Google gilt als fast Monopolist im Bereich der Suchmaschinen. Diese Seminararbeit betrachtet dabei, ob Google seine Macht ggf. ausnutzt im Wettbewerbsrecht. Dies wird besonders anhand des §102 TFEU analysiert.
“Googeln” is a common verb you can look up in the German encyclopedia Duden nowadays (BI). Google is a very well known player, not only in the market for search engines,
that made it possible throughout the last decade to increase its revenue to nearly 45 billion $ in 2012 (REV). While 14 years ago there were about 10.000 Google searches a day, nowadays this number is reached within one-hundredth of a second (STA). All the information gained is extremely valuable for advertisers that use Google AdWords to place consumer matched advertisement. This is also one of the reasons consumers can enjoy products such as internet searches without any charge and therefore might not notice if a player, such as Google, abuses its dominance since it can’t be done through
excessive pricing.
In the beginning of 2010 eJustice, Ciao and Foundem, three price comparison websites, claimed that Google has been downgrading their websites in the search results (Brian 2013). All three are so-called vertical search engines, which deal with specific content, such as flights/hotels “[…] rather than dealing with general search requests.” (Van Loon 2012, p. 16). As a result, the EU announced the opening of an antitrust investigation
against the search engine pioneer in November 2010. Here the EU will examine whether Google might violate the European competition law (§102, TFEU, 2007); the abuse of a dominant position. Just one month ago, Joaquín Almunia, the EUs competition commissioner rejected Google’s second offer to settle the investigation (FT). If the accusations
prove to be correct the firm might face fines up to 5 billion $ (Brian 2013). It is going to be especially interesting to find out the importance of Google’s first of a kind advantage, as it was the first search engine to introduce the so-called ‘Page Rank’ algorithm, which increased the search results accurateness.
Nonetheless, according to §102 TFEU, there are two conditions that a have to be analyzed before: The relevant market and the existence of a dominant position. Therefore I am going to present the economic theory and methods which are relevant and then apply these to Google. After that I will examine whether Google is abusing its dominant position in order to draw an answer to the question.[...]
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- Relevant Market
- Theory
- Dominance
- Theory
- Abuse of dominance
- Conclusion
Objectives and Key Themes
This paper aims to analyze whether Google abuses its dominant position in the search engine market. It examines the economic theory of market definition and dominance, applying these concepts to Google's practices. The investigation focuses on the EU's antitrust investigation against Google, triggered by complaints from price comparison websites.
- Market definition and the application of the SSNIP test.
- Determining Google's dominant position in the search engine market.
- Analysis of Google's business practices in relation to competition law.
- The role of Google's "PageRank" algorithm and its competitive advantage.
- The implications of potential antitrust violations and associated penalties.
Chapter Summaries
Introduction: This chapter introduces the topic by highlighting Google's significant market presence and the controversy surrounding its practices. It sets the stage for the analysis by mentioning the complaints filed by price comparison websites and the subsequent EU antitrust investigation. The chapter emphasizes the importance of examining the relevant market and Google's dominant position before assessing whether any abuse has occurred, framing the core questions of the paper. The speed and reach of Google's search engine, and its value to advertisers, are used to showcase the potential for abuse despite Google not charging users for its service.
Relevant Market: This chapter delves into the theoretical framework for defining a relevant market, focusing on the product and geographical markets. It introduces the demand-side substitution method and the SSNIP (Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price) test. The SSNIP test is explained in detail, describing the process of identifying substitute products and expanding the market definition until a hypothetical monopolist would find a price increase profitable. The chapter also discusses the geographical market, emphasizing the importance of homogeneous competition conditions and accessibility considerations.
Keywords
Google, search engine market, dominant position, antitrust, competition law, SSNIP test, demand-side substitution, relevant market, abuse of dominance, European Union, price comparison websites, PageRank algorithm.
Frequently Asked Questions: Analysis of Google's Dominance
What is the main topic of this paper?
This paper analyzes whether Google abuses its dominant position in the search engine market. It examines this issue through the lens of economic theory and competition law, focusing specifically on the EU's antitrust investigation prompted by complaints from price comparison websites.
What are the key themes explored in the paper?
Key themes include market definition using the SSNIP test, determining Google's dominant market position, analyzing Google's business practices in relation to competition law, the role of Google's PageRank algorithm, and the implications of potential antitrust violations.
What is the structure of the paper?
The paper is structured into several chapters: an introduction setting the context and framing the core questions; a chapter defining the relevant market using economic theory (including the SSNIP test); a chapter on Google's dominance; a chapter on the abuse of dominance; and a concluding chapter. The document also provides a table of contents, objectives and key themes, chapter summaries, and keywords.
What methodologies are used in the analysis?
The analysis utilizes economic theory, specifically focusing on market definition using the demand-side substitution method and the SSNIP (Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price) test. It applies these theoretical frameworks to Google's practices and the EU's antitrust investigation.
What specific aspects of Google's practices are examined?
The paper examines Google's business practices in relation to competition law. The role of Google's PageRank algorithm and its competitive advantage are analyzed, along with the implications of potential antitrust violations and associated penalties. The speed and reach of Google's search engine and its value to advertisers are highlighted as potential sources of abuse despite not charging users for its service.
What is the significance of the EU antitrust investigation?
The EU's antitrust investigation, triggered by complaints from price comparison websites, serves as a central case study for the paper's analysis. It provides a real-world context for applying economic theories of market dominance and abuse of dominance.
What are the key findings or conclusions (as previewed in the document)?
The preview does not explicitly state conclusions but sets the stage for an analysis of whether Google abuses its dominant position, using the EU antitrust investigation as a primary lens. The findings would presumably address the questions posed in the introduction and the objectives stated.
What keywords are associated with this paper?
Keywords include: Google, search engine market, dominant position, antitrust, competition law, SSNIP test, demand-side substitution, relevant market, abuse of dominance, European Union, price comparison websites, PageRank algorithm.
- Quote paper
- Mark Notkin (Author), 2014, Does Google abuse its dominant position in the search engine market?, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/272141
