For thousands of years, a major issue of moral philosophy has been whether morality is based on reason or sentiment. In ancient Greece, some viewed morality as being a matter of feelings while others believed that goodness was a matter of intelligence. Hume discusses each view in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. However, Hume comes to the conclusion that, “morality is determined by sentiment”.
Table of Contents
1. Hume’s View of Morality Based on Sentiment
1.1 Introduction to the debate between reason and sentiment
1.2 Two main arguments: Amiability and Motivation
1.3 Reason as a determinant of facts versus sentiment as a determinant of virtue
1.4 Distinctions between mistakes in principle and matters of fact
1.5 Analogies of moral beauty and natural beauty
1.6 Comparison between moral agents and inanimate objects
1.7 The role of sentiment in human action and motivation
1.8 Objections to Hume’s theory regarding moral disputes and subjectivity
1.9 The example of Fourli and the standard of judgment
1.10 Conclusion: The necessity of sentiment for moral approbation
Objectives and Topics
This work examines David Hume’s philosophical position that morality is fundamentally rooted in human sentiment rather than pure reason. The primary research goal is to analyze how Hume justifies the claim that moral judgments are derived from emotional responses and to address counterarguments regarding the objectivity and universality of such a sentiment-based ethical framework.
- The distinction between reason as a tool for factual analysis and sentiment as a source of moral valuation.
- Hume’s central arguments regarding amiability and the motivation for moral action.
- The comparison of moral judgments with natural beauty and aesthetic perception.
- The resolution of moral diversity through the lens of established first principles and varying circumstances.
Excerpt from the Book
Hume’s View of Morality Based on Sentiment
For thousands of years, a major issue of moral philosophy has been whether morality is based on reason or sentiment. In ancient Greece, some viewed morality as being a matter of feelings while others believed that goodness was a matter of intelligence. Hume discusses each view in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. However, Hume comes to the conclusion that, “morality is determined by sentiment” (Hume 160).
Hume maintains the view that if moral judgments are derived from reason, they can be right or wrong. However, if they are based on sentiment, there can be no dispute. It other words, one can dispute truth but not taste. Hume supports his view with two main arguments. Hume describes the notion of amiability when he says, “Virtue…belongs to be amiable, and vice odious. This forms their very nature of essence” (Hume 75). Here, he proclaims that morality produces in us certain feelings, like love or hate, which reason alone cannot produce. In other words, it is part of our nature of virtue to produce a sentimental response. Reason alone cannot determine what emotional response in we will have to something, thus reason cannot be the origin of our ideas of virtue and vice. The second main argument is the notion of motivation. Here he proclaims that moral distinctions move us to action. Reason alone can’t give us reason to act. One has to have sentiments of want or aim or desire in order to act. In Appendix I of EPM, Hume give five arguments supporting his two main claims. The first four support the idea of amiability while the final supports the idea of motivation.
Summary of Chapters
1. Hume’s View of Morality Based on Sentiment: This chapter introduces the central thesis that moral judgments are founded on sentiment, contrasting this view with the rationalist perspective. It outlines the foundational arguments regarding the nature of virtue and the motivational power of feelings in human decision-making.
Keywords
David Hume, Moral Philosophy, Sentiment, Reason, Virtue, Vice, Amiability, Motivation, Moral Judgment, Ethics, Subjectivity, Natural Beauty, Moral Disputes, Human Action, Approbation
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the central focus of this work?
The work focuses on David Hume’s argument that human morality is derived from internal sentiments and emotional responses rather than cold, objective reasoning.
What are the primary thematic pillars discussed?
The key themes include the distinction between factual truth and moral taste, the role of motivation in human behavior, the comparison between moral and natural beauty, and the challenges posed by moral subjectivity.
What is the main research question or goal?
The primary goal is to explain and defend Hume’s assertion that morality is determined by sentiment, specifically addressing how this framework accounts for moral diversity and individual circumstances.
Which scientific method is utilized in this paper?
The paper utilizes a philosophical analytical method, involving a close reading and interpretation of David Hume’s "Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals," accompanied by logical critique and illustrative examples.
What does the main body address?
The main body examines Hume's specific arguments for sentiment (amiability and motivation), compares moral action to physical examples like the flow of rivers, and addresses critical counter-objections regarding moral disputes.
Which keywords characterize this publication?
Key terms include Hume, sentiment, reason, virtue, motivation, moral judgment, and moral disputes.
What is the purpose of the "Fourli" example?
The example of the imaginary land of Fourli serves to illustrate how different cultures may have different moral conclusions while still reasoning from the same underlying principles, thus resolving the conflict between morality and cultural diversity.
How does Hume respond to the critique of subjective morality?
Hume argues that while morality is based on sentiment, this does not negate its validity; rather, it suggests that moral judgments are deeply tied to individual circumstances and the nature of human feeling.
- Quote paper
- Matt Segar (Author), 2010, Hume’s View of Morality Based on Sentiment, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/210745
