There is not too much agreement in philosophy about what a person is, how and when persons do persist over time or who a person is. And as it is usually the case when philosophical problems are discussed but not resolved, new questions and problems arise in the course of the debate and the argument shifts away from its starting point. Such a shift gave rise to the problem that is at the heart of my thesis.
We consider us to be persons and humans to be biological organisms. How do those two facts relate to each other and what can be inferred from them?
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
2 The Constitution View and Animalism
2.1 The Constitution View of Human Persons
2.2 Animalism
4 The Embodied Mind View
5 Conclusion
Objectives and Topics
This paper examines the ontological relationship between human persons and biological organisms, exploring three major philosophical positions to resolve the dilemma of diachronic identity and personal persistence.
- Analysis of the Constitution View (Lynn R. Baker)
- Critique of Animalism (Eric T. Olson)
- Examination of the Embodied Mind View (Jeff McMahan)
- Addressing the 'Too Many Persons Problem'
- Evaluation of the 'transplant intuition'
Excerpt from the Book
2.1 The Constitution View of Human Persons
Lynn R. Baker defends the view that we are animals in such a way that we are not identical to our organisms, respectively an animal. In her thesis, she tries to show that we can spell out a sound version of the latter claim without denying the former. The starting-point of her argument is the notion of a human person. We are human persons. What makes us human and what makes us a person then? According to Baker we are persons by virtue of having the "capacity to have a first-person perspective" and human by virtue of "being constituted by a human organism" [1, p. 91]. Hence we are beings with a certain cognitive capability who are not identical to their organisms. Initially, she does not distinguish between the terms 'organism' and 'body' and uses them interchangeably.
What is revealed in the first-person perspective is the capability to conceive of yourself as a subject that is disjoined from a “world of things different from yourself” [1, p. 92]. A person is a being that can conceptually differentiate between itself and the rest of the world. Herein Baker talks of a capacity in order to make sure that a person doesn't cease to exist when falling asleep or “[going] into a coma” [1, p. 92], where they don't employ a first-person perspective.
Summary of Chapters
1 Introduction: This chapter introduces the philosophical puzzle regarding the relationship between human persons and biological organisms and outlines the scope of the study.
2 The Constitution View and Animalism: This chapter contrasts two competing theories: Baker's constitution view, which distinguishes between persons and their organisms, and Olson's animalism, which claims identity between them.
2.1 The Constitution View of Human Persons: This section details how a human person is constituted by a biological organism while maintaining a unique first-person perspective.
2.2 Animalism: This section explores the animalist position, which asserts that we are numerically identical to our biological organisms, and discusses the 'thinking-animal argument'.
4 The Embodied Mind View: This chapter introduces McMahan’s alternative, which views persons as minds realized in brains, functioning as parts of an organism.
5 Conclusion: This chapter summarizes the evaluation of the three views and suggests that the Embodied Mind View offers the most promising framework by reducing philosophical complexity.
Keywords
Animalism, Constitution View, Embodied Mind View, Human Persons, Biological Organisms, First-Person Perspective, Diachronic Identity, Personal Persistence, Too Many Persons Problem, Transplant Intuition, Ontology, Mind-Body Problem, Consciousness, Philosophy of Mind.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary subject of this research paper?
The paper explores the ontological relationship between human persons and biological organisms, specifically focusing on how we persist over time and whether we are identical to our organisms.
What are the three main theoretical positions discussed?
The author discusses the Constitution View, Animalism, and the Embodied Mind View.
What is the central research goal?
The goal is to determine the most tenable position regarding the person-organism relation and to address the dilemma faced when choosing between existing, often problematic, philosophical accounts.
Which scientific or philosophical methodology is applied?
The author uses analytical philosophy, specifically the method of conceptual analysis and logical evaluation of arguments, such as the "thinking-animal argument" and the "transplant intuition".
What does the main body of the work focus on?
The main body critically assesses the internal consistency of the Constitution View and Animalism, followed by an in-depth analysis of the Embodied Mind View as a potential alternative.
How are the key terms in this work defined?
Key terms like 'person' are defined via cognitive capabilities (first-person perspective), while 'organisms' are treated as biological, spatially extended living systems.
What is the "Too Many Persons Problem" mentioned in the text?
It is a logical puzzle suggesting that if a person and their organism are two distinct entities sharing the same thoughts, then there are essentially two persons present, which creates an ontological and epistemic crisis.
Why does the author prefer the Embodied Mind View?
The author argues that this view is superior because it acknowledges our physical reliance on the organism without collapsing into the logical traps (like property duplication) found in the Constitution View or the counter-intuitive claims of Animalism.
How does the Embodied Mind View handle the "transplant intuition"?
It aligns with the intuition that we go where our brains go, as our identity is tied to the mind, which is realized in specific brain regions rather than the entire organism.
- Quote paper
- Stanislaw Wirok-Stoletow (Author), 2016, Human Persons and Organisms. The Constitution View, Animalism, and the Embodied Mind View, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/376739
