Table of Contents
2. The partners – a historical review
2.1 History: EU as an economic and political entity
2.2 The USA as a global player
3.1 Development of an idea
3.3 Core elements of the contract
4. Effects of TTIP on both sides
4.1 Positive effects
4.2 Negative effects
5. Further effects on other areas than economics
5.1 Foreign politics and diplomacy
5.2 Security policies
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) which is intensely discussed in the media as well political and economic interest groups and political parties seems to have the potential to become “the largest bilateral trade and investment negotiation ever undertaken”1 between two major politico-economic blocks, namely the United States of America and the European Union. Its presumable effects will not only be visible on the economic level, but also profoundly affect judicial, political, social2, and security issues. Due to the financial and Euro zone crises, the pact is about to be reshuffled, politico-economical powers have to be balanced anew and governments look for innovative and sustainable ways to reinvigorate their economies to position their industries and enterprises in the most competitive way on a global level. In this paper, the question of to what extent will potential effects of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Program affect (1) U.S. and (2) European Security Policy attitudes will be answered and the ways to get to this answer will be explained.
This paper consists of four major parts. To begin with, the two partners and their individual economical development and significance will be presented in brief. Secondly, the TTIP will be expounded with regard to its development, the ongoing negotiations, and the core elements of the contract. In order to evaluate this “geo-economic alignment”3, a selection of obvious and academically proven effects will be illuminated. This paper does not intend to promote or reject the TTIP initiative in a biased way, but to factually show potential positive and negative effects it would have and to what extent it would affect the United States and the European Union. The third part will be dedicated to effects that have been mentioned introductorily, thus on other areas than economies. Here, two major political areas have been selected: foreign policies and diplomacy as well as security politics. Fourthly, a critical and analytical outlook seeks to highlight necessary steps to curtail negative effects as much as possible and increase positive effects and most importantly public support and acceptance. In a conclusion, the overall results will be summed and recap the side effects of an economic treaty on national security policy.
2. The partners – a historical review
The United States of America (U.S.) and the European Union (EU) are doubtlessly two of the world’s major economical players. The EU, for instance, accounts “for 22% of its GDP and more than one-quarter of global consumption, with high levels of GDP per capita and relevant purchasing power.”4 It also represents one of the U.S.’s most important economic partners. Both political entities “share a large, dynamic, and mutually beneficial trade and economic relationship”5 and invest more than US-$3.7 trillion in each other’s economies. This chapter aims at presenting the development of the EU from a merely economic union to a political entity as it is today as well as the U.S.’s role on a international level in order to underline the dimensions of the TTIP initiative
2.1 History: EU as an economic and political entity
This brief discussion of the road the European Union has taken so far will focus on the aftermath of World War II. Nonetheless it is important to note that European civil societies of the 19th century already aligned themselves to the elements of peace, the rule of law and democracy and openly spoke their mind.6 Revolutions in many European countries, aiming at establishing a constitution, demanding the right to participate, and asking for civil rights to be legally acknowledged may be used to illustrate this fact.
The European continent has suffered from wars and national hatred for centuries; it was far from being a singular entity in any way until the beginning of the 20th century. After World War I, a primary stage of a pacifistic European idealism grew out of the rubble.7 “[B]ereft of a firm psychological basis”8 and under the Nazi-occupation of Europe, the merits of the idea of Europe became ambiguous.9 Ravaged by war and destruction, bemoaning the loss of millions of people and economically devastated, Europe experienced its zero hour in the aftermath of World War II. The founding fathers of the European unification primarily initiated this project to restore peace in Europe10 and “to eradicate unnecessary suffering from Western Europe whether caused by interstate war or by economic collapse”11. However, the occupying powers, namely the United States of America and the Soviet Union, were not interested in fostering an independent Europe12 and aimed at a restoration on a nation-state level instead. Given the amount of challenging tasks, the European national governments’ point of interest was their own country at first, not the seminal ideas of Europe. It was imperative to rebuild entire nations, including their societies, economy, political structure, and international relations, too. In this environment, considerable courage and dedication was needed to achieve a European unification13, given the tremendous dimension of fragmentation and devastation.
