This thesis analyzes 50 central texts from the five neoconservative writers Charles Krauthammer, William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Richard Perle and Norman Podhoretz to portrait their contributions to the public debate about foreign policy after the Cold War. At the heart of the analysis lies the preemptive strike launched on Iraq in March 2003 and its aftermath. All of the authors under research have openly advocated this decision prior to the invasion, one main question for this thesis is therefore how they assessed the actual implementation of the strategy and its consequences. The central Chapter 2 on the assessment of Iraq seeks to answer what they have learned from Iraq. Before I can answer this adequately, it is necessary to analyze their writings prior to 9/11 and then between 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. I will do this in Chapter 1 and thereby answer the question, what broader lessons the authors have learned from history. Knowing the answer is necessary to understand why they proposed a preemptive strike on Iraq and what their intentions were. Chapter 3 then seeks to connect these insights from Chapter 1 and 2 to shed light on the overall lessons that the authors have learned from their experiences since the end of the Cold War and 8 years of foreign policy under president George W. Bush. As a result, we will have an imperfect yet comprehen-sive overview of neoconservative thinking on American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.
There is a host of literature on different aspects of the Iraq war that also frequently raise the question to what extent decisions in the administration were actively influenced or taken by neocon-servatives . However, I could not find an analysis of neoconservative texts before and after Iraq. I therefore claim that there is a mismatch between the acclaimed influence of neoconservativism and the extent to which neoconservative writers’ assessment of the Iraq war has been analyzed. In this thesis, I intend to fill this gap with extensive study of original sources instead of secondary literature.
Table of Contents
Introduction
1. The neoconservative agenda: From the 1990’s through 9/11 to Iraq
1.1. Genesis and components of contemporary neoconservative foreign policy
1.2. From 9/11 to Iraq
2. Assessment of Iraq
2.1 Situation on the ground
2.1.1. Occupying Iraq from 2003 to 2005: Success and praise vs. problems and criticism.
2.1.2. Civil War 2006 and after: From optimism to disappointment
2.1.3. “The Surge” 2007 and after: From criticism to support
2.1.4. Was it right to invade Iraq?
2.2. The question of responsibility
2.2.1. Kagan, Kristol and Perle: “It’s the administration”
2.2.2. Krauthammer and Podhoretz: “It’s the others”
3. Implications for neoconservative foreign policy
3.1. Perle and Podhoretz “retire”
3.2. Kagan and Krauthammer: Neoconservatism 2.0?
Conclusion
Bibliography
Research Objectives and Themes
This thesis investigates how five prominent neoconservative commentators evaluated the implementation and consequences of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. By analyzing their original publications from the post-Cold War era through the George W. Bush administration, the study aims to uncover the specific lessons these writers derived from history and to map their shifting assessments of the war's outcome, security policy, and the role of the U.S. government.
- The influence of neoconservative thought on post-9/11 foreign policy.
- The divergence between neoconservative authors regarding the war's "success" or "failure."
- Differing perspectives on internal and external responsibility for Iraq's post-invasion volatility.
- The evolution of neoconservative strategy, particularly the integration of "democratization" as a primary objective.
- The historical context and perceived lessons of the Cold War and the "Munich Syndrome."
Excerpt from the Book
1.1. Genesis and components of contemporary neoconservative foreign policy
A first complex is the assessment of the US position after the Cold War, its origins and the consequences. Common ground among all authors is that the USA is currently in a position of absolute “strategic and ideological predominance”18. This is no coincidence but a direct result of the collapse of the USSR as the erstwhile rival superpower. The more general lesson is that US power and international security are intertwined and always “the product of self-conscious action by the great powers, and most particularly of the greatest power, which now and for the foreseeable future is the United States”19.
The US should therefore accept its “responsibility”20 and adopt a role of “global leadership”21. This requires that the US not sit back and relax in times of relative stability but use its supremacy to actively secure it in the long run, “not by practicing a foreign policy of live and let live, nor by passively waiting for threats to arise”22: “If America wants stability, it will have to create it”23.
