Excerpt
Contents
1. Introduction
1.1 The Movie Glory as Inspiration
1.2 Composition of My Thesis
2. The Debate about Freeing and Arming Slaves
2.1 President Lincoln and the Republican Party
2.2 The Split of the Democratic Party
2.3 The Role of Fugitive Slaves
3. The Rocky Road over Emancipation to the First Black Regiments
3.1 The Arrival of the Fugitives
3.2 The Slavery Element – The Struggle with the Border States
3.2.1 Gradual Compensated Emancipation
3.2.2 The Emancipation Proclamation
3.3 The First Black Regiments
3.3.1 Prejudices against Black Regiments
3.3.2 The New York Draft Riots
4. A New Definition of Race and Nation
4.1 Three Ideas of Liberty
4.2 The Black Soldiers’ Fight for a New Nation
4.2.1 The Black Recruiter Frederick Douglass
4.2.2 Motives of Black Soldiers – Voices For and Against
4.2.3 Fifty-Fourth of Massachusetts and Assault on Fort Wagner
4.2.4 The Dispute over Equal Pay
4.3 The Transforming Potential of the War
5. Conclusion and Outlook
6. Works Cited
1. Introductions
1.1 The Movie Glory as Inspiration
Receiving huge credit among audiences and historians, director Edward Zwick, producer Freddy Field and screenwriter Kevin Jarre presented their war movie Glory in 1989 which recounts the story of the black soldiers of the Fifty-Fourth Massachusetts Infantry, the most famous black regiment, and their relation to the American Civil War.[1]
Zwick consulted thousands of reenactors who were members of living-history groups and historically knowledgeable about this war, in order to make the movie as realistic as possible.[2] Nevertheless, mistakes and lacks occur in Glory; for instance, it suggests that most of the Fifty-Fourth were former slaves, but the regiment was recruited in the North where most of these black soldiers had always been free. Zwick also decided not to include the two prominent sons of Frederick Douglass, probably the most influential black orator of the time, but let the Fifty-Fourth remain a crowd of nameless fictional blacks instead. Such historical figures could have told the story and the viewpoint of Northern blacks toward slavery and the war, finds the historian James M. McPherson, but Zwick chose another narrative: the focus is not on the Fifty-Fourth specifically but on former slaves fighting as soldiers for their freedom in the Civil War in general.[3] The director chose the story of the most famous black regiment to tell the story of all black soldiers and their motives. The movie Glory is a narrative itself and shows one perspective in a specific historical moment, which is in this case the difficult path to the first black regiment and the recognition of black soldiers in the army. On behalf of cinematic art, Glory invents fictional scenes to deliver a specific message.
Watching Glory raised the following questions for me: Why did the North call for black soldiers? Why did it take until 1863 before the first black regiment was officially created? First and foremost, why were blacks so eager to enlist and to fight for a nation in which they did not have a stand? What were they expecting from fighting as soldiers in the war? The movie does not explain further the impact of the Fifty-Fourth’s attack on Fort Wagner on Northern opinion about the status of blacks, nor does it give any information about the political context of black enlistment. I was therefore curious to investigate the political background in this thesis and wanted to explore the history behind the movie.
1.2 Composition of My Thesis
The central questions of my thesis are: Why did American policy delay black emancipation and official enlistment until 1863, and what were the blacks’ motives for enlisting at all?
First I will investigate the political background, starting with introducing the three main parties in the emancipation debate, and continuing with the political steps toward official enlistment and the reactions of society to these developments. Secondly, I will focus on the black soldiers’ motives, including influences that had shaped them and obstacles which prevented emancipation in practice, and finally I will explore the war’s results for the black population. Throughout the whole analysis, the thesis focuses only on black soldiers and not on black participation in the war in general.
