Global warming and the protection of the environment have been a rising topic on the political agenda for more more than two decades. However, the progress necessary to avoid an environmental catastrophy hasn't been made yet - often due to high transaction costs for private corporations. This piece elaborates the costs of environmental protection as an explanation for the lack of environmental protection in an international context.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. No name of the game – disagreement about the results of global warming and responsible actors
3. Perspectives on environmental challenges – Transaction cost and property rights approach meets other mind sets
3.1. Absent rules of the game: Global passivity towards environmental challenges? An explanation using transaction cost and property rights approach
3.2. Other approaches supporting the explanation given by New Institutional Economics
4. Conclusion
5. Literature
5.1. Books and Articles
5.2. Newspaper articles, online sources and other papers
Research Objectives and Core Themes
This paper examines why global warming remains an unattractive issue within the global political agenda by utilizing the theoretical framework of New Institutional Economics, specifically the transaction cost and property rights approach.
- Analysis of institutional failures in managing global public goods.
- Evaluation of transaction costs in the context of international environmental policy.
- Comparison of economic perspectives with security and international relations theories.
- Investigation of the role of property rights in mitigating environmental degradation.
- Critique of current international passivity and the lack of enforcement mechanisms.
Excerpt from the Book
3.1. Absent rules of the game: Global passivity towards environmental challenges? An explanation using transaction cost and property rights approach
Although strong ecologic criticism is existing for decades, human production and consumption still causes increasing global carbon emission (Boden et al., 2010) – but why? Is the threat too abstract? Are predictions too uncertain? Are there no applicable approaches for the solution of environmental problems? Or are incentives just simply too low to act? The transaction cost and property rights approach embedded in the NIE can explain why any real measures aren’t taken for an improvement of the global environmental situation.
The general assumption regarding solutions to the global environmental problems is: On the international level, the property rights (broadly speaking) system in relation to the potential global public goods (atmosphere, seas, Antarctica, etc.) is not clearly established. Thus the formal and informal institutions are weak to state who owns these potential global public goods (and who is possible stakeholder in the management of their quality), who is responsible for its decreasing quality and sustainability (and if the sustainability of biosphere is global public good) and who and how is to punish such a free-riders, since there is no formal authority and formally institutionalized rules to even firstly name the game and maybe later set the rules of such a game. The basic institutional vacuum - reminding the well know tragedy of commons in which nobody manages and everybody exploits - suggest huge transactions costs for a possible action which bring consequently the low incentives to act. The Coase theorem including perfect knowledge of own and others’ rights to keep negative externalities on the low does not function in the complexity of international economic reality and the competitive pressure of global markets which forces the states, companies, people to prefer the short-term profit to the long-term sustainability.
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: Defines the scope of the debate on global warming and introduces the research question regarding why the issue remains unattractive for meaningful political action.
2. No name of the game – disagreement about the results of global warming and responsible actors: Discusses scientific projections regarding temperature increases and the subsequent social, economic, and environmental risks.
3. Perspectives on environmental challenges – Transaction cost and property rights approach meets other mind sets: Investigates the economic reasons for global passivity using New Institutional Economics and compares these with security and international relations theories.
3.1. Absent rules of the game: Global passivity towards environmental challenges? An explanation using transaction cost and property rights approach: Explains how the lack of well-defined property rights and high transaction costs lead to institutional failure and inaction.
3.2. Other approaches supporting the explanation given by New Institutional Economics: Contrasts the economic approach with security studies and realist theories to broaden the understanding of political inaction.
4. Conclusion: Summarizes the findings and reiterates that significant global change requires an institutional shift and a change in mentality to overcome high transaction costs.
5. Literature: Provides a comprehensive list of books, articles, and online sources used for the analysis.
Keywords
Global Warming, Climate Change, Transaction Cost, Property Rights, New Institutional Economics, Environmental Policy, Sustainability, Institutional Failure, Tragedy of the Commons, International Relations, Realism, Global Governance, Economic Incentives, Environmental Security.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this work?
The work focuses on analyzing the underlying economic and institutional reasons for the global passivity regarding climate change and the prevention of global warming.
What are the central themes of the study?
The central themes include the application of New Institutional Economics, the concept of property rights, the nature of transaction costs in environmental policy, and the challenges of international collective action.
What is the core research question?
The research asks why global warming is perceived as an unattractive problem within international political agendas and what conditions are necessary to change this dynamic.
Which scientific methodology is applied?
The paper utilizes a theoretical approach based on New Institutional Economics, specifically examining transaction costs and property rights frameworks, and incorporates comparative perspectives from international relations and security studies.
What is covered in the main part of the paper?
The main part covers the identification of environmental challenges, the explanation of institutional vacuums, the critique of market behaviors in the international system, and an exploration of alternative theories like realism.
Which keywords characterize the paper?
Key terms include Global Warming, New Institutional Economics, Transaction Costs, Property Rights, and International Institutional Failure.
How does the author explain the failure to act?
The author argues that high transaction costs and a lack of defined property rights for global public goods create an "institutional vacuum," making sustainable actions less attractive compared to short-term profits.
What role do nation-states play according to the author?
Nation-states are described as being caught in a dilemma where they are pressured by short-term economic gains and competition, often neglecting long-term environmental sustainability despite international agreements.
What is the significance of the "Westfailure System" mentioned in the text?
It refers to Susan Strange's concept of the failure of the institutionalized Westphalia system to organize collective solutions for the globalized, transnational challenges of the modern era.
- Arbeit zitieren
- Alice Greschkow (Autor:in), 2013, International Protection of the Environment. Transaction cost and property rights approach in contrast to other ideas regarding Global Warming, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/372521