One first step to foster closer cooperation and interaction took place in Geneva in 1947 when the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE or ECE) was founded14. It was the first supraregional sub-organization of the United Nations. Just one year later, 18 European states joined the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).15 In the very same year, the Hague Congress took place. It was the first meeting of such a kind, presided over by former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in which 800 politicians of Western European countries came together to explore future framework requirements of a unified Europe.16 Simultaneously launched, the Marshall Plan contributed much to the European unifying process in the economic sphere. It should be noted that the U.S. was in a position to impose more pressure which could have resulted in the creation of a common European political structure.17
The next decisive step was the Schuman Declaration of May 9th 195018. French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed the establishment of a community working supranationally, organizing coal and steel industries in France, Germany and other European countries willing to join.19 His forward-looking plan was implemented through the foundations of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the Treaty of Paris.20 In the field of military unification, the treaty of a European Defense Community (EDC), based on a proposal by René Pleven, then-French Prime Minister regarding a pan-European defense force was signed on May 27th 1952 by the members of the ECSC21, but the French Parliament denied its ratification. Thus, the idea of the EDC was never realized. With the Treaty of Rome (the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community), signed on May 25th 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or EURATOM) were founded.22
The division of Germany and the iron curtain, an ideological as well as a physical boundary, led to a separation between Western and Eastern Europe in a hitherto unknown intensity.23 The bipolarity between the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact on the one hand and the European Community and NATO member states on the other hand, as well as the subsequent political, economic, military and social tensions made history. The Cold War dominated the second half of the 20th century. But it also “gave way to debate in terms of Europe”24 due to the geographical closeness and the gradually defining of the European Community’s role. With the reunification of Germany in 1989 and the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, Europe witnessed “a historic turning point in [its] history”25. From then on, its actions were no longer reactive, but started showing constructive and forming traits26, giving a hand to “post-socialist societies which were struggling to achieve economic prosperity and political stability”27. Thus, a multitude of new EU member states’ incentives to join the EU was initially based upon mere economic calculations rather than on the founding ideas of the post-World War II momentum.28 The Maastricht Treaty, signed on February 7th, 1992, legally avouched the four great freedoms (freedom of trade, passenger traffic, services and capital) and presented the Three Pillars of the European Union.29 With the Lisbon Treaty, signed on December 13th, 2007, which adopted, with regard to contents, the 2005 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the EU now has a constitution-like legal framework. Even today, no proper term has been found to describe the political nature of the EU – which makes it one of a kind, “sui generis”30.
The face of Europe has changed remarkably over the last five decades. Never has this continent seen a comparable era of peace, stability, prosperity, and harmony. The number of its member states has more than quadruplicated since the foundation of the ECSC. Given its constant advancements and adjustments to internal and external requirements, the EU today is “clearly far more than a conventional international organization”.31 Forging a common destiny32 on various levels, the EU has developed far beyond mere economic integration traditionalists envisioned.
