Why the ‘Europe Question’ remains intractable for the Conservative Party despite leave

Contents

Introduction

Literature Review

Chapter One: The struggles of Maastricht

Chapter Two: “Stop banging on about Europe”

Chapter Three: Why the “Europe Question” has been intractable and the future

Conclusion

Bibliography

Abstract

The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 heralded an era of the intensification of European integration which served to amplify divisions within the Conservative Party. Using the case studies of John Major and David Cameron’s respective grapples with party division over Europe, this study looks at the intractability of the so-called ‘Europe Question’ for the Conservative Party. Policies of party management adopted by both Major and Cameron have proven to be unsuccessful, ultimately leading to an in/out referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union which was won by the leave campaign on 23rd June 2016. This study argues that the divisions over the ‘Europe Question’ within the Conservative Party have become increasingly ideological and will therefore persist following the referendum in relation to the nature of the Brexit negotiations and the nature of the UK’s new relationship with Europe.

Introduction

This research argues that the Conservative Party’s grapple with the issue of the UK’s relationship with Europe, also known as the ‘Europe Question,’ remains intractable despite an attempt to answer it in the in/out referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU on 23rd June 2016. Much of the current academic research relating to Brexit focuses on attempting to discern why the UK voted to leave the European Union. This research, however, will concentrate on how successive Conservative leaders were perennially beset and defined by divisions over Europe and why the referendum will not end the intractability of the ‘Europe question’ for the party. To do this, the research will highlight how the ideological battle that has engulfed the party since the 1990s coincided with the increased intensification of EU integration and how this will persist following the referendum despite suggestions that the ‘Europe Question’ has now been answered. The predominate research method will be the case study method, focusing on the Conservative divisions over Europe during the John Major and David Cameron premierships respectively. The main sources used to carry out this research are books current journals and newspaper articles, in order to put the case study methodology into the relevant context of Brexit. The research will be divided into three main chapters; the first focusing on John Major and the Maastricht Treaty, the second focusing on David Cameron’s endeavour to ‘stop banging on about Europe’, and the third focusing on the continued intractability of the ‘Europe Question’ post-Brexit.

Literature Review

This research will use the case studies of John Major’s grapple with the Maastricht Treaty rebels and David Cameron’s attempts to ‘stop banging on about Europe’ as he became leader of the Conservative Party, to examine how and why divisions over European integration made the so-called ‘Europe Question’ an intractable issue for the party. The majority of academic discourse since the Brexit vote has focused on discerning the broad political and social factors behind the decision of the British electorate to vote to leave the EU. Literature from Ashcroft (2016), Hobolt (2016) and Goodwin and Heath (2016), has focused on the broad reasons behind the Brexit vote such as immigration, sovereignty and cultural identity. Whilst this is an important endeavor, the gap in the literature that this research will address is investigating why the ‘Europe Question’ became an intractable issue for the Conservative Party and whether it will be solved by the vote to leave the European Union. In the review of the literature, the main areas that will be covered will be Conservative attitudes towards Europe that were illustrated by the Maastricht Treaty debates, the attempt of David Cameron to get the Conservative Party to ‘stop banging on about Europe’ and the present battle within the party over the nature of Brexit. The case study strategy will be the prominent method of research for this study. One limitation to the research will be the unpredictable fluidity of current events surrounding Brexit. Therefore, the study will be accurate as of the 31st April 2017. The majority of literature that the research will draw on will be qualitative in nature, using books, edited collections and journal articles from a range of perspectives.

According to Diamond (2016), the Conservative party has been in turmoil over Europe since the late 1980s when divisions erupted over how Britain, led by the Thatcher government, should respond to the quickening pace of European political integration. Indeed, Major in his own autobiography suggests that most of the background to the Maastricht Treaty was “already far developed’ by the time he became Prime Minister, pointing to the Single European Act 1987 that was established by his predecessor, Margaret Thatcher (Major, 1999). Whilst this assertion certainly carries a fair degree of merit, it must be recognised that divisions over Europe came to a head under Major’s tenure regardless and, therefore, this research will not delve into the impact of the Thatcher years on Conservative divisions over Europe.

