The Ukraine Crisis and Russia's Attitude towards the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europa

Index:

Acknowledgements:

List of Abbreviations:

1. Introduction

2. Theory and Background Perspectives
2.1 Neoclassical Realism
2.2 Collective Security and the structure of the OSCE
2.3 Collective Security and the success of the OSCE
2.4 The crisis of the OSCE and the decisive role of Russia in it

3. Context: Background of the Russia-OSCE relationship: The stages of the Kremlin’s OSCE policy

4. Methodology

5. Limitations

6. Case Study Analysis: Through the lens of Neoclassical Realism
6.1 Power considerations as a driver of Russia´s foreign policy
6.2 How the Kremlin’s interests in the crisis shaped its attitude towards the OSCE
6.3 The perception of the OSCE during the crisis and the Russian ‘shock’

7. Further Implications

8. Conclusion

9. Bibliography
9.1 Primary Sources
9.2 Secondary Sources

Acknowledgements:

I would like to express my gratitude to my program convenor who supported me with his expertise and open ears throughout my postgraduate studies. Furthermore, to my dissertation supervisor who guided me with his oversight and patience through the work. In addition, some special thanks belong to my friends who helped me with their moral support and shared laughter through the times of my study. Finally, I would like to mention my family who supported during my entire education.

List of Abbreviations:

illustration not visible in this excerpt

Boris Yeltsin: “We all have an equal interest in stability and security throughout Europe. The years the OSCE has existed, and particularly this year, have given rise to great expectations and at the same time to powerful disappointments.”^[1]

1. Introduction

The Ukraine crisis reached its peak point with the Russian annexation of the Crimea peninsula at the beginning of 2014. The annexation has since marked a turning point in the Russian-Western relations. Russia has disrespected international laws and norms, and thereby questioned the European order. The crisis reflects a significant shift in European geopolitics. Herman van Rompuy, the President of the European Council, has stated that “the world will never be the same again.” ^[2] The crisis is a symptom amongst others of the long-term development in the Russian-Western relations. Other symptoms are the Kremlin’s backing of separatists in Moldova and the foreshadowing war with Georgia in 2008. Russian foreign politics has destabilized states in the former Soviet territory for more than ten years now, ^[3] particularly in Ukraine, in which it already interfered during the Orange Revolution in 2004. The European Union’s (EU) disagreement with Russia has been the most pressing foreign policy (FP) issue of the Union recently. The Union has supported the new government, under Petro Poroshenko, in Ukraine and introduced sanctions against Russia.^[4] The crisis has exposed how vulnerable the post-Cold War European order is. The crisis management of the Weimar Triangle and Visegrad Group has not been fruitful. Indeed, the only forum which has succeeded in keeping the Russian-Western dialogue alive has been the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). ^{[5] [6]} It is the largest regional security organization in the world comprising fifty-seven member states from Europe, Northern America, and Asia. The organization bases its work on the shared values of its member states and aims to promote peace, security, and democracy.^[7] During this intense crisis, the importance of the OSCE has increased. Due to its structure, it not only has maintained the dialogue between the direct conflict parties - Russia and Ukraine - and the indirect conflict parties of the West, it even managed to broker the first challenging compromises. This was achieved due to two factors. Firstly, because all other channels of communication were exhausted between the Kremlin and the West. Secondly, due to the inclusive nature of the OSCE as an organization. This forum is preferred by Russia over other security mechanisms because it enjoys veto power. Every positive development in the crisis involves the work of the OSCE.^[8]

Since the organization is so central to the conflict, the research question aims to explain Russia’s attitude towards the OSCE during the Ukraine crisis by asking: What was the Russian attitude towards the OSCE during the Ukraine crisis from 2013-2016? It will argue that: Russia has not changed its attitude towards the OSCE over the course of the crisis. It dislikes the OSCE, but prefers it over other forums, because it can be a useful tool to promote Russian FP interests. Russia had acknowledged the OSCE as a valuable channel to represent its interests and therefore has given the OSCE more logistical importance than before the crisis, while the attitude towards the organization remained unchanged. In support of the research question the paper will refer to Russia’s behavior towards other states on the former Soviet territory in order to draw parallels to the approach towards Ukraine before 2013 to establish an understanding of Russia’s general stances on the intergovernmental organization (IGO) and the development of the relations.

