From Independent Colony to Interventionist Empire. The U.S. and the Mexican War 1846-48

Contents

I. Introduction .. 2

II. The political landscape and the strategic reasoning behind the invasion .. 3

III. The major battles and the ongoing guerrilla war .. 6

1. The battles .. 7

2. The partisan war .. 11

IV. The aftermath of war and the consequences .. 18

V. Conclusion .. 18

VI. Bibliography .. 22

I. Introduction

The Mexican War from 1846-1848, is one of the more obscure, some would even say” forgotten” wars [1], out of the long list of international conflicts, the United States were party to.

It marks the first time though, that America as an independent nation invaded another independent nation, the multitude of armed conflicts with the native Indians and the former colonial powers since the Revolutionary War notwithstanding.

While the annexation of Texas and the following war, leading to the annexation of the whole modern south west of the USA, might have seemed to be the preordained outcome to most contemporary observers of the time, like John L. O´Sullivan, who actually coined the term Manifest Destiny in 1845 [2], it was by no way unavoidable.

Actually, a couple of thousand more votes for the moderate Whig Party candidate Henry Clay in 1844, might have turned the war a lot less bloody, if war had erupted at all. But the close victory of (D) James K. Polk [3], who actually campaigned on the annexation of Texas without Mexico´s approval, almost assured a bitter conflict. Alas, the most crucial reason for the outbreak of the Mexican War, was not the Anglo-Saxon´s belief in Manifest Destiny, and the subsequent ruthless push westwards, but Mexico´s weakness to resist it. While the two freshly independent countries were posed to clash over Texas´s western and southern boundaries, a war on this scale could have easily been averted, if not for President Polk´s diplomatic ineptitude, and the Mexican´ elites´ willingness to sacrifice several ten thousand people just to demonstrate defiance and to keep their face.

While being extremely important to fully grasp this war, the history of the independence of the Texan Republic in 1836, and the struggle over the question of slavery in the US Congress until the outbreak of the US Civil War, is beyond the scope of this work, and has therefore been omitted to some point.

II. The political landscape and the strategic reasoning behind the invasion

In marked contrast to the United States, Mexico became independent more or less by accident, when Napoleon overran Spain in 1808 [4], breaking down the formerly undisputed colonial overrule in the process. While there was a pro-Spanish and very conservative caretaker government in place in Mexico, it was soon challenged by the Hidalgo rebellion of 1810. Although Miguel Hidalgo was a white creole or criollo, he had no qualms about inciting Indians and castas against their fair skinned overlords, sparking a massacre among Spaniards in the cities of Guanajuato and Guadalajara. He was executed soon after, but the unrest continued till 1821, when General Agustin de Iturbide of the loyalists, convinced General Vincente Guerrero of the rebels, to join him to declare independence from Spain in August 1821. Spain conceded not officially but de facto, and Iturbide became Emperor Agustin I. in 1822. Thereby he betrayed almost all of the impoverished castas, who had done the bulk of the fighting, and the white criollo elite, albeit split into conservative and liberal factions, monopolized all political and economical power. He was overthrown just a few months later, by a young aspiring officer named Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, who would become long time president and the archetypical caudillo strongman soon after.

While the original conquest was surely genocidal in scope and brutality- compared to the 18 million people of the Aztec empire in 1519, only 7 million people lived in Mexico in 1846 [5] - the Spanish crown put the surviving indigenous societies under royal protection, guaranteeing both their communal structures and jurisdiction. This protected the Indians from the worst exploitations by the new criollo overlords, who were severely taxed and kept in check by Madrid. The tight centralized imperial control left Mexico backwards, but relatively peaceful, much like Syria and Palestine under Ottoman rule in the same time.

With Spain out of the picture, the new rulers started to exploit the Indians and lower Castas ruthlessly, and the fractured political scene left the country in a highly decentralized state, with local strongmen caring just for their own provinces, a problem further aggravated by the very dismal transport infrastructure. The mostly illiterate people identified mostly with their local turf, called patria chica.

The Juan Alvarez rebellion of 1842-44 just precipitated the war with the US. This particular rebellion is very telling about the conduct of Mexican caudillos: In order to strengthen his conservative supporters, President Santa Anna instigated a land reform in the southern provinces at the behest of General Nicolas Bravo, threatening the self-administration of the Indian communities and the relative power of the local strongman General Juan Alvarez. And since the latter was in the liberal fraction, he toured the Indian communities and incited a class based revolt [6]. When this revolt turned out of control again, threatening all white people like 30 years earlier, Alvarez switched sides and defeated the peasant army with crushing force. And Santa Anna was forced yet again into exile, after a rare bloodless coup in 1845, but not for the last time. This left Mexico City with a liberal government, without much support from the most influential statesmen, and nearly no money to spend.