In answering my two-part question, I will quote key scenes of the movie Glory. Even though it is not expected that the movie conveys an accurate and historically verified picture of the Fifty-Fourth Massachusetts, it gives a possible perspective of the blacks toward the war and will therefore be taken into consideration. The following topics from Glory will be included and interpretations will be provided: Redville Training Camp of the Fifty-Fourth; the quartermaster’s refusal to provide Shaw’s regiment with proper shoes; the punishment of Private Trip because of his absence without official leave; the Fifty-Fourth’s collective refusal to receive inferior pay; the private encounter of Colonel Shaw and Private Trip; and the religious meeting before the assault on Fort Wagner. Furthermore, I would like to make it plain that I will focus neither on the cinematic depiction of these scenes nor on the movie itself as a whole. Questions such as “what story does the movie try to tell,” “how does it convince its observers,” “does it provide nineteenth century authenticity,” and “how does it depict the development of the protagonist” will not be addressed in the thesis. Instead, I will treat the movie as a narrative of the black soldiers.
As one of the first movies about the Civil War, Glory shows the perspective of black soldiers and differs in great measure from other Civil War narratives about blacks because its focus is not on emancipation but on identity. Robert Burgoyne, professor of film studies, specifies this topic with identity from above, which is the identification with the nation-state, and identity from below, which is concerned with racial and ethnic identity. According to Burgoyne, the desire and recognition of death, which are most elementary concerns, would define those forms of identity in the following way. The construction of identity needs, on the one hand, the desire for affiliation, recognition, and visibility and, on the other hand, the recognition of death, being willing to kill and die for this identity. This thesis wants to explore, especially in its second part, what exactly was this identity the soldiers were fighting for and why was it so strong that it made them die for it. Burgoyne also figures out “identity from across,” which describes the “nonsymmetrical relationship between white identity and black identity.”[4] The movie constantly shows the tension between these two parties because every side is feeling only fear and hatred for the other, which was one almost insuperable barrier on the way to racial equality.
The correct designation of Americans of African descent has changed drastically over the centuries and has always been subject to discussions. It should be noted that in times of the Civil War, it was common that people of African descent were called Negro, wherefore this word will occur in quotations which are taken from nineteenth century texts. However, when I am referring to this group of people, I will use the terms African Americans and blacks interchangeably.
2. The Debate about Freeing and Arming Slaves
The insurrection, as the president used to call the Civil War in the beginning, lasted unexpectedly for several years, and politicians as well as society had to face the fact that they had to tackle more serious problems than initially thought in the beginning of the war on April 12, 1861, after the attack on Fort Sumter. Possibly the most fundamental problem was the issue of slavery.
The Union army’s suffered a crushing defeat in the Seven Days Battle from June 26 to July 1 in 1862 near Richmond, Virginia, which marked a turning point in the Union’s war policy. The fact that the Union army under the command of George B. McClellan succumbed to the Confederate forces led by Robert E. Lee seemed to have sealed the Union army’s fate. Despite this huge setback, Lincoln did not falter and called for 300,000 new recruits. In order to avoid panic in the wake of the Seven Days Battle, he backdated the document to June 28 and he did not reveal that the Union needed soldiers because they were going to be overrun by the Confederate forces, but “to bring this unnecessary and injurious civil war to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion.”[5] Lincoln wanted to give the impression that the Union army was in the ascendancy over the rebels and that additional recruits were required only to speed up the process. However, casualty lists had spread fear and insecurity among the young male population and the 300,000 recruits who were needed came forward slowly.[6]
The census of 1860 revealed that the United States had a population of almost 31.4 million inhabitants, including approximately four million slaves living in slave states, and almost 500,000 free blacks living half and half in free states and slave states.[7] War weariness among the population and the menacing danger of defeat finally demanded a decision about freeing and arming those four million slaves in order to extend the Union troops and to prevent the slaves defecting to the rebel troops. This precarious issue not only drove a wedge between Republicans and Democrats but also divided the political parties themselves. This chapter will describe the different parties in the debate about freeing and arming slaves, including their different views on slavery and black emancipation.
2.1 President Lincoln and the Republican Party
Abolishing slavery was a difficult task to undertake because the institution of slavery and therefore the right of property in slaves were protected by the American Constitution. Neither President Lincoln nor the government were able to interfere easily with slavery, and since it was deeply rooted in great parts of white American society, nobody seemed willing to change old ideals in the first months of the war. Before his election in 1860, Lincoln had declared himself that he had “no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.”[8] This clearly shows that Lincoln had not planned to abolish slavery and he then, in times of war, still believed he could find the key to end this insurrection some other way. He spoke out in favor of the Constitution, which at the same time meant being in favor of slavery as well.
