Various studies discuss the American view of the Austrian State Treaty and Austrian neutrality, both concluded in 1955. There are a number of studies concerning the Eisenhower- and Kennedy Administrations regarding Austrian neutrality.
In all of them, the American fear of neutralism plays a key role. Securing Austria’s close connection with “western ideology” and therefore minimizing Soviet influence were main goals of U.S. policy towards Austria. The neutral state should at least show ideological support of the West in the East-West conflict.
In the first part of this paper, I will try to describe the difference between the terms “neutrality” and “neutralism”. Afterwards, it is necessary to discuss the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations policies towards Austria and give a brief overview of this time.
The main goal is to examine the Johnson Administration’s view of Austrian neutrality. The records in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library in Austin, Texas, indicate that there was no more fear of Austrian neutralism by the mid-1960s. This paper analyses this development and discusses the status of Austrian neutrality in the sixties. Did the Eisenhower Administration succeed in pulling Austria to the “western side” in the Cold War? Was neutrality simply unimportant in the sixties? What consequences does neutrality have for the process of European integration? Other important aspects touched on in this essay are Austrian relations with Eastern Europe, relations with the European Economic Community and U.S. financial support for the Austrian Armed Forces, the “Bundesheer”.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction
II. Definitions: Neutrality vs. Neutralism
III. Austrian Neutrality
IV. The Eisenhower Administration
IV.1. The fear of neutralism
IV.2. Challenges to Austrian neutrality
The Hungarian Crisis 1956
The Lebanon Crisis 1958 – A Soviet-Austrian honeymoon?
V. The Kennedy Administration
VI. The Johnson Administration
VI.1. Vietnam - the Shadow over LBJ
VI.2. “Bridge-building”: Austria and Eastern Europe
VI.3. Austria looks westwards: The EEC
VI.4. Military Sales
VI.5. Prague Spring 1968
VII. Conclusion - “Committed to the West”
VIII. Bibliography
Research Objectives and Themes
This paper examines the evolution of U.S. policy toward Austrian neutrality from the Eisenhower to the Johnson administration, aiming to demonstrate the shift from a fear of "neutralism" to a recognition of Austria's firm ideological commitment to the West. It explores how geopolitical crises and economic integration influenced American perceptions of Austria's status.
- Evolution of U.S. perceptions regarding Austrian neutrality
- Distinction between "neutrality" and "neutralism" during the Cold War
- Austria's role in "bridge-building" between East and West
- Austrian efforts regarding European economic integration (EEC)
- Influence of regional crises (Hungary 1956, Prague 1968) on bilateral relations
Excerpt from the Book
VI.2. “Bridge-building”: Austria and Eastern Europe
Austria’s relations with Eastern Europe were always an important factor in US-Austrian relations. The Eisenhower Administration tried hard to minimize Austrian connections to the East, above all to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the geographical location and the history predestined Austria for “bridge-building” across the “iron curtain” in the Cold War. The Kennedy and Johnson years were characterized by an “opening” towards the East, the US policy was to “relax tensions and improve trade relations with Eastern Europe.”44
Relations with Eastern Europe were also important for Austria; Chancellor Josef Klaus stated in 1965 that it was “a most important subject.” Klaus also was convinced that the countries in Eastern Europe, “which in 1945 turned completely toward the East, are now turning back toward Western Europe as toward an old family.”45
Austrian officials always tried to affirm their pro-western ideology when talking about relations to Eastern Europe with American politicians. For example, Chancellor Klaus stated that “Austria cannot become dependent on Eastern European trade”46. Given Austria’s strong economic ties to the West and the non-existing threat of an economic dependency on the East, such a statement was made only to please American officials.
Summary of Chapters
I. Introduction: Outlines the study's focus on the American view of Austrian neutrality, specifically tracing the shift in U.S. policy from the Eisenhower to the Johnson administration.
II. Definitions: Neutrality vs. Neutralism: Provides essential terminology, defining "neutrality" as a legal non-involvement and "neutralism" as a Cold War-era perceived alignment with communism or the Soviet Union.
III. Austrian Neutrality: Explains the origins of Austrian neutrality as a post-occupation necessity and a self-imposed status to ensure sovereignty.
IV. The Eisenhower Administration: Discusses the era dominated by the U.S. fear of "neutralism," detailing how officials like John Foster Dulles viewed non-alignment as potentially "immoral."
V. The Kennedy Administration: Describes a transition period where the U.S. began to view Austrian neutrality more positively and encouraged "bridge-building" efforts.
VI. The Johnson Administration: Analyzes the final period covered, showing that the U.S. had largely moved past fears of Austrian neutralism, acknowledging Austria's firm Western orientation despite ongoing geopolitical tensions.
VII. Conclusion - “Committed to the West”: Summarizes the thesis that by the mid-1960s, U.S. policy recognized Austria’s clear political and ideological commitment to the West.
VIII. Bibliography: Lists the primary and secondary sources utilized to construct the research, including archival records from the LBJ Library.
Keywords
Austria, Neutrality, Neutralism, Lyndon B. Johnson, Eisenhower, Cold War, Eastern Europe, Bridge-building, EEC, Foreign Policy, State Treaty, Soviet Union, Western Ideology, Diplomacy, Geopolitics
Frequently Asked Questions
What is this research paper primarily about?
The paper investigates the change in U.S. foreign policy toward Austria between 1963 and 1969, specifically examining how the U.S. administration under Lyndon B. Johnson moved away from the earlier fear of Austrian "neutralism."
What are the central themes of the work?
Key themes include the distinction between legal neutrality and political neutralism, the role of Austria in cross-Iron Curtain diplomacy, and the impact of Western integration efforts on international relations.
What is the primary research goal?
The goal is to analyze the shift in American perceptions, moving from the suspicion of neutral nations during the Eisenhower era to the acceptance of Austria as a stable Western-aligned country during the Johnson years.
Which methodology does the author employ?
The author uses historical analysis based on archival documents, particularly records from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, to trace the development of bilateral relations.
What is covered in the main section of the paper?
The main sections evaluate policy changes across administrations, the impact of crises like the Hungarian and Lebanon crises, Austrian economic integration efforts with the EEC, and U.S.-Austrian military cooperation.
Which keywords best characterize this work?
The work is characterized by terms such as Cold War, Neutrality, Austrian State Treaty, Bridge-building, and U.S.-Austrian relations.
How did the Eisenhower administration influence perceptions of Austrian neutrality?
The Eisenhower administration, heavily influenced by John Foster Dulles, initially viewed neutralism with suspicion, fearing it could lead to ideological drift toward communism or serve as a negative model for other countries.
What specific impact did the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 have on Austrian foreign policy?
The invasion caused widespread fear in Austria, leading the government to seek reassurance of its sovereignty and protection from the United States, thereby reinforcing Austria's desire to maintain close ties with the West.
- Quote paper
- Bernhard Hagen (Author), 2003, The Disappearing Fear of Neutralism, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/29250
