Ultimately, the question “Which factors have been favoring and obstructing power sharing in Bosnia and Macedonia?” will be answered in this thesis. The first part will offer the theoretical framework following Arend Lijphart's Favorable Conditions for Consociational Democracy, which has been subject of constant readjustment over the course of his different studies on consociationalism. Following a brief introduction on the theory of consociationalism, the nine favorable factors of power sharing by Lijphart will be explained in greater detail. External actors will be added as an additional factor up for review. Criticism of Lijphart's factors will conclude the first part of the thesis.
The main part of the thesis is concerned with the actual case studies of Bosnia and Macedonia. The theoretical model will be applied to the countries realities, by dedicating a chapter to each factor. Each chapter will end with a short conclusion on whether the factor can be considered favorable in the respective countries, while also including a brief comparison between Bosnia and Macedonia.
Moreover, the conclusion will draw a comparison of the effects of the favorable factors in Bosnia and Macedonia and therefore help assessing the relevance of Lijphart’s favorable factors in general.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
2 The favorable factors for power sharing
2.1 Smallness
2.2 The composition of segments
2.3 Geographical concentration of segments
2.4 Socioeconomic differences
2.5 Tradition of elite accommodation
2.6 Overarching Loyalties
2.7 External threats
2.8 External actors
2.9 Criticism
3 The concept of favorable factors applied to Bosnia and Macedonia
3.1 Smallness
3.2 The composition of segments
3.3 Geographical concentration of segments
3.4 Socioeconomic differences
3.5 Tradition of elite accommodation
3.6 Overarching loyalties
3.7 External threats
3.8 External actors
4 Conclusion
Research Objectives and Focus
This thesis aims to assess which factors favor or obstruct the implementation and maintenance of power-sharing structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. By applying Arend Lijphart’s theoretical framework of favorable conditions for consociational democracy, the study investigates how internal demographic composition, socioeconomic status, and external influences shape the democratization process in these post-conflict societies.
- Comparative analysis of power-sharing mechanisms in Bosnia and Macedonia.
- Evaluation of Lijphart’s nine favorable conditions for consociationalism.
- Examination of the role of external actors in peacebuilding and institutional stability.
- Investigation of socioeconomic obstacles and the impact of national identity on democratization.
- Assessment of whether established power-sharing models successfully mitigate or exacerbate ethnic tensions.
Excerpt from the Book
The concept of favorable factors applied to Bosnia and Macedonia
Following, the main part of this study will dedicate one chapter to each factor. First in order Bosnia will be up for review, followed by Macedonia. Each chapter will end with a short conclusion on whether the reviewed factor can be considered favorable or unfavorable for power sharing in the respective country. The chapter conclusion will also provide a brief comparison between Bosnia and Macedonia.
The focus of the study covers the investigation period from 1991 onwards. The phase between 1991-1995 in Bosnia and 1991-2001 in Macedonia encompasses the crucial time prior to the implementation of power sharing. The beginning of the period starts with the declaration of independence of the respective country, which is followed by the subsequent beginning of violent hostilities in Bosnia (1992-1995) and Macedonia (2001). Moreover, the time period after the implementation of the DPA (1995) and OFA (2001) casts light on the current difficulties in the development and maintenance of the established power sharing structures.
Chapter Summary
1 Introduction: This chapter introduces the research context, highlighting the persistent challenges to democratic consolidation in Bosnia and Macedonia and defining the study's goal to evaluate power-sharing factors.
2 The favorable factors for power sharing: This chapter outlines Arend Lijphart’s theoretical model of consociationalism, detailing the nine conditions that theoretically promote stability in plural societies and introducing external actors as an additional factor.
3 The concept of favorable factors applied to Bosnia and Macedonia: This central section systematically applies Lijphart's factors to the case studies, examining how elements like smallness, segment composition, and external threats manifest and impact each nation.
4 Conclusion: This chapter synthesizes the findings, arguing that the presence of favorable factors does not guarantee successful consociationalism and that elite behavior and a shared sense of nationhood are critical determinants.
Keywords
Power Sharing, Consociationalism, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Arend Lijphart, Democracy, Democratization, Ethnic Conflict, Elite Accommodation, External Actors, Dayton Peace Agreement, Ohrid Framework Agreement, Nationalism, Stateness, Decentralization
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this study?
The study evaluates why some countries with power-sharing arrangements successfully democratize while others struggle, specifically focusing on Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia.
What is the central research question?
The thesis asks: "Which factors have been favoring and obstructing power sharing in Bosnia and Macedonia?"
Which theoretical framework does the author utilize?
The author utilizes Arend Lijphart's "Favorable Conditions for Consociational Democracy" as the primary analytical lens, while augmenting it to include the role of external actors.
What methodology is employed?
The research conducts a comparative case study, analyzing the political, economic, and institutional realities of Bosnia and Macedonia from 1991 to the present day.
What are the main thematic areas covered?
Key themes include the impact of country size, the composition of ethnic segments, socioeconomic disparities, the role of external actors, and the challenges of building a shared national identity.
How is the success of power-sharing measured?
Success is measured by the stability of the state, the effectiveness of political decision-making, and the reduction of violent inter-ethnic conflict.
How did the legacy of Yugoslavia influence these nations?
The Yugoslav legacy provided formal power-sharing institutions, but these were often biased or dysfunctional, ultimately failing to provide the political elites with sufficient experience in cooperative governance.
What role did external actors play in Macedonia versus Bosnia?
In Bosnia, external actors assumed direct executive power through the Office of the High Representative (OHR), whereas in Macedonia, their role was less intrusive, focusing on facilitating reform and incentivizing integration through the EU accession process.
Does the author conclude that Lijphart's theory is universal?
No, the author argues that Lijphart's factors are not deterministic and that the success of power-sharing is more heavily dependent on the attitudes and behaviors of local political elites.
- Quote paper
- Julia Zhorzel (Author), 2015, The Favorable Factors of Power Sharing, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/311969
