Theoretical and empirical research has indicated that overconfidence affects merger decision-making and merger premium. However, founder-CEOs have not been subject of such a study, yet. This lack is particular surprising when considering the differences between founder and manager-CEOs as well as the media attention of founder-CEOs. The present dissertation aims to fill the research gap through investigating the effect of founder-CEO overconfidence on merger premium in the high-tech industry. Moreover, this dissertation aims to extend the literature by including target CEO overconfidence and studying the impact on merger premium when both, acquirer and target CEO are overconfident. By studying founder-CEOs this dissertation also aims to establish the effectiveness of founders as CEOs. The resource-based perspective argues that while founders help in the early years of the company, they become less effective as the firm evolves, since they lack the necessary management skills.
Design/methodology/approach – Using ordinary least square (OLS) technique, this study investigates the effects of implemented factors in determining the merger premium paid in high-tech acquisitions. A sample consisting of 245 acquisitions in the high-tech industry of 124 CEOs during a 19-year period (1995 to 2013) has been observed. In order to test the founder-CEO effects, this dissertation develops a matched sample approach of 62 founder-CEOs and 62 manager-CEOs.
This study shows a strong relationship between CEO overconfidence and acquisitions premium paid. The results suggest that the CEO overconfidence may provide an explanation for the well-rehearsed overpayment problem. An additional analysis indicates that the highest premium is paid when combined acquiring and tar-get firm CEO overconfidence exist. The dissertation also shows that founder-CEOs pay higher premia than manager-CEOs in the high-tech industry. It has been proven that founder-CEOs’ decisions are more independent from interventions of the board of directors and that founder-CEO overpayment is not dependent on the company’s size or relatedness of mergers. The findings are reliable as the results remain constant for applied robustness tests.
Inhaltsverzeichnis (Table of Contents)
- ABSTRACT
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- LIST OF FIGURES
- LIST OF TABLES
- LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
- CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
- Aim of the Chapter
- Background and Context to this Study
- Rationale, Aims and Intended Contribution
- Outline of the Dissertation
- CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
- Aim of the Chapter
- Merger Premium and M&A in the High-Tech Industry
- Review of Merger Premium Determinants
- Review of M&A in the High-Tech Industry
- CEO Overconfidence
- Concept of Overconfidence
- Review of Overconfidence and Merger Premium
- Review of Overconfidence Measures
- Review of Founder-CEO Characteristics
- Reflection on the Literature Review
- Hypotheses Development
- CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA SAMPLE
- Aim of the Chapter
- Variables Description
- Dependent Variable
- Overconfidence Measure
- Control Variables
- Data Sample
- Sample Collection and Sources
- Sample Description
- Trend Developments
- Research Method
- Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
- Dissertation Model
- Time Fixed Effects
- CHAPTER FOUR: EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
- Aim of the Chapter
- Correlation Matrix
- OLS Regression Results
- Impact of Founder-CEO Overconfidence on Merger Premium
- Impact of Acquirer and Target CEO Overconfidence on Merger Premium
- Founder-CEO Merger Decision-making - Differences between Merger Premia paid by Founder-CEOs and Manager-CEOs
- Robustness Checks
- Corporate Governance and CEO Overconfidence
- Media Portrayal as Measure of Overconfidence
- Principle Component Analysis
- Summary of Empirical Findings
- CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
- Aim of the Chapter
- Summary of the Study and general Conclusions
- Contributions
- Limitations and Direction for further Research
- References
Zielsetzung und Themenschwerpunkte (Objectives and Key Themes)
The dissertation aims to investigate the impact of founder-CEO overconfidence on merger premiums in the high-tech industry, specifically exploring the differences between founder-CEOs and manager-CEOs. It seeks to fill a research gap by examining the effect of CEO overconfidence on M&A decisions and to contribute to the existing literature by proposing a new measure of overconfidence.
- Founder-CEO overconfidence and its influence on merger premiums
- Comparison of merger premiums paid by founder-CEOs and manager-CEOs
- The role of CEO overconfidence in the overpayment problem during mergers
- Developing a new and comprehensive measure of overconfidence
- Implications of founder-CEO overconfidence for shareholders and target firms
Zusammenfassung der Kapitel (Chapter Summaries)
Chapter One introduces the research topic, outlining its significance and providing context. It details the research aims and intended contribution. Chapter Two presents a comprehensive literature review, covering various aspects related to merger premiums, M&A in the high-tech industry, CEO overconfidence, and founder-CEO characteristics. Chapter Three delves into the research methodology and data sample used for the study. It describes the variables, including the dependent variable, overconfidence measure, and control variables. It also explains the data collection process and sample description. Chapter Four presents the empirical results and analysis obtained from the study. It analyzes the relationship between founder-CEO overconfidence and merger premiums, explores the impact of CEO overconfidence on M&A decisions, and examines differences in merger premiums paid by founder-CEOs and manager-CEOs. The chapter also includes robustness checks to ensure the reliability of the findings.
Schlüsselwörter (Keywords)
The main keywords and focus topics of the text include: founder-CEO overconfidence, merger premiums, high-tech industry, M&A, CEO overconfidence, overpayment problem, corporate governance, strategic leadership, and new measure of overconfidence. The dissertation explores the impact of founder-CEO overconfidence on merger decisions, examines the differences between founder-CEOs and manager-CEOs, and contributes to the understanding of cognitive biases in strategic decision-making.
- Quote paper
- Christoph Meyer (Author), 2014, The Effect of Founder-CEO Overconfidence on Merger Premium, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/299190