This paper reviews the chapter “Popper and Lakatos in Economic Methodology” by Wade Hans published by Daniel M. Hausman in “The Philosophy of Economics” in 2008. The main purpose of this paper is to critically asses Karl Popper’s and Imre Lakatos’s methodological framework for economists consisting of both Popperian falsificationism and Lakatos’s ‘methodology of scientific research programmes’ (MSRP). The Popperian philosophy of science and its direct influence on the work of Imre Lakatos will be explicitly examined in terms of its influence and role in economic theory only, even though Popper’s philosophy of science and Lakatos’s MSRP were intended for science in general.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Popperian Falsificationism
3. Criticisms of Falsification
4. Lakatos and Sophisticated Falsificationism
5. Comparison and Conclusion
Objectives and Topics
This paper aims to critically evaluate the methodological frameworks of Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos within the context of economic theory, specifically examining the applicability of falsificationism and the methodology of scientific research programmes (MSRP) to modern economics.
- Analysis of Popper’s theory of falsification and its role in scientific demarcation.
- Examination of four major critiques of falsification as a normative economic methodology.
- Exploration of Lakatos’s 'sophisticated falsificationism' and the structure of research programmes.
- Comparison of the hard core and protective belt concepts in economic modeling.
- Assessment of the suitability of these philosophies for defining progress in economic science.
Excerpt from the Book
Popper and Lakatos in Economic Methodology
During his years in Vienna, Popper published his first theory of science as “Logik der Forschung” in 1934, which was a distinct critique of the verifiability principle in scientific methodology and its supporters thereof, i.e. logical positivists, as well as a solution to the problem of induction. In his work, Popper introduced the term falsification, by which he means an act of disproving a theory with at least one contradicting empirical observation. Thereby, Popper distinguishes between the demarcation of science from non-science and the methodology of science. A minimum requirement in order to tell if a theory is scientific, is that it must be logically possible to falsify the theory. However, for economists his methodology plays a more important role. In scientific practice his methodology suggests that a scientist starts with a simple conjecture which might be the first step in developing a theory. The next step is the rigorous testing of this conjecture by comparing the most likely consequences with real world empirical data. If the theory does well and complies with the data, it is provisionally accepted until a different researcher or new data succeed in proving the theory wrong. If this does not happen, the theory is provisionally accepted forever. However, the theory is neither verified nor is it definitely true. Popper’s idea was that it is impossible to verify a theory because there is always the chance that new, not yet found, evidence can contradict the theory, which was the original requirement for a scientific theory. If a conjecture is not in line with the data, it is falsified and must be replaced.
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: This chapter outlines the purpose of the paper, which is to assess Popper’s and Lakatos’s methodological frameworks regarding their application and influence within economic theory.
2. Popperian Falsificationism: This section introduces Popper's 1934 work, defining the principle of falsification and the logical necessity of empirical testing in scientific demarcation.
3. Criticisms of Falsification: This chapter details four significant critiques of Popper’s methodology in economics, including the Duhemian problem and the difficulty of applying falsification to qualitative comparative statics.
4. Lakatos and Sophisticated Falsificationism: This section explains Lakatos’s development of the methodology of scientific research programmes (MSRP), distinguishing between the 'hard core' and the 'protective belt'.
5. Comparison and Conclusion: This chapter compares the approaches of Popper and Lakatos, concluding that neither is perfectly suited for measuring progress in economics, though both offer valuable historical insights.
Keywords
Popper, Lakatos, Falsification, Economic Methodology, MSRP, Scientific Progress, Hard Core, Protective Belt, Inductive Problem, Verifiability, Empirical Testing, Social Sciences, Neoclassical Economics, Epistemic Justification, Theory Evaluation
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this paper?
The paper evaluates the methodologies of Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos to determine how their philosophies of science apply to the field of economics.
What are the central themes discussed?
The central themes include the feasibility of falsification, the problem of induction, the structure of scientific research programmes, and the definition of theoretical progress in economics.
What is the core research objective?
The objective is to critically assess whether Popperian falsificationism or Lakatosian research programmes provide a suitable framework for judging progress in economic science.
Which scientific methodology is primarily analyzed?
The paper analyzes Popper's falsificationism and Lakatos's 'methodology of scientific research programmes' (MSRP).
What does the main body of the text cover?
It covers the historical origins of these theories, critiques of applying them to economics, and the practical differences between a 'hard core' of theories and their 'protective belt' of auxiliary hypotheses.
Which keywords best describe this research?
Key terms include Falsification, MSRP, Hard Core, Economic Methodology, and Scientific Progress.
How does Lakatos differ from Popper regarding 'hard core' theories?
Lakatos suggests that a 'hard core' exists in research programs which is immune to falsification, whereas Popper’s original falsificationism suggests that theories should be rejected if they fail empirical testing.
Why does the author suggest economics might be a 'dismal science' under these methodologies?
Because according to strict interpretations of both Popper and Lakatos, much of modern economic practice fails to meet the rigid requirements for scientific progress.
- Citation du texte
- Tobias Kohlstruck (Auteur), 2017, Popper and Lakatos in Economic Methodology. A Review Paper of “Popper and Lakatos in Economic Methodology” by D. Wade Hans, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/416105