Second, while the assessment of main threats of the future and enemies are rather vague and differ, all authors are afraid of (nuclear) “Weapons of Mass Destruction” (WMD) in the hands of authoritarian regimes. Kagan and Kristol are afraid of possible nuclear missile attacks on US soil or “nuclear intimidation by the Chinese”24. Furthermore, they mention the danger of somewhat incalculable authoritarian “rogue states” like Libya, Iran, Iraq25 or North Korea26. Richard Perle warns that “such outlaw states as Iraq and North Korea and other dangerous states like Iran are aggressively trying to acquire ballistic missiles”27. Krauthammer states that the new main characteristic in international relations is the “emergence of a new strategic environment marked by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”28. Paradoxically, although the US is more powerful than ever, it is now easier to threaten, blackmail or attack it.29 He predicts in late 1990 that “Iraq (unless disarmed by Desert Storm) (…) is the prototype of this new strategic threat, what might be called the ‘Weapon State’”30.
Summary of Chapters
Introduction: This chapter highlights the impact of 9/11 on neoconservative thought and identifies the gap in existing literature regarding the analysis of neoconservative assessments of the Iraq war.
1. The neoconservative agenda: From the 1990’s through 9/11 to Iraq: This chapter describes the core assumptions of the 1990s and examines how authors justified the preemptive strike on Iraq as a response to perceived threats and historical lessons.
2. Assessment of Iraq: This central chapter explores the divergent interpretations of the Iraq war's progress, the surge in troops, and the contentious issue of who is responsible for the perceived successes or failures of the occupation.
3. Implications for neoconservative foreign policy: The final chapter analyzes how the specific experiences of the Bush presidency caused authors to either reinforce or revise their strategic concepts, with particular focus on the role of democratization and future foreign policy direction.
Conclusion: This final section synthesizes the findings, asserting that despite varied criticisms, the authors largely reaffirmed their fundamental neoconservative belief in the necessity of preemptive action and U.S. leadership.
Keywords
Neoconservatism, Iraq War, Foreign Policy, George W. Bush, Democratization, Preemptive Strike, War on Terror, Middle East, Strategic Predominance, Responsibility, Historical Lessons, Rogue States, Weapons of Mass Destruction, The Surge, American Exceptionalism
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this work?
The research examines the writings of five influential neoconservative commentators to understand how they assessed the Iraq War and what historical lessons they drew from their experiences during the George W. Bush administration.
What are the central thematic fields addressed?
Key themes include the justification of preemptive military action, the debate over "nation-building" vs. "quick military victory," the role of the U.S. as a global leader, and the interpretation of historical patterns like the "Munich Syndrome."
What is the main research question?
The core research question is: "What lessons have contemporary neoconservative writers learned from history?"
Which scientific methodology is employed?
The author performs an in-depth, original analysis of primary source texts authored by the five chosen neoconservative commentators, intentionally excluding secondary literature to minimize external bias and preserve the authors' own perspectives.
What does the main body of the work cover?
The main body investigates the neoconservative agenda in the 1990s, the evolving assessment of the situation on the ground in Iraq from 2003 to 2013, the assignment of blame for failures, and the implications of these events for future U.S. foreign policy.
Which keywords define this work?
Key terms include Neoconservatism, Iraq War, Preemptive Strike, War on Terror, Democratization, and U.S. Foreign Policy.
How does the author characterize the disagreement between the chosen commentators?
The author identifies a dichotomy between those who harshly criticized the administration's implementation of the war (Kagan, Kristol, Perle) and those who viewed it as a successful vindication of neoconservative ideals (Krauthammer, Podhoretz).
Does the author conclude that the invasion was viewed as a mistake by these authors?
No, the author finds that none of the subjects questioned the initial decision to invade. Even those critical of the administration's specific execution maintained that the preemptive strike itself was the correct and necessary strategic choice.
What role does the "Surge" of 2007 play in the analysis?
The "Surge" serves as a pivotal point where the authors' positions shifted or hardened, with many critics transitioning to supporters of the strategy, illustrating their adaptability in maintaining the relevance of their broader agenda.
What is the final perspective on neoconservatism after the Iraq War?
The author concludes that despite various critiques, the writers remained committed to their core neoconservative worldview, viewing the Iraq experience not as a failure of their principles, but as a challenge of implementation or an unfortunate clash with domestic and international obstacles.
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- Hannes Schweikardt (Autor:in), 2014, The Implications of Power. What Contemporary Neoconservatives Learned from History, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/270704
