The Islamic State´s [IS] establishment of a caliphate in 2014 received massive media coverage worldwide. The media has primarily focused on how IS use mass media, the Internet, extreme violence and lately, the terrorist attacks in Paris.
Terrorists who want to establish a caliphate are not new. Why exactly did IS establish a caliphate? Also, why didn´t al-Qaeda? This will be the main questions I want to explore in this essay. To answer these questions, I will utilize the fragile state concept.
Both al-Qaeda and IS have presented the establishment of a caliphate as one of their ultimate goals. Both organizations belong to the same Islamic school of theology: jihadist-Salafism. Both organizations have had success and become dominant groups in the jihadi cause. Therefore, it is interesting to compare the two groups in light of the status of Iraqi state to see if the fragile state concept can explain anything.
In this essay, I will compare 2000-2001 al-Qaeda with 2013-2014 IS. I have chosen two different periods in time because after 9/11 al-Qaeda was quickly reduced in terms of operational capabilities and changed its strategy from direct action to controlling and advising other affiliate groups. Thus, the assumed best chances for al-Qaeda’s ability to establish a caliphate was before 9/11. IS have fluctuated somewhat more regarding size and power but arguably increased in strength after US troops left Iraq in 2011 and the Syrian civil war erupted. As the caliphate was declared in 2014, this marks the time span that it is interesting to analyse IS.
This essay consists of five parts: a brief history of IS, al-Qaeda and Iraq, the concept and theory of fragile states and definitions, method, an analysis of the variables and a conclusion.
At a glance
- Compares Iraq’s 13 recorded terrorism incidents in 2000–2001 with more than 6,700 in 2013–2014
- Bases its qualitative, literature-based analysis primarily on secondary sources
- 32 sources in the bibliography
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Historical background
2.a. The Islamic State
2.b. Al-Qaeda
2.c. Iraq
2.c.i. 2000-2001
2.c.ii. 2013-2014
3. Concept and Theory of Fragile States
4. Caliphate
5. Method
6. Discussion
6.a. A fragile state?
6.b. The loss of physical control of its territory or monopoly on the legitimate use of force
6.c. The erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions and the inability to provide reasonable public services
6.d. The inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community
6.e. Al-Qaeda
7. Conclusion
Purpose and Themes
This essay asks whether the fragile-state concept can help explain why the Islamic State (IS) established a caliphate in 2014 while al-Qaeda did not establish one before 9/11. It compares Iraq in 2000–2001 and 2013–2014 alongside the strategies and histories of the two organizations.
- Fragile-state definitions and the Fund for Peace criteria
- Historical development of IS and al-Qaeda
- Changes in Iraqi authority, security, and public services
- Territorial control, military capacity, and Sunni support
- Contrasting strategies for establishing a caliphate
Excerpt from the Book
The loss of physical control of territory and the emergence of the caliphate
The fragile state of Iraq seemed to have an impact on how successful IS was in establishing a caliphate. The first caliphate was established by IS in 2006 and was nearly obliterated in 2008 (McCants 2015, 124; Hashim 2014, 73). Comparing the state of 2006-2008 and the post-2014 state, can give some insight into why the post-2014 state proved more successful. The state established in 2006 “[…] had virtually no land of its own […] Neither did it monopolize violence […] or consistently provide services.” (McCants 2015, 135). In addition, it “[…] did not have the resources or personnel to rule over a territory and people.” (Hashim 2014, 73). In contrast, the 2014 state quickly gained control of large areas of land in both Iraq and Syria, controlled them with monopolized violence and provided better service to its people than before (Hashim 2014, 78; Lister 2014, 4).
One of the biggest differences of 2006 Iraq and 2014 Iraq was the presence and absence of American military personnel. In 2006 between 125.000 to 160.000 U.S. military personnel was present in Iraq (Amy Belasco 2014, 9). According to McCants (2015, 125) “[…]the Americans simply had too many troops on the ground, and the Sunni tribes were too willing to cooperate with the Shi’a-dominated government in Baghdad[…]”. In contrast, there are no American troops in Iraq in 2014. McCants (2015, 125) suggests that the absence of U.S. troops in Iraq combined with Sunni distrust with the government in Baghdad contributed in providing favourable conditions for the establishment of an Islamic State in 2014.
