The present thesis examines the factors that led to the development of counterinsurgency doctrine in the United States Army and Marine Corps, focusing on the period from 1898-1940, and why the two organizations had strikingly different approaches and beliefs about the importance of this doctrine.
When the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz described war as “simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means,” he was writing primarily with reference to conventional warfare between the national armies fighting for the achievement of a specific set of political objectives. However, Clausewitz's understanding of war is equally applicable to a different kind of warfare: revolutionary warfare, defined by John Shy and Thomas Collier as “the seizure of political power by the use of armed force.” In this type of warfare, the insurgent force attempts to gain political power (usually the power of the state) while the counterinsurgent force—usually the state, although sometimes supported by outside actors—attempts to retain its hold on political power. Revolutionary war is at its heart a struggle for the support of the people, an explicitly political kind of warfare.
The problems of waging a successful counterinsurgency have plagued military experts for centuries. In a counterinsurgency, the strengths of a conventional military power are turned into weaknesses, as applying overwhelming force is generally counterproductive to the goal of winning popular support. For most conventional military forces, fighting a counterinsurgency
means changing the organization's very way of thinking about warfare. Military organizations known for their technological and conventional warfare prowess are forced to adopt new strategies and ideas when faced with the harassing tactics of
insurgents who need only strike when it suits them, while the counterinsurgent force must defend everything, everywhere, at all times. Isolating the insurgents from the population becomes the foremost goal of the counterinsurgency, requiring a delicate and shifting balance of offensive, defensive, and political operations often quite separate from the normal scope of military training and preparation.
Table of Contents
Introduction: The Special Problems of Counterinsurgency
1. Why Do Military Organizations Develop Doctrine, Anyway?
Types of Doctrine
Literature Review
Methodology
2. Remembering, Relearning, and Unlearning
The Army and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1898-1940
Historical Background
Wars in the Philippines
The Army at Home
3. Learning, Relearning, and Formalizing
The Marine Corps and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1898-1940
Historical Background
Wars in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua
Reaching Comprehensive Formal Counterinsurgency Doctrine
4. Putting the Cases Together
Conclusion: Preparing for the Next War(s)?
Research Objectives and Themes
This thesis investigates why, between 1898 and 1940, the United States Marine Corps developed comprehensive formal doctrine for counterinsurgency, while the U.S. Army — despite having similar operational experiences — failed to do so. The research seeks to identify the organizational factors, perceptions of mission, and institutional pressures that account for these divergent approaches to codifying lessons learned in warfare.
- Comparison of organizational learning patterns in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps.
- Distinction between formal and informal, comprehensive and limited military doctrine.
- The impact of institutional mission identity on doctrinal development.
- Evaluation of existing bureaucratic change models in military contexts.
- Historical analysis of counterinsurgency efforts from the Philippine-American War through the Latin American interventions.
Excerpt from the Book
Formal and Informal Doctrine
First, a distinction will be made between two forms of doctrine: formal and informal. Formal doctrine is the official, written instructions of the organization and the officially proscribed lessons transmitted through the organization's schools. Informal doctrine, on the other hand, can be found in items such as letters, professional journal articles, reading lists, and student papers produced by members of the organization, although informal doctrine may also consist of unwritten understandings. While informal doctrine is not the official policy of the organization, it reflects the general understandings of the members of the organization about the proper way to respond to various situations. Informal doctrine thus gives the organization's members a set of guidelines that can help govern their actions, especially in the absence of formal doctrine.
Distinguishing between formal and informal doctrine is especially useful when studying counterinsurgency doctrine because historically such doctrine has been developed through informal means. To rely only on the changes in formal doctrine would be to miss the important developments in doctrine that go on informally within the organization. However, formal doctrine represents a more organized and cohesive approach to a specific set of circumstances, indicating a higher level of organizational agreement on proper procedures. Additionally, the development of formal doctrine imposes costs upon the organization—in time and attention spent upon its development—so it is unlikely to be developed unless there is some organizational interest in doing so. Whether the organization has formal or informal doctrine allows for a measurement of the organization's level of interest in preparing for a particular kind of warfare and its level of consensus about lessons learned.
Summary of Chapters
Introduction: The Special Problems of Counterinsurgency: Outlines the fundamental challenge of counterinsurgency as a political struggle for support of the people and introduces the thesis puzzle regarding the divergent doctrinal responses of the Army and Marine Corps.
1. Why Do Military Organizations Develop Doctrine, Anyway?: Establishes definitions for doctrine and presents the theoretical framework and hypotheses regarding bureaucratic change and doctrinal evolution that will be tested.
2. Remembering, Relearning, and Unlearning: Analyzes the U.S. Army's experience from 1898 to 1940, demonstrating how it prioritized conventional warfare and ultimately failed to institutionalize counterinsurgency lessons despite significant practical experience.
3. Learning, Relearning, and Formalizing: Examines the Marine Corps' path to institutionalizing counterinsurgency doctrine through the development of the Small Wars Manual, driven by its mission identity as an expeditionary force.
4. Putting the Cases Together: Compares the two organizational outcomes against the initial hypotheses to explain why mission perception and internal consensus are the primary drivers of formal doctrinal development.
Conclusion: Preparing for the Next War(s)?: Synthesizes the findings, offering implications for how military organizations can better institutionalize lessons learned from counterinsurgency operations to avoid the costs of repeated relearning.
Keywords
Counterinsurgency, Military Doctrine, U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, Bureaucratic Change, Small Wars, Organizational Culture, Formal Doctrine, Informal Doctrine, Expeditionary Warfare, Institutional Learning, Philippine-American War, Latin American Interventions, Military Innovation, Warfare Tactics.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core subject of this thesis?
The thesis focuses on the history of counterinsurgency doctrine development within the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps between 1898 and 1940, investigating why the two organizations reacted differently to their shared experiences.
What are the central themes explored in the work?
The key themes include the distinction between formal and informal doctrine, organizational identity and mission perception, the bureaucratic costs of doctrine development, and the institutionalization of lessons learned in unconventional warfare.
What is the primary research question?
The study asks why the Marine Corps chose to develop comprehensive formal doctrine for counterinsurgency during the 1898-1940 period, while the Army, despite similar operational requirements, largely neglected to do so.
Which methodology is employed in this research?
The author uses a narrative panel analysis of comparative history, examining the development of both organizations over time to control for the variables of national culture and political system while contrasting their doctrinal outcomes.
What topics does the main body cover?
The main body provides detailed historical case studies of both services, analyzing their operational challenges in the Philippines, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, and how these specific conflicts influenced their internal documentation and manuals.
Which keywords best characterize this study?
Key terms include counterinsurgency, military doctrine, organizational culture, expeditionary warfare, and bureaucratic learning.
How does the Marine Corps' mission identity influence their doctrine?
The research argues that because the Marine Corps identified itself as an expeditionary and small-wars-focused force, it was more incentivized to institutionalize lessons from counterinsurgency into comprehensive formal manuals.
Why did the U.S. Army prioritize conventional warfare over counterinsurgency?
The Army viewed itself as a peer competitor to European-style powers and considered counterinsurgency operations to be distracting "police missions" that did not fit their vision for a modernized, large-scale conventional fighting force.
- Quote paper
- Lauren Raouf (Author), 2008, Learning, Relearning, and Unlearning. The Development of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in the United States Army and Marine Corps, 1898-1940, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/321077
