Managerial Theories and the Principal Agent Problem. The Conflict between Managers’ and Shareholders’ Objectives

Name: Managerial Theories and the Principal Agent Problem. The Conflict between Managers’ and Shareholders’ Objectives
Author: Bsc (Honours) Economics Thabani Nyoni

Nyoni, Thabani

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Managerial Theories and the Principal Agent Problem. The Conflict between Managers’ and Shareholders’ Objectives

Essay, 2015

5 Pages

Bsc (Honours) Economics Thabani Nyoni (Author)

Abstract or Introduction

While it is important to understand the various objectives of firms, it is equally important also to note that some of these objectives may be inconsistent or incompatible with each other due to the principal-agent problem that normally exists between shareholders (owners of the firm) and managers (those who control the firm). This essay serves to analyse some managerial theories in light of the principal-agent problem and the conflict of interest between the shareholders and managers.

Details

Title: Managerial Theories and the Principal Agent Problem. The Conflict between Managers’ and Shareholders’ Objectives
Author: Bsc (Honours) Economics Thabani Nyoni (Author)
Year: 2015
Pages: 5
Catalog Number: V302048
ISBN (eBook): 9783668007352
ISBN (Book): 9783668007369
File size: 383 KB
Language: English
Keywords: managerial, theories, principal, agent, problem, conflict, managers’, shareholders’, objectives
Price (Ebook): 6.99

Quote paper: Bsc (Honours) Economics Thabani Nyoni (Author), 2015, Managerial Theories and the Principal Agent Problem. The Conflict between Managers’ and Shareholders’ Objectives, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/302048

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