The research puzzle is concerned with Russia’s preference of collective security such as the OSCE over collective defense organizations like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Despite its preference for the organization, over others, Russia has repeatedly has criticized the ‘double standards’ of the OSCE. The focus of this critique is the OSCE’s claim to support peace and security amongst all its members, yet Putin has mentioned that it is biased against Russia, as for instance in the infamous Munich speech from 2007.

Since its founding in the early, 1970s, and for its first twenty years of operation, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), forerunner of the OSCE, was a platform for interstate talks getting conflict parties to the table. This was focused mainly on the Soviet Union and West. The forum assisted in mediating and working out compromises. The hopes for the organization were high. On the one hand, immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, Emerson expected the IGO to “have a European Security Council on the model of the United Nations (UN)”^[9] by 2010. Moreover, Mortimer proposed that the organization would be utilized to construe the Kremlin’s function in European security and to level NATO expansion.^[10] On the other hand, Russian political leaders wanted the forum to develop into a mature regional structure that would offer an integrative joint security structure supported by legal commitments.^[11]

Firstly, this working paper will present the theory of Neoclassical Realism (NCR). The theory is crucial because it will be the theoretical tool for the analysis chapter. The approach is concerned with the question: How does Russia see power balance in Europe? The theory is appropriate because it focuses on power, interest, and prestige: arguably the key driving factors when it comes to analyzing Russian FP towards the West and OSCE. Secondly, in the following chapter, NCR will analyze how the concepts of regional security governance and collective security explain the relationship between the two actors and will shed light on the collective security basket of the IGO. In addition, the structure of the IGO will be explained.

The subsequent chapter will state how the collective security approach has helped the OSCE to keep the Cold War “cold”. This section is followed by the chapter entitled “ Crisis of the OSCE and the decisive role of Russia in it”. It will discuss why the organization lost influence after the end of the Cold War. Moreover, it will be concerned with the internal activities of the OSCE and the Kremlin’s policy within the organization. Moreover, it will state the Kremlin’s critique on the organization.

The chapter on the context of the Russian-OSCE relations deals with the founding of the organization and the key events in its history. It also explains the main dynamics regarding the interest of the two power blocs in the organization. Furthermore, the chapter sets the tone and provides the context for the analysis section. The methodology chapter is concerned with the approach to the study. It points out the relevant parameters, explaining why the single case study and the theoretical approach together are useful tools to answer the research question. As for the basket of the OSCE, the focus will be on collective security. The argument might end up at the conclusion that Russia has paid lip service to the IGO. Furthermore, the subsequent chapter deals with the limitations of the chosen approach. The main part of the thesis is dedicated to the analysis of the case study. This case study looks at the events from 2013-2016 using the lens of NCR. Consequently, the chapter is broken down into the three main driving factors of FP behavior according to NCR: power, interest, and perception. The main part will be followed by the implications, which will be based on the analysis and debate the possible continuation of the Russian-OSCE relations, and the possible implications for Russia's relations with countries on the former Soviet territory. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the findings of the study.