Another aspect of the military success of IS was the availability of military and intelligence trained high-ranking Sunni’s sympathizers who did not wish to serve the Shia-dominated government (Lister 2014, 20-21). These men had both experience and education in military and intelligence operations that was valuable to IS. Lister (2014, 21) holds these high-ranking officers responsible for having “[…] brought a level of professionalism to IS’s ability to operate as an efficient and capable organization.”. How important to the establishment of the caliphate these officers are difficult to access, but their impact on military and intelligence operations arguably had an important impact. The success of military campaigns also contributes to recruiting, new funds and consolidating of territory. This can have an impact on the chance of establishing a caliphate.
On the other hand, the connection between the loss of physical control of territory and monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and the defection of high-ranking officers is not automatic. Officers can have different agendas for defection, and the state may very well be stable for them doing so.
Chapter Summaries
Introduction: The essay frames its central question around why IS declared a caliphate in 2014 while al-Qaeda did not do so before 9/11. It proposes comparing the groups against the changing condition of the Iraqi state.
Historical background: This chapter traces the development of IS and al-Qaeda and contrasts Iraq under Saddam Hussein with Iraq after the 2003 invasion and the 2011 U.S. withdrawal.
Concept and Theory of Fragile States: The essay discusses contested definitions of state fragility and adopts the Fund for Peace criteria to examine possible links between fragility, terrorism, and caliphate formation.
Caliphate: The chapter describes differing views on the caliphate and establishes a working definition as a political-religious state led by a caliph.
Method: The study uses a qualitative, literature-based approach, relying primarily on secondary sources and discussing reliability and validity limitations.
Discussion: The analysis compares Iraq’s fragility across two periods and considers territorial control, public services, international standing, and the differing priorities of IS and al-Qaeda.
Conclusion: The essay argues that Iraq’s fragile condition helps explain IS’s opportunity to establish a caliphate, while al-Qaeda’s strategy offers a different explanation for its failure to do so.
Keywords
fragile states, Islamic State, IS, al-Qaeda, Iraq, caliphate, terrorism, state fragility, Sunni population, territorial control, public services, jihadist-Salafism, Fund for Peace, qualitative research
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the essay about?
It examines whether Iraq’s state fragility helps explain why IS established a caliphate in 2014 while al-Qaeda did not establish one before 9/11.
Which main themes does the essay address?
Its themes include state fragility, the histories and strategies of IS and al-Qaeda, political and security conditions in Iraq, and differing approaches to establishing a caliphate.
What is the central research question?
The essay asks whether the fragile-state concept can explain why IS established a caliphate in 2014 and pre-9/11 al-Qaeda did not.
What research method does it use?
It uses a qualitative, literature-based approach, relying primarily on secondary academic sources.
What does the main analysis examine?
It compares Iraq in 2000–2001 and 2013–2014, considering territorial control, legitimate authority, public services, and interaction with other states.
Which keywords characterize the work?
Fragile states, Islamic State, al-Qaeda, Iraq, caliphate, terrorism, and jihadist-Salafism are among its key terms.
How does the essay define a caliphate?
It uses a combined definition: a political-religious state under Islamic rule led by a caliph as spiritual head and temporal ruler.
What specific Iraqi periods does the comparison cover?
The essay compares Iraq in 2000–2001 with Iraq in 2013–2014, relating the changing political and security context to the groups’ opportunities.
Which framework does the essay apply to assess fragility?
It adopts the Fund for Peace’s four attributes, including loss of territorial control, erosion of legitimate authority, inability to provide public services, and inability to interact as a full member of the international community.
- Quote paper
- Aleksander Bjelland Koldingsnes (Author), 2015, The fragile state concept and the emergence of the caliphate, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/337997