About two-thirds of the Sierra Leonean population depends on agricultural activities for their livelihood. Agriculture in Sierra Leone is diverse but the highest potential for increasing rural income is attached to cocoa production. Cocoa producers in the Eastern region have an option to sell their cocoa to cooperatives, companies, petty traders, resident and Lebanese buyers. Producer marketing decision is key to breaking a vicious circle of low quality, prices and incentives that hinder overall development in the sector and poverty alleviation. The purpose of this study was therefore to better understand marketing behaviour of cocoa producers in Sierra Leone with the help of New Institutional Economics. In this study, the concept of Power Resources was employed and complemented by a Value Chain Analysis to study factors which influence cocoa marketing decisions. Both qualitative and quantitative research methods were applied. First, qualitative research activities included 20 Focus Group Discussions with farmers in selected communities in the Eastern province. The research team then returned to respective communities to conduct questionnaires with 100 farmers. Considering the twelve Power Resources investigated in greater detail showed that those related to transaction costs, risks, exit possibilities, sanction power and credibility affect marketing decisions the most. The results revealed that farmers are encouraged to sell to cooperatives because of relatively lower transaction costs, risks and credible commitments. It was further found that farmers are discouraged to sell to petty traders and Lebanese buyers amongst others because of the lack of market information, the fear of being cheated and high price risks. Farmers were further found to face comparably high exit costs in transactions with cooperatives, companies and Lebanese buyers because of strong dependency and parallel business relations as well as unavailability of alternative market outlets. Furthermore, it was discovered that farmers are poorly endowed in sanction power and therefore prefer to sell to resident buyers who could be sued to the traditional chiefs in case of transaction problems. Overall, the principal conclusion was that Power Resource endowments in the Sierra Leone cocoa market encourage producers to sell to cooperatives while discouraging farmers to sell to petty traders and Lebanese buyers.
At a glance
- Grade: 1.0 (1.0 is the best grade)
- 20 focus groups involved 359 farmers
- Questionnaire survey covered 100 farmers across three districts
- 79 sources in the bibliography
- 3 figures and 9 tables
Table of Contents
ABSTRACT
LIST OF GRAPHS
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND ON SIERRA LEONE ECONOMY
1.2 COCOA MARKETING IN BRIEF
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION AND OBJECTIVES
1.5 THESIS OVERVIEW
2 THEORIES AND CONCEPTS
2.1 NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
2.1.1 Transaction cost economics
2.1.2 Factors influencing governance forms in nature-related sectors
2.2 MARKETING BEHAVIOUR IN PRACTICE
2.3 POWER RESOURCES
2.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
3.1.1 Value chain framework
3.1.2 Power Resources framework
3.2 SELECTION OF STUDY AREA
3.3 METHODS
3.3.1 Focus Group Discussions
3.3.2 Questionnaire
4 COCOA VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS
4.1 HISTORY OF THE COCOA MARKET
4.2 IMPORTANCE OF COCOA AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL
4.3 KEY ACTIVITIES
4.4 KEY STAKEHOLDER
5 POWER RESOURCES ANALYSIS
5.1 DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS
5.2 TRANSACTION COSTS
5.3 RISKS
5.4 EXIT POSSIBILITIES
5.5 SANCTION POWER
5.6 CREDIBILITY
5.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DISCUSSION
6 CONCLUSIONS
6.1 SUMMARY
6.2 CRITICAL REFLECTION
6.2.1 Theories
6.2.2 Empirical methods
6.3 OUTLOOK
6.3.1 Recommendations
6.3.2 Further research
Objectives and Themes
This thesis seeks to understand how Power Resources affect the marketing decisions of cocoa farmers in Sierra Leone. It combines institutional economic theory, value chain analysis and field research to examine how farmers choose between different buyers.
- New Institutional Economics and agricultural contracting
- Power Resources and bargaining between farmers and buyers
- The history and organisation of the cocoa value chain
- Transaction costs, risks and access to market information
- Exit possibilities, sanction power, trust and credibility
- Cooperatives, companies and different types of cocoa traders
Excerpt from the Book
2.3 Power Resources
Having explained the difficulty of imposing previously used frameworks on the cocoa market study in Sierra Leone, the concept of Power Resource sets base for the conceptual framework of this paper.