2. Theory and Background Perspectives

2.1 Neoclassical Realism

The coiner of the term ‘Neoclassical Realism’ is Gideon Rose, who bases his thinking on Thucydides’ work. He stated in 1998 that a significant feature of the theory is that it embodies both the domestic as well as foreign policy parameters making it further developed and more schematized in contrast to classical realist thinking.^[12] NCR performs a synthesis of two schools of realism. It embraces Carr’s, Morgenthau’s and Wolfer’s thinking as it supports ideas of Neorealism, yet it also sees truth in structural realism. NCR regards the world order as anarchic.^[13] The theory is a foreign policy theory and aims to explain why states conduct policy in a certain way.^[14]

However, the range and aspirations of a nation’s FP are motivated primarily by its place in the international order. Therefore, it is a systemic theory. In particular by its relative material power ability to perform, which is the single most important factor in the power ranking and where the analysis commences.^[15] NCR claims that relative material power sets the foundational variable for a states’ FP, as Thucydides famously phrased it: "the strong do what they can, and weak suffer what they must."^[16] Nevertheless, the theorists stress that there is no direct relationship between material capabilities and a country's FP conduct. Thus, NCR argues, that domestic politics as a driver of choices comes second to systemic factors. Therefore, their approach is first to analyze which influences the systemic has on the domestic. Perception is one of the three main motivators of action, together with interest and power. NCR borrows from Classical Realism Philosophers such as Machiavelli, Rousseau, and Hobbes who listed “security, self-interest, and honor” as the single most important driving factors for policies.^[17]

Morgenthau, who is regarded as one of the fathers of NCR understands the nature of men as animalistic in the political realm. Their primary goal is to strive for power and to take pleasure from possessing power.^[18] The desire for power leads to competition for relative gains to achieve a safe political environment in which the state can be self-determined. Consequently, if one aims for a political sphere without the interference of other powers, one must summon its power and spread their power for that objective.^[19]

FP decisions are conducted by political elites; their actions are triggered by their understanding of a given situation and not merely by assessment of relative power. Hence, NCR attempts to comprehend the connection between policy and power, and the circumstances under which decisions are made are important. Consequently, an individual’s perception of threat depends on his or her given relative material power. Wohlforth has outlined power according to NCR as: "the capacity or resource, with which states can influence each other."^[20]

NCR differentiates between the material capabilities of a state’s FP ‘interest’ which is defined as the objectives or inclinations that lead a state’s FP.^[21] NCR claims that countries do not strive for security; they indeed react to the unpredictability of the anarchic global system by aiming for order and to form their FP surroundings. The core empirical reasoning of NCR according to Fareed Zakaria is that over the long run, the relative material capabilities of a state will define its ration of aspiration in the international system.^[22] Consequently, when its power declines, over time the ambition will be reduced accordingly.^[23] In addition to that, in their works, Zakaria and Christensen both stress the relevance of ‘shocks’ to the perception and action of leaders. These shocks are one-time events that abruptly change their perception and make them sensitive to current progressive shifts of power in the international system. Moreover, NCR emphasizes that the power of a government and its political leadership is more important than the power of the nation in terms of its hard power resources, highlighting the importance of effort required for political leaders to enforce their political ideas.^[24] Another important aspect of NCR is mentioned by Randal L. Schweller in his work “Deadly Imbalances” in which he claims that countries characters are defined by the “degree to which they are status quo or revisionist-satisfied or dissatisfied with the existing distribution of international spoils.”^[25] The distribution is especially important concerning principles of the world order, resources, and prestige.

As previously mentioned, NCR bases its reasoning on the power share that nations hold to assess their FP. In addition to that, a decision maker’s perception of a given event is crucial, with regards to reputation and power considerations. Taliaferro has deepened the theory by adding the factor of sensed loss aversion to it. He argues that a sensed loss of power and reputation motivates dominant states to conduct risky FP and to engage in military maneuvers abroad, in particular in peripheral areas. Ultimately, this is done to deflect the perceived losses.^[26] A potential loss of reputation is a stronger driving factor than a potential gain. A state’s reputation changes when it is able and prepared to conduct its FP and follow its interests and goals while risking dissonance with NATO or the European Union.^[27] Morgenthau has famously expressed that the reputation of a state or an individual has the same relevance as what they actually are.^[28] A further feature of the theory is formulated by Schweller, which is called ‘balance of interest.’ It deals with the categorization of motivational drivers of nations, differentiated by how much countries are in the first place driven by fear and greed.^[29] Finally, NCR discusses states cheating and lying to one another in order to achieve their power aims. Plato and Morgenthau have elaborated on the unmoral behavior of states^[30] arguing that ethics exists in the private space but that ethics is not the same in the political arena. Plato famously, called this a ‘noble lie’ - an act of deceiving another state for the benefit of its people.^[31]

