German-Iraqi business relations. A struggle of economic, political and hegemonic interests

Contents

Introduction

Chapter 1: Theoretical Background
1.1 Theories of International Trade
1.2 World System Theory
1.2.1 The Middle East in the World Capitalist System
1.2.2 Iraq
1.3 Criticism of the World Systems Theory

Chapter 2: German Trade during the Ottoman Era
2.1 Rising European Interest in the Region
2.2. German Ventures in the Region during the Ottoman Period
2.2.1 Politics
2.2.2 Economy

Chapter 3: Iraq under British Influence
3.1 The British Occupation of Iraq
3.2. Hashemite Monarchy
3.3 British Oil Policy
3.4 The End of British Hegemony in Iraq
3.5 German-Iraqi Business 1918 - 1958
3.5.1 Weimar Republic
3.5.2 Third Reich
3.5.3 Federal Republic until 1958

Chapter 4: Baath Regime
4.1 Military Rule
4.2 The Iraq-Iran War
4.3 German-Iraqi Business 1958 - 1991

Chapter 5: Iraq under American Influence
5.1. US Interest in Iraq
5.2 The Gulf War I
5.3 Sanctions
5.4 Iraq War

Chapter 6: Post War Period
6.1 Economic Developments
6.2 German-Iraqi Business 2003 - 2013
6.3 Perspectives for Germany

Conclusion

Bibliography

Appendix

Introduction

The Middle East is an enormous market for Germany, a highly specialized export nation. The label Made in Germany enjoys an excellent reputation worldwide, particularly in the Middle East, where it is often understood as a guarantor for high quality.^[1] German exports to the Middle East reached 34.33 billion EUR in 2014^[2], growing by over 9% since 2013, despite decreasing exports to Iraq and Yemen^[3]. Abdulaziz Al-Mikhlafi, Secretary General of the German-Arab chamber of trade Ghorfa, encourages German companies to perceive the region as a partner and industrial location, instead of reducing it to a mere export market. “While competitors from China, Japan and Korea are eager to invest, German companies are more hesitant.”^[4]

The Arab World is a vast market offering promising returns to companies active in the region. Many Arab countries are investing massively in infrastructure, electricity, health, education and the water-sector.^[5]

One country in desperate need of reconstruction is Iraq. Iraq is facing the challenge to rebuild its economy and to overcome political instability and terror with the help of immense natural resources.

The Iraqi economy is characterized by drastic ups and downs. Between 1840 and 1915 in the latter phase of Ottoman rule, the Iraqi region slowly incorporated into the world’s economy, exporting agricultural products and raw materials. Under British administration, the run for Iraqi oil began, leading to large British investments in this sector. After independence Iraq slowly grew to become a striving middle income country by the 1970s, with high growth rates and sizable foreign assets. Since then Iraq has fallen into debt and chaos facing a series of wars and political upheavals.^[6] Correlated to the domestic Iraqi’ economy, German- Iraqi business relations have flourished and ceased to zero.

Iraq, nowadays a country of 35.9 million inhabitants, still holds potential for foreign business. Iraq is estimated to have the third largest oil reserves in the world after Saudi-Arabia and Iran. The concrete number of proven reserves, provided by OPEC is 143,069 million barrels.^[7] Immediately after the Iraq War, investors from all over the world were on the qui vive to secure themselves a share of the lucrative reconstruction projects. However, the political instability and the poor security situation prevented many German firms from operating in Iraq.

In the following paper I will examine the key drivers behind German-Iraqi commerce from the Ottoman era until 2015 - a history affected by upheavals of the rickety Iraqi history. By analyzing the deterred relations of German-Iraqi business, a prediction for the future might be attempted.

In the first chapter, the World System Theory will be discussed, an approach offering an explanation for British and later US, intervention in Iraq, which had severe effects on German-Iraqi trade. ^[8]

In the second chapter, German-Ottoman trade will be analyzed. Germany’s failed attempt of expanding its sphere of influence to the Middle East will be illustrated by the venture of the Baghdad Railway. Furthermore the issue of rivaling British and German interests will be presented. While Iraq as a nation did not exist prior to World War I, the Reich’s economic / imperialistic ventures in the Ottoman Empire, especially the undertaking of the Baghdad Railway, remain important for the later emerging relations with Iraq and for the British perception of German policy.

The 3rd chapter will deal with the time span of British control over Iraq from 1918-1958 and the resulting decline of German-Iraqi economic relations. An essential part of economic relations was related to oil. The oil policy of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich shall be illustrated, as will Britain’s attitude towards it.

The 4th chapter will cover the peak of German-Iraqi economic relations from the revolution in 1958 until 1991, covering the Iraq-Iran War.

The 5th chapter will deal with US-American interests in Iraq and its consequences for German-Iraqi trade, covering the period of sanctions, the Oil for Food Program and the Iraq War.

In the 6th and last chapter the postwar period will be examined. The developments of German-Iraqi trade will be illustrated, covering recent political incentives and economic ventures.

My findings will be summarized in the conclusion.

Chapter 1: Theoretical Background

1.1 Theories of International Trade

The theories of international trade are plentiful and so are the factors influencing German- Iraqi trade relations. A durable theory of trade affirms that the economic relations between any two nations are commonly affected by a warming or cooling of bilateral diplomatic relations.^[9] Mercantilist thinkers of the 18th century or imperialists of the 19th century would have deemed the notion that international economics could be studied in isolation from its political consequences absurd. That economics and politics were inextricably intertwined was taken for granted and that international trade flows would follow the state’s interest was a given.^[10] The aggregated economic power was to strengthen the state. Josiah Child, an economist proponent of mercantilism, stated: "It seems to me absolutely necessary that profit and power ought jointly to be considered."^[11] However, politics came first and trade followed the flag.

This perception changed drastically with the rise of liberalist thought, replacing the mercantilist idea of military conquest with economic exchange in order to secure the resources needed for political stability. The liberals promoted the idea that open international markets and increased trade prevented hostilities.^[12] However, even in the modern era, it is possible to find a strong link between foreign affairs and trade. “Ideological” trade was paramount in Cold War times. The phenomenon is known as the international relations theory of 'bandwagoning’, developed to describe the prevalent policy during the Cold War, in which countries allied with whoever best served their interest.^[13] Economic ties were strengthened with countries supportive of one’s political agenda. Cuba and Syria to name two examples became Soviet clients and their trade relations remained largely within the

Soviet Bloc. Equally the US fostered trade relations with Pakistan, Israel and numerous other countries.^[14] With the end of the Cold War the linkage between diplomatic relations and trade did not necessarily decrease.^[15]

Much of the literature connecting foreign relations to trade centers on the effects of a hegemonic distribution of power on commerce.^[16] Following Wallerstein’s definition of hegemony, hegemony has an inverse effect on global trade. Applying different definitions hegemony may also be directly correlated to trade or be entirely unrelated.^[17] I will elaborate on the World System Theory nevertheless since it serves as a useful model explaining Anglo-American interest in Iraq, as will be shown in the following sections.