According to Best (1994, p.104), the main challenge for the Conservative leadership during the Maastricht negotiations was to control rebel factions “as they manoeuvred their way through the complicated parliamentary procedures.” Indeed, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd described the government’s approach to Europe as that of “craftsmen rather than visionaries” (Best, 1994, p.105). Best explains that the Major government resisted calls from Conservative Eurosceptics to hold a referendum on ratification of the Maastricht Treaty on the grounds that it would go against the principles of representative democracy and parliamentary sovereignty, and be open to all sorts of ‘demagoguery’ and irrelevant voting motivations. He also asserts that the public was denied any say or choice in the Maastricht process. This argument is supported by Patterson (2011, p.73) who suggests that, “Conservative Party members, like members of the public in general, claimed to have not been told enough about the Maastricht Treaty.” However, John Major suggested that the job for Parliament was to shape the nature of Britain’s place in Europe rather than deciding whether Britain would be part of Europe, saying, “You will not be voting for Europe: right or wrong? You will be voting for Europe: Right or Left?” (Patterson, 2011, p.74). For John Major, the challenge was to maintain his ‘Good for Britain, Good for Europe’ balance between defence of the Treaty and defence of the ‘national interest’ (Best, 1994). Despite this sentiment espoused by Major, Norton (1996) accounts for the divisions within the party that were exposed when a bill introduced to enact the Maastricht pledge to increase the EC budget faced stiff backbench opposition within the Conservative Party. Norton (1996) explains that Major, therefore, made the passage of the bill a vote of confidence, which he won. However, 8 Conservative MPs failed to back the bill at the second reading and the whip was withdrawn from all 8. The salience given to the ‘Europe question’ in Norton’s source is somewhat underwhelming given the fact it was published in the immediate aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty debates and ratification. Norton focuses somewhat more on other issues facing the Conservative Party at the time such as the resurgence of the Labour Party. This book will be more relevant to the final chapter on why the issue became intractable as it has a considerable focus on Conservative thought, however, it will be a limited point of reference for the first and second chapters. Bale (2010) and Patterson (2010), on the other hand, will be key sources in the first two chapters as they chart how the divisions over Europe developed during the tenures of both Major and Cameron. The contribution of Best (1994) to the edited collection, “Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty,” focuses heavily on the actual chronology and process of the Maastricht Treaty, only offering brief comments on the divisions that the process caused within the Conservative Party and thus this source will be somewhat limited in its use for this research. Furthermore, this source was published only a year after the official ratification of the Maastricht Treaty 1993, with John Major continuing as Prime Minister until 1997. Therefore, it only provides a perspective of the attitudes and divisions within the Conservative Party before and during the ratification process, rather than the aftermath in which the real divisions were exposed. Nevertheless, it offers a perspective that helps to put later, more analytical sources into context. Moreover, when used in tandem with Patterson’s “The Conservative Party and Europe”, which does offer a more analytical approach to Conservative divisions over Europe, Best’s literature is a useful piece to provide a base knowledge.

“The Major Affect” (Kavanagh and Seldon, 1994) focuses more heavily on how the Thatcher era laid the groundwork for the divisions that came to a head in the 1990s, something that will not be in focus in this particular study. However, Kavanagh and Seldon do comment on how the final negotiations of the Maastricht package, “displayed most characteristically Major’s preoccupation with party management rather than long term objectives.” This suggests that Major’s employment of a balancing act tactic within the party rather than a decisive position on Europe, perhaps exacerbated divisions within the party on both sides of the European fence. Indeed, Patterson (2011) supports this argument by claiming that whilst the Eurosceptic backbenchers were allowed to continue to succeed in their activities, Conservative Europhiles became increasingly disillusioned in both the Major and Cameron eras. Furthermore, Major admits that his infamous ‘bastards’ outburst reduced the possibility of, “much-needed reconciliation across the party” (Major, 1999, p.134), and thus whilst, “the battle of Maastricht was won – the war over European policy was not over” (Major, 1999, p.134). This life-narrative analysis from John Major is a useful perspective for the research, providing a first-hand, albeit open to bias, assessment of how the Maastricht Treaty debates caused divisions within the Conservative Party from a primary source. It delves into the events surrounding the process of the Maastricht Treaty and the fallout that followed ratification in great detail compared to much of the other literature. Furthermore, Major speaks, by name, of many of the Eurosceptic MPs who caused his government such great difficulties in regards to European policy, providing useful insight into the detail of the divisions. Namely, he pays significant homage to what he calls the “Thatcher-Tebbit axis” in reference to the stiff opposition that Margaret Thatcher and Norman Tebbit harboured, especially at party conferences. It also gives a useful insight into the party management tactics Major employed, helping to illustrate how he did indeed postpone conflict within the party.

