Understanding Kidnapping as a Political Act. A Case of the Niger Delta


Term Paper, 2016
27 Pages, Grade: A-

Excerpt

Contents

The Niger-Delta and a Chequered History of Violence

What is Kidnapping?

The State, Multinational Corporations and Insurgents: A Triad of Uneasy Relationship.

Enter NDPVF and MEND: Towards Conceptualizing Kidnapping as a Political Instrument

The Political Nature of Kidnapping

Conclusion

Bibliography

The Nigerian state is facing problems of unprecedented proportions. Boko Haram, a deadly sect that is bent on Islamizing the country, has destabilized the northeastern part of the country, killing, maiming, and displacing hordes of people from their abodes. In Lagos and the major cities, frequent turnover of university graduates without the institutional mechanisms to support their absorption into the workforce has increased the rate of unemployment to alarming levels. In Abuja, the seat of government, institutions are so weak that corruption has been institutionalized. More worryingly, kidnapping of expatriates in the oil-rich Niger-Delta region has added to the twists of insecurity bedevilling the Nigerian state in space and scale.

Of the challenges enumerated, kidnapping in the Niger-Delta as a phenomenon deserves urgent scrutiny. Other security challenges faced by Nigeria, although important, have a veiled connection to the violent developments in the Niger-Delta. The region is the goose that lays the golden eggs of the Nigerian state. Indeed, 90 percent of Nigeria’s foreign earnings comes from the sale of crude oil explored from the region. It is from the revenues from the region that other challenges afflicting the nation receives concomitant resource attention. Therefore, ensuring the unfettered production of oil while guaranteeing the safety of oil workers is not only important to the Nigerian state but at the core of its survival. This paper is thus saddled with the task of examining the political nature of kidnapping and disaggregating it kidnapping for other means (crime) as well as implications for strategic studies.

The last decade of the twentieth century marked a watershed in the history of the struggle to control resources in the region. Armed insurgency became the new normal and seen as a tactic to even the odds against multinational oil corporations who, from time immemorial, colluded with the Nigerian state to shortchange the people of the region. Thus the region became an amphitheatre for highly dangerous, homegrown militant groups to unleash mayhem on Nigeria’s and multinational corporation’s oil facilities, infrastructure and architecture. The vandalization of pipelines, occupation of oil facility and illegitimate oil bunkering became the order of the day.[1] Led by groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger-Delta (MEND) and the Niger-Delta Peoples’ Volunteer Force (NDPVF),[2] kidnapping in the region was portrayed within the orbit of a regional social movement that is bent on using kidnapping of expatriates as a tactic to right historic wrongs associated with economic and resource exploitation as well as environmental degradation of the Niger-Delta region. Amid the wanton destruction of oil infrastructure and kidnapping of expatriates, it is puzzling that the Nigerian government has not been able to nip the act in the bud. Attempts to placate insurgent groups by granting them amnesty and placating them have been partially successful.[3] Against this backdrop, Western multinational corporations, led by Shell, and fearing for the lives of its foreign workers, have begun to divest from Nigeria and their place usurped by local and oriental firms.[4] Reflecting on these developments, one cannot but wonder: why expatriates and why has the Nigerian government found kidnapping intractable to quell?

The Niger-Delta and a Chequered History of Violence

The history of the Niger Delta in the twentieth century is a constellation of violence. Consequently, near identical reasons have been advanced by academic scholars as pivotal to understanding violence activities in the region. Michael Watts, whose research cuts across the political economy of Africa has been at the forefront of scholars that have attempted to explain violence in the Niger Delta focusing on endogenous and exogenous variables.[5] Watts’, in one of his works on the Niger Delta with Ike Okonta and Von Kemedi, is concerned with why “oil producing communities in the Niger Delta… the site of intense conflict and violence”?[6] Styled “petro-violence”, the authors attribute conflict in the Niger Delta to lack of concrete governance at the municipal level occasioned by the menacing activities oil corporations in the region.[7] One recurrent theme in all of Watts’ works on the Niger Delta is that peace in the region was endangered by historic marginalization, lack of democratic rule at the municipal level, corporate irresponsibility, and institutionalized corruption by the Nigerian state.[8] Without question, Watts provides a template for understanding violence in the Niger Delta. While his works are anchored on causality, he makes no genuine attempt to conceptualize kidnapping as a political act. Other works on the Niger Delta have often followed similar trajectories.[9]