1.2 World System Theory

Immanuel Wallerstein is recognized as the creator of the World System Theory^[18] (WST), which he introduced in his work The Capitalist World Economy^[19] World System refers to the inter-regional and transnational division of labor, which divides the world into core countries, semi-peripheral countries and the countries of the periphery. According to Wallerstein, the modern nation state exists within a broad economic, political and legal framework, without which individual societies or nation states cannot be understood.^[20]

Bruce Cumings later expanded the theory, placing American foreign policy and the individuals responsible for it, within a set of three intertwining structures:^[21]

1. World Capitalist System
2. Specific regional subsystem
3. The hegemon’s domestic socio-economic system

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten^[22]

These sets are connected and affect each other mutually even though they generate an autonomous dynamic. The World Capitalist System (WCS) is the largest in scope and influence. States are located in the core, semi-periphery or periphery of the WCS. Core states are the most advanced states in the system, specializing in high-profit, capital intensive, high-wage activity. Peripheral states are defined by relative under-development and labor intensive, low-wage economies. The structures are interconnected via trade and exchange. ^[23] Wealth tends to be transferred from the periphery to the core, thanks to the capitalist tendency to reward capital and skill more than raw labor.^[24]

The WCS tends to produce a hegemon - meaning the dominance in the fields of finance, production and technology of a single core state to such an extent that it becomes able to order the international economic and political system according to its own preferences.^[25] The significantly greater military, economic and political power of the hegemon elevates it to a predominant position among other core states. As the preponderant beneficiary of the WCS, the hegemon guards the system by the provision of public goods. It enforces worldwide
economic liberalization, halts barriers to trade and investment and most importantly it ensures the access of other cores to necessary raw materials from the periphery, as for example, oil.^[26] Although the hegemon is the greatest beneficiary, its policies generally work in the favor of other core states and thereby help to secure the latters’ consent to its hegemonic role.^[27] While the hegemon tries to rely on consensual leadership among the cores whenever possible, coercion is hardly absent from its practice. The continuous drive of peripheral countries to improve their position in the World System is occasionally met with a violent response from the hegemon.^[28]

After the defeat of Napoleon, hegemony largely passed to the British Empire, which became the largest empire in history under the rule of Queen Victoria.

In the capitalist world order only the United States of America could establish hegemony after the British Empire.^[29]

In Europe, Germany, rather than Britain, may have been the strongest power after 1871, but Samuel Newland writes:

“Bismarck defined the road ahead as: “no expansion, no push for hegemony in Europe.” Germany was to be the strongest power in Europe but without being a hegemon. His basic axioms were first, no conflict among major powers in Central Europe; and second German security without German hegemony.^[30]

The early 20th century, like the late 19th century was characterized by multiple great powers but no global hegemon. During World War I, an attempt of German hegemony under Kaiser

Wilhelm II was prevented, yet Great Britain was weakened further. However, the position of the US had been strengthened.^[31]

The second failed attempt to inaugurate a German hegemony - World War II -, established the US in a hegemonic position, which was carburized even further after the end of the Cold War. Its foreign policy aimed to maintain this position by extending and defending its preferred version of market economy. In this task the US have generally been supported by the other cores of Western Europe and Japan, while they resorted to force to discipline the periphery, such as Iraq.^[32] According to WST the UK’s and later the US’ motive for their presence in Iraq was to secure their access to oil for themselves and their allies. Particularly the US also aimed to prevent the raise of forces able to challenge their hegemony by intervening in Iraq.^[33]

The second set of World System Theory includes specific regional subsystems. The distinctive nature of the integration of different regions into the WCS works as the theoretical base for this set. Regarding the Middle East, as the world’s main source of oil, a unique situation of mutual dependence and impenetrability was created towards the core states and the hegemon.

The third set, the hegemon’s domestic socio-economic system, deals with the hegemon’s objectives at a given time and their resulting course of action.

1.2.1 The Middle East in the World Capitalist System

The European powers’ direct intervention in the Middle East was followed by colonial rule and the arbitrary creation of borders and weak, dependent states after World War I. The ruling elites in the Middle East often lacked legitimacy and were therefore dependent of the cores to safeguard them from internal threats, such as radical nationalist movements and external threats, for instance invasions. National movements trying to overthrow the pro- western regimes, led to the even firmer reliance of the surviving regimes on their western allies.^[34] On the other hand, the oil states of the Middle East have been able to retain a noteworthy degree of autonomy. They were able to avoid a deeper integration into the World Capitalist System due to their oil wealth, which allowed them to create their own revenue and remain independent of World Bank or IMF loans linked to neoliberal reform processes. Therefore, the oil exporting countries remained largely independent of American capital and, as a side effect, of its culture.^[35]

Consequently, the US has not been able to move its influence in the region beyond security guaranties and economic access. This failure has had a significant impact on US policy, provoking the frequent resorting to coercion to maintain its position of dominance.

A second aspect of the regional subsystems is their internal dynamics, such as Arab-Israeli relations, or the Iraq-Iran war. While they are related to western intervention and ambitions of integrating into the WCS, they develop their own underlying forces.^[36]

1.2.2 Iraq

Iraq has been shifted in and out of the semi peripheral-zone in the last 50 years. Iraq is characterized as politically tumultuous and economically dynamic. The outcome of Iraq’s attempts to pursue semi-peripheral mobility is also determined by the global petroleum hunger and geopolitical situation^[37]

Between 1840 and 1915, in the latter phase of Ottoman rule, Iraq's incorporation into the world’s economy took place. British colonization accelerated Iraq's peripheralization. After World War II, Iraq became an important exporter of oil on the world market. During the military regimes of 1958-1968, the state used oil rents to further economic independence from the British. Institutional power shifted to the disadvantage of Great Britain in favor of a strong Iraqi state. Although the state strengthened, Iraq remained a peripheral country until the 1970s.^[38]

In the 1970s Iraq took the chance to move into the semi-periphery of the WCS through the nationalization of oil. The emerging stronger state structure and newfound oil wealth prompted a transition towards regional dominance. The increasing world importance of oil, accompanied by a growing concern for security in the region, was paramount in this transition. Additionally, by 1980 western core states prompted Iraq's advance in order to curb the threat of the Iranian Islamic Revolution.^[39]

Iraq’s industrial development progressed in the 1970s, much of it accounted for by state enterprises. The majority of industries were private enterprises by 1977; however, the 280 state industries produced over 50% of Iraq's industrial output.^[40] Trade with the cores grew steadily. For example, Iraq's trade with the US increased eightfold from 1971 to 1974. Trade increases with Japan and West Germany were equally significant in the 1970s. In addition, Iraq's trade with peripheral countries expanded.^[41]

Iraq continued to depend on the import of machinery, iron, steel and metals, which altogether increased ten times in the two year period from 1973 to 1975. Iraq also came to depend upon the expertise of firms from the core states in order to build new factories and infrastructural projects.^[42]

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

The economic growth and the strong state enabled Iraq to reach out for regional dominance. In the war with Iran, Iraq was weakened politically and economically due to its inability to exit the war as the clear regional power and due to its diminishing oil revenues. Through a combined strategy of loan-seeking and privatizations, Iraq then garnered greater military strength with which it could make a second and more disastrous, attempt to secure its semi- peripheral gains - the First Gulf War. Iraq's military path to semi-peripheral consolidation was therefore a clear failure.^[43]

1.3 Criticism of the World Systems Theory

World Systems Theory has attracted criticism from several directions, pointing out its various shortcomings. Besides facing internal debates about the moral and political implications to draw from this theory, World System Theory is criticized by positivists, orthodox Marxists, state autonomists and culturists alike.^[44]

