This book deals with two forms of today's populism - the Western European stubborn-child form, and the more serious show-it-all pendant that turns its head very keenly towards autocracy. Is there a way to understand right-wing populism? Are there differences between the two mentioned sorts and if so, what are the aims of them? And is it possible that populist regimes, in some way, are not even too wrong in what they proclaim?
"Ritalin and Upper Limits. On European Populism and the voluntary new obedience in parts of the society." tries to answer questions like these and to open up the readers' minds towards the way of thinking of populist leaders and their followers; the author tried his best to do it with as little judgement of any direction as possible and hopes he succeeded and could offer you a diverting and educating read.
NOTE: "Ritalin and Upper Limits. On the European Populism and the voluntary new obedience in parts of the society." is the author's English translation of his work "Ritalin & Obergrenze. Über den europäischen Populismus und den freiwilligen neuen Gehorsam in Teilen der Gesellschaft". The sources used and named in the appendix are mostly in German, if you want further reading, try to find them in your preferred language.
Table of Contents
- The theme of this essay is the question of how enemy images emerge, how they are spread in a populist manner, who accepts them. It also exemplifies Hungary's current and everything but uncritical political situation under Viktor Orbán's Fidesz administration compared to Western European populism and attempts to find out whether and how the two systems of exclusions differ. My synthesis is that right-wing populism, especially in times of insecurity and at best by unenlightened, distorted institutionalized conceptions of its own history and defeats, finds social acceptance precisely because, and this stands in contrast to Brückner's impression, these collectives long for an authoritarian father figure who knows how to defend the alleged national interests of the enemies who want to obliterate them and seek to rob the nation of its identity.
- One fact in advance: the world has far more resources than is needed to meet the basic human needs of the currently living human population on several occasions, yet we count about six billion people living in miserable conditions (cf. Berghold 2007, 55).
- Greed, selfishness, and megalomania are what I call the main actors in the constitution and manifestation of this unsustainable audacity. Since ancient Greece, man is actually seen as a social being, as an individual dependent on his fellow human beings, their solidarity and care, but under these conditions, it becomes clear that these dependencies can by no means relate to the totality of fellow human beings. There must be groups or personal systems which one would expect to be solitary, who one is also solitary and caring for, and others who are considered less worthy of solidarity. This appraisal of other parts of the world community is also reflected in the fact that at any given time wars, saber-rattling or the creation or revival of resentment against what is defined as the dangerous stranger (mostly by authorities), vast amounts of these goods are squandered, apparently without reflecting and understanding that, with the research and testing of new nuclear super-killers, entire communities of emerging economies or the so-called Third World could have been freed from poverty, not to mention the opportunities for developing their own country improved education, tax reforms to be useful to - one's own people should the Third World be geographically and morally too - remote from the ruler.
- The winner takes it all, the loser has to fall - that seems to be the credo in today's elbow-society. When everyone thinks just about themselves, everyone is cared about. Something in this manner they seem to whisper to each other on the populist clientele-orientated parkette of European and world politics while dancing with raised glasses of champagne. And to legitimately guarantee this extravagant standard, they make sure that everything happens within the democratic frame, but that for them and their avid advocates the frame gets a wee bit more democratic - and therefore they love to use the principles of exclusion. These actions are not always aimed against the quite placative example of the Third World (which does not mean it is not true). Enemy concepts and the creation of resentments, within societal collectives or initiated by the political actors, provide a very welcome potential, especially in the current time. The first question opens up: What is an enemy picture? Conceptually, there are different approaches depending on the school, but the processes they handle are the same. If Robert Miles's racism discourse, to be discussed later, refers to a process of finding and constructing differences, which he calls 'signification' (Miles 2000, 18), this is quite similar to that of Omer et al. described process of demonization, i.e. the negation of another person or a group, resulting in a pathologization of the same, a dislike and an indispensable fight against the thus produced "monster" (Omer et al., 2007, 13). In the demonization process, the person/group in question is first eyed suspiciously; every action is assumed to have a negative intention. Later one then proceeds to see through the shameful and destructive motives of the opponent allegedly and to feel an inner compulsion to put an end to this evil, if necessary violently the "monster" to stop his threatening actions, his dangerous behavior (cf. ibid., 15). The main aim of the demonizing enemy construction is to make a certain group responsible for an imagined, lost perfection and to combat it by all means, in order to finally be able to restore the previous beloved status quo ante (cf. ibid., 53). For example, in the past, the witches were persecuted, because they were seen possessed by the devil (this was especially in the Middle Ages, the destruction argument par excellence). Here is an example of the signification mentioned above: the affected women were defined as witches, as they deviated from the social norm (by special healing or herbal knowledge or similar 'supernatural' abilities) and thus an alleged danger was inferred, Brückner also outlines this method of detestation (cf. Brückner 1966, 25).