In the same vein, there have been attempts to find causality between kidnapping and politics. Mark Turner notes that throughout human history, did not bear resonance with politics. He finds that infusing political motives into kidnapping started in the 1970s. In his classification of kidnappings, he differentiates between political and non-political kidnappings.[10] Though this work classifies kidnapping using a binary approach, the author and a few others have found that it is difficult to separate economic motivations from political kidnappings.[11] What these authors have failed to do, however, explore kidnappings that hurt the interest of the modern state. As a result, this paper casts doubt on earlier works on political kidnapping as a useful recipe for understanding the security and survival of the modern state in the 21st century. A proper attempt to conceptualize kidnapping within state apparatus thus deserves our attention.

What is Kidnapping?

Contextualizing kidnapping within the field of contentious politics is an arduous exercise. This problem is further compounded when the term is substituted with terms such as hostage-taking and hijacking.[12] At best, kidnapping cannot be contextualized without an understanding of the motivation behind the act. As such, whatever judgment the reader will accord the context should be situated within the spectrum of the ‘incentive’ to kidnap. One place to start is Diana Concannon’s contextualization of Kidnapping.[13] Drawing on her work, Oriola identifies six forms of kidnapping: domestic kidnapping, which takes within a family; political kidnapping, which is seen as a means to a political end; predatory killing of an adults and minors; kidnapping for profit; kidnapping as a form of reprisal; and “staged kidnapping.”[14] Concannon’s work, which is an inductive examination of 100 randomly selected cases of kidnapping in the United States offers a template but insufficient to fully comprehend the rationale for kidnapping of expatriates in the Niger-Delta. Despite this submission, one must, however, understand that Concannon drives home the point that kidnapping is an antisocial activity that drives fear into the hearts of its victims. A more useful classification, as Oriola has suggested, is Nseabasi Akpan’s[15] classification of kidnapping, which helps understand and amplify the Nigerian situation.

Akpan, citing the work of Mark Turner[16] traces the origin of the term “kidnapping” to 17th century England where children were “kidnapped” and traded as slaves to colonial officers and farmers.[17] He nonetheless admits that the term has been expanded to accommodate associated behaviours. Reflecting on the Niger-Delta, Akpan sees “kidnapping as a general liberation struggle” owing to the government’s overt and covert inability to respond to agitations of marginalization of residents and lack of development of the region; “kidnapping for economic reasons” in which foreign oil workers are seen as “demand” and the ransom paid by multinational corporations as “supply”; “kidnapping as a political tool” where kidnapping is orchestrated out of political considerations but with a proviso that victims are released in exchange for ransoms; and “kidnapping as a new form of crime” in which ordinary citizens are captured in order for the victims to part with their hard earned money.[18]

Explicating Akpan’s classification, his classification is more useful as it clearly addresses why kidnapping of expatriates has been the modus operandi of insurgents. Akpan is right to organizations such as MEND and NDPVF see their struggle as one against state oppression and exploitation by multinational corporations – trends that predated Nigeria’s independence. In fact, when MEND claimed responsibility for the abduction of Shell foreign oil workers in 2006, it demanded among other things that the federal government of Nigeria abrogate all laws associated with land and resource ownership in the Niger-Delta, the Niger-Delta should be allowed to control its resources, and funds be set aside to morph the region of environmental degradation caused by years of oil exploration.[19] Although this paper focuses on the linkage between kidnapping and politics, we cannot exclude the economic incentives that heralds the aftermath of the act. Oriola, citing Matthew Harwood, reflects that oil workers paid a ransom of an average of $250,000 to release each expatriate[20] and that the oil industry expended $3 billion on security at the zenith of insurgents’ activities between 2007 and 2009.[21]

While this paper agrees with Akpan, Stephanie Hanson suggestion that kidnapping in the region is essentially a political act bears more resonance.[22] Again, we cannot discount the economic value that has accrued to insurgents since kidnapping and associated ills began.[23] But we can conclude that some criminals have drawn inspirations from kidnapping in the region to further their agenda. Kidnapping as a political act is, however, gaining currency the world over. The kidnap and subsequent release of Robert Bergdahl, an American soldier in exchange for 5 Taliban members held at Guantanamo Bay is a case in point.