2.2 The USA as a global player
At this point, the entire history of the U.S. shall not be presented in detail. The nation can be considered to be an economical entity which stands for “the most productive and wealthiest large economy in the world by a wide margin, attracting more foreign direct investment (FDI) than any other single national economy ($227 billion in 2011 alone).”33 With regards to the EU, one can state that the presently existing economical interaction is already immense. In terms of investment, these two partners are “each other’s largest investors and together they comprise nearly 60% of the total global inward stock of FDI and almost 75% of the outward stock.”34 This makes the EU one of the U.S.’s most significant trade partners.35 For instance, in 2012, “U.S. investment in the Netherlands [..] was 14 times larger than in China” thus vitiating common assumptions. 36 The U.S. as well as the EU export a remarkable percentage of their goods and service into the respective other market. At this juncture, the U.S. can largely be considered to form a politico-economic entity with “little variability across the fifty states in services exports to the EU”37 which is all tightly interwoven with mainly individual nation members of the EU. A respectable number of Americans are “employed in positions directly linked to trade and investment”38 with the EU. Many of these jobs were created and are assured because of existing internationalization and globalization incentives of enterprises on both sides of the Atlantic. Vice versa, the U.S. represents a major economic outlet for EU member states’ economies “with an export share of 23 percent of total EU exports and an import share of 20 percent of EU imports.”39
Politically, the ever increasing trade with the EU, especially after the crises both partners had to pull through, has been perceived in a positive way by Congress, organized labor, and the general public. To exemplify the political support for economic treaties, one can refer to Congress’s call for Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) in the course of the TTIP negotiations.40
The EU, aware of the importance of the U.S. as a long-term and reliable trading partner, sent United Kingdom deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg “to the USA in September 2013 with a specially prepared booklet designed to convince each of the 50 US states of the potential gains that TTIP might bring to them.”41 On the other hand, the U.S. also relies on credible partners of good repute in the future. There has always been intensive trade with the EU which can now be even enhanced with a new treaty. The U.S. depends “on networks, which had made [it] more efficient, [but] had also made the country more susceptible to danger.”42 Hence, in order to maintain its strong position at the present time, the U.S. should envisage further tightening economical cooperation and partnership with familiar and reliable partners.
The three most important people representing the negotiating parties on TTIP are President Barack Obama, Jose Manuel Barroso (President of the EU Commission), and Herman Van Rompuy (President of the EU Council). Once established, it will “represent the latest evolution in the relationship between the two blocs that have been leading pioneers of free trade,”43 namely the U.S. and the 28 members of the EU. Hence, the program will comprise 29 individual nations at present and allows for an increasing number, given multiple potential candidate countries who seek to join the EU. As mentioned before, both sides are aware of “the need to stimulate their stagnant economies in the aftermath of the financial and Eurozone crises”44 in order to maintain their citizens’ economic status and living standard as well as to conserve their political strength.
In its contours, TTIP “is a timely political, economic and cultural partnership that will boost world economic development, strengthen the natural partnership of the west, and create an international level playing field for fair competition.”45 One can note that a program of that extent and ramification is unique It represents an estimated value of over US-$4.7 trillion in combined bilateral trade and investment, which ascends into a hitherto unknown dimension. 46
Despite the tremendous extent and impact of TTIP on various mainly economical sectors, environment, intellectual property rights, and labor rights, “little is known about the content of the TTIP proposals, since the governments involved have stated that they will not publish a draft text” or make it available to the public online or in paper. 47 The prior-ranking aim, however, is not to reduce tariffs on imports between the U.S. and the EU since these are already at extraordinarily low levels; instead, representatives of both sides “acknowledge that the main aim of TTIP is instead to remove regulatory ‘barriers’ which restrict the potential profits to be made by transnational corporations in US and EU markets.”48 To present the TTIP concisely, a short introductory part of this chapter is tripartite. At first, it will explain the development of the idea. Subsequently, the ongoing negotiations will be analyzed. In a final step, the core elements of the contract will be illustrated.
