The Scandal of Rhetoric. On "Otherness" of Metaphor in Gothic and Monstrosity

The Scandal of Rhetoric: A On the “Otherness” of Metaphor in Gothic and Monstrosity

In concert with estranging the general notion of metaphor as a figurative repulsion of uniformed similes such as "like" and "as", and still to regionalize its predicate- the modifier of subject- as a fluctuating condition of syntactical extension, that is, of a mutational speech force according to which comparison, resemblance or association with an unrelated "object" achieve their inventive analogy, metaphor in its duality of inbred content could be reproduced finitely as an extrovert experimentation of unrelated "subject". Referential in its linguistic not the less than being monstrous in its non- linguistic definitions, Mark Blechner for instance describes musical metaphor in The Dream Frontier as to be an "inter- object" - an incomplete fusion of two objects- in which a piece of music can "map to the personality and emotional life of a person" and of which "nearly half of the non- professional subjects could not perceive the difference between the two chords" (139.140) or - as to the cognitive mutation in question- between the two predicates of a same sentence. Accordingly, and if metaphor is a topological projection of referentiality that suspends a repressed line of personification or even self- contradiction, itself , according to its psyche might at least be reviewed as a scandal of rhetoric, only elected to confine. It might be notational thus to formalize metaphor in this essay as a self- contained or a self- perlocutionary centrality with an oddly- experimental or oddly- curious instrumentation according to which the cognitive instance 'discoursed psychology is a tonal extension' would overthrow so far the diegetic ornament "Hercules is a beast".

But if metaphor is a qualitative schemata of abstract comparison, such as taming a duality of attribution midst parallel modes of deformity- deformity because a word signature in the process of multiplication, subordinates its condensed semiotic constraint- how the gradation of metaphor's curiosity- could be called elective curiosity- would from the slavery of resemblance/analogy extend a lobe of monomaniac /mono- logical /quantitative repulsion, inter- textual in its merits to experimentation though extra- textual to category? Drawing in a context- sensitive answer by a formal textual example; it is demonstrative to note that the enslaved metaphor between H. G. Wells' The Island of Dr. Moreau 's subconscious identity and its architectural tonality (the overall structure or plan of a piece of music) is by no means a catachresis- a mixed metaphor used by design and accident- since the process of rhetorical liberation in question is far in its hierarchy from metaphor's rhetorical fault.

It is notable just before referring to the island's hapless castaway whose conscious mind finds itself strained between a mad scientist and his half- man/half- beast creations, to posit a fact that both Sigmund Freud- renowned as the father of psychoanalysis- and H. G. Wells- considered one of the fathers of science fiction- did in their lifetimes share socio- political conditions when their classifications were widely unpopular if not for the most part unaccepted. Significantly enough, Freud's multi- level subconscious and Wells cohabited island were - metaphorically- as much paternal in their didactics as they were retributive in their references, seemingly like a banished metaphor from a kinship signified. Similar to The Island of Dr. Moreau which presents three main characters: Dr. Moreau, Montgomery, and Prendrick, Freud in his essay “The Ego and the Id”, states that mind compromises three main components, the Super Ego, the Ego and the id. Comparatively justified, each property struggles with each other to claim its centrality and dominance, with each positing its vehicle - the object whose attributes are borrowed- as to be its hypo- textual's (original signified) predicate of the intended sentence/thought. It would be more bizarre to enclose Wells’s story with a definition from actual perception than attributing its elements to a dreamlike connotation, let alone dreams to be "a detachment of the soul from the fetters of matter" (Freud, The Interpretations of Dreams, 3) which serve as a procedural deciphering of the aforesaid mind's structure. Thus, Prendick the protagonist whose observation neither the "captain nor the mate would believe ¼judging that solitude and danger, had made me (him) mad, and fearing their opinion might be that of others" (181)can be seen presumably as a functional psychoanalyst whose position as a first reader of a tripartite metaphor is compared to his attempting to read the inner workings of the mind which could only be grounded- given the subject to which attributes are ascribed- through dream interpretations of the nature of unconscious thoughts. However, if Super Ego, Ego and Id are seemingly evident in their self- efficiency, would a mere observer of mind - their container/crucible- be grafted as an associate in their intrinsic referentiality? Not likely, and beast creatures in lieu appear to have committed the first puncture in the textual predicative curiosity, that is, denounced Prendick's share of the (un- defaced) metaphor though not as yet in a hyper- textual category.

Dr Moreau, whose "crying puma" is first heard when "bound painfully on a frame work¼un- anesthetized" while his face is blotted out as "white¼at the cutting board", is inflicted according to Sherryl Vint as to be "a scientist, possessed and absorbed by the scientific idea that he pursues" (78). He does not hear the cries of animals, he does not see their flowing blood, he sees nothing but his idea, and is aware of nothing but an organism that conceals from him the problem he is seeking to resolve." (79) Moreau then is comparable to a major extent with Freud's distinction of the Superego - or in such casethe first ground in cognitive metonymy- which against other variations of the mind's hierarchy is the center of moral conscious and intellectualism; a punisher of guilt and a vivisector of imperfection. His law, the only one permitted on his island, assimilating the metaphor's tenor to which the attributes- predicate's first curiosities- are ascribed, reflects the Superego's internalization of cultural subordinate sources - collectively in this instance, metaphor's second predicate/vehicle- to their adapter(Moreau) where condensation of novelty(still the second) deforms precedence and admits an impending incompleteness, just similarly when Moreau "Each time I (He) dip a living creature into the bath of burning pain, say(s), 'This time I will burn out all the animal; this time I will make a rational creature of my own!'(120)