2.2 Collective Security and the structure of the OSCE

There are various comprehensions of the term ‘governance.’^[32] Regional security governance is concerned with the need for multi-governmental group action, joint action to overcome issues and common considerations that foster collective collaboration.^[33]

OSCE is a structure of member states that collectively intended to perform security governance.^[34] The organization was assigned the duty to observe and produce policies that build the framework of tolerable interstate conduct across the greater European continent.^[35] Its formulated aim is to build a pluralistic community reaching from Vancouver to Vladivostok to ensure peace.^[36] From the beginning, the policy concerning accession to the organization has been very inclusive. Every country that expressed its will to accept the norms of the community has been accepted. The organization anticipated that the identities and interest of the member states would change over time through exchange with other members.^[37]

The political route of the OSCE is determined by the respective governmental leaders of each member state during the summits. The summits are infrequently held and are arranged according to urgency. The Ministerial Council is the highest level executive organ of the OSCE and gathers at the end of each year. The Permanent Council summons every week in Vienna and represents the permanent negotiation and administrative institutions of the OSCE. The President of the Permanent Council is the spokesperson to the OSCE of the member state that oversees the chairmanship. The Chairperson-in-Office (CiO) is currently Sebastian Kurz, who followed, Frank Walter Steinmeier, both of whom were foreign ministers of their respective countries during their presidency. The CiO is held for one entire calendar year. Another component is the Forum for Security Co-operation, which too is an executive organ of the IGO. It is mainly concerned with issues concerning joint military actions, like the procedure for inspections, following the Vienna Document of 1999. ^[38] As part of the executive structure, there are the “Secretary General, the Secretariat Vienna, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Representative on Freedom of the Media and the HCNM.”^[39]

According to Sperling and Weber, IGOs ease the importance of power relations and even assist to bring actors together.^{[40] [41]} More classical academics like Waltz understand IGOs as a sphere in which the balance of power is tested. They tend to intersect in political debate and their activities.^[42] The effectiveness of the OSCE vastly depends on its member states.^[43] The organization is a reflection of the security governance concepts of importance to its members and their relations with each other.^[44] Therefore, analyzing Russia’s role in OSCE as a key player, and its relationship with other members is crucial to gain an insight into the processes of the OSCE.

The argument for collective security is based on the idea that monitoring, controlling and balancing through institutions offers more stability for actors than anarchic, uncontrolled self-help balancing in which each actor acts on their own. Following this concept of collective security, countries accept rules and norms so as to arrive at order in the sphere of the collaborating states. In addition to that, they agree to cooperate their actions in case of aggression. Order in the system the nonexistence of major war is the intended result of collaboration. In an international order that is balancing under anarchy, countries defend themselves following the rule of the aggressive international system. The structured order in the system is the by-product of competition. The main question is whether organized balancing based on the approach of each state on its own is more probable to defend peace. The positive aspects of collective security are split into two classifications: firstly, it offers more efficient balancing against aggressors. Secondly, it encourages trust and collaboration. Collective security replies directly to the main arguments of realists concerning the antagonistic character of the international system and its tendency to cause spirals of hostility. It is amply apprehensive of the war-triggering aspects of the international environment, and collective security aims to offer a more impelling structure for balancing aggressors in case they appear. Moreover, it strives to make hostility less probable by improving the combative character of international relations. The institutions that are an aspect of the concept are an enhancement in opposition to no institutions and the self-help approach in an international order ruled by a world of balancing under disorder. Collective security offers a more compelling balance against aggressors with advantages over simply equivalent material capability . ^[45] In the chaos of the international system, only the countries that fall victim to aggression or countries that have a fundamental interest in the region that is under aggression will stay together to fight the aggressor. In utilizing the concept of collective security as a tenet of an alliance among nations – as is exhibited in OSCE and similar groups – an act of aggression against one member state will necessitate other member states to declare support of the country under attack. This is done as an agreement among the states due to their belief in collective security. Moreover, these countries have a vested interest in conserving the balance of the international stage, which they perceive as advantageous to their state security. Collective security aims to enlarge the sphere of private interests, to arrive at a status in which states whose safety is not directly vulnerable have an interest in preventing aggression. One of the most persuasive arguments against collective security is that at its worst condition it is more or less equal to power balancing in a chaotic world order. However, at its most positive and efficient case, it reassures partaking countries to expect the help of other states. A result of that can be that immediately threatened countries are underprepared and vulnerable because they rely too much on their alliance(s). ^[46] Various models of governance exist, and the most elaborate form of international governance it is a security system.