Attempts to understand kidnapping in the Niger-Delta region requires its delineation from other forms of the act. Indeed, other forms of kidnapping in Nigeria have been identified since Shell workers were first kidnapped in 2006 by Niger-Delta militants. Most of these types had economic dimensions to them. In addition, most occurred in the southeastern part of Nigeria. Here, Rodanthi Tzanneli appears useful. For him, “policy and risk assessment milieux discursively construct it [kidnapping] as a ‘threat to society’, and administrative studies have focused on classifications that describe the phenomenon.”[24] He is convinced that understanding kidnapping should mirror all the “characteristics of a rationalized system of exchange, based on rules and regulations reminiscent of legitimate business.”[25] What Tzanelli has done is to place kidnapping within the context of psychology by placing kidnappers’ motivation at the epicentre of his discourse. He also accords primacy to the economic nature of the act.

While not discounting the fact that kidnappers in the Niger Delta get ransom as a reward for kidnapping foreign oil workers, this reward is a just an add-on, not an end in itself. Without mincing words, and as Charles Tilly has pronounced,[26] kidnapping in its form and substance, is a “continuation of policy [politics] by other means.”[27] Of course we cannot see kidnapping in the Niger Delta as constituting war from the strategic standpoint but Clausewitz’s definition of war applies to our situation: “War is therefore an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.”[28] And for Clausewitz, war is essentially political.

No one in their right senses can say that kidnapping in the Niger Delta is not a violent act with the intent to cow the Nigerian government and multinational oil corporations into submitting to the demands of kidnappers. Most of these demands are political. Consequently, these insurgents have seen kidnapping as a political instrument to achieve their objectives. Whether or not these insurgents have achieved their objectives is open to scrutiny and beyond the purview of this paper.

The State, Multinational Corporations and Insurgents: A Triad of Uneasy Relationship.

The Niger-Delta sits in the southern part of the Nigerian map and constitutes approximately 7.5 percent of Nigeria’s land mass. Its place in the history of Nigeria as its economic nerve centre is uncontested. Paradoxically, the region has been marred by tension between state apparatus bent on controlling the resources of the region and resistance, sometimes violent, by a section of the population. The region gained prominence for its role in the supply of agricultural produce to industries in Western cities such as Liverpool, Manchester, Hamburg and Paris in the now infamous “legitimate trade.” The history of legitimate trade has been treated elsewhere[29] but what is relevant to our study is that, owing to the vast agricultural riches of the region, the British in 1884 signed a treaty with the people of the Niger-Delta culminating in the establishment of the “Oil Rivers Protectorate.”[30] The essence of naming the Niger-Delta a protected area was to provide an unfettered access of the region’s palm produce to industries in Europe. This exploitation without redress soon drew condemnation from some kingdoms in the Niger-Delta who sought means to curb this massive exploitation. King Jaja of Opobo of Opobo kingdom, Chief Nana Olomu of Itsekiri, and Eyo Honesty I’s resistance was met by superior military might and a high level of trickery[31] that not only humiliated these important leaders of their respective kingdoms, but one in which they never recovered from. The British then went on to conquer the whole of the Niger-Delta. By 1900, its incorporation into modern day Nigeria was complete.

The full significance of kidnapping in the Niger-Delta cannot be fully grasped without an excursion into the history of the discovery of oil in Nigeria and politics associated with it. As suggested in the preceding paragraph, the allure of the region’s fertile lands and rivers brimming with fish[32] proved irresistible to the British. The discovery of oil in the twentieth century and its attendant environmental impact truncated the region’s economy.

Oil prospecting started in the region in 1908 with a German company, Nigerian Bitumen Company leading the sway.[33] The company’s oil prospecting, however, had to come to an abrupt end with the defeat of Germany[34] in World War I (WWI) and the war guilt clause placed on the country. Exploration did not resume until after the Great Depression. By this time, the British Government, through the Colonial Mineral Ordinance[35] in 1937, had granted D’Arcy Petroleum (later styled Shell BP) the exclusive rights to the prospecting and exploration of oil in Nigeria. With Nigeria’s as its oyster, the company retreated to the Niger-Delta.[36] It is unclear why D’Arcy narrowed its operations to the Niger-Delta but it is probable that the company did so because it was on the coast, its role during legitimate trade, and because of the fact that the British had established an administrative centre in Calabar, another city east of the Niger-Delta. Thus, we can argue that D’Arcy wanted to keep open the lines of communication that had been established by the British colonial oligarchy in the region. Be that as it may, and as Yates has submitted, the incursion of D’Arcy Petroleum into the Niger-Delta heralded “a new age of toxic oil pollution.”[37]