Elliot and Hanning’s (2012), “Cameron: Practically a Conservative,” is a strong source for information on why David Cameron was adamant that the party needed to ‘stop banging on about Europe.’ Elliot and Hanning describe how Cameron understood the destructive nature of the ‘Europe Question,’ having worked for the party during the Major years. However, this source was published in 2012 and is, therefore, somewhat limited in that is does not cover the period in which Cameron decided he would have to pledge a referendum. Bale (2011) and Patteron (2011) are, again, useful sources for the Cameron chapter as they provide a detailed account of Cameron’s years in opposition before finally returning to government in 2010. Like Hanning and Elliot, however, these two sources do not cover the period in which ‘stop banging on about Europe’ became an unrealistic prospect. Nevertheless, Copsey and Haughton’s (2014), “Farewell Britannia? ‘Issue Capture’ and the Politics of David Cameron’s 2013 EU Referendum Pledge,” gives a strong insight into the events leading up to Cameron’s pledge of an in/out referendum on EU membership and is put into context by the earlier sources. Kirkup’s (2016) article, “David Cameron, the man who wanted the Tories to stop talking about Europe has been destroyed by it,” charts Cameron’s journey from not speaking about Europe to granting the referendum that led to his own downfall. This source also illustrates the pressure that Cameron faced on two fronts; the resurgent UKIP party and the Eurosceptics within his own party.

Diamond’s, “Don’t be fooled, the Conservatives remain utterly divided on Brexit,” article illustrates how that, despite the EU referendum supposedly settling the ‘Europe Question’, the Conservatives are still, if not more so, divided on the issue. Diamond argues that there are in fact three distinct groups within the party in relation to shaping the nature of Brexit. Those in favour of ‘hard Brexit,’ those in favour of ‘soft Brexit,’ and those in the middle who, whilst accepting that ‘Brexit means Brexit,’ are still hoping the UK can retain single market access. Diamond also claims that the grassroots party membership is heavily in favour of ‘hard Brexit.’ This article suggests that the shaping of the nature of Brexit by the Conservative Party will be crucial to both the future of the party and indeed the country itself. Negotiating a ‘successful’ Brexit is a major challenge for Tory party statecraft, according to Diamond. This piece of literature contains specific analysis of the post-Brexit Tory Party and is therefore pertinent to my research and will be a useful source. It also highlights comparisons with the Maastricht period through the membership versus parliamentary party paradigm. Swan (2016) supports Diamond’s sentiments in the article, “Brexit will not mean an end to Tory divisions on Europe.” Swan affirms the Maastricht literature that, “Tory divisions on Europe first became serious under John Major and his difficulties with the Eurosceptic ‘bastards’ in his Cabinet.” He also makes the argument that the Brexit referendum result was heavily influenced by migration fears, a sentiment reiterated by Hobolt (2016), Runciman (2016) and Vasilopoulou (2016), but retaining access to the single market means accepting the ‘four freedoms’ of free movement of goods, capital, services and labour, meaning continued migration. This incorporates the ‘hard’ versus ‘soft’ Brexit argument in which some Conservatives want to leave the single market in order to control migration, whereas other Conservatives see retention of single market access as more important, illustrating the continued intractability of the issue. This article is closely aligned with the areas that this research will address; the Maastricht Conservative divisions, Cameron’s ‘stop banging on about Europe’ effort and the post-referendum context. It illustrates parallels between the periods and is thus relevant to the research. The comparisons are striking in that Major, Cameron and now May have had to, and in the case of May will increasingly have to, master the fine art of balancing party contentment with the feasibility and reality of the situation. Parallels can also be drawn with the Maastricht Tories when division over Europe did not, “coincide neatly with the groupings arising from the more basic ideological splits” (Best, 1994, p.205). Sceptics were drawn from a range of the traditional far right, Tory paternalists and market liberals. Norton (1996), Scruton (1984) and Turner (2000) agree with this and comment on the ideological aspect of the divisions saying that European integration made them more ideological which caused unprecedented factionalism within the party. In tandem with these two sources, Ludlam and Smith’s, “Contemporary British Conservatism,” provides a good understanding of Conservative Thought. All four of these sources agree that Conservatism is more of a set of principles or dispositions than an ideology. However, Turner’s (2000) book, “The Tories and Europe,” suggests that the ‘Europe Question’ has in fact made the Conservative Party more ideological and is thus responsible for the divisions that have made the issue intractable.