On the North American side of the equation, the period of 1845-50 was the heyday of Manifest Destiny [7], and the push to the Pacific. Starting with the acquisition of Florida from Spain, the presidency of Andrew Jackson in the 1830ties saw a massive expansion, both to the south- and north-west, which led to trouble with the former colonial power Britain, and the freshly independent Mexico.

The young and vigorous Unites States were quite rich [8] and quickly expanding, whereas Mexico was in no way able to properly colonize even the comparatively rich lands of Texas and upper California. The Indian peasants were simply too tied to their ancestral lands, and inviting foreigners to settle en mass, was out of the question in the highly conservative and racist society.

After the independence of the short lived Texan Republic 1836, President Jackson put the eagerly awaited annexation of her by the US on indefinite hold, first to secure the nomination of his chosen successor Martin van Buren, and second, because the question of slavery in newly acquired territories already soured the political discussion.

His successors did not touch the issue either, until public opinion swayed towards full annexation. But when President Tyler tried to annex it, he´d already lost most of his supporters in the Senate, so his proposed treaty failed.

When James K. Polk, a former pro-slavery governor of Tennessee [9], ran for presidency as a Democratic Party candidate in 1844, with an explicit pro-annexation policy against the moderate Whig candidate Henry Clay, things escalated quickly into an international crisis. Polk won with just 38.000 votes, prompting Great Britain, who had her own border issue with the US over the Oregon territory, to support both Mexico and independent Texas against the US [10].

Having nearly no money left to spend, Mexico´s freshly appointed President Herrera offered to finally recognize Texas´ independence, in exchange for non-annexation and a definite border at the Nueces River, 150 miles northwest of the Rio Grande, the old provincial border between Coahuila and Texas during Spanish rule. The Mexicans wanted the arid space between the rivers as a buffer zone.

Since Texas was a point of national pride for Mexico´s elite, this offer of recognition on May 19, 1845, was considered as something akin to treason by many in the Capital, which led to Herrera´s ouster by V. Gomez Farias soon after.

Meanwhile, most Texan lawmakers had already declared their support for annexation by the States, and declined the long overdue offer of recognition on July 4, and dissolved the Republic of Texas on February 19, 1846. Further, they deliberately moved their border claim down to the Rio Grande, and as far west as Santa Fe in New Mexico, which was immediately supported by President Polk, who was fully aware, that this would result in war with Mexico. He actually made sure to incite more anger in Mexico, by sending Plenipotentiary Slidell to Mexico City, offering 25 Million $ for Texas, New Mexico and Upper Callifornia. He was not even received, for Mexico had demanded an impromptu commissioner [11]. Before Polk could even declare war by a very dubious procedure in Congress [12], Mexican cavalry clashed with General Taylor´s army, which was deliberately placed south of the Nueces River, thereby giving Polk the pretext to claim self-defence in the so called Thornton Affair at Rancho Carricitos in April 25 of 1846.

III. The major battles and the ongoing guerrilla war

The invading US Army force with a total in 1848 of 26.000 men [13], plus additional navy elements and up to 70.000 militias like the infamous Texas Rangers, was tiny compared to the over 7 million people living in Mexico at the time. While the American force more or less equalled the Mexican Army and National Guard of some 18.000 men and another 10.000 activated reserves [14], in size, it was way better armed. To begin with, the US had more rifled guns, which had been very effective already in the Revolutionary War [15] for long range sniping, modern caplock guns, and more importantly, they had a distinctive advantage at artillery [ 16], especially light field artillery, which proved to be decisive in the land battles. And last but not least, they enjoyed near total navy superiority, enabling them to launch otherwise extremely risky amphibious landings.

On the other hand, the Mexicans had a much larger body of cavalry, especially the much feared lancers, highly mobile cavalry equal to the famous contemporary Calcutta Light Lancers of the Crimean war, and the countless Mexican militias, household troops, partisan groups and glorified bandit formations, are rather impossible to quantify, because of their shifty nature. The Mayan tribal warriors in the Yucatan Caste War alone, boasted some 30.000 fighters in their full blown insurgency against the Mexican central government [17].

This mismatch between official troops of the line, and a far larger body of irregulars, was very well known by the US commanders, and proved to be their greatest headache soon after.