Not all members of the Republican Party followed Lincoln unconditionally, but three different factions over the question of slavery and black enlistment emerged within the Republican Party. The radical faction believed that “emancipation could be achieved by exercise of belligerent power to confiscate enemy property [slaves],” and the conservative faction believed in an “ultimate demise of bondage … by the voluntary action of slave states.”[9] Lincoln and his party supporters represented the moderate faction. “My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery,”[10] Lincoln emphasized in a letter replying to abolitionists’ accusations published in the New York Tribune. Although Lincoln’s faction supported the radicals’ moral aversion to slavery, they feared the racial consequences of emancipation.[11]
It was known that four million slaves could not be neutral, and sooner or later they would argue in favor of either the North or the South. The Republican administration respected the shield which was thrown over the institution of slavery, although “it was known that the rebels were directly and indirectly employing their slaves in the war against the Government,” as Gideon Welles, Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy, admitted in the aftermath in 1872.[12] The federal government did not dare to touch topics which conflicted with the Constitution, even though the anti-slavery feeling in society increased steadily in the face of an impending incessant national conflict. Instead, the government constantly refused to seize control from local governments in states where slavery had always existed. Welles called this approach a “policy of non-action and of strict construction” and he interpreted it as “the basis of disaffection and civil war.”[13]
Slowly it dawned on the Republicans that the fate of the nation could not be separated from the fate of slavery, but Lincoln’s timid proposal of emancipation earned great rejection among the population. An Ohio editor expressed discontent with the Republicans’ sentiment toward a war to free the slaves as follows: “a large majority ... can see no reason why they should be shot for the benefit of niggers and Abolitionists.” If “the despot Lincoln” still tried to forcefully compel abolition, “he would meet with the fate he deserves: hung, shot, or burned.”[14] The vague political course and insufficient steps were crucial reasons for the current war weariness and doubt in the administration therewith, that in one and a half years of the war, Republicans had not achieved any notable progress and people were, therefore, longing for a change.[15] After the setback in the Seven Days Battle, when the war began to turn into a total war, the Northern Democratic Party protested heavily against the Republican war aims because they absolutely disliked this transformation. In their eyes, the Republicans’ only war aim was now “to destroy the old South instead of to restore the old Union.”[16] Republicans had a simple answer to that: arrest for those who opposed Republican war aims, which meant that they were opposing the war itself.
2.2 The Split of the Democratic Party
The Democratic Party split over the question of how to end the war. While radical War Democrats switched mainly to the Republican Party, the larger part of the Democrats became an antiwar party, calling themselves Peace Democrats or Copperheads, who believed in a reunion through negotiations rather than victory. The term “copperhead,” the name of a venomous snake, had been invented by Republicans in the first place to insult antiwar Democrats. Although meant as an insult, Peace Democrats proudly accepted this term and identified themselves with it.[17]
Nevertheless, the two factions of the Democrats agreed on one point: opposition to emancipation. The issue of emancipation was raised in a time when a racist view of the world was the norm; the Peace Democrats clearly shared that position and “supported slavery, believing it to be the best situation for a degraded race.”[18] They perceived African Americans as inferior and the Southerners to have fallen victim to abolitionists. They therefore strictly opposed Lincoln’s plans of emancipation because they feared that the president would act beyond his constitutional powers, and they spread scary visions of what the freedmen would do to Northern workers, their wives and daughters. “Free the blacks and enslave the whites” was not their only slogan; they also extended Lincoln’s slogan: “the Constitution as it is, the Union as it was, and the Niggers where they are.”[19]