Nations rank their power abilities relative to those of other nations.^[47] Therefore, IGOs are from this point of view in the first place a sphere to execute equilibrium of power games in the international arena. ^[48]

In contrast to collective security, pluralistic security communities are made up of various independent states that keep their respective governments and political system. Nevertheless, the members do not only share core values they also have identical political institutions and have shared a history which leads to a distinct level of communality and reliability.^[49] The OSCE has been repeatedly referred to as exemplary for a European security community. In 2010 for instance, at the OSCE Astana Summit, the suggestion to establish an Atlantic and Eurasian security community was raised. The organization itself nonetheless, is currently not capable of realizing the suggestion. Following Mikhail Gorbachev’s famous words: “of the common European home” only the Western corridors have been built while neglecting the Eastern.^[50]

2.3 Collective Security and the success of the OSCE

Looking at the bigger picture, especially in comparison with other parts of the globe, the OSCE can draw on one major success. It was part of avoiding escalation that of the Cold War even during the most unsettling phases. It was successful in realizing this objective not only during the Cold War but also after the Soviet Union disintegrated. However, it could not hinder the outbreak of a cruel several years war in the Western Balkans. In addition to that neither could it prevent the frozen and permanent conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union, nor Russia’s confrontation with Ukraine or Georgia. A conflict is considered frozen when the active military fighting has stopped but no peace treaty has been signed, or other models to overcome the conflict to the satisfaction of the actors.^[51] Nevertheless, the OSCE was successful in establishing that all these crises were strategically monitored and contained. This is noteworthy since the majority of the OSCE member states only aimed at resolving them. During the procedure, the OSCE has developed a progressive function in post-conflict management and rebuilding, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. It is beyond question that it has helped to prevent armed conflicts in several other regions, via instruments like the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) or through the wide scope of field missions. In the end, it is one of the very few forums where states and non-state actors can keep up a dialogue despite the fact that respective governments are entangled in an open conflict.^[52]

2.4 The crisis of the OSCE and the decisive role of Russia in it

The OSCE has been a much-criticized organization over the course of its existence. It was labeled a “picture of misery and a paper tiger” by various members of the organization itself.^[53] For the past decade, it experienced a loss of profile and relevance. This was the result of a variety of factors: The IGO’s ambiguous profile, the test of its relevance through other actors, the inaction due to the East-West divide, and finally its marginal external perceptibility.^[54] The troubled status of the OSCE is as well due to the West’s policy regarding Russia, which remained indistinct until the introduced of sanctions regarding the Ukraine crisis.^[55] While Libya had previously been a central issue, it is now the Russian involvement in Syria and missile defense systems that reflect the friction within the organization. Moreover, the OSCE is stunted due to the ongoing division of Europe and the consensus principle to arrive at decisions.^[56]

