The demise and survival of utopian communities. A question of commitment?

Index of contents

1 Introduction and Research Question

2 Exploring the field of subject
2.1 Defining “Utopia”
2.2 From Utopia to Communitarianism
2.3 Communitarianism – A Recurrent Social Phenomenon?

3 Demise or Survival? Introducing the theoretical framework
3.1 Community and Commitment
3.2 Problems and Limitations – Implications of Structural Functionalism?

4 Applying the Theory - Commitment-Building in a Canadian commune
4.1 Sointula – A brief history
4.2 Processes of community-building in Sointula

5 Conclusion

6 Appendix: Sample and Methodology

7 Bibliography

1 Introduction and Research Question

“And me, I still believe in paradise. But now at least I know it’s not some place you can look for, cause it’s not where you go. It’s how you feel for a moment in your life when you’re a part of something, and if you find that moment... it lasts forever...” says Leonardo di Caprio at the end of the movie “The Beach”, upon return from a failed utopian island community. This statement, together with the whole movie, expresses a widespread conviction: utopian communities are bound to fail. “Paradise” is nothing that one can realize in an actual community. If anything, it can be realized as a feeling or a state of mind; but why do we think that way? Do we all feel that there is a sociological law that inevitably leads to the demise of a community that tries to realize the ideal society? Is this point of view empirically provable? These were the questions that intrigued me when I decided to make utopian communities my research topic; or, formulated into a single research question: Is there a single, most important feature or process that led to the demise or survival of former utopian communities?

To answer this question, we should first have a brief look at the great field of studies about the various kinds of utopias. This will help us achieve a better understanding and localization of the aspect of utopia we are looking at in this paper (utopian communities). At the same time, it will help us to find a useful definition of the vague and ambiguous term “utopia” and, more specifically, “utopian communities”. Subsequently, we will also have a brief look at the history of those communal experiments. After these prefatory remarks, I will introduce Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s concept of utopian commitment as a conceptual framework for the exploration of the longevity of utopian communities. Kanter’s functional concept is one of the few analytical models in this field. However, its functional approach is not unproblematic. Therefore a brief evaluation of its strengths and weaknesses seems necessary. Finally, I will use Kanter’s concept to analyse the developments of a failed utopian community (the Finnish colony of Sointula), which contrasts with a more successful community (the Shaker sect) and, thus, serves to test the concept’s validity.

2 Exploring the field of subject

2.1 Defining “Utopia”

When we use the word “utopia” or “utopian” in our daily lives, we usually try to criticize something as impossible, impractical or infeasible. For most of us, the word bears a negative connotation. However, at the same time utopian ideas or stories have great and almost irresistible appeal for many of us (shown, for example, by either successful science-fiction novels or movies like “The Beach”). This ambiguity seems strongly related to the origin of the term “utopia”. The title of Thomas More’s famous book Utopia (More, 1989) was a pun: derived both from the Greek terms eutopia (good place) and outopia (no place).

Unfortunately, this ambiguity related into the scientific use of utopia. Many scholars exploring the various fields of utopian ideas and practices (e.g. literature, communal experiments, political theories) did not seem to see a need for a common definition as a basis for their research. However, conceptual clarity depends upon such a definition and prevents inflationary and confusing use of the term: “Many of the problems which beset utopian scholars arise from the absence of a clear definition of utopia which separates its specialist academic use from the meanings current in everyday language” (Levitas, 1990, p. 2). Furthermore, to be able to define the purpose of utopian communities, we first have to be sure about the meaning of utopia.

As Levitas points out, the various existing definitions of utopia relate to three main aspects: content, form and function (Levitas, 1990, pp. 4ff). Some of those definitions combine these aspects, others focus on only one of them. A common way of defining utopia by content would be a focus on the possibility (or impossibility) of a utopia. The problem with such definitions is obvious: it often seems impossible to agree on a content that defines a utopia. While some authors think, for example, that the impossibility of a utopian scenario is its most important aspect, others do not see this feature as clearly indispensable.

Most of the definitions of utopia (especially by authors of the dominant liberal-human tradition), however, are expressed in terms of form. Many authors, influenced by More’s Utopia (More, 1989) see utopia as a literary genre “involving the fictional depiction of an alternative society” (Levitas, 1990, p. 5). Those kinds of definitions normally exclude a large number of phenomena frequently seen as utopias and do not allow for a historical change in the form of utopias. For a historical comparison, therefore, they do not seem very adequate.

Definitions by function, finally, are often associated with the Marxist tradition. With such a definition, the problem of historically changing forms of utopia can be eliminated. Therefore, a much broader range of phenomena can be encompassed. One frequent example for a defining function of utopia is social change – either negative as preventing or positive as encouraging it. However, we can immediately see that the same problem applies here as with the first two definitions: the question of which function is the defining one.