Peace Democrats were willing to trade victory for peace but apparently they seemed unable to provide a realistic solution of how that state of peace could be achieved. Moreover, they persistently remained deaf to the South’s wish of being independent, but rather planned an amendment to protect slavery in the South forever.[20] Considering that they provided no constructive contribution to the debate, their “refusal to deal with the complexity of the war and of governance nearly consigns their ideas to the realm of fantasy,”[21] as stated by Jennifer Weber in her research report about the Copperheads’ political course. Although the Copperheads must be seen as a strong opposition to Lincoln’s course of politics, they never were in the position to take the tiller, or as Weber puts it in appropriate words, “locked into their own worldview, certain of their rectitude, they failed to appreciate that they did not control their own destiny.”[22] The black orator Frederick Douglass also accused the Democratic Party of not having a clear course but being for and against every issue at the same time.[23]
During secession, many of the Peace Democrats who opposed the war did not simultaneously support the rebels. They rather thought that secession was legal because the constitution did not forbid it. As in the summer of 1862 and the beginning of 1863 the Union armies had to bear military setbacks, with many people joining the Peace Democrats because they longed for peace and were tired of the war. All in all, it can be said that the power of the Peace Democrats ran in inverse relation to the successes of the army: if it went well for Union forces, Copperheads found no moral support, and vice versa. Although many Northerners considered the Peace Democrats as traitors to the Union cause, historians have to admit that the majority of them had always stayed loyal to the Union because their core issue was that the nation returns to status quo ante bellum.[24]
In view of their intentions and their actions, or even non-actions, I conclude that Peace Democrats ignored the social changes completely and remained deaf to the up-roaring voices of society which increasingly cried for freeing the slaves. Bearing in mind that the Copperheads insisted on negotiations rather than a military takeover, it seems ignorant to block the basis of negotiations with the South by this refusal. Moreover, in a way they intended to keep the South under control, completely ignoring Southern society’s wish of being independent but rather keeping on making the rules for them. In short, the Peace Democrats’ answer to the war was radical oppression of the South.
2.3 The Role of Fugitive Slaves
While politicians seemed to get wrapped up in discussions and theories about the slavery issue, the part of the population in question decided that it was time for action and entry into the debate. Thousands of slaves escaped from their masters and entered the Union lines as fugitives because they saw the Union’s war against the South as a war against their masters. In the beginning they were returned to their masters because this had been the usual procedure heretofore. However, times had changed and since the North was now at war with the South, this method was slowly thrown into doubt.
In returning fugitive slaves to their masters in the South, the Union was actively supporting their enemy who was attacking the Constitution and the federal government. McPherson points out that this might have weighed heavily upon black people’s trust in the federal government and may have driven them into the arms of the Southerners, because they would now fight for the South in hope that their masters would do what the Union had failed to do: set them free in the end.[25] With this approach the Union risked losing a huge quantity of men who could be potential soldiers.
The rebels had abjured their allegiance, refused to accept the Republican government and, as a consequence, affirmed that they were no longer citizens of the United States. According to Welles, Secretary of the Navy, the status of the rebels was called into question and a discussion emerged about what rights Confederates had to appeal to the Constitution and to make a demand on returning fled slaves to them, which meant in fact, returning the slaves to their rebel government. Welles was sure that the escape of the slaves expressed not only their running for shelter but, first and foremost, their allegiance to the flag, and the Union should therefore not send away those stalwarts.[26] The illogic of the Confederates’ idea of seceding from the Union on the one hand, but referring to the Union’s constitution on the other hand, soon triggered a debate in the North about how to deal with fugitive slaves.
As discussed earlier, politically diverse voices took part in this debate. The conservative voice said the president must return the slaves to the slave-owners; the radical voice said it was the president’s duty to rob the slaves. Lincoln, being in the middle of the conflict, intended most of all to obey the law.[27] One the one hand, returning the slaves to the South could be considered as a step toward the rebels, which asserted that the North still wanted to support Southern society and clarified that they had no interest in boycotting the South. On the other hand, robbing the slaves and using them for their own war aims would be a clear signal of demonstrating power and the indefeasibility of the federal government. At the same time, the Union would also send a clear signal that they considered restructuring the ideals of Southern society.
