This work investigates the behavior of patent trolling entities in the European, German and American patent system. Legislative, judicial, executive and private measures with the intent to contain the rent seeking and abusive conduct of patent trolling entities are discussed. Moreover, the impact of these measures on other entities in the patent system are examined. The most efficient measures are assumed to show a high selectivity and a strong impact on the business model of the trolling entity, while negative effects on other entities are minimal or non-existent and positive effects are preferred. According to these requirements, suitable measures to increase the patent quality like improving the patent examination processes of the patent office or the inter partes and the post-grand review are debated. Furthermore, the introduction of a peer to patent network or Patent Investment Trusts (PIT) are examined. To cut through growing patent thickets, the collaboration with patent pools or patent pledges is proposed. At last, the differences between the European, German and American patent system regarding their vulnerability to trolling entities are elucidated. In the end, containment measures against patent trolling behavior should selectively target the business model of patent trolling, which is expected to arise from the weak spots of the patent system.
- Arbeit zitieren
- Joscha P. Bartmann (Autor:in), Jonas M. Schulz (Autor:in), 2016, Trolling behavior in the European and American patent system. The impact of regulatory and private containment measures on practicing and non-practicing entities, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/373683