To sum up, the conventional historic view of the war, especially in early US sources, of a few decisive battles and sieges, and a clear cut victory after the fall of Mexico City in September 1847 [18], cannot prevail after a closer look, as will be shown in the next chapters of this work.

1. The battles

Out of a multitude of skirmishes and minor battles, two mayor field battles and two sieges stand out : The battles of Buena Vista and Cerro Gordo, and the sieges of Veracruz and Mexico City, or rather the Castle of Chapultepec guarding her.

While there had been a serious naval engagement between the Texan Republic and Mexico, resulting in the battle of Campeche in 1843, Mexico in 1846 did not put up any resistance at sea. To the contrary, her two very modern and well-armed ironclads Guadeloupe and Moctezuma, which did fight at Campeche 3 years earlier, were sold off to Britain, to prevent their capture by US forces [19].

This kind of defeatism and damage mitigation was rather typical for the Mexican behaviour during the war [20]. The general plan was to confine the invaders to the sparsely populated northern frontier territories, and if that failed, to blockade the passes through the Sierra Madre, and prepare for a landing at the Caribbean coast, which led directly to the population centers in the heartlands.

Even the first skirmish, the Thornton Affair at Rancho Carricitos, precipitated much of the remainder of the war; despite being mounted dragoons, Captain Thornton could not outrun the faster Mexican Lancers chasing him, ending up with the loss of both his squadrons. Till the end of the war and the American withdrawal from Mexico proper, US forces never managed to decisively defeat a Mexican cavalry force, simply by lack of speed and tactical stubbornness. Only one US officer, Joseph Lane, called for a mobile fast column to wage efficient counter-insurgency warfare [21].

Alas, their endeavour to keep the field army together, highly inspired by Napoleonic strategy and tactics, did a lot to help win the set piece field battles.

The early battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma in May 1846, were both decided by the very effective “flying artillery” [22], and the generally higher range, the Mexicans just did not came close enough to do serious damage.

[…]

[1] Wagenen Van, Michael S. : Remembering the Forgotten War: The Enduring Legacies of the U.S.- Mexican War. Amherst, 2012 , p. 5 a. 159-161, hence the title. In Mexico however, this peculiar war never slipped out of the nation´s cultural memory, since it constitutes a vital part of the genesis of modern post-revolutionary Mexico, ibid. p. 41 ff.

[2] Henderson, Timothy J.: A Glorious Defeat, Mexico and its War with the United States, New York 2007, p. 137

[3] Dusinberre, William: Slavemaster President, The Double Career of James Polk, Oxford 2003, p. 130-142

[4] Henderson: Glorious Defeat, 2007, p. 19-29

[5] Levinson, Irving W.: Wars within War, Mexican Guerillas, Domestic Elites and the United States of America 1846-48, Canada 2005, p. 1-7

[6] Levinson: Wars within War, 2005, p. 12-14

[7] As coined by John L. O´Sullivan, Henderson: Glorious Defeat, 2007, p. 137ff

[8] 13 times richer per capita than Mexico in 1845 actually, compared to „just“ twice as much in 1800. Henderson: Glorious Defeat, 2007, p. 18

[9] Dusinberre: Slavemaster President, 2003, p. 7ff

[10] Henderson: Glorious Defeat, 2007, p. 142-147

[11] Ibid. p. 154

[12] Dusinberre: Slavemaster President, 2003, p. 133-36

[13] Levinson: Wars within War, 2005, p. 18 a. 61

[14] PBS: http://www.pbs.org/kera/usmexicanwar/war/mexican_army.html , retrieved 08.19.2016

[15] Black, Jeremy: War for America: The Fight for Independence, 1775–1783. Avon 1991

[16] Wagenen V. : Remembering the Forgotten War, 2012, p. 46

[17] Levinson: Wars within War, 2005, p. 88-91

[18] Like in the famous painting of Carlos Nebel, showing General Scott parading his troops through the city. In reality, he had to fight his way through every dark alley. Ibid. p. 113.

[19] Symonds, Craig: The US Navy. A Concise History, Oxford 2015, chapter Manifest Destiny and War with Mexico

[20] Levinson: Wars within War, 2005, p. 16-22 and Henderson: Glorious Defeat, 2007, p. 157

[21] Ibid. p. 121

[22]PBS: Palo Alto, http://www.pbs.org/kera/usmexicanwar/war/palo_alto.html , ret. 8.22.16