3.1 Development of an idea
Long before the TTIP in its current form–which is still modifiable–was created, there have been several attempts to develop a transatlantic trade agreement. The former German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Klaus Kinkel,49 was one of the first to advocate such plans in 1995 in the aftermath of the Cold War and during the ongoing political and economical reorganization of Europe. However, his idea did not gain further traction. In 1998, the European Commission proposed a draft to the Council of Ministers entitled ‘The New Transatlantic Marketplace’ (NTM). This proposal “was effectively vetoed by France in April 1998” as the French apparently worried about a bilateral agreement undermining the current multilateral trade liberalization process. 50 Just In September 1998, the European Commission started a new attempt, the Plan for Transatlantic Economic Partnership, which envisaged a “a regular dialogue in order to ensure closer EU-US cooperation in the run up to the I999 Ministerial Conference in the WTO.” 51 Hence it can be considered to be very different from the previous attempts. These plans of cooperation did not come into effect until the Transatlantic Economic Council in 2007. This institution allows for transatlantic business dialogues “to press for a free trade area based on the deregulation of markets in both the EU and USA.”52 In 2011, the High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG) was assigned to conduct “a thorough exploratory analysis to identify policies and measures to increase transatlantic trade and investment with the goals of supporting mutually beneficial job creation, economic growth, and international competitiveness.”53 The HLWG consisted of experienced representatives and experts of both parties and was led by the U.S. Trade Representative and the EU Trade Commissioner. Their interim as well as their final report both suggest a comprehensive transatlantic trade and investment agreement which has been officially enacted to be negotiated at the G-8 Summit in Northern Ireland in June 2013, when the U.S. and the EU “announced plans to open negotiations on a long sought deal to create a unique market between the world’s two strongest economic regions.”54 President Obama “formally notified Congress of its intent to launch negotiations on the TTIP” in March 2013 already, after having announced the start of negotiations on TTIP in his State of the Union address of February 2013 before. 55
There have been four considerable rounds of negotiations on TTIP so far. The first round took place in July of 2013 in Washington, D.C. when “EU and U.S. negotiators set out respective approaches and ambitions in some twenty areas covered by the TTIP” and framed the guidelines for subsequent meetings. 56 Originally, solidly text-based negotiations were planned to be held in October 2013, but the second round had to be postponed into mid-November 2013 because of the U.S. government shutdown, followed by a third round in mid-December in Washington, D.C. shortly after.57 The fourth round took place in early March 2014 in Brussels. Until now, no dates for future meetings have been published.
One can definitely see a clear difference in the state of consensus of the two negotiating parties. Whilst the U.S. is able to speak in a large part unanimously, the representatives of the EU have to take into consideration the individual demands, interests, and capabilities of commitment of 28 sovereign states. Economically strong states zealously support the TTIP initiative and strive to promote it in the most favorable way to gain public support. Member states with comparably less competitive economies show a greater degree of reluctance.58 A potential successful outcome thence mainly depends on the ability of the EU leadership as well as on the willingness of the respective EU member states to negotiate.
A major issue is the high level of secrecy the negotiations have been conducted so far. The general public, journalists, interest groups, and even politicians who were not directly involved did not have the possibility to contribute or to access relevant documents related to the content negotiations, a fact that until now “contrast[s] markedly with the relatively transparent financial and commodity market ruling making process.”59 The results of the negotiations are provided to the public only afterwards in extracts. Hence, the way the negotiations have been conducted so far is widely “inconsistent with basic principles of good governance and with the public’s right to informed, meaningful participation in what amounts to a public policy dialogue of profound national consequence on both sides of the Atlantic.”60 Particularly interest groups have complained about the opacity and barely democratic practice. This issue will be discussed later on in this paper, especially with regard to the broad effects of TTIP on various parts of civil society.
3.3 Core elements of the contract
Itemizing the core elements of TTIP already show the momentousness of this contract. Apart from mere economical, its content affects the social and political spheres as well. The entire negotiations were aiming at covering trade plus topics, “including rules for public procurement, investment, intellectual property protection and patents, competition, data protection, and environmental and social safeguards” in order to level out existing varieties that might be an obstacle to economic interests. Four major economic components will be presented in the following. 61
Given antecedent ideas that have been mentioned before, one might assume that “TTIP will serve primarily as an opportunity to reduce regulatory barriers to trade” in order to enhance market access through the elimination of barriers to trade and investment. 62 Although tariffs are already quite low in transatlantic transactions, the removal of obvious financial obstacles can certainly considered to be one of the major elements of TTIP.
Moreover, it intends to enhance regulatory cooperation and compatibility. A “greater regulatory alignment and increased access to services and procurement markets” will foster the elimination of bureaucratic duplication and simplify transatlantic trade. 63
TTIP also has the potential to open “up public services and government procurement contracts to competition from transnational corporations” which might lead to another increase in privatization of pivotal sectors such as health or education. 64
Furthermore, TTIP aims includes plans to strengthen and develop “new rules in areas such as intellectual property rights (IPR), investment, trade facilitation, labor, the environment, and emerging ‘21st century’ issues (e.g., digital trade, localization barriers to trade in the digital environment, and state-owned enterprises).”65 This is a remarkable step as there are little transnational regulations regarding IPR. Consolidating and harmonizing trade and investment between two globally leading entities such as the U.S. and the EU will create an incentive and worthwhile example for international competitiveness.66
1 Tuncak, Baskut, Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Monitor, in: CIEL (Center for International Environmental Law) 1/2013, p. 1.