Positivists have mainly opposed that WST is based on hypotheses that have not been rigorously tested and critiqued the insufficient quantification of the research. In part, this is a critique of an insufficient reduction of complex situations to clearly defined and simple variables. The opposite, a broad complexity and contextualizing, is core to WST. Wallerstein, catering to the criticism, refers to the famous ‘streetlight effect’ to defend this broader approach and lack of quantifiable data by affirming; "that one should not look for the lost key only under the street lamp just because the light is better.,^[45]

The earliest and most famous critique came from Marxist scholar Robert Brenner. Brenner has pointed out that the prioritizing of the world market means the neglect of local class structures and struggles: "They fail to take into account either the way in which these class structures themselves emerge as the outcome of class struggles whose results are incomprehensible in terms merely of market forces."^[46]

The orthodox Marxist critique similarly asserts that World Systems Theory has abandoned or insufficiently stressed class analysis and has thereby eliminated the presumption of an inevitable progression of historical stages of development.^[47]

The state autonomists criticize the theory for blurring the boundaries between state and business. Furthermore all three, the positivists, the orthodox Marxists and the state autonomists argue that the state should be the central unit of analysis.^[48]

Another criticism is that of reductionism made by Theda Skocpol. She believes the interstate system is far from being a simple superstructure of the capitalist world economy and points out that the international states system as a transnational structure of military competition was not originally created by capitalism.^[49] While being very critical of Wallerstein’s theory, she emphasizes the high relevance of his work, pointing out that no other book deserved more attention.^[50]

Finally, the culturists argue that World Systems Theory puts too much importance on the economy and too little on culture.^[51]

Wallerstein's defends his theory proclaiming that: "In short, most of the criticisms of world- systems analysis criticize it for what it explicitly proclaims as its perspective. World-systems analysis views these other modes of analysis as defective and/or limiting in scope and calls for unthinking them.''^[52]

Chapter 2: German Trade during the Ottoman Era

2.1 Rising European Interest in the Region

European interest in the Middle East got new impulses with economic ventures dating back to the Industrial Revolution. The capitalist ventures in the Middle East predated the government-led intervention in the region. European merchants and investors had established strong ties with the region during the 19th century.^[53]

The British historian Hourani confirms: “Behind the merchants and ship-owners of Europe stood the ambassadors and consuls of great powers supported in the last resort by the armed might of their governments.’^[54] Great Britain, Russia, Germany, France and Italy engaged in a struggle for influence over the Ottoman provinces and their governors throughout the 19th century.^[55]

Britain’s interest in the region was motivated by protecting its route to India and economic interest in the Indian Ocean.^[56] Its exclusive treaties with the Trucial States allowed for British and Indian merchants to travel freely through Southern Iraq. Iraq’s main exports at the time were dates and grain. While the total trade volume was still small, it grew steadily in the run­up to World War I. By 1906, 79% of the trade was British, the total value still only amounting to 8.2 million Pounds. In 1914 the British share dropped to 76% and the traded amount rose to 12.84 million Pounds.^[57] Second in place came Germany.^[58]

2.2. German Ventures in the Region during the Ottoman Period

2.2.1 Politics

The founding of the German Reich in 1871 laid the foundation for Prussian hegemonic developments in economics and politics. Between 1888 and 1918, during the reign of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Germany grew to become one of the world’s leading industrial nations, thanks to a rapid industrialization, urbanization and population growth. The expansion of Germany’s industrial exports, particularly at the beginning of the 20th century, provoked the discussion on Germany’s new role in foreign affairs. It was commonly advocated in Germany that the new gained economic influence should go hand in hand with an increased continental power, beyond Europe’s frontiers. Germany should exercise “Weltmachtpolitik”^[59].

Germany developed a Middle East policy quite different from those of the other European powers for various reasons. First of all the European powers had already distributed most of the Middle Eastern territories among themselves. Peaceful trade relations therefore became a cornerstone of Berlin’s Middle East policy. This was also true during the ‘German Orient founding years’, which started in 1884 and lasted three decades. It was a time when Germany intensified its economic, cultural and military relations to the Middle East from Turkey via Palestine and Mesopotamia to Egypt and Mauritania. A striking feature of Berlin’s Middle East policy in peacetime took shape: respecting the status quo and rejecting the idea of colonies in the region. Secondly, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck argued that European and American policy were more important and the Middle East should be subordinated. Thirdly, the Middle East was not promising enough for a great strategy of German policy. Bismarck used to put it this way: “the Eastern Question is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian musketeer.”, Pommern being a particularly poor and uninfluential German province. He realized that a significant advantage could emerge for Germany if it appeared to be the least interested party in the region and was convinced that the longer Germany stayed out of Ottoman affairs the larger this advantage would become in the future - particularly with regards to trade.^[60]

Germany developed a stronger interest in the Middle East after Bismarck’s abdication. Due to its relative independence, its strategic position between Russian and British-dominated

Persia, German efforts increasingly concentrated on the weakened Ottoman Empire. The European powers were expecting the certain collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Problems could be found throughout each and every aspect of governance. The Ottoman Empire had just declared bankruptcy. It possessed an old-fashioned military and suffered from ethnic separations. European military, diplomatic and economic advisors were dispatched to Istanbul, to engage in reforming the outdated state apparatus. Growing tensions among the imperial powers hindered a successful reform process. While they now seemed inclined to let the Ottoman Empire collapse, German personal arriving in Istanbul took the necessary steps to reverse the decline. The Germans, as “uncompromised outsiders”, were well received. Individuals like the railway engineer Wilhelm von Pressel and the military advisor Colmar Freiherr von Goltz quit their German positions and took on working in the Ottoman service. They soon created close ties with the Ottoman leadership and helped hatching closer cultural ties. ^[61]

German foreign policy was soon to reflect these more cordial relations. By 1890 Germany slowly replaced its policy of detachment with a more active engagement in the Ottoman Empire. Kaiser Wilhelm II and his ambassador to Istanbul, Adolf Freiherr Marschall von Bieberstein, took the Turco-German relations to new heights. In 1876 Abdulhamid II became Sultan. Unlike his predecessors, Sultan Abdulhamid II took a strong interest in developing closer ties with Germany. When the bidding-war for the railway concessions emerged Germany found itself in the best possible position to win.^[62]

With the Young Turks a more pro-British government came to power in 1908. During World War I, the Ottoman Empire allied with the Central Powers. Germany switched to a wartime Middle East policy, directed against Great Britain, Russia and France. Germany pushed the Young Turks to call for Jihad, in order to agitate Muslims to fight their colonial oppressor. However, the Jihad carefully planned by Max von Oppenheim, head of the Oriental News Department, was ignored by most Muslims, despite the extended German expenditure for pan-Islamic propaganda. Germany was hampered by the fact that it could not compete with the British in handing out promises to the Arab leaders.^[63]

2.2.2 Economy

The Ottoman Empire seemed a promising market for industrial goods.^[64] The region of Iraq in particular, was perceived to hold unlimited possibilities.^[65]

