supply management on international trade negotiations.
- Strategic lobbying and diplomatic engagement with the United States.
- Domestic political challenges regarding copyright legislation and intellectual property.
- Balancing international market access with domestic economic stability.
Excerpt from the Book
TWO-LEVEL GAME THEORY
As described by Robert Putnam (1988), two-level game theory explains that domestic politics and international relations are intimately linked with one another. In international negotiations, such as in trade agreement negotiations, all involved states attempt to create a common framework where each party can mutually benefit from the final ratification. Also known as a win-set, each party attempts to obtain the most attractive aspects of an agreement in terms of each of their national interests while avoiding negative impacts that the agreement could have domestically. This is the two-level game, which a state must play in order to amplify benefits while reducing cost. On Level I, or the international level, leaders and decision makers are influenced by outside factors such as international governments and politics, foreign protectionist measures, foreign negotiators, and all other international influences. On Level II, or the domestic level, leaders and decision makers are influenced by intra-national pressures such as labor unions, domestic lobby groups, and local governments to ensure that the welfare and interests of domestic parties are being met.
According to this theory, Level II will often take precedence over Level I as Level II ultimately holds power over the government and also represents the domestic interests of the various interested parties within a state. Level II, therefore, can restrain a government’s ambition to negotiate or ratify an international agreement as leaders aim to either retain or gain domestic political power. In turn, political actors attempt to create coalitions with supporters and bargain with opponents in an attempt to build support for Level I foreign policy ambitions (Putnum, 1988). Conversely, other states or international organizations push for their interests, which can often be in conflict with a state’s domestic policies or state ambitions. Therefore, the more agreement there is between Level II and Level I on a foreign policy issue, the larger the win-set and so ratification is more likely to occur. It can be argued, however, that a large win-set can also work to a state’s disadvantage as international actors can use a large win-set as a reason to pressure a state into giving greater concessions.
Summary of Chapters
INTRODUCTION: Provides an overview of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Canada's challenging journey toward gaining an invitation to negotiate.
TWO-LEVEL GAME THEORY: Introduces Robert Putnam's framework for understanding how domestic and international politics intertwine during trade negotiations.
LEVEL I: CANADA’S LOBBY OF THE UNITED STATES: Details the diplomatic and economic strategies Canada utilized to convince the U.S. and other members to include them in the TPP talks.
LEVEL I: RESTRICTIONS ON CANADA: Discusses the limitations placed on Canada as a late-joining negotiator and the domestic skepticism regarding these conditions.
LEVEL I: NEW ZEALAND AND THE UNITED STATES: Examines the specific international conflicts regarding Canada's agricultural policy and intellectual property standards.
LEVEL II: CANADA’S SUPPLY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: Analyzes the domestic controversy surrounding Canada's dairy industry and its impact on international trade flexibility.
LEVEL II: CANADA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STANDARDS: Explores the legislative process of Bill C-11 and the internal political struggles regarding U.S.-style copyright laws.
CONCLUSION: CANADA’S TWO-LEVEL GAME: Summarizes the ongoing challenges Canada faces in balancing domestic interests against the demands of international trade ratification.
Keywords
Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP, Two-Level Game Theory, Canada, Foreign Policy, Trade Negotiations, Supply Management, Dairy Industry, Intellectual Property, Copyright Act, Robert Putnam, International Trade, Asia-Pacific Markets, Domestic Politics, Economic Diplomacy.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core focus of this research?
This research examines Canada's entry into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) by applying Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory to illustrate the connection between domestic policy pressures and international negotiating goals.
What are the primary thematic areas covered?
The main themes include Canadian foreign trade strategy, the friction between domestic agricultural supply management and international trade liberalisation, and the influence of intellectual property standards on trade agreements.
What is the primary research goal?
The goal is to analyze how Canadian government leaders balance domestic economic interest groups with the international imperative to gain access to Asia-Pacific markets through the TPP.
Which scientific framework does the author apply?
The author applies Robert Putnam's "two-level game theory," which posits that state leaders must simultaneously negotiate at both a domestic level (to maintain political support) and an international level (to achieve foreign policy outcomes).
What does the main body address?
The main body examines the lobbying efforts toward the U.S., the constraints on Canada as a late entrant to the TPP, and the specific domestic controversies surrounding supply management systems and intellectual property legislation.
Which keywords best describe this study?
Key terms include TPP, Two-Level Game, Canada, Trade Agreements, Supply Management, Intellectual Property, and Foreign Policy.
How does the agricultural supply management system affect Canada's negotiations?
The system creates a "two-level" dilemma: while it protects domestic farmers and maintains economic stability, it acts as a barrier to free trade that causes friction with international partners like New Zealand, potentially limiting Canada's flexibility in trade talks.
Why is the issue of intellectual property rights significant?
The U.S. has pushed for strict intellectual property standards as a condition for trade agreements, creating domestic political controversy in Canada regarding the alignment of domestic laws with aggressive U.S.-style copyright enforcement.
What conclusion does the author reach regarding Canada's strategy?
The author concludes that Canada must either find a way to adjust its domestic policies to accommodate international partners or build stronger domestic coalitions to insulate support for policy changes, highlighting the ongoing political challenge of maintaining a successful trade agreement.
- Quote paper
- Michael Kennedy (Author), 2012, Canada and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/201516