2 Cf. Menzel, Christoph, Dimensionen und Auswirkungen eines Transatlantischen Freihandelsabkommens, retrieved from: http://www.bmwi.de/Dateien/BMWi/PDF/Monatsbericht/Auszuege/04-2013-freihandel,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf, p. 1, date of access: 11.04.2014.
3 Zeneli, Valbona, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: A Historic Deal?, in: Security Insights (George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies), 9/2013, p. 1.
4 Zeneli, Valbona, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, p. 1.
5 Akhtar, Shayerah Ilias/Jones, Vivian C., Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Negotiations, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C. 2014, p. 2.
6 Cf. Schmale, Wolfgang, Geschichte und Zukunft der Europäischen Identität, Bonn 2010, p. 103.
7 Cf. Szyszko, Agata, Die kulturelle Identität Europas als ideen- und begriffsgeschichtliches Konzept, in: Birk, Eberhard (Ed.), Aspekte einer europäischen Identität, Fürstenfeldbruck 2004, p. 16.
8 Checkel, Jeffrey T., Katzenstein, Peter J., The politicization of European identities, in: Checkel, Jeffrey T./Katzenstein, Peter J. (Eds.), European Identity, Cambridge 2009, p. 4.
9 Cf. Schäfers, Bernhard, Sozialstruktur und sozialer Wandel in Deutschland, Stuttgart 2002, p. 296.
10 Cf. Westerwelle, Guido, Der Wert Europas: Vier Thesen zum Zukunftsprojekt Europa, in: integration, 2012 (2), pp. 90-93, p. 91.
11 Linklater, Andrew, A European Civilising Process, in: Hill, Christopher/Smith, Michael (Eds.), International Relations and the European Union, New York, NY 2005, p. 376.
12 Cf. Gruner, Wolf D., Woyke, Wichard, Europa-Lexikon. Länder – Politik – Institutionen, München 2004, p. 42.
13 Cf. Szyszko, Agata, Die kulturelle Identität Europas als ideen- und begriffsgeschichtliches Konzept, p. 16.
14 Cf. Janz, Louis, Die Geschichte der europäischen Einigung nach den Zweiten Weltkrieg, p. 83.
15 Cf. ibid.
16 Cf. Hick, Alan, Die Europäische Bewegung, in: Loth, Wilfried (Ed.), Die Anfänge der Europäischen Integration 1945-1950, Bonn 1990, p. 241.
17 Cf. Janz, Louis, Die Geschichte der europäischen Einigung nach den Zweiten Weltkrieg, p. 84.
18 This date is regarded as the hour of birth of the EU and is celebrated as the Europe Day since 1986, commemorating Schuman’s far-reaching idea and speech.
19 Cf. Janz, Louis, Die Geschichte der europäischen Einigung nach den Zweiten Weltkrieg, p. 86.
20 Cf. ibid., p. 89.
21 Cf. ibid., pp. 89 f.
22 Cf. ibid., p. 93.
23 Cf. ibid., p. 80.
24 Wæver, Ole, Kelstrup, Morten, Europe and its nations, p. 64.
25 Weidendfeld, Werner, Janning, Josef, After 1989: The Emerge of a new Europe, in: Weidendfeld, Werner, Janning, Josef (Eds.), Global Responsibilities: Europe in Tomorrow’s World, Gütersloh 1991, p. 12.
26 Cf. Wæver, Ole, Kelstrup, Morten, Europe and its nations, p. 64.
27 Linklater, Andrew, A European Civilizing Process, p. 368.
28 Cf. Kielmannsegg, Peter Graf, Integration und Demokratie, in: Jachtenfuchs, Markus, Kohler-Koch, Beate (Eds.), Europäische Integration, Opladen 2003, p. 50.