Germany had a longstanding tradition of German influence on the Ottomans, as demonstrated by the modernization of the Ottoman army.^[66] Already in 1829 Sultan Mahmoud invited a Prussian delegation of Military advisors, headed by Helmuth von Moltke to “prussianize” the Ottoman army. This mission was disbanded quickly. In 1880 a new attempt was undertaken. Kaiser Wilhelm I approved Sultan Abdulhamid’s request to urgently restructure the Ottoman army. General Colmar von der Goltz was assigned the task and became Sub-Director of the Ottoman military academy. Frustrated with the little effect he had on the military since most of his reform request went ignored, Goltz realized that Abdulhamid had no intention to modernize his army yet merely aimed to promulgate a sense of security to attract investors. Hence Goltz resigned in 1885.^[67] However, during the time of his stay, he had established a widespread network between the Ottoman Empire and German enterprises. Appointed to the Ottoman War Ministry he gained lucrative contracts for German firms, such as the sale of a large set of cannons and other weaponry from the manufacturers: Krupp, Schichau and Mauser und Löwe. Goltz laid the foundation for further bilateral trade and by the time of his resignation, German products, such as glassware, knives, razors, textile, leather good, plows and musical instruments slowly expanded into the Ottoman market.^[68]

However, the government, headed by Bismarck, refused to sponsor any private ventures in the Ottoman Empire and notified the entrepreneurs that they would have to pursue their undertakings without governmental securities. While Bismarck did not want to actively discourage German investment in the Ottoman Empire he deemed it unwise to tantalize

Great Britain. Despite the unsupportiveness of the German Government, the trade volume between the German Reich and the Ottoman Empire rose steadily.^[69]

Once Wilhelm II was crowned Kaiser, the tide turned. He openly criticized Bismarck’s policies. According to Kaiser Wilhelm II, Germany had to look beyond its borders to acquire natural resources to satisfy the booming industry and the growing population. The Ottoman Empire seemed to offer a never-ending supply of such resources.^[70]

Germany remained the third biggest exporter to the Ottoman Empire and its provinces, following Great Britain and France.^[71] From the last decade of the 19th century until 1912, the export of German capital to the Ottoman Empire had grown by almost half a billion Mark and if one was to add outstanding Ottoman debt to Germany it amounted to 1 billion Mark.^[72]

German companies were awarded contracts for harbor and railway improvements. The diversity of German goods exported to the Ottoman Empire remained stable during this period, not expanding significantly. The trade volume between the Ottoman Empire and the German Reich remained small in comparison to Britain or France^[73] and the large majority of German exports were materials delivered for the construction of the Anatolian railway. Even though some important trade channels were established for certain German industries, the overall significance of the Ottoman Empire for the German economy was minimal. In 1912 merely 1.3% of total German exports were directed to the Ottoman Empire. The trade pattern remained industrial goods versus raw materials.^[74]

After World War I Germany lost all its concessions and properties in the Ottoman Empire. Very little remained of German economic and political influence in the region after its defeat.^[75] Britain strengthened its position as the most influential force in the area.

The Baghdad Railway

The Baghdad Railroad serves as a notorious example for the longstanding German political and economic interest in the region, which nowadays entails modern Iraq.^[76]

The German railway engineer Pressel is known as the founding father of the Baghdad Railway project. Pressel had built railways across Europe and ended up spending the last 40 years of his life in the Ottoman Empire, first working as a technical director and from 1872 onwards as the General Director of the Turkish Railways.^[77] Pressel picked up on a vague idea of building a railway to the Persian Gulf. He designed initial proposals to build a network linking Istanbul, Ankara and Baghdad to Basra which were very well received, yet at the same time, deemed too expensive. Even in times of extreme financial hardship, Pressel was able to convince Sultan Abdulhamid of the enormous value of the railway for his empire. Pressel was convinced that the railway would obviously benefit both, the Ottoman Empire and the nation that built it, calling on German industrial interests to take advantage of the plentiful Ottoman resources.^[78]

Attracting capital for the Istanbul-Ankara route proved difficult. Pressel personally approached Bismarck and German, British, French and Italian financial institutions. Yet, once he had gathered enough capital, his bid was rejected for relying on a too multi-national financial backing. The Sultan intimated that German capital investments would be well received. Pressel, after another unsuccessful attempt to convince bankers in Germany, met with Alfred Kualla, Director of the private Wurttemberger Volksbank in Istanbul, who then put him in touch with Georg von Siemens, Director of Deutsche Bank. While Bismarck refused to back up the project from governmental site, Kualla and von Siemens submitted their bid to the Sultan, which was immediately accepted. The Deutsche Bank formed the Anatolian Railway Company (ARC) in 1889 and immediately initiated construction on the Istanbul­Ankara route.^[79] The success of this route convinced the Sultan to extend it until Baghdad.

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten^[80]

The Baghdad Railway was to connect Constantinople with the Persian Gulf as far as India via Baghdad. By connecting the eastern European hinterland to the Persian Gulf a way of rapid transportation for goods was to be built, which would become an immediate competitor of the British-held Suez Canal.^[81]

The railway network was to become an essential step for Germany’s economic presence in the region.^[82] However, von Radolin, German Ambassador to the Porte was skeptical of the undertaking, fearing it would alienate the French and the British who were already suspicious of German motives.^[83]

Von Radolin was replaced by Marschall von Bieberstein, who was willing to support German ventures in the Ottoman Empire and who would back the plan politically. Under von Bieberstein German economic interest in Anatolia became increasingly aggressive towards French or British rivals. Von Bieberstein urged the German Chancellor, Prince Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe, to see the countless, profitable opportunities:^[84]

“There is plenty of scope for useful future expansion [and] for solid enterprises employing German capital and German industry. There are, quite apart from special services for the army, railways, ports and bridges to be build, electrical works to erect for lighting, tramways, etc. and the really wretched conditions of most of the steamers that ply regularly here offer good chances for German competition. We shall naturally not be left alone to do all this and certain concessions will be granted to others. But one thing we must claim for ourselves and that is linking the present sphere of interests of the Anatolian railways with the river districts of the Tigris and Euphrates and so on to the Persian Gulf”.^[85]

Von Bieberstein went to great lengths to convince the German authorities to make the Baghdad Railway a venture financed and built by German companies. Yet at the same time Britain and France lobbied the Sultan to grant them the railway commission. Wilhelm II even travelled to Istanbul in October 1898, hoping to influence the negotiations in his favor. Indeed several friendship-, shipping- and trade-agreements were signed during his stay, but not the railway commission.^[86]

Conversely not everybody was as enthusiastic about molding the railway into a tool of foreign policy as Wilhelm II and von Bieberstein. Georg von Siemens remained skeptical, pointing out that recent crop failure had taken their profit of the Anatolian Railway Company and that Germany generally lacked the strength to realize the project on its own.^[87] Alternatively he recommended broadening out the ventures’ financial base to reduce the risks.

British counterproposals became a major threat to the project. However, in 1899 the British withdrew from the negotiations since the Boer War required their undivided attention. Deutsche Bank signed an agreement with the French-held Imperial Ottoman Bank to fund 40% of the Baghdad Railway.^[88] After further changes to the contract in favor of the Ottomans, the ARC was awarded the contract. The line was to be built from Konya to Baghdad and Basra within 8 years.