However, if the choice of vehicle is a matter of hierarchy, according to which tenor's preference entails discrimination, and of which later correspondence is semantically mutational, how the aforesaid repressed line of personification addresses its ultimate punishment ? Moreau again as a representation of the Superego strives to act against Freud's representation of the Id. The Id- which would later be attributed analytically to beast/man creatures- , is described as the unorganized part of the mind's architecture which longs for instant self- gratification and in case of Dr. Moreau's island "running on all fours" and with "stubborn flesh of beast"(82). It is apparently irrevocable so that Moreau- the promoter of tenor- does not in his aspirations permit his first creation- although deformed- to exceed its domain connotation by form, although he would otherwise do so when the chosen domain is led on the other hand by diction, a compulsory diction, as in their own words "Not to go on all- Fours; that is the Law. Are we not Men? , Not to chase other Men; that is the Law. Are we not Men?' (116)

Moreover, Freud's implication of the Superego as a symbolic actualization of the father figure bears a multiple- layered personification of the real status of Dr. Moreau and his practices. In accordance with Freud's identification with the Superego, he claims that it is a stationary product of two main factors: the powerlessness of the child and the Oedipus complex;" The super- ego retains the character of the father, while the more powerful the Oedipus complex was and the more rapidly it succumbed to repression, the stricter will be the domination of the super- ego over the ego later on.." (Anthropology in Theological Perspective, 196) A mentioning of a helpless child may be attributed to Moreau's "id- ridden" representation of a precedent stage of maturity right before his accomplished status as a possessed, merciless, experimental scientist when he could be imagined as one unable to cope with the demands of reality, acting as a reservoir of libido, which is the main source of instinctual will and pleasure. Massively composed of "instinctual cathexes seeking discharge" (16), his earlier stage of immaturity could have been diagnosed as discharging morality for the sake of multiplication, merely to satiate "the dark, inaccessible part of the unconscious" (16). Significantly enough, it is notable to state at this early stage, how equally his behavior /functionality has survived "stubbornly" from immature Moreau's id to mature Moreau's superego in his" grafting and shaping". Such "diction" of a child, and a "form" of multiplication/vivisection would lead hitherto to Oedipus's Complex whose dynamics are incomplete on Moreau's island however, insatiable.

Strictly speaking, Oedipus Complex denotes feelings and aspirations inherent within the mind's unconscious borders, via dynamics of conscious repression- any attempt by an individual to repel one's own desires and impulses towards pleasurable instincts by excluding the desire from one's consciousness and holding or subduing it in the unconscious- that forthwith concentrates on a child's first desire to sexually acquire the parent of the opposite sex (in such case, males who are attracted to their mothers.) Analogically, Freud's castration anxiety is contingent on the validity of such a male complex. Such anxiety is described as the unconscious or conscious dread of losing part or all of the sex organs or their functionality during initial stages of sexual development though still lasting a life time. From a "mother- fixated" point of view, when an infant male becomes aware of the difference between the male and female genitalia, he supposes that the female's penis has been removed and accordingly becomes annoyed lest his penis will be cut off by his probable rival- his father- as a punishment for his desiring the mother figure. Accordingly, if Otto Rank states that the superego is "the heir to the Oedipus complex" (A Modern Reader, 172) which is formed as the infant child starts internalizing the familial laws of his father, just after that little boy's lack of success in attaining his mother as a love- object, who could be Moreau's truant father - his rival- if we have had already a glimpse what his laws are? And if Moreau's island adopts no parents,with a crying puma- the beast protagonist- not granted a proper name of gender either male or female, Wells’s narration includes all condensations of vivisection" dwindling shreds of humanity¼teeth and hands¼foreheads or feet or claws" (107) but not a solitary notation for male's or female's genitalia? Since this essay owes its tripartite metaphor - which itself constitutes a protrusive line of personification - to subjective dichotomy, a sub- categorical liberation is due to categorical answers which Freud's psychic apparatus can "unravel some of the forms of madness¼but it can neither limit, nor transcribe, nor most certainly to explain, what is essential in this enterprise."(Memorable Quotations, 95), while, a second domain of tonality- which in itself does the same part of psychoanalysis in its deciphering functional listening to effective signatures- would try to offer answers to these questions in correspondence to each of Moreau's characters' psychology.

If Freud is to be elected as to have proposed a first signifier in a metaphor's conditionality, as much to define his structural model's three provinces ", the id, the ego and the superego, all had lengthy past histories not to fall together into three peaceful couples¼and of which we had no right to expect any such smooth arrangement" (The Ego and the Id,3) , it could be altogether justifiable to posit Allen Winold's definition of pulse in music as to be " a (repeating) series periodic short- duration stimuli perceived as points in time (tempo)occurring at the mensural level" (Rhythm in Twentieth- Century Music,2) - of, relating to, or being polyphonic music- as to be a first modifier to metaphor's psychological subject. With what Freud called the conscious and the unconscious - which represent the backbone of the psyche structure;" conscious and on the other hand repressed and unconscious are far from coinciding"(6) , pulse in its strictest definition could be audible or implied, which when played quickly would become a drone, but would become as unconnected sounds when slower. Pulse then in itself is far from coinciding, and perceiving it eloquently, is conditional on a smooth arrangement in between its meters. Relatively though, pulse's metric levels are composed of three divisions, mainly, the beat level, multiple levels and division levels.

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