The Kremlin has aimed to gain more political power over the comparably independent OSCE institutions, for instance, the ODIHR, HCNM.^[57] The separation between the member states of the organization according to their reputation is the reason for the obstruction to clearing up the legal status of OSCE and to adopt a specific charter for it. In Moscow, the prevailing perception is that the co-operative approach of the 1990s was not a success.^[58] It claims that the nation’s security interest was not respected with regards to missile defense and “the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty).”^[59] Moreover, it asserts that its security was not taken into account by the Atlantic world’s aid for the ‘color revolutions’ whereby it supported the development of pluralistic democratic organizations. This is used as an example of how the Russian sphere of interest was overlooked. Moscow criticizes the organization for these three factors: firstly, the security community aspect is overshadowed due to an over stressing of the organization’s humanitarian dimension. Secondly, in balancing between state sovereignty, and basic humanitarian rights, it sides with human rights - the recognition of Kosovo is referred to as an example for that. Thirdly, interventions are only undertaken ‘East of Vienna’ despite important issues elsewhere, for instance in Northern Ireland.^[60]

3. Context: Background of the Russia-OSCE relationship: The stages of the Kremlin’s OSCE policy

The following chapter will give a synopsis of the progress in the Russian-OSCE policies and its attitude towards the Organization. Various descriptions of the term attitude have been suggested by psychologists. Arguably the most commonly recognized contemporary understanding defines it as a psychological disposition that is disclosed by appraising a specific entity with a certain level of approval or disapproval. It can refer to an object, person, or organization, etc. Another characteristic is its evaluability and mirroring the degree of approval or disapproval of a person concerning the attitude toward the entity.^[61]

This working paper cannot account for all developments in the relations, but it aims to point out key events in the Soviet Union’s involvement with the CSCE/ OSCE from the 70s to 1991. The key to understanding the Russian relationship with the OSCE lays in the Soviet approach to the organization. The empire had displayed its interest in a “European security conference or treaty in the 1950s.”^[62] The relationship between the Eastern and Western bloc was hesitantly improving during the 70s.^[63] During several conferences in which the political elite of Western Europe and the Soviet Union participated, as part of the Helsinki process, the OSCE announced its aim to enhance and strengthen the relations between the two blocs, and to further devote itself to peace, safety, justice and collaboration in Europe. The East was hopeful to improve its slowly decreasing place and saw the forum has a chance to enhance its economic and political ties with its counterparts to eventually make the West accept the separation of the continent.^[64] Moreover, it had the aspiration to interfere in the European relationship to the United States and have it open its eyes for cooperation with Russia more.^[65]

[...]

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^[1] "Monitoring | Full text of Boris Yeltsin's speech." BBC News. November 18, 1999. Accessed February 24, 2017. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/526343.stm.

^[2] Buras Piotr, Anthony Dworkin, Francios Godement, Daniel Levy, Mark Leonard, and Kadri Liik. "Ten global consequences of the Ukraine crisis." ECFR. June 16, 2014. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_ten_global_consequences_of_ukraine272.

^[3] Van Metre, Lauren, PhD, Viola G. Gienger, and Kathleen Kuehnast. The Ukraine-Russia Conflict Signals and Scenarios for the Broader Region. Report no. 366. United States Institute of Peace. March 2015. Accessed January 12, 2017. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR366-The-Ukraine-Russia-Conflict.pdf.

^[4] Ibid.

^[5] Buras Piotr, Anthony Dworkin, Francios Godement, Daniel Levy, Mark Leonard, and Kadri Liik. "Ten global consequences of the Ukraine crisis." ECFR. June 16, 2014. Accessed January 15, 2017.

^[6] Kropatcheva, Elena. "The Evolution of Russia’s OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis."Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23, no. 1 (January 02, 2015): 6-24. doi:10.1080/14782804.2014.1001823.

^[8] Kropatcheva, Elena. "The Evolution of Russia’s OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis."Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23, no. 1 (January 02, 2015): 6-24. doi:10.1080/14782804.2014.1001823.