29 Cf. Hänsch, Klaus, Perspektiven der europäischen Integration, in: Leiße, Olaf (Ed.), Die Europäische Union nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, Wiesbaden 2010, p. 70.
30 McCormick, John, Understanding the European Union. A Concise Introduction, New York, NY 2011, p. 22.
32 Cf. Weidenfeld, Werner, Turek, Jürgen, Wie Zukunft entsteht, Weidenfeld, Werner/Turek, Jürgen, Wie Zukunft entsteht. Größere Risiken – weniger Sicherheit – neue Chancen, München 2002, p. 178.
33 Zeneli, Valbona, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, p. 1.
34 AMCHAM EU (The American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union), The Transatlantic Opportunity. Why we need a Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership, Dublin/Brussels 2013, p. 5.
35 Cf. Menzel, Christoph, Dimensionen und Auswirkungen eines Transatlantischen Freihandelsabkommens, p.1.
36 Zeneli, Valbona, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, p. 2.
37 Barker, Tyson/Collett, Anne/Workman, Garrett, TTIP and the Fifty States: Jobs and Growth from Coast to Coast, Washington, D.C. 2013, p. 3.
38 Barker, Tyson/Collett, Anne/Workman, Garrett, TTIP and the Fifty States, p. 2.
39 Kommerskollegium (National Board of Trade, SWE), Global Value Chains and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Stockholm 2013, p. 2.
40 Cf. Barker, Tyson/Workman, Garrett, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Ambitious but Achievable. A Stakeholder Survey and Three Scenarios, Washington, D.C. 2013, p. 1.
41 Hilary, John, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Brussels 2104, p. 14.
42 Jarmon, Jack A., The New Era in U.S. National Security. An Introduction to Emerging Threats and Challenges, Lanham, MD 2014, p. 55.
43 AMCHAM EU (The American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union), The Transatlantic Opportunity, p. 5.
44 Barker, Tyson/Workman, Garrett, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, p. 1.
45 Zeneli, Valbona, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, p. 4.
46 Cf. Barker, Tyson/Workman, Garrett, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, p. 1.
47 Hansen-Kuhn, Karen/Suppan, Steve, Promises and Perils of the TTIP. Negotiation a Transatlantic Agricultural Market, Berlin 2013, p. 5.
48 Hilary, John, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, p. 11.
49 Felbermayr, Gabriel J./Larch, Mario, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): Potentials, Problems and Perspectives, in: CESifo Forum 2/2013, pp. 49; Hindley, Brian, New Institutions for Transatlantic Trade?, in: International Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1 (Jan. 1999), p. 45.
50 Hindley, Brian, New Institutions for Transatlantic Trade?, p. 46.
52 Hilary, John, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, p. 10.
53 Zeneli, Valbona, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, p.1
55 Barker, Tyson/Workman, Garrett, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, p. 2.
56 Tuncak, Baskut, Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Monitor, p. 2.
57 Cf. ibid.
58 Cf. Zeneli, Valbona, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, p. 3.
59 Hansen-Kuhn, Karen/Suppan, Steve, Promises and Perils of the TTIP, p. 15.
60 Tuncak, Baskut, Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Monitor, p. 4.
61 Mildner, Stormy-Annika/Schmucker, Claudia, Trade Agreement with Side Effects. European Union and United States to Negotiate Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, in: SWP (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) Aktuell 26/2013, pp. 1.
62 Tuncak, Baskut, Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Monitor, p. 1.
63 Barker, Tyson/Workman, Garrett, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, p. 1.
64 Hilary, John, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, p. 11.
65 Akhtar, Shayerah Ilias/Jones, Vivian C., Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Negotiations, p. 2.
66 Cf. Zeneli, Valbona, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, p. 4.
- Quote paper
- Stephanie Theresa Trapp (Author), 2014, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Side effects of an economic treaty on national security policy, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/296209