One of the biggest challenges of the globalized world is still the establishment and maintenance of international cooperation. The growing interdependency produced by cross-border externalities demand for joint actions in an anarchic world order.
The United Nations (UN) or the international economic system, consisting of the World Bank, the International Monetary Funds (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), are some examples of mostly successful supranational forms of cooperation. What those institutions not include is the threat of climate change, which is today’s biggest challenge of international matter. With its Report “Limits to Growth” from the year 1972, The Club of Rome not only put the subject of climate change for the first time on the political and scientific agenda but also raised the public awareness of this problem. From this point on, ongoing efforts were made to commonly regulate emissions and control the sustainability of climate goods. Nevertheless, the first binding agreement on climate change, the Paris Agreement, entered into force 44 years after this report, on the 4th of November 2016.
For some political and economic theorists this is no surprise. Following the assumptions of the economic game theory and global governance-approaches, non-cooperative behavior is the consequence of rational decision making. Basic dilemma situations depict the competition about non-excludable goods and foresee the challenges of global climate negotiations.
The latest success on the Climate Conference in Paris challenges these assumptions and raises new questions about human cooperative behavior. While this matter has its origins in the neoclassical approach of game theory, behavioral economists started to examine the phenomenon and question the basic assumption of rational choice. “Homo oeconomicus is also a Homo socialis”.
Aspects of both facets of human behavior shall be analyzed in this paper, in order to explain the mechanisms of cooperation on climate change. The existing literature focuses mostly on only one of these aspects which leads to an incomplete picture of the decision-making process.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. International Cooperation on Climate Change
3. Mechanisms of Cooperation
3.1. A Game Theory Approach
3.2. A Behavioral Economics Approach
4. Cooperation in Global Climate Negotiations
5. Conclusion
Objective and Thematic Focus
This paper aims to analyze the mechanisms of international cooperation regarding climate change by bridging the gap between classical economic theory and behavioral economics to provide a more comprehensive understanding of decision-making processes in global negotiations.
- The role of international institutions in climate policy
- Game theory applications in environmental dilemma situations
- Behavioral economics and the critique of the rational choice model
- Key cooperative mechanisms: Reciprocity, trust, and we-identity
- The impact of human behavioral anomalies on negotiation outcomes
Excerpts from the Book
3.2. A Behavioral Economics Approach
Recent studies go way beyond a rational choice approach of cooperation behavior. Regarding the wish for utility maximization by weighting up costs and benefits as only one facet of human decision making, the field of behavioral economics provides new input to the discussion about international cooperation. Some approaches even state that cooperation is an inherent feature of human behavior. Messner et al. (2013) call this characteristic “a third mechanism of evolution, on par with mutation and selection” (Messner et al., 2013, p. 11). As explanations for this hypothesis the authors summarize some experimental research approaches of behavioral economics as well as experimental settings about pro-social behavior of children. All of these reveal that the human species is not as rational as homo oeconomicus might suggest. Rather, a natural bias of pro-social, and by this, of pro-cooperative decision making can be assumed and is independent of social, cultural and historical settings (ibid., p. 11ff.).
Nevertheless, empirical attempts to reach international binding agreements and treaties put some doubts on the before described assumptions. As natural as cooperation seems to be from those theories, as impossible seem the mutual agreement on, and compliance to, an effective and global approach to climate change. Following a theory of pro-cooperative biases, the obstacles to fruitful international negotiations must be found within the institutional design of the later. Messner et al. (2013) develop seven mechanisms that affect the willingness to cooperate, which consists of reciprocity, enforcement, trust, communication, reputation, fairness and we-identity. The first two properties of this so called cooperation hexagon, reciprocity and enforcement, are also part of the before introduced rational choice approach but differ somewhat in their meanings.
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: This chapter highlights the challenges of international cooperation regarding climate change and introduces the dual-perspective approach of combining game theory with behavioral economics.
2. International Cooperation on Climate Change: This section reviews the historical development of climate negotiations, starting from early UNFCCC meetings up to the 2015 Paris Agreement.
3. Mechanisms of Cooperation: This chapter examines the theoretical underpinnings of international cooperation, exploring both traditional rationalist views and behavioral insights.
3.1. A Game Theory Approach: This section utilizes economic game theory models, such as the prisoner’s dilemma, to explain the obstacles to achieving collective climate action.
3.2. A Behavioral Economics Approach: This section analyzes human decision-making beyond pure rational choice, introducing concepts like the cooperation hexagon and behavioral anomalies.
4. Cooperation in Global Climate Negotiations: This chapter applies the previously discussed theoretical frameworks to the specific context of international climate policy and negotiation outcomes.
5. Conclusion: The final chapter synthesizes the findings, suggesting that future success depends on fostering a sense of joint responsibility and deeper trust beyond mere rational calculation.
Keywords
Climate Change, Paris Agreement, Game Theory, Behavioral Economics, Cooperation, International Negotiations, Public Goods, Rational Choice, Homo Oeconomicus, Reciprocity, Trust, We-Identity, UNFCCC, Decision Making, Sustainability.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core focus of this research paper?
The paper examines why international climate cooperation is difficult to achieve, specifically analyzing the motivations behind state and negotiator behavior through the lenses of both game theory and behavioral economics.
What are the primary thematic fields covered?
The study covers international relations, environmental economics, institutional design, and behavioral decision science within the context of global climate policy.
What is the primary research question?
The central goal is to explain how behavioral biases and cooperative mechanisms can be integrated into the analysis of climate negotiations to overcome the limitations of the traditional rational choice model.
Which scientific methods are applied?
The author uses a literature-based theoretical analysis, contrasting neo-classical rational choice models (game theory) with modern behavioral economic perspectives.
What is addressed in the main body of the work?
The main body details the shortcomings of rationalist models in solving cross-border externalities and presents alternative frameworks like the "cooperation hexagon" and concepts like "bounded rationality" and "we-identity".
Which keywords characterize this work?
Key terms include climate change, cooperation, game theory, behavioral economics, public goods, and the Paris Agreement.
How does the "cooperation hexagon" explain negotiation success?
It identifies six key mechanisms—reciprocity, enforcement, trust, communication, reputation, and fairness—that influence the willingness of parties to cooperate and sustain long-term commitments.
Why are standard game theory models often insufficient for climate change?
Standard models assume agents act as perfectly rational "homo oeconomicus" who prioritize individual utility, failing to account for the actual human pro-social biases and moral motivations that exist in real-world negotiations.
- Arbeit zitieren
- Mareike L. (Autor:in), 2017, How to Explain the Paris Negotiations. Environmental Cooperation in the Light of Behavioral Economics, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/444055
