September 11, 2001, a terrorist attack on the U.S cities occurred to the Americans and the world at large. This attack was regarded as one of the most disastrous failure of the U.S. intelligence, which caused 3,000 deaths. This failure was attributable to the unprecedented ineffectiveness of information sharing mechanisms.
Therefore, this case study will give an evaluation of the effectiveness of information sharing regarding the 9/11 attack and the subsequent reforms.
Table of Contents
Abstract
Introduction
Intelligence Failures of the attack of September 9/11
Remedy to the Lack of Intel Sharing
Post 9/11 Intelligence Reform
Productivity of the Policies
Conclusion
Objectives and Core Topics
The primary objective of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of information-sharing mechanisms within U.S. intelligence agencies prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and to analyze the subsequent institutional reforms implemented to address identified systemic failures.
- Analysis of communication breakdowns between agencies like the FAA and NORAD during the 9/11 attack.
- Examination of cultural barriers, such as the "need-to-know" versus "need-to-share" mentalities.
- Evaluation of the impact of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
- Assessment of ongoing challenges, including bureaucracy and persistent information-sharing gaps in post-9/11 counter-terrorism efforts.
Excerpt from the Book
Intelligence Failures of the attack of September 9/11
It seems evident that there was an unprecedented failure of information sharing between FAA and NORAD during the course of attack. Delayed communication between FAA and NORAD, especially with regard to the disappearance of Flight 77 from the radar provides substantial evidence of the failed communication. The Pentagon attack could have been prevented because FAA was aware of the two hijackings out of Boston but, it delayed notifying the Pentagon, until 28 minutes later. Borjesson et. al (2013) reports, “The FAA, already in contact with the Pentagon about the two hijackings out of Boston, reportedly did not notify NORAD of this until 9:24, 28 minutes later” (par. 53). On the other hand, Pentagon spokesman reaffirmed this miscommunication by stating, “The Pentagon was simply not aware that this aircraft was coming our way” (par. 56).
It is reported that the U.S intelligence agencies pieces of valuable information, which could have led to the disruption of the Al Qaeda's plot of September 9/11 terrorist attack but, this information was not shared among the agencies, leading to the fatal attack. The Center for Public Integrity (2012) cites evidence of the lack of information sharing among the U.S intelligence agencies with the July, 2001 memo. This memo was written to the bureau of executives by one of the FBI agents in Phoenix, Arizona, warning Washington of what he referred as, “possibility of a coordinated effort by Osama Bin Laden to train terrorists in U.S. flight schools” (par. 1).
Surprisingly, the memo was not seen by any of the FBI agents who were in the Radical Fundamentalist Unit until after 9/11 terrorist attack. The Center for Public Integrity reports the remarks of the 9/11 Commission that, “Had they seen the memo in a timely manner, it could have sensitized the FBI so that it might have taken the Moussaoui matter more seriously” (par. 1). Moussaoui was one of suicide hijackers of 9/11 attack whom FBI had tracked his training activities, especially with regard to flying commercial aircraft.
Summary of Chapters
Abstract: Provides a brief overview of the 9/11 failure and the study's goal to evaluate information sharing reforms.
Introduction: Outlines the historical context of the 9/11 attacks and identifies the lack of intelligence coordination between the Clinton and Bush administrations.
Intelligence Failures of the attack of September 9/11: Details specific instances of communication lapses, such as the delayed FAA/NORAD notification and the uncirculated Phoenix memo.
Remedy to the Lack of Intel Sharing: Discusses the legislative and structural responses, including the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
Post 9/11 Intelligence Reform: Highlights the transition from a "need-to-know" to a "need-to-share" culture and the creation of the DHS.
Productivity of the Policies: Critically assesses the remaining gaps and persistent bureaucratic inefficiencies in the intelligence system.
Conclusion: Summarizes the need for continued implementation of reform recommendations to ensure national security.
Keywords
9/11 terrorist attack, U.S. intelligence, information sharing, intelligence failure, FAA, NORAD, FBI, CIA, Al-Qaeda, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Department of Homeland Security, need-to-share, counter-terrorism, national security.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the central focus of this research paper?
This paper focuses on investigating why U.S. intelligence agencies failed to prevent the 9/11 attacks, specifically emphasizing the role that inadequate information-sharing mechanisms played in that failure.
What are the primary themes discussed in the work?
The work explores institutional communication failures, the cultural resistance to sharing sensitive data between agencies, legislative reforms enacted post-2001, and the ongoing struggle to balance bureaucracy with intelligence efficiency.
What is the core research question or objective?
The objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of information-sharing protocols as they existed before 9/11 and to determine how well subsequent reforms have addressed those specific weaknesses.
What methodology does the author use?
The author employs a case study methodology, utilizing historical evidence, governmental reports (such as the 9/11 Commission Report and GAO findings), and secondary analysis of intelligence reforms.
What does the main body of the text cover?
The main body covers the specific failures of communication between the FAA and NORAD, the missed warning signs regarding Zacarias Moussaoui, the legislative changes introduced by the 2004 Act, and the remaining systemic gaps in the modern intelligence apparatus.
Which keywords best characterize the study?
Key terms include information sharing, 9/11 intelligence failure, Al-Qaeda, counter-terrorism, and Department of Homeland Security.
How does the "need-to-know" culture relate to the failures of 9/11?
The "need-to-know" culture caused agencies to withhold information rather than share it, which prevented the FBI and CIA from connecting the dots regarding Al-Qaeda activities and flight school training prior to the attacks.
How does the 2009 Detroit-bound plane incident illustrate persistent issues?
The 2009 incident demonstrates that despite significant reforms, intelligence agencies still struggle with bureaucracy and the practical implementation of "need-to-share" policies, as valuable information about the hijacker was held by the government but not acted upon effectively.
- Quote paper
- Caroline Mutuku (Author), 2018, Information Sharing Mechanisms Prior to the September 11 Attack. Evaluation of Effectiveness and Subsequent Reforms, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/428838