D’Arcy soon discovered oil in the region though not in commercial quantity. But it was clear to observers and analysts that it was a matter of time before oil was discovered in commercial quantity in the region. It is thus not surprising that by the 1950s, American might had broken all barriers ceding exclusive rights to British oil companies to prospect in the region. By 1965, oil behemoths such as Mobil, Chevron, Texaco, Safrap (later renamed Elf), and Agip[38] had staked their claims to the Niger-Delta thus ushering in the birth of multinational oil corporations (MNOCs) in the region. These corporations, responsible for over two-thirds of Nigeria’s crude oil production, discouraged the diversification of the industry into downstream production. The result was a Nigerian state that became a rentier state saddled with the task of producing crude oil and exporting it to the world capitalist economy.

Increase in crude oil production correlated with the increase in gas production. Since the Nigerian economy and indeed, the Niger-Delta was rural, gas production was wasted. According to Yates, “more than 90 percent of associated gas was ‘flared’ into the air.[39] This has resulted in various economic, health, and environmental complications for the region.[40]

Oil exploration and its negative impact on the Niger-Delta soon became unbearable to the inhabitants who had had their means of livelihood destroyed. Worryingly, oil exploration in the region had midwifed a range of health complications. As Nigeria approached independence, the fear of the people of the Niger-Delta became heightened. A commission set up by the government and headed by Harry Willink, the colonial secretary in Nigeria, to investigate this fear confirmed that the fear of minorities was well justified.[41] Attempts by the people of Niger-Delta to appeal to the Nigerian government before independence fell on deaf ears. The results were dissenting voices ready to champion the cause of the region. Led by Isaac Adaka Boro, the region witnessed an organized onslaught on the Nigerian state. For Boro, the Nigerian state had colluded with MNOCs to marginalize and exploit the region. On February 23, Boro positioned himself at Tontoubau, a thick forest in Kaiama, in Rivers (now Bayelsa State) with one-hundred and fifty-nine militants.[42] Before declaring the region “the Niger-Delta Peoples Republic”, Boro made a statement that resonated with his group’s objective:

Today is a great day, not only in your lives, but also in the history of the Niger Delta. Perhaps, it will be the greatest day for a long time. This is not because we are going to bring the heavens down, but because we are going to demonstrate to the world what and how we feel about oppression. Remember your 70-year-old grandmother who still farms before she eats; remember also your poverty-stricken people; remember, too, your petroleum which is being pumped out daily from your veins; and then fight for your freedom.[43]

Boro’s rebellion was subsequently crushed after a twelve-day battle with the Nigerian military.[44] The quashing of Boro’s rebellion, notwithstanding, there are important lessons to be learned. Just like the resistance by the leaders of kingdoms in the Niger Delta in the nineteenth century, Boro framed his struggle as an attempt to liberate the people of the Niger Delta from perceived injustice and exploitation. Unlike his predecessors, Boro’s struggle was well organized and coordinated. The Adaka Boro uprising thus signposts the beginning of organized violent and nonviolent struggles against the Nigerian state and MNOCs operating in the Niger-Delta.

[...]


[1] Tope Oriola, Criminal Resistance? The Politics of Kidnapping Oil Workers (Ashgate, 2013), p. 3

[2] I beamed my searchlight on these two organizations for the following reasons: the groups are largely constitutive of the Ijaw ethnic group; MEND can be seen as a subsidiary of NDPVF because it broke off from the latter; they employ different but reconciliatory tactics aimed at weakening the Nigerian establishment: NDPVF’s forte is pipeline vandalization and illegal oil bunkering while MEND is concerned with kidnapping. This paper is convinced that they both work in concert and not unthinkable that NDPVF carried out some form of kidnappings, too. This point is given concrete significance by the fact that MEND is “faceless” and little is known of its organized structure. Although it has a website and well-oiled organogram, no one can be definitive about who their leaders are. More so, they often make demands such as advocating for the release from detention of leaders of NDPVF. This paper, therefore, sees the two organizations as one.

