The purpose of this research is to analyze and assess the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the subsequent insurgency that followed. The latter was a direct result of the Coalition’s inability to come to terms with the various complexities of the country. This paper will look into the Iraq war’s transformation from a conventional invasion, into an anti-occupation insurgency, as well as the Coalition’s progress with dealing with the insurgency from its outbreak in 2003 to the most recent developments in early 2008.
I had chosen this particular topic because being a Maltese-American, anything that either country does in its foreign policy is of direct interest to me – not only as a student of International Relations, but also as a citizen. The issue of Iraq has long been on the front pages of newspapers, and the top stories on the news on television.
No matter what medium of the media you access, news about the situation Iraq is everywhere. I do not believe that one should simply sit back and watch the issues unfold with just as a means to pass the time, or worse, criticize without an ample knowledge of the facts. Rather, we should analyze and interpret the events that have occurred in Iraq and try to remedy the situation by evaluating every possible option to achieve stability in the country.
The term ‘fighting the flea’ derives from a book written by Robert Taber, an investigative journalist, after witnessing first-hand Fidel Castro and his revolutionaries wage a successful insurgency against the Batista government in the mid-1950’s and effectively take over the country.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Chapter 1: Operation Iraqi Freedom
Chapter 2: Eye of the Storm
Chapter 3: The Insurgency Erupts
Chapter 4: A Fractured Society
Chapter 5: New strategy, better results
Conclusion
Appendix A: Map of Iraq
Appendix B: Provincial map of Iraq
Appendix C: Interview with A, U.S. Army.
Appendix D: Interview with B, U.S. Marine Corps.
Appendix E: Iraq’s effects on the U.S. military survey.
Research Objectives and Themes
This research aims to analyze the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the subsequent insurgency, examining how the Coalition’s failure to grasp the country's complexities led to an anti-occupation struggle, while assessing progress through early 2008.
- The transformation of the Iraq war from a conventional invasion into an anti-occupation insurgency.
- The impact of Coalition political and military decisions on the emergence and growth of the insurgency.
- The influence of sectarian divisions (Sunni-Shi’a) on the escalating instability and violence.
- The effectiveness of the 2007 troop "surge" and the implementation of classic counterinsurgency strategies under General David Petraeus.
Extract from the Book
Chapter 1: Operation Iraqi Freedom
Operation Iraqi Freedom was by all means a conventional attack by one group of conventional military units against another – in this case the U.S. and its allies in the Coalition launching offensive operations against Saddam’s military component. As a military operation, it was a combination of advanced military technology, blitzkrieg military maneuvers, and the decimation of Iraqi military hardware and command and control structures (if possible) long before U.S. ground forces ever encountered the enemy, in order to facilitate their rapid capture of Baghdad. Major Isaiah Wilson, an official military historian on the ground with U.S. forces at the time had then remarked in the following way:
It was a war focused operationally on the destruction of the Iraqi army – the state’s war fighting capability...In this sense… it was effectively ‘a continuation’ of the 1991 war.
Nearly a year before the invasion, it became known to the U.S. intelligence community that Saddam Hussein had begun to fortify the major Iraqi cities in preparation for the war that he believed was imminent. Anti-aircraft positions were erected on multi-storied buildings and government offices alike, dirt and sand berms were built as positions to hold back U.S. forces, and iron rods and barbed wire were placed in and around Baghdad in order to thwart any possible U.S. paratrooper drop into the capital. Saddam had already explained to regional governors and military commanders that he planned to besiege U.S. forces in urban areas in order to negate the U.S. technological advantage (namely air power and surveillance) and even the odds.
Summary of Chapters
Introduction: Provides the research purpose, focusing on the transition from a conventional invasion to an insurgency and the rationale for the study.
Chapter 1: Operation Iraqi Freedom: Analyzes the conventional military phase of the 2003 invasion and Saddam Hussein's pre-war preparations for a follow-up insurgency.
Chapter 2: Eye of the Storm: Discusses the immediate post-invasion period, characterized by chaos, looting, and a power vacuum resulting from inadequate Coalition planning.
Chapter 3: The Insurgency Erupts: Examines how early Coalition decisions, such as de-Ba'athification and the dissolution of the Iraqi army, fueled the rise of the insurgency.
Chapter 4: A Fractured Society: Explores the historical and demographic roots of the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian divide and how it exacerbated the conflict.
Chapter 5: New strategy, better results: Details the 2007 troop surge, the shift to classic counterinsurgency tactics under General Petraeus, and the role of Sunni self-defense forces.
Conclusion: Synthesizes the findings, emphasizing the importance of political reconciliation and the long-term necessity of a stable government for Iraq's future.
Keywords
Iraq War, Insurgency, Coalition, Counterinsurgency, Sunni, Shi’a, Sectarian Violence, Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. Military, General David Petraeus, Ba’athist Regime, Reconstruction, Democracy, Stability, Reconciliation.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this dissertation?
The work examines the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the transformation of the military conflict into an intense, multi-faceted insurgency against the Coalition occupation forces.
What are the central themes discussed in the book?
Key themes include the Coalition's lack of post-combat planning, the impact of sectarian tensions, the strategic mistakes during the early occupation, and the shift in tactics during the 2007 "surge".
What is the main research objective?
The objective is to assess the progress of the Coalition in dealing with the insurgency from its inception in 2003 through early 2008, specifically analyzing whether military strategy effectively addresses the country's complexities.
Which methodology does the author employ?
The author utilizes a comprehensive analysis of scholarly works, period literature, and unique primary data obtained through interviews with U.S. military personnel serving in Iraq.
What is covered in the main body of the text?
The text analyzes the conventional invasion, the failure to secure the post-invasion environment, the impact of de-Ba'athification, the sectarian civil war, and the strategic pivot to classical counterinsurgency.
Which keywords best characterize this analysis?
The analysis is centered on terms such as Counterinsurgency, Sectarianism, Coalition, Stability, and Nation-building.
How did early Coalition policies influence the insurgency?
The book argues that policies like the dissolution of the Iraqi army and the De-baathification order marginalized professional elites and former soldiers, directly driving them into the ranks of the insurgency.
What significance does the author attribute to the Sunni-Shi'a divide?
The divide is portrayed as a fundamental cause of instability; the empowerment of the Shi'a majority caused the Sunni minority to feel dispossessed, leading to radicalization and violent resistance against the new power structure.
- Quote paper
- Matthew Bugeja (Author), 2008, Fighting the Flea. The Iraqi Insurgency, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/274353