^[9] Krupnick, Charles. "Europe’s intergovernmental NGO: The OSCE in Europe’s emerging security structure."European Security 7, no. 2 (1998): 30-53. doi:10.1080/09662839808407361.

^[10] Ibid.

^[11] Zagorski, Andrei. "The Russian Proposal for a Treaty on European Security: From the Medvedev Initiative to the Corfu Process." In OSCE Yearbook 2010, 43-59. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

^[12] Rose, Gideon. "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy."World Politics 51, no. 01 (1998): 144. doi:10.1017/s0043887100007814.

^[13] Walt, S. M. "The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition." In Political Science: The State of the Discipline, 210. New York: W. W. Norton, 2002.

^[14] Friedberg, A. L. The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 8. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.

^[15] Ibd. p. 146

^[16] Rose, Gideon. "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy."World Politics 51, no. 01 (1998): 146. doi:10.1017/s0043887100007814.

^[17] Markey, Daniel. "Prestige and the Origins of War: Returning to realism’s roots."Security Studies 8, no. 4 (1999): 133-55. doi:10.1080/09636419908429388.

^[18] Morgenthau, H. J. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 193. 3rd ed. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1965.

^[19] Jackson, Robert, and Georg Sørensen. Introduction to International relations: theories and approaches. 72. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

^[20] Wohlforth, William Curtis. The elusive balance: power and perceptions during the Cold War. 4. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993.

^[21] Rose, Gideon. "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy."World Politics 51, no. 01 (1998): 150. doi:10.1017/s0043887100007814.

^[22] Zakaria, Fareed. From wealth to power: the unusual origins of America’s world role. 3. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998.

^[23] Kennedy, Paul M. The rise and fall of great powers. 25 New York: Random House, 1987.

^[24] Zakaria, Fareed. From wealth to power: the unusual origins of America’s world role. 9. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998.

^[25] Schweller, R. L. Deadly Imbalance: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest. 25. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.

^[26] Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. "The Psychology of Great Power Interventions." In Making sense of IR theory, 38. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2006.

^[27] Ibd. 41

^[28] Morgenthau, H. J. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 193. 3rd ed. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1965.

^[29] Elman, Colin. "Realism." In International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century, 16. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

^[30] Jackson, Robert, and Georg Sørensen. Introduction to International relations: theories and approaches. 72. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

^[31] Plato. The Republic. 82. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1974.

^[32] Ehrhart, Hans-Georg, Hendrik Hegemann, and Martin Kahl. "Putting security governance to the test: conceptual, empirical, and normative challenges."European Security 23, no. 2 (March 11, 2014): 119-25. Accessed January 22, 2017. doi:10.1080/09662839.2013.851676.

^[33] Breslin, Shaun, and Stuart Croft. Comparative regional security governance. 29 London: Routledge, 2012.

^[34] Kirchner, Emil J., and Roberto Dominguez. "Security governance in a comparative regional perspective."European Security 23, no. 2 (2013): 164. Accessed January 17, 2017. doi:10.1080/09662839.2013.846327.

^[35] Sperling, James, and Mark Webber. "Security governance in Europe: a return to system."European Security 23, no. 2 (2014): 126. Accessed January 21, 2017. doi:10.1080/09662839.2013.856305.

^[36] Adler, Emanuel. "Seeds of peaceful change: the OSCE’s security community-building model." In Security Communities, 119-60. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

^[37] Adler, Emanuel. "The OSCE as a security community."OSCE Magazine, January 2011, 14-15.

^[38] Vienna Document 1999 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Report no. 1. OSCE. November 1999. Accessed January 29, 2017. http://www.osce.org/fsc/41276?download=true..

^[39] OSCE. "What is the OSCE?" News release. OSCE. Accessed November 11, 2016. http://www.osce.org/whatistheosce/factsheet?download=true.