The German Foreign Office, while officially holding up the idea that the railway was a solely commercial enterprise, saw the venture’s greatest value in creating an alternative route to the British-held Suez Canal and expected it to work as a vehicle of German political, financial and cultural expansion. ^[89] The financers on the other hand hoped for the modernization of the Ottoman Empire through the railway system, thereby creating an even bigger market for German goods and services. Furthermore during the construction a large share of profits was expected to go to German steel manufacturers, machinery- and shipping companies.^[90] A survey established that the financing of the railway by Deutsche Bank alone would be too risky. Von Siemens tried to secure more German capital, yet the Preußische Staatsbank and the Reichsbank affirmed that while the railway might be in the Kaiser’s best interest, that was no reason for them to deviate from their principles.^[91] Von Siemens tried to obtain capital from Britain or France, yet cooling diplomatic relations made it impossible. His successor, Arthur von Gwinner, then succeeded in creating the Baghdad Railway Company (BRC), a subsidiary of the Anatolian Railway Company (ARC).^[92] The Ottoman government and the ARC each purchased 10% of the shares. The remaining 80% went to a financial conglomerate of German, French, Austrian, Swiss, Italian and Ottoman banks.

Construction only began in 1903 under the direction of the Philipp Holzmann Company. Eight years after the contract had been signed, less than 10% of the rails had been laid. Obstacles at the construction site and a shortage of finances and a lack of common vision slowed the project down significantly.^[93]

In 1908 the Young Turks came to power and demanded changes to the project. Germany’s good relations with the Sultan dwindled. As relations between Britain and the Young Turks warmed, relations with the Germans cooled down.^[94] The Young Turks considered a buyback, followed by a new concession to the British; however, the Germans were the only ones willing to provide loans to go ahead with the construction. The cooperation had become a marriage of convenience. The construction went slowly, hindered by technical problems, a limited workforce and lack of finances.^[95] Between 1910 and 1914 Anglo-German trade rivalry began to intensify further.^[96] Historians have often identified the Baghdad Railway as one of the likelier causes of World War I.^[97]

The outbreak of World War I was a critical turning point for Turco-German relations. On the 2nd of August 1914 a formal alliance^[98] was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Reich bringing the era of Great Power dominance to an end. The Ottoman Government took advantage of German interest in the Baghdad Railway as to support its own goals. British and French ambassadors, suspecting the German-Turco alliance might be a ploy, put effort into convincing the Turks to remain neutral. The Turkish decision to enter an alliance with Germany must be seen from the angle that the Ottoman Empire was in ruinous shape and needed to protect itself from further invasion. Germany at the time still appeared to have the least imperialistic intentions and was therefore deemed the least threatening force.

At the outbreak of the war only 867 of 1,255 miles of non-consecutive track had been laid. Von Bieberstein urged the speediest completion possible to use the railway for political blackmailing. He argued that: “if the costs mounted higher than planned, they would still be less than in the long run than maintaining a state of constant preparedness in Germany against Britain’s world domination.”^[99] " While the war raged on, the railway construction sites remained active. While German troops invaded France, the railway constructors dealt with a different kind of battle: tunnels in the Taurus and Amanus Mountains, the tracks from Aleppo to Baghdad and a steel bridge above the Euphrates.^[100]

In 1915 discussions went on how the Baghdad Railway would best serve Germany’s strategic interest. Deutsche Bank was hesitant to finance the project without at least an equal contribution from Ottoman side, yet the German Foreign Office ordered German Banks to assume the entire cost of the railway, reminding them that the railway question was not simply a financial one.^[101] The Reich grew increasingly dependent on completing the railway to challenge the British and the Ottomans tried to obstruct the construction process to pressure for more German loans. Due to a lack of supplies and workforce the construction become more and more difficult, expensive and slow. By 1917 Gwinner informed the German Foreign Office that he would no longer disguise the fact that the BRC was “heavily in debt and insolvent.” As a consequence, the Ottoman Treasury agreed to assume construction costs for parts of the railway and so the construction continued. By 1918 the situation was so desperate that roots were dug up to fuel the trains carrying soldiers to the front.^[102]

As part of the German war losses, the railway fell into British possession in 1919.^[103]

Before the outbreak of World War I, oil started to rise in significance for western governments. The concession of the Baghdad Railway came with the right over natural resources 20 kilometers each side of the track. The railway track was to cut right across most of the oil-bearing regions in Mesopotamia.^[104] While literature often claims that oil was included in this concession and a key motivation for Germany to build the railway^[105], it actually only referred to materials which would be used during the railway’s construction.^[106]

The very first interest in Ottoman oil concessions was shown by German banks and companies, involved in the building of the Baghdad Railway. Takers from Britain followed suit. Since 1900 numerous rivaling groups had bid for concession rights in the Ottoman provinces. In 1912 representatives from Britain, Denmark and Germany formed the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) which was granted concession for the Baghdad and Mosul provinces. The creation of the TPC was majorly owed to Gulbenkian, a Turkish-born Armenian businessman, who held 5% of the shares. Deutsche Bank owned a 25% share.^[107] The rest was distributed between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC, a subsidiary of Royal Dutch / Shell) and the national bank of Turkey. By 1914 the APOC (under control of the British government) was the majority shareholder and merged with the TPC.^[108]

While the promise of concession had been made by the Ottoman government, the outbreak of World War I in 1914 put a sudden halt to all further plans of exploration and a possible German participation.^[109] All the same a lesser amount of oil working was taking place to provide for the British and Ottoman armies; German wells were extracting 10,000 gallons a day in Qayyara and a lesser amount in Tuz Karmatli, Qala Naft and Zakho.^[110]

After the War it remained an essential part of British policy that no power should be able to deny British control of its oil supplies. The royal commission agreed with Churchill: “We must become the owners or at any rate the controllers at the source of at least a proportion of the oil which we require.”^[111]

Chapter 3: Iraq under British Influence

3.1 The British Occupation of Iraq

To secure itself a steady oil supply, the British navy encouraged its government to obtain a majority shareholding in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1914.^[112]

As the Ottomans joined the Central Powers in World War I the British feared for their trade routes and oilfields. They dispatched 5,500 men from India to Basra to deter the Ottomans from interfering in British interests. Britain subsequently took Baghdad and found itself in charge of the three Ottoman provinces of Basra, Mosul and Baghdad by 1918.^[113]

With tacit support from the US, Iraq was chosen to be turned into a British protectorate. The question of a suitable candidate for ruling emerged. Faisal I bin Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi was chosen to become King of Iraq, as he belonged to a well-known Arab family, was tolerant on religious matters and therefore acceptable to the Shiites and because his short reign in Syria had given him some reputation as a nationalist leader. Yet the British believed he would still comply with their demands^[114], as they wished for a King “to reign, not to govern.”^[115] It was Faisal’s challenge to appear sufficiently independent to be accepted by the Iraqis and sufficiently compliant to his guarantors. The main concern of the British authorities remained to enable a government facilitating the pursuit of British imperial interests.^[116]

3.2. Hashemite Monarchy

Faisal’s coronation took place on the 23rd of August 1921 after the British Colonial Office renounced on having him announce his subordination to Britain in his accession speech. Now a treaty putting order into Anglo-Iraqi relations had to be drafted in a way to “justify Faisal in the eyes of his own people while preserving the necessary position of the H.M. Government vis-à-vis the League of Nations.”^[117] The Anglo-Iraqi treaty contained, besides procedures of British representation of Iraq in foreign countries, the duties of British officials, the British supervision of the juridical system, repayments for Britain’s public works built during the occupation and the Open Door principle, which granted economic equality to all states.^[118]

