The European Union has always been alleged of institutional democratic deficit with the claim that the main institutions of the Union suffer from democratic accountability. The debate on democratic deficit in the EU led to the Spitzenkandidaten system in 2014 in which European political parties nominated candidates for the president of the European Commission. The nomination of the candidates for the position of president of the Commission is considered as one of the important ways to make the institution accountable to EU voters through their representatives in the European Parliament. This paper examines the extent at which the introduction of Spitzenkandidaten influences voting behavior of the EU citizens in the 2014 European parliamentary elections, especially in the Member States of the two leading candidates nominated by the two major or largest, in terms of number of MEPs, European political parties in the EP. On the other hand, the paper critiques the claim on democratic deficit which largely borders on lack of accountability in the institutional framework of the EU in relation to decision making by adopting a teleological interpretation of the Treaties.
The aim of this paper is in three folds, first, to analyze the result of the 2014 parliamentary election turnout (with special attention on the countries of the two leading candidates proposed by the political parties for the president of the Commission) with the introduction of Spitzenkandidaten. Second, to examine representation and accountability among the three main decision making EU institutions with respect to Treaties' provisions in other to provide answers to the questions bordering on democratic unaccountability raised in many studies. And third, to adopt the intertwined responsibilities and competences enshrined in the foundation of the Union (i.e. the Treaties) to explain the reason for multiple and sometimes, overlapping agenda-setting processes in the European Union.
Then, I will conclude that the democratic deficit claim in the European Union is a myth as the EU is constructed in such a way that allows for checks and balances amongst the main decision-making institutions which make them accountable to one another with the extensive powers of National Parliaments of Member States, as well as EU citizens, to exercise control over the European Commission, European Parliament and the Council.
Inhaltsverzeichnis (Table of Contents)
- Introduction
- Partyism of the European Commission: a case of power grabs?
- Parliamentarization or Personalization?
- Representation and Accountability
- The European Commission and Accountability
- The European Parliament and Accountability
- Who Checks the European Council?
- The Council of the European Union under Public Scrutiny
- Agenda Setting and Policy Making Arena in the EU
- Conclusion
Zielsetzung und Themenschwerpunkte (Objectives and Key Themes)
This paper examines the democratic deficit claim in the EU by analyzing the impact of the Spitzenkandidaten system in the 2014 European parliamentary elections. It investigates how the system influenced voting behavior, particularly in the Member States of the two leading candidates. The paper also assesses the accountability of the EU's main institutions, focusing on the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council. By examining the intertwined responsibilities and competences of these institutions, the paper explores the reasons behind the multiple and sometimes overlapping agenda-setting processes within the European Union.
- The impact of the Spitzenkandidaten system on voter behavior in the 2014 European parliamentary elections
- Accountability and representation within the EU's main decision-making institutions
- The role of the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council in agenda setting and policy making
- The democratic deficit claim in the EU and the role of checks and balances among institutions
- The EU's political system and its relationship with parliamentary systems of democracy
Zusammenfassung der Kapitel (Chapter Summaries)
- Introduction: This chapter explores the debate around the democratic deficit in the EU, focusing on the Commission and the Spitzenkandidaten system introduced in the 2014 EP elections. It analyzes the perceived lack of democratic accountability within the EU, particularly concerning the Commission's power and the role of the Member States in appointing its president.
- Partyism of the European Commission: a case of power grabs?: This chapter delves into the impact of European political parties nominating candidates for the presidency of the European Commission in the 2014 European parliamentary elections. It examines the shift from the traditional selection process, where the European Council nominated candidates, to a more party-centric approach.
- Parliamentarization or Personalization?: This chapter explores the concept of parliamentarization of the European Commission and its implications for the EU's political system. It analyzes the arguments for and against the parliamentarization process, highlighting the potential benefits and drawbacks.
- Representation and Accountability: This chapter examines the principles of representation and accountability within the EU, focusing on the three main decision-making institutions: the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council. It analyzes the extent to which these institutions are accountable to the EU citizens and their elected representatives.
- The European Commission and Accountability: This chapter examines the accountability of the European Commission, focusing on its powers and the mechanisms by which it is held accountable to the other EU institutions and to the citizens. It analyzes the Commission's role in decision making and its relationship with the European Parliament and the Council.
- The European Parliament and Accountability: This chapter examines the accountability of the European Parliament, highlighting its role in representing the EU citizens and its ability to scrutinize the Commission and the Council. It analyzes the Parliament's powers and its influence on the EU's decision-making process.
- Who Checks the European Council?: This chapter explores the question of accountability for the European Council, examining its role in the EU's decision-making process and the mechanisms by which it is held accountable to other institutions and to the citizens. It analyzes the Council's power and its relationship with the Commission and the Parliament.
- The Council of the European Union under Public Scrutiny: This chapter delves into the accountability of the Council of the European Union, analyzing its role in decision making and its relationship with the Commission and the Parliament. It examines the Council's powers and the mechanisms by which it is held accountable to the public.
- Agenda Setting and Policy Making Arena in the EU: This chapter analyzes the agenda-setting and policy-making processes within the European Union, exploring the intertwined responsibilities and competences of the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council. It examines the multiple and sometimes overlapping processes involved in shaping the EU's policies.
Schlüsselwörter (Keywords)
The paper examines the concept of democratic deficit in the EU, focusing on the accountability of the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council. It analyzes the role of the Spitzenkandidaten system in the 2014 European parliamentary elections, explores the parliamentarization of the European Commission, and examines the EU's agenda setting and policy-making processes. Key concepts include democratic accountability, institutional framework, representation, decision making, and the role of the Treaties in shaping the EU's political system.
- Quote paper
- Sesan Adeolu Odunuga (Author), 2018, Democratic Deficit Claim in the EU. A Myth?, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/426994