^[40] Sperling, James, and Mark Webber. "Security governance in Europe: a return to system."European Security 23, no. 2 (2014): 136. Accessed January 21, 2017. doi:10.1080/09662839.2013.856305.

^[41] Schimmelfennig, F. International socialization in Europe: European organizations, political conditionality and democratic change. 41 Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

^[42] Adler, Emanuel, and Patricia Greve. "When security community meets balance of power: overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance."Review of International Studies 35, no. S1 (February 1, 2009): 68. doi:10.1017/s0260210509008432.

^[43] Sperling, James, and Mark Webber. "Security governance in Europe: a return to system."European Security 23, no. 2 (2014): 140. Accessed January 21, 2017. doi:10.1080/09662839.2013.856305.

^[44] Kirchner, Emil J., and Roberto Dominguez. "Security governance in a comparative regional perspective."European Security 23, no. 2 (2013): 166. Accessed January 17, 2017. doi:10.1080/09662839.2013.846327.

^[45] Kupchan, Charles A., and Clifford A. Kupchan. "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe."International Security 16, no. 1 (August 1991): 117. Accessed January 27, 2017. doi:10.2307/2539053.

^[46] Ibid., 124

^[47] Adler, Emanuel, and Patricia Greve. "When security community meets balance of power: overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance."Review of International Studies 35, no. S1 (February 1, 2009): 74. doi:10.1017/s0260210509008432.

^[48] Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. 60 New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.

^[49] Mützenich, Rolf, and Matthias Z. Karádi. "The OSCE as a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community: Theoretical Foundations, Preconditions, and Prospects." In OSCE Yearbook 2012, 47. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012.

^[50] Ibid., 49

^[51] Alice, Mary, C. Clancy, and John Nagel. Frozen Conflicts, Minority Self-Governance, Asymmetrical Autonomies – In search of a framework for conflict management and conflict resolution .14. Report. International Conflict and Research Institute, University of Ulster, Londonderry/Derry, Northern Ireland and Letterkenny, Republic of Ireland.

^[52] Bailes, Alyson, and Zdzislaw Lachowski. "Collective Security and the politico-military role of the OSCE."Security and Human Rights 21, no. 1 (2010): 5. doi:10.1163/187502310791306061.

^[53] Zelikow, Philip. "The Masque of institutions."Survival 38, no. 1 (January 1996): 6-18. doi:10.1080/00396339608442828.

^[54] Mützenich, Rolf, and Matthias Z. Karádi. "The OSCE as a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community: Theoretical Foundations, Preconditions, and Prospects." In OSCE Yearbook 2012, 51. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013.

^[55] Przemysław, Grudzinski. "A Conceptual Framework for Regional Security, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy." In OSCE Yearbook 2010, 75-84. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011.

^[56] Mützenich, Rolf, and Matthias Z. Karádi. "The OSCE as a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community: Theoretical Foundations, Preconditions, and Prospects." In OSCE Yearbook 2012, 53. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013.

^[57] Mützenich, Rolf, and Matthias Z. Karádi. "The OSCE as a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community: Theoretical Foundations, Preconditions, and Prospects." In OSCE Yearbook 2012, 53. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013.

^[58] Ibid., 47

^[59] Ibid., 48

^[60] Ibid., 49

^[61] Druckman, James N. Cambridge handbook of experimental political science. 141 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011

^[62] Light, Margot. The Soviet theory of international relations. 39 New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988.

^[63] Genscher, Hans. "Wird die OSZE unterschätzt? [Is the OSCE underestimated?]" In OSZE Jahrbuch 2001, 23. Baden-Baden: Nomos. (I speak German and translated the source for the study)

^[64] Hurlburt, Heather. "Russia, the OSCE and European Security Architecture"Helsinki Monitor 6, no. 2 (1995): 7. Accessed February 4, 2017. doi:10.1163/157181495x00199.

^[65] Ibid., 10