A solid opposition against the treaty emerged, especially among the Shiite clerics. Faisal refused to sign, but when he fell ill and was not able to handle political tasks, the treaty was eventually signed by his plenipotentiary Naqib. The treaty was however not ratified until 1924.^[119]

After the fall of Lloyd George’s cabinet a border conflict with Turkey about the Mosul area arose. The threat of a war with Turkey, for which there was no support among the British public and the Iraqi protests against the Treaty and British presence in the country led the early Bonar Law government to consider a full evacuation of Iraq. However, High Commissioner Cox stated that evacuation from the country would be seriously prejudicial to British interests, especially the security of oil of the transferred territories and the potential oilfields in Mosul.^[120] Cox secured King Faisal’s survival by deporting opposing elements. The British-owned TPC was granted concession rights for the entire country until the year 2000 in return.^[121]

The British mandate officially ended in 1932 and Iraq became the first Arab country to be admitted to the League of Nations. However, Britain retained its influence: it secured Iraq’s airbases and seaports and exercised an overwhelming influence over the Iraqi economy and its politics.^[122]

3.3 British Oil Policy

Oil dominated British considerations upon Iraq as much as strategic interests and these subsequent interests were closely linked to the TPC.^[123]

Since oil had become a vital good for their respective navies, the Great Powers made their own access to the resource an essential. Britain therefore aimed to be in a position where it exerted control or political influence over territories where oil reserves were known, or likely to exist. The second part of the policy affected Germany, by politically and commercially excluding other powers wherever possible from these areas.

However, the changing world order after World War I hindered Britain from actually extracting Iraqi oil. Especially the US blocked British ambitions by promoting the idea of Economic Equality according to which no country should dominate another country’s trade. The result was a long struggle for Iraqi oil.

When Britain sent surveyors to Iraq in 1919, the US claimed the same right for themselves. The French had handed Mosul to the British in 1918 and were granted the 25% TPC share of Deutsche Bank in return, which had been confiscated during the War by the Custodian of Enemy Property. The matter was signed in the San Remo Oil Agreement which was heavily criticized by the US since it claimed that the company working Iraqi oil fields should be under permanent British control which would be a breach of the Open Door principle.^[124]

Churchill found himself increasingly pressured and noted:

” There is some reason to believe that neither the United States nor France would be sorry to see the Turks back in Mosul in a position to give to their nationals the oil concessions which are at present claimed by H.M. Government for the Turkish Petroleum Company. ”^[125]

Fearing the Americans would jeopardize the British position entirely, he yielded to their pressure and provided them with a 25% share of the TPC. The Open Door principle was not to be heard of again.^[126]

Any concession decisions had to be ratified by the Iraqi parliament. In 1924 negotiations between the TPC and the Iraqi government reached a dead end, since Iraq insisted on the 20% share on the TPC which had been previously promised to them. The Iraqi Minister of Finance, Sasun Hasqaiul, made every effort to secure the share, but failed due to a limited bargaining position and little capital. If anything, a gold base for sliding Iraqi royalties could be secured.

To avoid conflict with Turkey, it was granted 10% of Iraqi oil royalties for 25 years. Exploratory work began in 1927 and large quantities were discovered around Kirkuk.^[127] Since the oil world market was still satisfied production remained low until the 1950s. There had been little economic development in Iraq until then, when suddenly oil production began to provide some revenue. In the following years maldistribution of oil revenues began to be a divisive issue.^[115]

Britain’s central role in the exploitation of Iraqi oil seems to be one of the most long-lasting results of its intervention in Iraqi affairs. It controlled the largest part of the TPC until its nationalization in 1972. The second result was British dominance in Iraqi imports amounting to slightly less than 50% in 1913 and to a third in 1952-1958.^[128]

3.4 The End of British Hegemony in Iraq

After various upheavals throughout the years, directed against the remaining British influence, the situation appeared to calm down in the beginning of 1958. In March the US

Embassy in Iraq had reported that opposition against the Hashemite Monarchy centered around Nasserism, which was “neither particularly significant nor effective”.^[130] When Nasser announced the creation of the United Arab Republic the British assessed the situation as “a threat to Iraq and its oil revenues, its development programme, to its monarchical regime and all it stands for."^[131]

To deal with this threat, Britain asked for financial and military aid from the US to protect the monarchy in Baghdad, yet the US did not take action. So that on the 14th of July 1958 the long-anticipated coup against the Hashemites took place. Abd-al-Karim al-Qasim and his followers took no chances and decapitated the entire regime, leaving nobody, around whom a coercive opposition might have coalesced.^[132] British power and influence had vanished from Iraqi politics overnight. In Washington the coup confirmed Eisenhower’s view, that the British imperial system in the Middle East was outdated, detrimental to western interests and now a thing of the past.^[133]

3.5 German-Iraqi Business 1918 - 1958

3.5.1 Weimar Republic

Politics

World War I had put an end to Germany’s ambitions to play a larger role among the colonial powers. Germany lost its colonies and its influence in the Middle East. It suffered of hyperinflation and Germany’s role as an outcast among the nations hindered its return to the political stage. Germany had no ties to the new Iraqi government, installed by the British. Germany had to be wary of Britain’s economic interest as it had no means to challenge it in its sphere of influence^[134].

[...]

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^[1] Deutsche Welle, “El negocio de la reconstruccion,” 2003, http://dw.Com/p/40mK, accessed August 2015 or Juliane Brach, “Problemzone? Chancenmarkt! - Der Nahe Osten und die deutsche Wirtschaft,” https://giga.hamburg/de/system/files/publications/gf_nahost_1009.pdf, accessed July 2015 or “Nordafrika-Mittelost-Initiative (NMI) - Startseite,” 2016, http://www.nm-initiative.de/, accessed January 2016.

^[2] Numbers for Near and Middle East without Maghreb. DIHK, Vorläufige Statistik der deutschen Exporte und Importe 2014, http://www.dihk.de/themenfelder/international/aussenwirtschaftspolitik- recht/umfragen-und-zahlen/statistiken-zum-aussenhandel, accessed July 2015.

^[3] Ibid.

^[4] Sabine Kinkartz, “Arabischer Markt mit viel Potenzial für deutsche Firmen,” Deutsche Welle, 2015, http://www.dw.de/arabischer-markt-mit-viel-potenzial-für-deutsche-firmen/a-17685728, accessed February 2015.

^[5] Ibid.

^[6] David D. Caron, “The Reconstruction of Iraq: Dealing with Debt,” International Law and Policy 11 (2004): 132.

^[7] OPEC, “Annual Statistical Bulletin,” 2015, p. 8, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/ASB2015.pdf, accessed January 2016. Further reserves are expected to be discovered. Estimations however vary between 45 and 99 billion barrels, kindly see Blanchard, C. M. (2010). C. M. Blanchard, “Iraq: Oil an d Gas Sector, Revenue Sharing and U.S. Policy.,” 2010, p. 1

^[8] Brian M. Pollins, “Conflict, Cooperation, and Commerce: The Effect of International Political Interactions on Bilateral Trade Flows,” American Journal of Political Science 33, no. 3 (1989).