Chapter One: The struggles of Maastricht

The so-called ‘Europe Question’ has repeatedly dogged a plethora of Conservative Party leaders, both in power and in opposition for several decades. From Margaret Thatcher in the late 1980s right through to Theresa May today, each Conservative leader in this period has, despite efforts to stay clear of the issue, experienced the divisions caused by questions of European involvement and further integration. Indeed, the ‘Europe Question’ has been the intractable issue of the Conservative Party for nearly four decades. The downfalls of Margaret Thatcher, John Major and David Cameron are all rooted in the issue of Europe. Following the resignation of Margaret Thatcher in 1990, John Major took up the mantle of Conservative leader and thus Prime Minister. The following years came to be dominated by party divisions on Europe as the process of ratifying the Maastricht Treaty drove the Conservatives into twelve years in the political wilderness as a rejuvenated Labour Party took full advantage of Conservative civil war over Europe. This chapter will examine the circumstances and outcomes of the Conservative Party divisions on Europe during this period in an attempt to illustrate how party management, the postponement of conflict and the increasingly ideological division on the issue of Europe were reoccurring themes in the following Cameron era, and will continue to persist as Theresa May embarks upon negotiating Brexit. The chapter is divided into divisions in a European context, a domestic context and a party context.

Europe

No sooner than John Major had taken over the reins of No. 10 from Margaret Thatcher did the issue of Europe resurface once again in the form of the Maastricht Treaty negotiations in the second half of 1991. Major went into the Maastricht negotiations knowing he had to strike a balance between keeping Britain, “at the heart of Europe” (Major, 1999, p.81), and managing the Eurosceptic sentiment within the Conservative Party. The Eurosceptics within the Conservative Party, buoyed by Thatcher, were ardently opposed to the increased political integration that the Maastricht Treaty would bring and so Major’s preservation of party balance dominated the negotiations which led to the Treaty (Holmes, 2006). For Major, the issue of Europe had become a function of party management as he endeavoured to preserve party unity (Holmes, 2006). Indeed, this endeavour of party management on the ‘Europe Question’ would become a reoccurring theme within the Conservative Party under successive leaders. The treaty itself facilitated the transition from the European Economic Community to the European Union and laid the framework for the creation of a single currency through a three-pillar system. These pillars of Supranational, Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Justice and Home Affairs were a move towards a more integrated Europe. However, this integrationist move by the European Community was met by misgivings in several states including Denmark, France and indeed the UK, who had struggled with an ideological uneasiness regarding the European project for decades (Christiansen et al, 2012). Given these misgivings and in order to maintain both public and internal party support, Major had to secure a negotiated deal that would keep the UK involved in the European movement but also include opt-outs from aspects that the Eurosceptics would not agree to. Following the negotiations in the second half of 1991, Major and his team emerged with Britain being granted an opt-out of participation in the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union, which created the single currency (Loth, 2013). Furthermore, he secured an opt-out of the Social Chapter which, in essence, provides a legislative tool for qualified majority voting in the European Parliament for certain areas of social policy (Europa.eu, 1997). The concessions Major managed to get from Europe were seen as a significant victory in the British efforts to slow down the pace of further European integration.

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