[3] Iyabobola Ajibola, “Nigeria’s Amnesty Program: The Role of Empowerment in Achieving Peace and Development in Post-Conflict Niger Delta” Sage Open (July 2015)

[4] Martin Yeboah, “Oil and Gas: Local firms replace majors in Nigeria’s Delta” The Africa Report (November 2014) http://www.theafricareport.com/West-Africa/oil-and-gas-local-firms-replace-majors-in-nigerias-delta.html accessed January 26, 2016

[5] See Michael Watts, “Tipping point: slipping into darkness. Niger Delta.” Economies of Violence Working Papers, No. 23, Institute of International Studies, University of California (Berkeley, 2009); Michael Watts, “Crude politics: life and death on the Nigerian oil field. Niger Delta” Economies of Violence Working Papers, No. 25, Institute of International Studies, University of California (Berkeley, 2009); Michael Watts, “Imperial oil: The anatomy of a Nigerian oil insurgency. Niger Delta” Economies of Violence Working Papers, No. 17, Institute of International Studies, University of California (Berkeley, 2008); Michael Watts, Ike Okonta, and Von Kemedi, “Economies of Violence: Petroleum, Politics and Community Conflict in the Niger Delta, Nigeria” Economies of Violence Working Papers, No. 3, Institute of International Studies, University of California (Berkeley, 2004)

[6] Michael Watts, Ike Okonta, and Von Kemedi, “Economies of Violence: Petroleum, Politics and Community Conflict in the Niger Delta, Nigeria” Economies of Violence Working Papers, No. 3, Institute of International Studies, University of California (Berkeley, 2004), p. 1

[7] Michael Watts, Ike Okonta, and Von Kemedi, “Economies of Violence: Petroleum, Politics and Community Conflict in the Niger Delta, Nigeria” Economies of Violence Working Papers, No. 3, Institute of International Studies, University of California (Berkeley, 2004), p. 2

[8] Michael Watts, Ike Okonta, and Von Kemedi, “Economies of Violence: Petroleum, Politics and Community Conflict in the Niger Delta, Nigeria” Economies of Violence Working Papers, No. 3, Institute of International Studies, University of California (Berkeley, 2004), p. 3

[9] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Resource rents, governance, and conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 4 (2005), pp. 625-633; Aderoju Oyefusi, “Oil and the Probability of Rebel Participation Among Youths in the Niger Delta of Nigeria,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 45, No. 4 (July 2008), pp. 539-555

[10] Mark Turner, “Kidnapping and Politics,” International Journal of the Sociology of Law Vol. 26 (1998), pp. 145-160

[11] Mark Turner, “Kidnapping and Politics,” International Journal of the Sociology of Law Vol. 26; Richard Clutterbuck, Kidnap and Ransom: The Response (Faber and Faber, 1978)

[12] Richard Clutterburg, Kidnap, Highjack, and Extortion: The Response (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987)

[13] Diana Concanon, Kidnapping: An Investigator’s Guide to Profiling (London: Elsevier, 2008), p. 4

[14] Oriola, Criminal Resistance? op.cit. p. 4

[15] Nseabasi Akpan, “Kidnapping in Nigeria’s Niger Delta: An exploratory study” Journal of Social Sciences, 24, 1 (2010), pp. 33-42

[16] Mark Turner, “Kidnapping and Politics” International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 26 (1998) 145-160

[17] Akpan, op.cit., p.33

[18] Nseabasi Akpan, “Kidnapping in Nigeria’s Niger Delta: An exploratory study”, pp. 38-40

[19] Nseabasi Akpan, “Kidnapping in Nigeria’s Niger Delta: An exploratory study”, p. 8

[20] Matthew Harwood, “Perils amid profits in the Niger Delta” Security Management (September, 2007) https://sm.asisonline.org/migration/Pages/perils-amid-profits-niger-delta.aspx accessed on April 8, 2016; Tope Oriola, Criminal Resistance? p.1

[21] Tope Oriola, Criminal Resistance? pp. 1-2

[22] Stephanie Hanson, “MEND: The Niger-Delta’s Umbrella Militant Group”, Council on Foreign Relations (March 22, 2007), http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/mend-niger-deltas-umbrella-militant-group/p12920 accessed on January 26, 2016

[23] MEND and NDPVF have at different times vandalized oil installations and participated in oil bunkering, selling it to neighbouring countries. See Ludovica Laccino, “Nigeria’s oil war: Who are the Niger Delta militants?” International Business Times (September 24, 2015) http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/nigerias-oil-war-who-are-niger-delta-militants-1520580 accessed on April 8, 2016