It is said that market actors take decisions based on (1) anticipated economic consequences of contracts, (2) the ideology referring to the distribution of benefits amongst actors as well as the (3) the use of bargaining power for transacting parties (KIRSTEN et al. 2009). This is where the theory of Power Resources originates. One can assume that Power Resources which determine bargaining power are especially significant in markets where contracts and property rights depend on bargaining as coordination method (SCHLÜTER 2007). Assuming that actors can use their bargaining power to derive benefits from a transaction, prices paid are the result of power constellations and resources (HARRISS-WHITE 1997). For the thesis at hand, the marketing behaviour of farmers is considered as the result of Power Resource constellations between two bargaining parties. The theory of bargaining helps to understand institutional arrangements as a product of social and political bargaining over property rights that transacting parties can sue to derive benefits from resources (KORF 2003).
Many scholars have used game theories to better understand the negotiation process between actors. Keywords such as ‘prisoner dilemma’ or ‘Nash equilibrium’ are tightly related to game theory and describe situations in which players pursue negotiation strategies to cooperate or decide not to. Self-interest therefore results in opportunistic behaviour at the cost of other players. To put it blunt, game theory shows that a player can use his resource endowments to gain economic benefits. In game theory, power is understood as the capability to “affect someone’s freedom of action. The more powerful actors can change, distort and/or restrict the (perceived) choices available to the other actor (s)” (DI GREGORIO et al. 2008). From that understanding, DI GREGORIO et al. (2008) argue that Power Resources contribute to the ability to influence payoffs of other players.
The concept of Power Resources applied to game theory is explained by the outcome of the game as a function of relative distributions of Power Resources (SCHLÜTER 2007). If individual A has a greater resource endowment and thus bargaining power than individual B, individual A will likely get a higher share of the benefits from the bargaining process (KNIGHT 1992).
When taking marketing decisions, actors do not only need to consider their own Power Resources but also decisions of their trading partners. KNIGHT (1992) names this ‘strategic interdependence’ and comes to the conclusion that to take rational decisions, actors do not only need to anticipate the actions of others but as well be aware about the effect their choice has on other actors’ choices. This contributes to the assumption that the weight of Power Resources is part of a process and only come into effect once actors engage into negotiation.
Chapter Summaries
1 INTRODUCTION: The opening chapter introduces Sierra Leone’s economy and cocoa market, then sets out the research problem, question and objectives.
2 THEORIES AND CONCEPTS: This chapter explains New Institutional Economics, reviews research on marketing behaviour and introduces the Power Resources approach.
3 METHODOLOGY: The author describes the value chain and Power Resources frameworks, selection of study communities, focus group discussions and questionnaire survey.
4 COCOA VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS: This chapter traces the cocoa market’s history and examines household production, processing and the roles of farmers and buyers.
5 POWER RESOURCES ANALYSIS: The empirical analysis explores transaction costs, risks, exit possibilities, sanction power and credibility across different marketing outlets.
6 CONCLUSIONS: The final chapter brings together the findings, reflects on theoretical and empirical limitations, and presents recommendations and questions for further research.
Keywords
cocoa marketing, Sierra Leone, Power Resources, New Institutional Economics, value chain analysis, transaction costs, bargaining power, smallholder farmers, cooperatives, market information, transaction risks, exit possibilities, customary law, credibility
Frequently Asked Questions
What is this thesis about?
It examines how Power Resources influence cocoa farmers’ choices of buyers in Sierra Leone.
What are its central themes?
The thesis addresses institutional arrangements, bargaining, cocoa value chains, transaction costs, risks, buyer relationships and farmers’ access to remedies.
What is the main research question?
The study asks how Power Resources affect the marketing decisions of cocoa farmers in Sierra Leone.
What research methods are used?
The author combines qualitative focus group discussions with a quantitative questionnaire survey and complements the Power Resources framework with value chain analysis.
What does the main analysis cover?
It describes the cocoa value chain and examines how transaction costs, risks, exit possibilities, sanction power and credibility relate to farmers’ marketing choices.
Which keywords characterise the work?
Key terms include cocoa marketing, Sierra Leone, Power Resources, New Institutional Economics, value chains, transaction costs and smallholder farmers.
Which buyers does the study distinguish?
It considers cooperatives, companies, petty traders, resident buyers and Lebanese buyers.
Where did the fieldwork take place?
The research covered selected communities in Kenema, Kailahun and Kono districts in Sierra Leone’s Eastern Province.
How does the thesis examine farmers’ ability to change buyers?
It considers dependencies, other business relationships and the availability of alternative marketing outlets as aspects of exit possibilities.
- Quote paper
- Margitta Minah (Author), 2012, Effects of Power Resources on Producer Marketing Behaviour , Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/206219