As we can see, the three ways of defining utopia shown above differ considerably in the scope of the included phenomena. A central question seems to be if a narrow or a broad definition of utopia is more helpful. According to Levitas, a broad and analytical definition that avoids both normative and descriptive elements should be given preference (Levitas, 1990, pp. 198ff). This assessment seems rather comprehensive. Although such a definition cannot satisfyingly solve the important problem of the boundaries of the field, it has the virtue of avoiding many other important problems already mentioned above. Therefore, Levitas chooses the following definition: “Utopia is the expression of the desire for a better way of being” (Levitas, 1990, p. 8). As one can see, such a definition allows for changes in form and function and clarifies the common element of many rather different phenomena mentioned above. Its content seems to be quite uncontroversial. Thus Levitas’ definition, at least in comparison to all other existing definitions, seems to be highly useful and workable and is therefore given preference here.

2.2 From Utopia to Communitarianism

By using Levitas’ definition of utopia, the common purpose defining all utopian communities is also made clear. However, a definition only by this purpose would be very broad (ranging from short-lived action groups to durable religious sects). In the literature about utopianism^[1], long-term communal experiments are often referred to as “communitarianism”, described by Goodwin and Taylor as “the desire to establish a closely knit, self-contained, family-like social unit based in a particular locality or territorial region” (Goodwin/Taylor, 1982, p. 181). This desire is created by the longing for a better way of life, and the realization that such a way of life is not possible within the constraints of mainstream-society. Therefore, communitarianism is a strategy for social change that differs fundamentally from revolution (Zablocki, 1980, p. 24). While revolution tries to change society as a whole, communitarianism separates from society and tries to achieve its goals without regard for the rest of society.

Experiments of communitarianism are the focus of this paper and will further be meant when referring to “utopian communities” or “communes”. Despite the common aspects mentioned above, there is still a great variety within these kind of communities (ranging, for example, from highly religious to totally secular groups). To avoid ambiguity I will therefore use Kanter’s description of utopian communities (Kanter, 1972, pp. 2-3) to make the definition complete. From this description, five key features can be distilled:

- Voluntary: Conformity within the community is based on commitment – the individual’s own desire to obey its rules – rather than on force or coercion.
- Self-determined: Members are controlled by their own laws, the entire membership or by the individuals they respect within the community rather than by outside laws, agents or political forces.
- Physical and social boundaries: The community is identifiable as an entity, for it has a physical location and a way of distinguishing between members and non-members.
- Value-based: The community intentionally implements a set of values or ideals (including harmony, brotherhood, mutual support, and value expression), and its primary end is an existence that matches these values.
- Self-centred: The community operates to serve first and foremost its own members; relations among members of the community are more important than are relations to the outside world.

Both examples for utopian communities that we will look at in the end of this paper fully incorporate all of these five criteria.

2.3 Communitarianism – A Recurrent Social Phenomenon?

To be able to allocate the phenomena discussed later in this paper historically, we must now look at most important steps in the development of communitarianism. Zablocki (1980, pp. 29-40) and Poldervaart (2001, pp. 12-14) distinguish various historical periods of increased communitarian movements. We will focus on the six major ones here. Zablocki places the first one around the beginning of the first century, characterized by withdrawal sectarians of Roman Palestine (Jews and Essenes), which did not want to conform to Hellenism as well as Christian communities that favoured solidarity, equality (between rich and poor, men and women), and the sharing of all good communally. The next major period did not occur until the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Then, heretical sects like the Brotherhood of the Free Spirit attacked the hypocrisy and debauche of the clergy and sought to realise the utopia of the first Christian communities again. The third communitarian period during the seventeenth and eighteenth century was characterized by geographical transition. North America became the new centre for communitarian experiments. The earliest communes in America were tentative and short-lived religious experiments of Protestant refugees from Europe. But by the eighteenth century, the communitarian tradition had taken root: the Amish originated in 1727, the Moravians in 1741, and the Shakers in 1774. However, there were no secular communitarian ideologies at this time. The fourth communitarian period in the early and mid nineteenth century, the Utopian Socialist Period, meant a shift in the utopian tradition (Poldervaart, 2001, p. 13). For the first time utopian theories and communities coincided. Utopians such as Fourier in France and Owen in England (who triggered the so-called Owenite and Fourierist movements) rejected the static design of former utopians and no longer strived for equality, but for the possibility for everyone to express their unique qualities. This was the first great period of secular communitarianism. The few long-lived American communes beside the Shakers (New Harmony, Brook Farm, the North American Phalanx, Oneida) were all founded during this period. Socialism also dominated the next communitarian period around the beginning of the twentieth century. Many self-described socialist groups advanced a range of views that strongly resembled those of the first socialists. For the first time, communitarianism became a truly nationwide (and partly urban) social movement in America. The sixth and last communitarian period in the 1960s and 70s was characterized by the back-to-the-land movement and the co-operative communities of the Hippie era. This period also marked the second shift of utopian tradition (Poldervaart, 2001, p. 14): the commune was seen as just one of many alternatives and no longer as an example for the whole world.

