What is a Speech Act? A brief introduction to Searle’s theory on speech acts

Inhaltsangabe oder Einleitung

John R. Searle was born in 1932 in Denver, Colorado. In his article What is a Speech Act? Searle develops a “theory in the philosophy of a language, according to which speaking in a language is a matter of performing illocutionary acts with certain intentions, according to constitutive rules (Grewendorf / Meggle 2002: 4). The following paper will deal with the ideas on speech acts developed in Searle’s article.
First, a fundamental understanding of the assumptions Searle’s theory is based on will be provided. There will be a brief introduction to the theories of J.L. Austin and H.P. Grice, whom Searle’s article was mostly influenced by. Grice’s Meaning and Austin’s How to do things with words will constitute the reading mostly consulted.
After providing a basis for Searle’s theory, his article What is a Speech Act? will be looked at in detail. The examinations will include Searle’s distinction between regulative rules and constitutive rules and his introduction of the notions ‘proposition-indicating element’ and ‘function-indicating device’, as derived from ‘illocutionary act’ and ‘propositional content of an illocutionary act’. The focus will then be on Searle’s conditions for the illocutionary act of promising, and the rules for the use of the function-indicating device for promising, which he derives from these conditions.
There will finally be a brief overview on revisions and amendments Searle developed on his theory after 1965. These include a more detailed classification of speech acts and a distinction between speaker meaning and sentence meaning.