After the government had declared that returning fugitives to their ex-masters would be renounced in the future, the problem was far from being solved because the political course was not indisputably set yet. Fugitives from the four non-seceding slave states Missouri, Delaware, Maryland, and Kentucky were still returned because their masters had a right to appeal to the Constitution, which protected the institution of slavery. This discordance about the issue was mirrored in the Union officers’ arbitrary acts, because some of them were convinced that fugitive slaves must be excluded from the Union lines and others welcomed slaves and proclaimed their freedom. This clearly shows that the decision of not returning fugitives to the South did not mean the Union had abolished slavery itself and so “the country was not fully to pronounce freedom to all slaves.”[28] Another indicator of this confusion is General Hunter’s proclamation on May 9, 1862, in which he said that the states Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina had been put under martial law because they had seceded from the United States. Furthermore, Hunter confirmed that “slavery and martial law in a free country are altogether incompatible” and slaves “are therefore declared forever free.”[29] Lincoln annulled this proclamation promptly with the reasoning that no person had been authorized to make such a proclamation, and that if such a proclamation were necessary, he as Commander in Chief for the Army and Navy would make that decision himself, not the officers on the field.[30]
These interpretations and misinterpretations of the government’s political course about how to deal with fugitive slaves show the complexity of the slavery issue, which must be addressed with great sensitivity since it is rooted so deeply in American society. Nevertheless, the wind of change had reached the United States. The following chapter will show the change in the institution of slavery, with the focus on the enlistment of black regiments.
3. The Rocky Road over Emancipation to the First Black Regiments
3.1 Arrival of the Fugitives
Union officers seemed to be overwhelmed by the circumstances caused by the war, on the one hand, and ambiguous political instructions on the other. However, the fugitive slaves were now present, either because political law allowed them to come and stay or because they had come of their own initiative and officers had to deal with the situation – although a new article of war issued in July 1862 not only forbade the returning of fugitive slaves who were seeking refuge and freedom but also stated that fugitive slaves were “deemed captives of war, and shall be forever free of their servitude and not again held as slaves.”[31] Although officers might obey the first section, they did not bother to enable fugitives to live in more humane conditions than slavery. Union General Thomas described for the New York Times a freedmen camp which he had visited near Cairo, Illinois. He had been shattered “seeing these black people huddled together, abused and neglected by those who had been in charge of them.” In this one camp alone, 2,500 blacks had died from “measles, pneumonia and small-pox” due to the disastrous sanitary situation Thomas observed and in which the fugitives were “dying like sheep.” As a consequence, many fugitives had already returned to the rebels, preferring slavery over this even more degrading and inhuman treatment through the Union army.[32]
George Luther Stearns, a later recruiter of black soldiers, to mention another example, also observed terrible treatment in a freedmen camp near Nashville, Tennessee, where hundreds of fugitives had found shelter with General William Rosecrans’s army. But when Stearns reported the inhumane conditions to Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, he did not receive any positive answer. Instead he got active himself and tried to convince Tennesseans “to support a policy of humane treatment, prompt payment, education, and enlistment rather than impressments of the freedmen.”[33] McPherson explains the varying scale of the officers’ behavior therewith, that Northern soldiers fought first of all for the Union and against treason and only a minority were abolitionists and showed real interest in fighting for black freedom. Officers of the Union army did not employ blacks because they wanted them to be free but because they wanted to weaken the enemy and seizure of the fugitives deprived the rebels of their strength.[34]
In August 1862 the First Confiscation Act was issued, “allowing for the seizure of all Confederate property used to aid the war effort.” This “property” included fugitive slaves, who were seen as the property of the slaveholders and now, when they entered Union lines, were treated as “contraband of war.”[35] The Confiscation Act only applied to slaves who had worked at fortifications and in military buildings in general and had thereby helped to advance the military power of the Confederacy. It did not emancipate blacks but it was an important step toward emancipation and black freedom. After the idea settled of confiscating blacks, the idea of using them as military forces against the South gathered speed. Since the huge number of contrabands grew out of control and an end of the war was not in sight, the idea of black enlistment became more vigorous.[36] As David W. Blight, professor of history, appropriately interprets this new act, “initial consideration of Blacks as soldiers must be seen in this context: a war that, if waged long enough, would have to crush Southern society in order to preserve the Union.”[37] From the moment when black enlistment would be announced officially, there was no doubt that American society could not restore the Union as it was, because if the blacks fought in the Union army against the Confederates, there would be no going back to the old status as slaves.
The question of black enlistment simultaneously raised the question of black emancipation, for which two important steps had to be taken: the political emancipation and the settling of this emancipation in the minds of Northern whites. First, I will investigate the political course and the circumstances which made it so hard to pass laws in favor of black emancipation. Then I will explore the shifting public opinion toward the black race at the time, summarizing voices for and against the emerging first black regiments.