- The division of the world into a black or white scheme, the We and the threatening stranger, that is automatically harmful to us, precisely because it is not identical with us. This division of the world undoubtedly requires a certain position of power. If an individual wants to impose his demonized worldview on a broader audience, then far more than the nightly discussion with the village elders is needed. He needs ways and means to spread his crude, displaced views: a shrewd, all-encompassing propaganda machine.
- The road to power, of any internal and external party intrigue, charismatic promise to the takeover of the scepter and the like should not be treated too insistently for this essay, but one thing is for both the rise and in its final reign of immense importance: fomenting and maintaining hope; the hope of the constructed dangers, i.e. the first imagined, then medial and/or interpersonal intensified resentment towards and ultimately identified as a threatening murderer individuals of society find redemption and regain the former happiness (Omer et al., 2007, 52f).
- For the most part, individuals who use exclusion practices are convinced that Darwin's law of the strongest also applies to humanity. He who is thus excluded, therefore, lets it happen as a sign of weakness, and is thus naturally subject to its oppressor in its value (cf. Beck 1986, 136). Such a grotesqueness could be solved by a discourse of politics and society, but, according to the subjective well-being of large sections of society, politics does not give answers to specific questions, but gives false answers to unasked questions (cf. ibid.). Thus, it is understandable that these 'left-alone' parts of society seek a ringleader, one who understands them and knows how to give an answer to their problems. It is not simply accepted everything that can be formulated in two hundred and eighty signs. It must coincide with what moves the citizens: if you are afraid of loaded millet in the bread, the prince may try to introduce more natural millet, but in the long run, the goal is to banish them completely from the baked goods. Or, to put it less industry-specific: when a concern is sparked that is rooted in its roots for the most part economically; a fear of a certain novelty in society (which does not necessarily have to be objectively one), then it needs a Messiah, who has the courage, the remaining, in their view, true 'people by isolation and eradication of these recognized as danger collectives to preserve. Niklas Luhmann's system theory reveals the extremely helpful concept of double contingency; I cannot know what someone thinks about me, vice versa (Omer et al 2007, 26).
Objectives and Key Themes
This essay examines the emergence and spread of enemy images within populist discourse, exploring how these images gain acceptance among certain segments of society. The essay specifically contrasts Hungarian politics under Viktor Orbán's Fidesz administration with Western European populism, seeking to understand potential differences in their exclusionary practices. The author argues that right-wing populism thrives on a longing for an authoritarian figure who can defend perceived national interests and counter perceived threats to national identity, especially in times of insecurity and uncertainty. This stands in contrast to traditional conceptions of societal progress and development.
- The emergence and spread of enemy images in populist discourse
- The role of fear, insecurity, and uncertainty in the acceptance of populist ideology
- The appeal of authoritarian leadership in populist movements
- Comparative analysis of Hungarian and Western European populism
- The relationship between exclusionary practices and national identity
Chapter Summaries
The essay begins by outlining the prevalence of enemy images within populist discourse, highlighting the specific case of Hungary under Viktor Orbán's Fidesz administration. It explores the historical and social context that contributes to the acceptance of such images, suggesting that a longing for authoritarian leadership and a sense of national threat play a crucial role. The essay then delves into the broader social and political dynamics that facilitate the spread of populist ideology, examining the role of fear, uncertainty, and exclusionary practices. The essay concludes by offering insights into the complexities of populist discourse and its implications for national identity and social cohesion.
Keywords
The essay focuses on the key concepts of enemy images, populism, right-wing politics, exclusionary practices, nationalism, authoritarianism, national identity, and social cohesion. It examines the interplay of these concepts within the context of contemporary political discourse, exploring how these factors contribute to the spread of populist ideology and the emergence of divisive social and political landscapes.
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- René Nieland (Autor:in), 2018, Ritalin and Upper Limits. On the European Populism and the voluntary new obedience in parts of the society, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/412732