After these prefatory but nevertheless important remarks in mind, we can now move on to the next step of our analysis: the theoretical framework for the final empirical examination.

3 Demise or Survival? Introducing the theoretical framework

Studying the literature on utopian communities, one can find numerous problems that seem to be connected to the failure of former communes. To name only the most important ones: the distribution of work; the design of decision-making processes; the level of self-sufficiency and the related level of exchange with the outside world; gender relations; economic conditions and the “scarcity gap”; or simply interpersonal difficulties. But what can a community do to solve these problems successfully? Many writers stress the importance of aspects like leadership, ideology, or solidarity for communal survival. So far, however, few have studied these problems and possible solutions in an analytical, comparative, and comprehensive way. Unfortunately, most of the literature stays more or less descriptive.

Furthermore, there is an even more fundamental problem. When can a commune be called successful? How can the success of utopian communities be objectively measured? The self-evident solution, i.e. to analyse the degree to which the better way of being has been achieved, seems problematic. Many of the sometimes rather broad goals of communes seem to be difficult to operationalise. More importantly, how does one deal with a change of goals in the community? Is this a sign for a failure to attain the original goals or is it a successful adaption to reality? However, the fulfilment of its goals is not the only aspect of a community’s success. Durability also plays a vital role. Fortunately, this indicator can be measured relatively easy and objectively, given some defined vital aspects that clearly indicate the survival or expiration of a commune.

3.1 Community and Commitment

One of the few models to examine the success of utopian communities in an analytical and comparative way was developed by Rosabeth Moss Kanter, who based her findings on a comparative study of thirty nineteenth-century utopian communities (Kanter, 1972). Here, communal success is solely measured by “length of time in existence” (ibid., p. 245). In order to be considered successful, a system has to exist as a utopian community for at least twenty-five years, the sociological definition of a generation^[2]. Only nine of the communes included in Kanter’s study could be classified as successful according to this standard.

What leads to success then? For Kanter (ibid., pp. 63-64) the prior reason for the success of a commune is commitment. Commitment, in sociological terms, means the attachment of the self to the requirements of social relations. “When a person is committed, what he wants to do (through internal feeling) is the same as what he has to do (according to external demands)” (Kanter, p. 66). Kanter^[3] then distinguishes three aspects of a social system that involve the commitment of its members: retention of members, i.e. the willingness of people to stay in the community, support it and carry out roles and duties; group cohesiveness, i.e. the ability of people to develop a collective identity and mutual attraction as well as the strength to withstand external threats; social control, i.e. the ability to govern the community through the command of obedience and respect as well as the conformity of all members to the shared values.

To identify the kinds of individual commitment that support those three kinds of communal commitment, Kanter refers to social action theory: “a person orients himself to a social system instrumentally, affectively, and morally” (ibid., p. 68). Instrumental commitment emerges merely from a rational calculation of rewards and costs involved in the participation in the community; it reinforces the retention of the members. Affective commitment refers to the emotional relations and links between the members of the system; it reinforces group cohesiveness. Moral commitment, finally, arises from the acceptance of the communal norms and beliefs; it reinforces social control. Those kinds of individual commitment are not only a feature of communes but of almost any kind of community. However, while other kinds of communities normally focus on one or two of those aspects^[4], the peculiarity of utopian communities, according to Kanter (ibid., p. 68), lies in the fact that all three aspects are equally important, causally connected, and mutually reinforcing. Consequently, “[g]roups with all three kinds of commitment […] should be more successful in their maintenance than those without it” (ibid., p. 69).

To promote the commitment of its members, a commune usually relies on two broad means: detaching the members from other, unwanted options (that is, mainly, the outside world), and attaching them to the commune. “A person becomes increasingly committed both as more of his own internal satisfaction becomes dependent on the group, and as his chance to make other choices or pursue other options decline” (Kanter, p. 70). Based on the findings in her study, Kanter then identifies six commitment-building processes that can fulfil these two functions. Every kind of individual commitment is related to or, more precisely, promoted by two of these processes, a detaching and an attaching one. Successful utopian communities in Kanter’s study usually showed examples for most of those six processes. (For a better understanding of Kanter’s complex conception, the dependencies of this model are visualized in Chart 1.)

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^[1] In accordance with Levitas’ definition, this phenomenon can be described as “the desire for another way of living together, expressed in theories, fiction or experiments” (Poldervaart, 2001, p. 11).

^[2] The vital indicator here is self-determination, i.e. the central control of all relevant relations among members by a single organization.

^[3] The rest of the section refers to Kanter, pp. 65-74.

^[4] „A business organization may concentrate on solving problems of continuance rather than cohesion […]; a religious organization may stress control” (Kanter, pp. 67-68).