3.2 The Slavery Element – The Struggle with the Border States
3.2.1 Gradual Compensated Emancipation
The four border-states Missouri, Delaware, Maryland and Kentucky were slave states which had not seceded from the Union. Still, the slavery element constituted a common interest which they shared with the rebels and not the North. Because of this, the federal government was urged to proceed cautiously and deliberately with laws and acts concerning the institution of slavery if they did not want to risk losing the allegiance of the border-states. Although there was hatred of the abolitionists, patriotism and confidence in the president still held the majority of people in the border-states.[38]
[...]
[1] Glory. Director: Edward Zwick. Screenwriter: Kevin Jarre. USA: Tristar Pictures, Inc. 1989. Edition: Blu-ray. Sony Pictures Home Entertainment Inc. 2009. 122 min.
[2] Voices of Glory. Director: Edward Zwick. Screenwriter: Kevin Jarre. USA: Tristar Pictures, Inc. 1989. Edition: Blu-ray. Sony Pictures Home Entertainment Inc. 2009. 11:18 min.
[3] James M. McPherson, “Glory.” Past Imperfect: History According to the Movies. Ed. Mark C. Carnes. New York: Henry Holt Co., 1996. 130–31.
[4] Robert Burgoyne, “Race and Nation in Glory.” Film Nation: Hollywood Looks at U.S. History. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 2010, 16–17.
[5] Roy C. Basler (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. 9 vols. New Brunswick, N.J., 1952–55, V, 297.
[6] James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. Vol. 6 of The Oxford History of the United States. 12 vols. 1982–, 490–492.
[7] For the whole census see James M. McPherson, The Negro’s Civil War: How American Negroes Felt and Acted during the War for the Union. New York: Pantheon Books, 1965, Appendix A.
[8] Basler (ed.), Collected Works, IV, 439.
[9] McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 494.
[10] Basler (ed.), Collected Works, V, 388.
[11] McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 494.
[12] Gideon Welles, “The History of Emancipation.” The Galaxy. 14 (Dec. 1872): 838–851, November 7, 2013, 840.
[13] Ibid., 838.
[14] The Crisis, Oct. 15, 1862 in Wood Gray, The Hidden Civil War: The Story of the Copperheads. New York: The Viking Press, 1942, 112.
[15] Ibid., 110. On the anti-Republican sentiment see also McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 495, 560–62.
[16] McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 494.
[17] Jennifer Weber, Copperheads: The Rise and Fall of Lincoln’s Opponents in the North. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, 3. On the term “Copperhead” see also McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 494.
[18] Ibid., 6.
[19] Ibid.; Frank L. Klement quoted in McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 560.
[20] Ibid., 4.
[21] Ibid., 6.
[22] Ibid., 9.
[23] On Frederick Douglass’s opinion on the Democratic Party see Philip Sheldon Foner (ed.), The Civil War 1861 – 65. New York: International Publishers Co. Inc. 1952. Vol. 3 of The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass. 5 vols. 1950–1955, 381.
[24] Weber, Copperheads, 1, 6–9, 16. On Peace Democrats’ popularity see also David W. Blight, Frederick Douglass’ Civil War: Keeping Faith in Jubilee. Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1989, 156.
[25] McPherson, The Negro’s Civil War, 22–23. On returning fugitive slaves see also “Position of the Government toward Slavery,” DM, June, 1861, in Foner (ed.), Life and Writings, III, 104–109.
[26] Welles, “The History of Emancipation,” 838.
[27] Ibid., 839.
[28] Ibid., 40.
[29] Basler (ed.), Collected Works, V, 222.
[30] Ibid., 222–23.
[31] Ibid., 435.
[32] The New York Times, 20 July 1863, online archive, accessed on November 16, 2013.
[33] McPherson, The Struggle for Equality, 209–210.
[34] Ibid., 208–10; McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 497, 502.
[35] Blight, Frederick Douglass’ Civil War, 151. See also Basler (ed.), Collected Works, IV, 439.
[36] Ibid., 151–52; McPherson, The Negro’s Civil War, 28.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Welles, “The History of Emancipation,” 840.