[24] Rodanthi Tzanelli, “Capitalizing on Value: Towards a Sociological Understanding of Kidnapping” Sociology, Vol. 40(5): 929

[25] Tzanelli, op. cit., p.929

[26] Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge University Press, 2003)

[27] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. Carl Von Clausewitz On War (Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 87

[28] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. Carl Von Clausewitz On War (Princeton University Press, 1989), p.75

[29] J. C. Anene, Southern Nigeria in Transition (Cambridge, 1966); Dike Kenneth Onwuka, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1855 (Oxford, 1956)

[30] John Mukum Mbaku and Mwangi Kimenyi, “Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa” The Indian Journal of Social Science, Vol. 8, No. 3 (1995), p. 290

[31] J. C. Anene, “Ja Ja of Opobo” in Kenneth Dike, ed., Eminent Nigerians of the Nineteenth Century (London, 1956); David Dafinone and Peter Ekeh, ed., Warri City and British Colonial Rule in Western Niger Delta (January 2005) pp. 40-43; Rosalind I. J. Hacket, Religion in Calabar: The Religious Life and History of a Nigerian Town (Walter de Gruyter: January 1, 1988)

[32] Owing to the nature of the region, the primary occupation of the people was predominantly farming and fishing.

[33] For a discussion of the company and the regulation that gave it license to operate in the Niger-Delta, see A.O.Y. Raji and T. S. Abejide, “The British Mining and Oil Regulations in Colonial Nigeria: C. 1914-1960: An Assessment”, Singaporean Journal of Business Economics and Management Studies Vol. 2, No. 10 (2014), pp. 62-75

[34] Douglas Yates, The Scramble for African Oil: Oppression, Corruption and War for Control of Africa’s Natural Resources (Pluto Press, 2002), pp. 207-8.

[35] The Ordinance was formulated by Lord Lugard, Nigeria’s first colonial governor-general. The Ordinance gave sole rights to British interests to prospect oil in the region. Part VI of the Ordinance reads, “No lease or license shall be granted except to a British subject or to a British company registered in Great Britain or in a British colony and having its principal place of business within her majesty’s dominion, the chairman and managing director (if any) and the majority of the directors of which are British subjects.” Quoted in A.O.Y. Raji and T. S. Abejide, “The British Mining and Oil Regulations in Colonial Nigeria: C. 1914-1960: An Assessment”, Singaporean Journal of Business Economics and Management Studies Vol. 2, No. 10 (2014), p. 66

[36] Douglas Yates, The Scramble for African Oil, op. cit., p. 209

[37] Douglas Yates, The Scramble for African Oil, op. cit., p. 209

[38] Mobil (1955), Chevron (1961), Texaco (1963) are US-owned corporations. Agip (1962) is Italian and Safrap (Elf) is French.

[39] Douglas Yates, The Scramble for African Oil, op. cit., p. 209

[40] Anslem Ajuwo, “Negative Effects of Gas Flaring: The Nigerian Experience”, Journal of Environmental Pollution and Human Health 1.1. (2013): 6-8; Temi E. Ologunorisa, “A review of the effects of gas flaring on the Niger-Delta environment”, International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology 8.3 (2001): 249-55. Some of the effects range from the rise in global warming to the destruction of lakes and streams in the region as well the region’s vegetation. Soil nutrients have been depleted thereby destroying the people’s means of livelihood.

[41] Richard Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation (Africa World Press, 2004), p. 138

[42] Nseabasi Akpan, “Kidnapping in Nigeria’s Niger Delta: An exploratory study” Journal of Social Sciences, p. 37

[43] Quoted in Tope Oriola, Criminal Resistance? op.cit. p. 49

[44] Nseabasi Akpan, “Kidnapping in Nigeria’s Niger Delta: An exploratory study” Journal of Social Sciences, p. 37

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Title
Understanding Kidnapping as a Political Act. A Case of the Niger Delta
Course
Political Science
Grade
A-
Author
Year
2016
Pages
27
Catalog Number
V339042
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9783668287945
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9783668287952
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517 KB
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English
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understanding, kidnapping, political, case, niger, delta
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Ayo Peters (Author), 2016, Understanding Kidnapping as a Political Act. A Case of the Niger Delta, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/339042

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