^[9] Brian M. Pollins, “Does trade still follow the flag?,” The American Political Science Review 83, no. 2 (1989): 465.

^[10] Henry W. Spiegel, El desarrollo del pensamiento económico (Barcelona: Omega, 1991), p. 164

^[11] However, over the past decades a debate engendered on whether increased trade prevented or fostered conflict or whether they had no bearing on each other. Please see: Edward D. Mansfield and Brian Pollins, Economic interdependence and international conflict: New perspectives on an enduring debate (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), p. 1

^[12] There are more interpretations of “bandwagoning” one of them the “balance for threat” theory assuming a forced alliance. To learn more about the various interpretations, kindly see: Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit,” International Security 19, no. 1 (1994), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539149, accessed July 2015. 5

^[13] Rory Miller, “The Politics of Trade and Diplomacy: Ireland's Evolving Relationship with the Muslim Middle East,” Irish Studies in International Affairs 15 (2004): 123-124, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30002083, accessed July 2015.

^[14] Ibid., p. 124.

^[15] Edward D. Mansfield, “The Concentration of Capabilities and International Trade,” International Organizations 46, no. 3 (1992): 713, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706994, accessed July 2015.

^[16] Ibid., pp. 736-737.

^[17] Wallerstein himself does not refer to it as World System Theory, but World System Analysis.

^[18] Immanuel M. Wallerstein, The capitalist world-economy: Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

^[19] Thomas J. Barfield, The dictionary of anthropology (Oxford, Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 498-499

^[20] To read Cumings’ original thesis, kindly refer to: Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: A history, 1st ed. (New York: Modern Library, 2010), pp. 4-22

^[21] Lou Coban, A world map of countries by trading status, late 20th century, using the world system differentiation into core countries, semi-periphery countries and periphery countries. Based on a list in Christopher Chase-Dunn, Yukio Kawano and Benjamin Brewer, Trade Globalization since 1795, American Sociological Review, 2000 February, Vol. 65 (2010), https://en.wikipedia.Org/wiki/File:World_trade_map.PNG, accessed September 2015.

^[22] Angus McDonald, “Wallerstein's World-Economy: How Seriously Should We Take It?,” The Journal of Asian Studies 38, no. 3 (1979): 539.

^[23] Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: A history, 1st ed. (New York: Modern Library, 2010).

^[24] Thomas McCormick, “Every System needs a Center sometimes,” Corvallis (1986).

^[25] Raymond A. Hinnebusch, The international politics of the Middle East (Manchester, New York, New York: Manchester University Press; Distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave, 2003),

p. 216

^[26] Robert W. Cox, Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international relations theory

^[27] Christopher Chase-Dunn et al., “The Development of World-Systems,” Sociology of Development 1, no. 1 (2015).

^[28] Thomas G. Paterson and Dennis Merrill, Major problems in American foreign relations: Documents and essays, 4th ed. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1995), p. 6

^[29] Samuel J. Newland, Victories are not enough: Limitations of the German way of war (Army War College (U.S.)), pp. 29-31, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB634.pdf, accessed June 2015.

^[30] Kindly refer to: Thomas G. Paterson and Dennis Merrill, Major problems in American foreign relations: Documents and essays, 4th ed. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1995), pp. 6-7

^[31] Thomas J. McCormick, America's half-century: United States foreign policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

^[32] Bernd Kubbig, Brandherd Irak:: US-Hegemonieanspruch, die UNO und die Rolle Europas (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2003), p. 15

^[33] For a more extensive discussion of this matter, kindly refer to: Simon Bromley, Rethinking Middle East politics, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994).

^[34] Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: Contriving king and country, 2nd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), pp. 68–69

^[35] Ibid., pp. 73–75.

^[36] To learn more about rising maldistribution issues, please see: Amatzia Baram, Achim Rohde, and Ronen Zeidel, eds., Iraq Between Occupations (Springer, 2010), p. 22

^[37] Mohammad Salman Hasan, “The Role of Foreign Trade in the Economic Development of Iraq,” in Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to the Present Day, ed. Michael Allan Cook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 346–372

^[38] Michael A. Cook, Studies in the economic history of the Middle East: From the use of Islam to the present day (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 428-467

^[39] Ibid., pp. 428-467.

^[40] Kindly refer to: Cynthia Siemsen, “Oil, war, and semiperipheral mobility: The case of Iraq,”

^[41] Studies in Comparative International Development 30, no. 4 (1995): 24, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF02687158.

^[42] Ibid., p. 27. Ibid., p. 30.

^[43] Fred Gotthell, “Iraqi and Syrian socialism: An economic appraisal,” World Development 9, 9-10 (1981): 834.

^[44] M. Farouk-Sluglett and P. Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (I. B. Tauris, 2001), p. 173, https://books.google.de/books?id=F_A9ZQMP79oC.

^[45] Cynthia Siemsen, “Oil, war, and semiperipheral mobility: The case of Iraq,” Studies in Comparative International Development 30, no. 4 (1995): 33, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF02687158.

^[46] Immanuel M. Wallerstein, World-systems analysis: An introduction (Durham, N.C., London: Duke University Press, 2004), p. 20, For a careful weighing up of Brenner's arguments against Wallenstein, please see: Robert A. Denemark and Kenneth P. Thomas, “The Brenner-Wallerstein Debate,” International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 1 (1988).

^[47] Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis (New Haven, Conn.: Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems) p.10.

^[48] Theda Skocpol, “Review: Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique,” American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 5 (1977): 1089, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2777814.

^[49] Ibid., p. 1089.

^[50] Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis (New Haven, Conn.: Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems) pp.10-11.

^[51] Ibid.

^[52] Beverley Milton-Edwards, Contemporary politics in the Middle East (Cambridge, UK, Malden, MA: Polity Press; Blackwell Publishers, 2000), p. 19

^[53] Albert Hourani, Die Geschichte der arabischen Volker, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1992), p. 329

^[54] Beverley Milton-Edwards, Contemporary politics in the Middle East (Cambridge, UK, Malden, MA: Polity Press; Blackwell Publishers, 2000), p. 19

^[55] Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: Contriving king and country, 2nd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007),

^[56] Ibid.

^[57] German for: world power politics.

^[58] Kindly refer to: Jonathan S. McMurray, Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001).

^[59] Ibid.pp. 20-27

^[60] Ibid.

^[61] David Fritzlan, Dispatch Bagdad to WDC (18/03/1958), p. 1

^[62] Wright, Telegram from British Embassy Baghdad (11.02.1958), http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C2891715.

^[63] Roby C. Barrett, The greater Middle East and the Cold War: US foreign policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy (London, New York, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co; Distributed in the US. and Canada by Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 69

^[64] Dwight D. Eisenhower, Diary (06.01.1953), pp. 5–6

^[65] Please see: Bernd Lemke, Der Irak und Arabien aus der Sicht deutscher Kriegsteilnehmer und Orientreisender 1918 bis 1945: Aufstandsfantasien, Kriegserfahrungen, Zukunftshoffnungen, Enttäuschungen, Distanz (Frankfurt am Main, New York: Peter Lang, 2012), p. 99

^[66] Wilhelm II abdicated in November 1918

^[67] Ibid. pp. 72-79

^[68] Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, Germany and the Middle East, 1871-1945 (Princeton, N.J., Great Britain: Markus Wiener, 2004), p. 156

^[69] Kindly refer to: Lukasz Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East (London, Toronto: Routledge & K. Paul; Toronto University Press, 1966), p. 19

^[70] Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: Contriving king and country, 2nd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007); Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: Contriving king and country, 2nd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), p. 3

^[71] Kindly refer to: Jonathan S. McMurray, Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), pp. 16-26

^[72] Ibid., pp. 26-27.

