In the history of art, Ernst Gombrich’s groundbreaking Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation (1960) was influential in arguing against the traditional view of representation of reality in art as imitation. In the philosophy of science, notably Karl Popper and then Thomas Kuhn challenged the concept of progress as the cumulation of factual observations.
This paper wants to approach the larger issue of progress within the framework of Art and Illusion by asking: in how far do concepts of progress as derived from the philosophy of science relate to the notion of arts? More specifically, how did Gombrich challenge the traditional idea of representation as imitation? In following, it will be shown that Gombrich’s methodology and main concepts are greatly indebted to Popper’s theory of falsification. In a second step, Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolution, which opposes Popper’s writings, will be outlined in relation to Gombrich and his ideas of perception and classification.
At a glance
- Compares Gombrich’s account of artistic change with Popper’s and Kuhn’s theories
- 10 sources in the bibliography
Contents
1. Introduction
2. Progress in Art & Science
2.1 “Making Precedes Matching” – Progress through Falsification
2.2 Kuhnian Paradigms & Progress
3. Conclusion
Objectives and Topics
This paper examines how concepts of progress from the philosophy of science relate to art, focusing on how E.H. Gombrich challenged the traditional idea of pictorial representation as imitation. It considers his account alongside Karl Popper’s falsificationism and Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions.
- Gombrich’s psychology of pictorial representation
- Mental sets, schemata, and perception
- Popper’s falsificationism and trial and error
- Kuhn’s paradigms and scientific revolutions
- Continuity and change in artistic traditions
Excerpt from the Book
2.2 Kuhnian Paradigms & Progress
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was published in 1962, two years after Gombrich’s Art and Illusion3. While Gombrich desanctified the ideals of ‘great art’ by outlining its problem-solving activity, Kuhn similarly demonstrated that scientific knowledge was collective and conventional by nature, “driven by ambition and limited by force of habit” (Wood, 2009, p. 837). With The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, however, Kuhn challenges the inductivist and falsificationist view of science on the basis that both do not hold up regarding historical evidence (Chalmers, 1999). Kuhn, as Popper, opposes the synchronic view that scientific progress is not a continuous process of accumulating empirical evidence and content and that there is no objective criterion for truth (Niiniluoto, 2011). However, Kuhn puts forward a definition of progress that differs greatly from Popper’s idea that consecutive theories may advance towards the truth (ibid). Generally, Kuhn explains the notion of progress in terms of scientific revolutions as contingent of its socio-historical and temporal context (Chalmers, 1999).
Hereby the ‘paradigm’ plays a central role: it is a conceptual framework shared by a scientific community, which consists of a general standard of theoretical laws and assumptions that are applied with an accepted form of methodology and instruments (ibid.). Under the rules of this single paradigm, scientists practice ‘normal science’, which allows them to engage in puzzle-solving activity of theoretical and experimental nature4.
Although Kuhn’s ambivalence towards scientific progress makes a coherent picture of ‘Kuhnian progress’ difficult, one can delineate two different kinds of progress in his theory. On the one hand, it may be considered as the capacity of theories to solve ever more puzzles that are generated by the paradigm within a period of normal science. As criticism and severe testing of theory experience a period of relaxation during normal science, working within such a paradigm allows the scientist to engage in detailed work that is necessary to improve the match between paradigm and nature (Kuhn, 1962).
On the other hand, science progresses through paradigm shifts – the replacement of paradigms through scientific revolutions. The latter notion of progress takes place once the existing paradigm loses more and more of its puzzle-solving ability, whereby anomalies begin to pose serious problems to the very fundament of the paradigm. The resulting crisis opens the field for critical debate. An incommensurable rival paradigm will develop out of this, which will view different questions and general standards as legitimate, and also perceive the world differently (ibid.). Once the existing paradigm is abandoned for another one by a scientific community based on conviction, one can speak of a scientific revolution. In this sense, progress is not viewed as continual, but as rare episodes of revolution in science. Whereas for Popper progress is a continual refutation of theories towards the truth – also termed ‘evolutionary epistemology’ – Kuhn suggests a non-cumulative advance of science through ‘selection by conflict’ (Chalmers, 1999; Jones, 2000)5.
Chapter Summaries
1. Introduction: The introduction sets out the question of how philosophical accounts of scientific progress relate to art and introduces Gombrich, Popper, and Kuhn as its principal reference points.
2. Progress in Art & Science: This chapter examines Gombrich’s account of schemata and “making and matching” in relation to Popper’s falsificationism. It then considers Kuhnian paradigms, scientific revolutions, and their relevance to artistic change.
3. Conclusion: The conclusion assesses the relationships between Gombrich’s account and the two philosophies of science, before considering the challenges posed by contemporary art.
Keywords
E.H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion, philosophy of science, artistic progress, scientific progress, pictorial representation, mimesis, mental set, Karl Popper, falsificationism, Thomas Kuhn, paradigm shifts, perception, artistic tradition
Frequently Asked Questions
What is this paper about?
It explores how concepts of progress in the philosophy of science relate to Gombrich’s account of pictorial representation and artistic change.
What are its central topics?
The paper discusses representation, perception, artistic tradition, falsification, scientific paradigms, and competing ideas of progress.
What is the primary research question?
It asks how concepts of progress derived from the philosophy of science relate to art, particularly how Gombrich challenges representation understood as imitation.
What method does the author use?
The author develops a conceptual comparison of Gombrich’s arguments with Popper’s falsificationism and Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions, drawing on published philosophical and art-historical works.
What does the main discussion cover?
It considers Gombrich’s “making and matching” alongside Popper’s trial-and-error model, then compares mental sets with Kuhnian paradigms and changes in perception.
Which keywords characterize the paper?
Key terms include pictorial representation, artistic progress, mental sets, falsificationism, paradigms, perception, and artistic tradition.
How does Gombrich describe the role of schemata in art?
He presents schemata as starting points that shape perception and can be tested and adjusted through a process of making and matching.
How does the paper relate Kuhn’s paradigms to Gombrich’s mental sets?
It compares the way paradigms guide scientific observation with the way mental sets make schemata available to artists, while also examining differences between paradigm shifts and artistic change.
- Arbeit zitieren
- Patrizia Koenig (Autor:in), 2012, Exploring Gombrich’s "Art and Illusion" in Relation to the Philosophy of Science, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/214769