^[73] Ibid., p. 27.

^[74] Ibid., p. 28.

^[75] Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, Germany and the Middle East, 1871-1945 (Princeton, N.J., Great Britain: Markus Wiener, 2004), p. 3

^[76] Lukasz Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East (London, Toronto: Routledge & K. Paul; Toronto University Press, 1966), p. 2

^[77] Miletus L. Flaningam, Some economic aspects of German eastward expansion, 1900-1914 (Champaign, 1940).

^[78] Kindly refer to: Marian Kent, The Great Powers and the end of the Ottoman Empire, 2nd ed. (London, Portland, 1996), p. 118

^[79] Lukasz Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East (London, Toronto: Routledge & K. Paul; Toronto University Press, 1966), p. 6

^[80] Jukka Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle East 1914-1920 (London: Athlone Press, 1969).

^[81] Jonathan S. McMurray, Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), pp. 14-19

^[82] Ibid, pp. 14-19.

^[83] Ibid, p. 22.

^[84] Map showing the proposed route of the Baghdad Railway, The completed line is represented by a solid black line. The uncompleted line by dashed lines. Frank M. McMurry, The geography of the great war (New York: Macmillan, 1919).

^[85] To learn more about the Bagdad railway project, kindly refer to: Dietrich Eichholtz, Die Bagdadbahn, Mesopotamien und die deutsche Ölpolitik bis 1918: Aufhaltsamer Übergang ins Erdölzeitalter mit Dokumenten (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2007). Or Sean McMeekin, The Berlin-Baghdad express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's bid for world power (Cambridge Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010).

^[86] Jehuda L. Wallach, Germany and the Middle East 1835-1939: International Symposium, April 1975 (Tel-Aviv: Nateev, 1975), p. 87

^[87] Jonathan S. McMurray, Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), p. 29

^[88] Ibid., pp. 29-30.

^[89] Miletus L. Flaningam, Some economic aspects of German eastward expansion, 1900-1914 (Champaign, 1940).

^[90] Jonathan S. McMurray, Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), p. 31

^[91] Jürgen Lodemann and Manfred Pohl, Die Bagdadbahn: Geschichte und Gegenwart einer berühmten Eisenbahnlinie (Mainz: Hase & Koehler, 1989), p. 46

^[92] Paul Butterfield, The Diplomacy of the Bagdad Railway 1890-1914 (PhD, Georg-August­Universität Göttingen), p. 16, http://worldcatlibraries.org/wcpa/oclc/720928551.

^[93] Jonathan S. McMurray, Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), p. 41

^[94] Ibid., p. 41.

^[95] Jürgen Lodemann and Manfred Pohl, Die Bagdadbahn: Geschichte und Gegenwart einer berühmten Eisenbahnlinie (Mainz: Hase & Koehler, 1989), p. 52

^[96] Fay B. Sidney, “The Bagdad Railway: A German Defense of the Financial Arrangements,” The Journal of Modern History 4, no. 2 (1932).

^[97] Frank G. Weber, Eagles on the crescent. Germany, Austria, and the diplomacy of the Turkish alliance, 1914-1918 (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 136-140

^[98] Jonathan S. McMurray, Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), p. 115

^[99] Frank G. Weber, Eagles on the crescent. Germany, Austria, and the diplomacy of the Turkish alliance, 1914-1918 (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 141.

^[100] Kindly refer to: Jonathan S. McMurray, Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), pp. 109-132

^[101] Ibid., p. 138.

^[102] Helmut Mejcher, Imperial quest for oil: Iraq 1910-1928, 6th ed. (Ithaca Press, 1976), p. 5

^[103] For example: Christopher Tugendhat, Oil: The biggest business (New York: Putnam, 1968), pp. 59-61 or Lukasz Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East (London, Toronto: Routledge & K. Paul; Toronto University Press, 1966), p. 2

^[104] Jonathan S. McMurray, Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001).

^[105] Helmut Mejcher, Die Politik und das Ol im Nahen Osten 1 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1980), p. 102

^[106] Edwin Black, Banking on Baghdad: Inside Iraq's 7,000-year history of war, profit and conflict (Hoboken, N.J., Great Britain: Wiley, 2004), pp. 139-145

^[107] Ibid., pp. 139-145.

^[108] Kindly refer to: Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: Contriving king and country, 2nd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), pp. 66-68

^[109] Ibid., p. 67.

^[110] Ibid., p. 4.

^[111] Ibid., p. 4.

^[112] Ibid., pp. 31-39.

^[113] Ibid., p. 26.

^[114] Ibid., p. 7.

^[115] George Kidston, to JE Shuckburgh. Note of Foreign Office (25.01.2019).

^[116] Kindly refer to: Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: Contriving king and country, 2nd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), p. 50

^[117] Kindly refer to: Ibid., p. 50.

^[118] Ibid., p. 54.

^[119] Amatzia Baram, Achim Rohde, and Ronen Zeidel, eds., Iraq Between Occupations (Springer, 2010), p. 22

^[120] Lukasz Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East (London, Toronto: Routledge & K.

^[121] Paul; Toronto University Press, 1966), p. 8

^[122] To learn more about the evidence provided kindly refer to: Helmut Mejcher, Imperial quest for oil: Iraq 1910-1928, 6th ed. (Ithaca Press, 1976).

^[123] Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: Contriving king and country, 2nd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), pp. 68-69

^[124] Winston Churchill, Iraq Oil (13.03.1922).

^[125] Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: Contriving king and country, 2nd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), pp. 68-69

^[126] Ibid., pp. 73-75.

^[127] To learn more about rising maldistribution issues, please see: Amatzia Baram, Achim Rohde, and Ronen Zeidel, eds., Iraq Between Occupations (Springer, 2010), p. 22

^[128] Mohammad Salman Hasan, “The Role of Foreign Trade in the Economic Development of Iraq,” in Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to the Present Day, ed. Michael Allan Cook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 346-372

^[129] David Fritzlan, Dispatch Bagdad to WDC (18/03/1958), p. 1

^[130] Wright, Telegram from British Embassy Baghdad (11.02.1958), http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.Uk/details/r/C2891715.

^[131] Roby C. Barrett, The greater Middle East and the Cold War: US foreign policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy (London, New York, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co; Distributed in the US. and Canada by Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 69

^[132] Dwight D. Eisenhower, Diary (06.01.1953), pp. 5-6

^[133] Please see: Bernd Lemke, Der Irak und Arabien aus der Sicht deutscher Kriegsteilnehmer und Orientreisender 1918 bis 1945: Aufstandsfantasien, Kriegserfahrungen, Zukunftshoffnungen, Enttäuschungen, Distanz (Frankfurt am Main, New York: Peter Lang, 2012), p. 99

^[134] Wilhelm II abdicated in November 1918